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Abstract 
 
In The Tragedy of Marx and Justice: A Critique of Marx’s Failed Attempt to Dispense with 
Principles of Justice, I critique Marx’s belief that his theory of history, as well as the socialist 
society it would help to bring about, are beyond the need for justice. Although there have been 
three waves of debate about the relation between Marxism and ethics (1890-1900s; 1950-70s; 
1970-90s), no one has yet provided the definitive interpretation of Marx on the question of 
justice. Furthermore, each of these debates ended in the same basic impasse between 
consequentialism and deontology, both of which Marx explicitly rejects. This occurred for three 
reasons. First, they misinterpreted Marx’s immanent critique, which demonstrates how 
capitalism systematically contradicts its own principles. I explore Marx’s use of this method with 
regard to principles of justice. Second, they not only neglected the use of immanent critique in 
Marx, but also of Marx. They do not critique him according to his own standards. They fail to 
subject Marx to a historical materialist critique which roots his evasive relation to justice in the 
transformations of the theory and practice of justice in the transitions to capitalism. I discuss the 
major aspects of these transformations, the most important of which is the devaluation of justice 
relative to the ethical systems of non-capitalist class societies. I contend that Marx’s dismissal of 
justice is an uncritical absorption of the capitalist social relations that, otherwise, he did so much 
to critique. Third, the debates tended to focus on one or another aspect of justice, and in 
particular, the question of exploitation. Conversely, I argue that we need a comprehensive theory 
of justice that includes commutative justice, distributive justice, corrective justice, and complete 
justice. Only then can we appreciate the full ethical implications of the silence on justice in Marx 
and many Marxisms. Indeed, this more robust theory is necessary if justice is to be not only a 
principle of judgement by which we assign praise or blame, but also as a guide to activity, 
especially for those who aspire to something as dangerous as dramatic societal transformation. 
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Pessimism of the intellect… 
 
— Antonio Gramsci 
 
 
Franz shook his head. “When a society is rich, its people don’t need to 
work with their hands; they can devote themselves to activities of the 
spirit. We have more and more universities and more and more students. 
If students are going to earn degrees, they’ve got to come up with 
dissertation topics. And since dissertations can be written about 
everything under the sun, the number of topics is infinite. Sheets of paper 
covered with words pile up in archives sadder than cemeteries, because 
no one ever visits them on All Souls’ Day. Culture is perishing in 
overproduction, in an avalanche of words, in the madness of quantity.”  
 
— Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being 
 
 
What is published now depends on the publisher’s and the editor’s need 
to fill the journal and the author’s need to be published in time for tenure 
review, a job hunt, or a raise. The question rarely arises, ‘Is this 
publication necessary?’ Therefore, a significant part of the much-cited 
information explosion is really a noise explosion. 
 
— Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist 
 
 
hundreds of presses, thousands of titles. 
who is to survive out of all this mulch? 
it’s almost improper to ask. 
 
— Charles Bukowski, the last generation 
 
 
No one can read two thousand books. In the four hundred years I have 
lived, I’ve not read more than half a dozen. And in any case, it is not the 
reading that matters, but the rereading. Printing, which is now forbidden, 
was one of the worst evils of mankind, for it tended to multiply 
unnecessary texts to a dizzying degree.  
 
— Jorge Luis Borges, A Weary Man’s Utopia 
 
 
…optimism of the will. 
 
— Antonio Gramsci 
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Part 1: The Problem of Justice in Capitalist Modernity 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Karl Marx is the most famous, indeed, infamous critic of capitalism. But does he deem 
capitalism unjust? The answer is by no means clear. Marx explicitly asserts that capitalist 
exploitation is not unjust. And yet, he also describes it as extortion, robbery, and theft. Marx 
seems to espouse moral relativism when he asserts: “Right can never be higher than the 
economic structure of society and the cultural development thereby determined.”1 Nevertheless, 
he also seems to appeal to a theory of natural right when he speaks of the social conditions that 
are “most worthy” for our “human nature.”2 Marx’s relationship with ethics is deeply 
ambiguous. So too are the political movements that have acted and are acting in his name. 
Whether it was the parliamentary elitism of the Second International or the insurrectionary 
authoritarianism of the Communist International, these movements have neglected the need for 
the long-term and widespread cultivation of the ethical and political capacities necessary to 
create anything remotely resembling a genuinely democratic socialism. This goes back to Marx 
himself. 
These ambiguities have inspired a number of debates about the relation between Marxism 
and ethics. We can distinguish these debates into three broad waves. The first occurred during 
the 1890-1900s. The two major sides were the neo-Kantian revisionists and the consequentialist 
‘orthodox Marxists.’ The second took place in the 1950-70s. It pitted Marxist-humanism against 
structuralist-Marxism. The third debate emerged in the 1970-90s. It took place largely within 
Anglo-American analytical Marxism. Inspired by the widespread impact of Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice, this debate focused specifically on the question of justice. It would not be unfair to 
describe the two most influential camps in this most recent debate as neo-revisionist and neo-
orthodox. 
Despite the different historical periods and social contexts of these debates, all three 
ended in the same basic impasse. Commentators usually divided into two forms of ethics, both of 
                                                          
1
 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York: International Publishers, 1938), 10. 
2
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume Three, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1991), 959. 
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which Marx explicitly rejects: the consequentialism typical of utilitarianism or the deontology 
typical of Kantianism. In other words, each of the three debates became mired in irreconcilable 
oppositions between what I will describe as determinism and formalism. Indeed, there is still no 
consensus about whether or not Marx condemns capitalism as unjust and affirms socialism as 
just. It is a goal of this dissertation to explain why each of these debates have ended in a similar 
impasse. 
 Before I discuss what is original in this dissertation, I must first concede that, given that 
there have been three waves of debate about Marxism and ethics, this dissertation necessarily 
treads some familiar ground. There are at least three significant aspects of my argument that, 
although I say some original things about them, are not themselves novel: (i) explaining the 
theories of Marx’s intellectual influences and the role they play in the interpretation of Marx; (ii) 
showing how his method shapes his theories of ethics and justice; and (iii) engaging in an 
exegesis that situates Marx’s sparse comments on ethics in terms of his entire corpus in order to 
understand him on his own terms. I will briefly summarize my findings. 
 First, I argue that commentators have neglected or misinterpreted the theories of Marx’s 
intellectual influences, especially Hegel. I attempt to remedy this by applying a deep textual 
reading of Hegel’s dialectical method to my interpretation of his writings. I not only look at his 
most famous works, but also more obscure texts throughout his entire career, including his early 
theological writings, his lectures on aesthetics, and his late lectures on religion. There are at least 
four original things I contribute to the understanding of Hegel’s influence on Marx. First, I prove 
that Marx was intimately familiar with Hegel’s early essay on ‘Natural Law,’ which has crucial 
bearing on the question of justice in Marx. Second, I show that Hegel’s theory of tragedy is a 
crucial precursor to Marx’s critique of liberal rights. Indeed, I demonstrate that Marx was not the 
first to say the famous statement that is often attributed to him, ‘Between equal rights, force 
decides.’ It is said in a number of places, sometimes explicitly, by Hegel. Third, I prove that 
Marx’s alternative to corrective justice is based upon a theory of forgiveness that he acquires 
from Hegel. Fourth, I solve the mystery of the principle, ‘From each according to their abilities, 
to each according to their needs.’ It is my contention that no one has yet understood from whom 
Marx gets the famous needs principle, and with whom he is most in dialogue in the development 
of his own version of that principle. Most have speculated that it is Blanc, Bakunin, or even less 
plausible candidates. I show that, not only is it impossible that Marx could have attained the 
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needs principle from these theorists, but that the theorist from whom he does receive it, Hegel, is 
crucial for our understanding of what Marx is attempting to accomplish with the needs principle. 
Second, with regard to the significance of Marx’s method for a proper interpretation of 
his theory of justice, I show the importance of Marx’s much neglected use of immanent critique 
in his otherwise unintelligible assertions about justice. Put succinctly, immanent critique 
attempts to show how someone or something becomes mired in contradictions according to their 
own standards or principles. It is the fundamental method of the dialectic, which exposes the 
incomplete character of our theories and practices by demonstrating how they necessarily 
become their opposite. In an exegesis of Marx’s Capital, I show how his critique of Proudhon’s 
clumsy use of the dialectic, and how Marx’s own more sophisticated use of it, helps to explain 
why he describes exploitation both as ‘not unjust’ and as ‘theft.’ Furthermore, this explanation 
does not rely on crude notions of dialectical resolutions as tenuous syntheses based in a 
‘both/and’ approach—something endemic to the dialectical method in Marxism in general. 
Instead, I explain this in a way that cannot be accused of ‘dialectical wizardry.’ 
Third, with regard to the exegesis of Marx’s corpus, I attempt to counter something that 
is quite prevalent in these debates. It is often the case that commentators force their 
interpretations of Marx into their own particular assumptions or agendas because they do not 
show enough fidelity to Marx’s intended meanings. This occurs in a number of ways. 
Commentators are often flippant in their attributing latent or implicit meaning to Marx when, for 
example, they support their interpretations by excusing certain inconvenient passages as 
instances of Marx’s ‘sarcasm’ or ‘irony.’ This also occurs in more sophisticated forms when 
commentators impute to Marx what I call here ‘saving distinctions.’ When Marx explicitly says 
something about capitalism that has bearing on the question of justice, commentators frequently 
assert that Marx is referring only to the everyday and mystified experience of surface 
phenomena. These commentators argue that, in actuality, Marx thinks the opposite about what is 
deeper or more essential to capitalist society. For example, if Marx says that the distribution of 
commodities under capitalism is just according to the only possible standards, for some 
interpretations, this must mean that he deems the more fundamental distribution of the conditions 
of production as unjust. These are ‘saving’ distinctions because they impute to Marx something 
that saves the particular interpretation against potential counter-evidence. All of these tactics fail 
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to ask, if Marx believes what is being attributed to him as a latent or implicit meaning, why does 
he fail to state it explicitly? 
In my interpretation of Marx, I read him literally. I ask if everything that Marx says about 
justice can be made consistent without needing to impute anything to him. I try to show that this 
is in fact the case. Without diverging from what he says explicitly, all of his assertions about 
justice, no matter how contradictory they may at first appear, can be made compatible without 
straining their intended meaning or our own credulity. Nevertheless, even if everything that 
Marx says about justice is internally consistent, the way in which Marx separates justice from 
other ethical values may point to a deeper and more profound inconsistency. This is the basis of 
what I think is the unique contribution of my dissertation. 
 As I noted before, each of the three waves of the debate about Marxism and ethics ended 
in the same basic impasse. It is my contention that this has occurred because none of these 
debates began with the right question. They went directly to the problem without first studying 
its conditions of possibility. They did not ask why there is a debate in the first place. The first 
question is not about whether or not Marx condemns capitalism as unjust. Rather, our starting 
point must be, why is Marx so evasive about ethics in general and justice in particular? It is 
because I begin from this question that this commentary offers three novel contributions to these 
debates. 
The first is surprisingly simple. This dissertation points to the significance of immanent 
critique not only in Marx’s work, but of Marx’s work. With regard to the question of Marx and 
justice, to my knowledge, no one has yet attempted an immanent critique of Marx. No one has 
applied the method to the master. None of the commentators have attempted to understand Marx 
according to a properly Marxist method. They have not asked whether or not Marx’s ambiguous 
relationship with justice, and for some commentators, Marx’s shortcomings in these respects, can 
be rooted in his historical conditions. They have not asked whether or not Marx’s assertions 
about justice are ideological in Marx’s sense of that term. In other words, they have applied 
historical materialism to everyone but Marx himself. Therefore, even when these Marxists 
substantively disagree with Marx, their approach is basically dogmatic. Conversely, I engage in 
the beginnings of a historical materialist critique of justice. Throughout the development of 
capitalist society, justice, in both theory and practice, has undergone significant transformations. 
I situate Marx’s ambiguous relation to justice in the context of these material developments. It is 
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only through this method that we can begin to determine if Marx critically accepts or uncritically 
absorbs these broader trends of capitalist modernity. 
The second novel aspect of this dissertation is that it has a more comprehensive notion of 
justice than any previous commentary. Much attention has been focused on the relation between 
Marx and questions of ‘distributive justice.’ Few have thought to distinguish it from what is 
traditionally called ‘commutative justice,’ or fairness in exchange. Even fewer commentators 
have explored the relationships between Marx and ‘corrective justice,’ or questions of crime and 
punishment, as well as ‘general,’ ‘legal,’ or ‘complete’ justice, the ethical disposition of 
individuals toward the common ends of the social whole. No one has yet developed an 
interpretation of Marx that integrates all of these most significant aspects of justice into a single 
theory. 
I combine this comprehensive theory of justice with a historical materialist critique of 
justice to show the most significant changes undergone by justice in capitalist modernity, the 
most important of which is the devaluation of justice relative to the ethical systems of pre-
capitalist societies. Amid capitalist modernity, justice has been supplanted by freedom or liberty 
as the apex of the table of values. When we consider these historical developments, it becomes 
much easier to contextualize and understand Marx’s evasive relationship with justice. 
Briefly stated, I argue that all of the apparent inconsistencies of Marx’s theory of justice 
are resolved when we understand that, for Marx, the trajectory of human history, and therefore, 
the character of his own theory, is beyond justice itself. Marx believes that the need for justice is 
not a permanent feature of human existence. Like so much else in the ‘pre-history’ of 
humankind, he believes that justice will wither away. Marx’s attempt to get beyond justice is 
much easier to understand when we situate it within the widespread devaluation of justice under 
capitalist modernity. Ultimately, I argue that Marx’s attempts to transcend justice fail and that 
this reflects the fact that, with regard to questions of justice, Marx has uncritically absorbed 
significant trends within a capitalist modernity that, otherwise, he did so much to critique. 
The full implications of this are only apparent when we explore these transformations of 
justice in all of its most significant aspects. Only then is justice not merely a principle of 
judgement by which to assign praise or blame, but also a guide to activity. If all we do is focus 
on isolated aspects of justice, as has been common in these debates, we gain a basis by which to 
condemn one or another feature of capitalism as unjust. With the comprehensive theory of 
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justice, however, we can begin to develop a practice in which our attempts to dramatically 
transform these unjust social conditions do not establish injustice in another form. 
The third and final original contribution in this dissertation is to establish a new research 
agenda. One reason I have decided to focus on justice is because it is a taproot to the rest of 
ethics. Marx’s work is certainly normative, but this does not yet entail a formal ethical theory. 
Justice is not only a crucial aspect of any systematic ethics, but theorizing the dramatic 
transformations undergone by justice under capitalist modernity provokes questions about the 
ways in which capitalist social conditions fundamentally change ethics in general. Those who 
have attempted to construct a Marxist ethics have often pursued an idealist method that is 
strangely unsuited to the basic premises of Marxism. They have typically done one of two things. 
They have either attempted to cobble together all of Marx’s disparate statements about ethics 
into a more systematic ethics, or they have attempted to synthesize Marx with other moral 
philosophers, such as Aristotle, Spinoza, or Kant. Conversely, my dissertation puts on the agenda 
a full-scale historical materialist critique of capitalist ethics. It is only in this way that we can 
liberate the method from the master. Before we can begin that project, however, we must first 
understand the master. It is to this interpretation that I now turn. 
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Chapter 2: The Three Waves of Debate About Marxism and Ethics 
 
There have been a number of debates about the relation between Marx and ethics.
3
 This is due 
primarily to the ambiguous, seemingly inconsistent things that Marx says on the rare occasions 
when he explicitly addresses ethics at all. Particularly illustrative in this respect are Marx’s 
deeply ambiguous statements about ‘Recht’ or justice. In the German philosophical tradition we 
must distinguish between Recht, which means justice proper, and Gesetz, which means the law.
4
 
We should also distinguish between Recht, which has the connotation of natural right or natural 
law, and Gerechtigkeit, which refers more to positive law, to a specific juridical authority. In 
general, Recht includes (i) the corpus of laws as distinct from particular laws; (ii) ‘rights’ in the 
sense of claims against others; and (iii) justice in the sense of moral rightness. 
Marx was not always so vague about ethics and justice. As a young man, for example, he 
used terms like ‘right’ quite freely, even going so far as to make the standard distinction between 
natural and positive law: “Therefore the press law is the legal recognition of freedom of the 
press. It constitutes right, because it is the positive existence of freedom. It must therefore exist, 
even if it is never put into application, as in North America, whereas censorship, like slavery, can 
never become lawful, even if it exists a thousand times over as a law.”5 Nevertheless, after 1844, 
when Marx becomes a Marxist, he never again speaks in such terms. Does he retain all, some, or 
none of these early sentiments? 
 While it is obvious that the mature Marx condemns capitalism, it is unclear whether or 
not he does so according to a principle of justice. Marx does not explicitly condemn capitalism 
as unjust. In fact, he occasionally asserts that capitalist exploitation is not unjust:  
 
On the one hand the daily sustenance of labour-power costs only half a day’s 
labour, while on the other hand the very same labour-power can remain effective, 
can work, during a whole day, and consequently the value which its use during 
                                                          
3
 I presented an early draft of this chapter at the 73rd Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 16, 2015. I thank David F. Ericson and Robert W. Mickey for their helpful 
comments. 
4
 This is derived from Ladd’s excellent explanation in John Ladd, ‘Translator’s Introduction,’ in Immanuel Kant, 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis, New 
York, Kansas City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), xv-xviii. 
5
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works: Volume One (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1975), 162. 
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one day creates is double what the capitalist pays for that use; this circumstance is 
a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice towards the 
seller.
6
 
 
Nevertheless, Marx also describes exploitation in numerous places as theft, extortion, and 
robbery. Take, for example, the following representative passage from the same text: 
 
The means of production with which the additional labour-power is incorporated, 
as well as the necessaries with which the workers are sustained, are nothing but 
component parts of the surplus product, parts of the tribute annually exacted from 
the working class by the capitalist class. Even if the latter uses a portion of that 
tribute to purchase the additional labour-power at its full price, so that equivalent 
is exchanged for equivalent, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of 
the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has 
stolen from them.
7
 
 
This would seem to imply that Marx deems exploitation unjust, but if so, why does he fail to 
explicitly assert this? 
 If Marx’s condemnation of capitalism is obvious, so too is his praise of socialism as the 
only viable societal alternative. Nevertheless, it is not clear if Marx’s advocacy of socialism is 
based primarily in a principle of justice. Marx offers an explicit principle of distributive justice in 
the first phase of socialism: ‘From each according to their ability, to each according to their 
contribution.’ Nevertheless, he also criticizes this principle of justice because its abstract 
character reproduces certain inequalities between individuals: “It recognises no class differences, 
because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognises unequal individual 
endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. It is therefore a right of inequality 
in its content, like every right.”8 Marx seems to assert that all rights are necessarily self-
contradictory. Therefore, when he articulates the standard of distribution for the second phase of 
                                                          
6
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 
1977), 301. 
7
 Ibid., 728. 
8
 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, op. cit., 9. 
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socialism, ‘to each according to their needs,’ it is unclear whether or not he regards this as a 
principle of justice or beyond justice as such. 
 It is also unclear whether or not Marx deems the principle of distributive justice in the 
first phase of socialism a plausible standard by which to critique any other mode of production, 
including capitalism. After all, Marx asserts that “Right can never be higher than the economic 
structure of society and the cultural development thereby determined.”9 It appears that Marx 
deems principles of justice and right to be historically relative. Nevertheless, Marx also makes 
appeals to human nature in ways that have direct normative implications. For example, Marx 
argues that because socialism creates the social conditions necessary for everyone to express 
themselves through free creative activity, it is “most worthy and appropriate” for our “human 
nature.”10 Indeed, Marx seems to hint toward a theory of natural right, of permanent ethical rules 
based in more or less fixed aspects of human nature, when he asserts that the liability of all who 
are able to labour, namely, working with both head and hands in order to eat, is a “general law of 
nature.”11 If this is the case, however, it is unclear what role, if any, justice plays in his 
conception of human nature. 
Finally, all of these ambiguities are refracted through Marx’s dialectical method. One of 
its peculiar features is that it rejects the fact-value distinction. Therefore, he does not recognize 
any strict separation between the explanation of ethical phenomena and the evaluation of them. 
In other words, he does not distinguish between, on the one hand, the sociology of ethics, of how 
certain ethical norms arise from specific historical conditions, and on the other hand, ethics 
proper, the evaluation of whether or not we should accept these norms. We can contrast Marx’s 
method with that of Weber
12
 on the one hand and Strauss
13
 on the other. 
 Like Weber, Marx thinks that ethical phenomena are historically-determined. Our ethical 
values arise from our location in specific social conditions. It is the task of historical science to 
explain how this occurs, a precondition of which is that the scientist recognize her situated 
position within historical development. Nevertheless, unlike Weber, Marx does not think that 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., 10. 
10
 Marx, Capital: Volume Three, op. cit., 959. 
11
 Karl Marx, The First International and After: Political Writings: Volume Three, ed. David Fernbach (London: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1974), 88. 
12
 Max Weber, Sociological Writings, ed. Wolf Heydebrand (New York: Continuum, 1999), 248-59; Max Weber, 
The Vocation Lectures, eds. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong; trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2004), 291-95. 
13
 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 35-80. 
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these ethical norms are thereby purely subjective. Like Strauss, Marx believes that ethical 
systems can be comparatively evaluated and that certain norms prove to be objectively better 
than others.
14
 Both Marx and Strauss contend that there are objective goods of human nature that 
provide a factual basis for values irrespective of whether or not particular individuals recognize 
them as such. Therefore, we cannot be, and should not try to be, neutral toward conflicting 
conceptions of the good life, or as Marx would describe it, the actualization of our species-
being.
15
 Nevertheless, there are also substantial disagreements between these two theorists. 
Strauss argues that objective human goods are rooted in a permanent or trans-historical nature. 
Indeed, Strauss contends that trans-historical ethical principles are more objective than any 
narrowly historical norms. Conversely, Marx argues that objective human goods are rooted in 
history, in the way that human nature develops over the course of history. This avoids Weber’s 
value-relativism only because Marx has a ‘universal history,’ a theory of the fundamental 
meaning of human history as a whole. 
Marx thinks that his location in history, capitalist modernity, reveals the direction of 
history in its entirety. It is in that sense that the explanation of how certain ethical norms arise in 
specific historical conditions is at one and the same time an evaluation of how those norms are 
situated in, and contribute to, the struggle to fully realize our objective human goods throughout 
history, a process that culminates in an end to these struggles. The role that justice plays in 
Marx’s account of history remains an open question, but misinterpretations of Marx’s method 
have confused matters. As we will see, many commentators debate over whether one or another 
of Marx’s statements is a sociology of ethics or a statement of ethics proper, of Marx’s own 
ethical convictions. This often imposes the fact-value distinction on him. Indeed, the debate 
frequently bifurcates to such a point that some commentators impute to Marx a value-relativism 
more akin to that of Weber, while others attribute to Marx a theory of natural right typical of 
Strauss. As we explore Marx’s work, we must always remember that, for him, the theory of the 
objective human good is no less scientific than the theory of historical development because they 
are one and the same. Marx deems us eminently historical beings. Indeed, as we will see, for 
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Marx, our essence is actualized when we make our history in a conscious way. As a first 
approximation, for Marx, our objective good is inherently social and is based in the unique and 
universal human capacity for free and creative activity as an end in itself. For example, Marx 
expresses both of these sentiments when he asserts, “When a worker co-operates in a planned 
way with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his 
species.”16 
The debate about the relation between Marxism and ethics has occurred substantively 
three times. The first debate took place at the turn of the twentieth-century in Germany, Austria, 
and Russia. It pitted “orthodox” Marxists against neo-Kantian “revisionist” Marxists, 
foreshadowing the collapse of the Second International in the lead up to the First World War. 
The second debate occurred in the 1950-70s. In the West, it was a part of the larger debates 
between structuralist and humanist Marxists amid the revelations of Stalin’s crimes as well as the 
suppression of revolution in Hungary. In the East, the debate occurred between Marxist-Leninist 
scholars in the Soviet Union. While we can describe the Marxist-Leninist contributions as a 
debate within orthodox Marxism, it would be inaccurate to describe the humanist or structuralist 
Marxists as ‘neo-revisionist’ or ‘neo-orthodox.’ Nevertheless, many of the arguments familiar to 
the first wave of the debate reappeared in the second wave in both the East and the West. The 
third and most recent debate began in the late 1970s and continued until the early 1990s. It gave 
rise to what can be fairly described as ‘neo-orthodox’ and ‘neo-revisionist’ positions. Most of the 
contributors abandoned the dialectical methodology, as had the revisionists in the first debate and 
the structuralists in the second. This was a debate between mostly Anglo-American analytical 
philosophers who often described themselves as ‘No Bullshit’ Marxists. Perhaps. We will see. 
Despite their different contexts, each of the three waves of debate resulted in the same 
impasse. None of the debates were able to offer the definitive interpretation of Marx’s theories of 
ethics in general and justice in particular because each bifurcated into either determinism or 
formalism. In other words, each side in the various debates tended to recede into either a 
consequentialist morality typical of utilitarianism or a deontological morality typical of 
Kantianism, both of which Marx rejected.
17
 Indeed, we can express these impasses as an inability 
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to reconcile the scientific conception of history with the ethical justification of socialism. Of the 
three waves, the last debate focused most on questions of justice. Since that is our topic, the third 
wave will occupy most of our attention. For our purposes here, this commentary on the three 
waves of debates is necessarily schematic.
18
 Nevertheless, this brief overview is crucial if we are 
to truly understand the most recent debate and where we stand now. Addressing the impasse of 
the three waves of debate is all the more important because, with the publication of two new 
texts on Marxism and ethics, Michael J. Thompson’s Constructing Marxist Ethics and Norman 
Fischer’s Marxist Ethics within Western Political Theory, a fourth wave of debates may be in the 
offing.
19
 
 
2. 1: The Debate of the 1890s-1900s 
 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century increasing tensions between the reformist and 
insurrectionist wings of the Second International gave rise to a debate about the relations 
between historical materialism, socialism, and ethics. Despite their differences, both sides of this 
debate were influenced by the rise of positivism.
20
 Most tended to read Marx’s theories of 
economic laws and historical change in deeply determinist ways. For example, Eduard Bernstein, 
the most prominent theorist of the reformist wing, criticized Marx’s assertion that the 
concentration of capital is a precondition of socialism: 
 
If the victory of socialism depended on the number of capitalist magnates 
constantly shrinking, the logical course for Social Democracy would be, if not to 
support by all possible means the heaping up of capital in ever fewer hands, then 
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at least to refrain from anything that could impede it. In fact, Social Democracy 
more often than not does the opposite. These considerations, for instance, do not 
govern its votes on questions of taxation. From the standpoint of the theory of 
collapse, a great part of the practical activity of Social Democracy is a matter of 
undoing work that ought to be left alone. But it is not Social Democracy which is 
at fault in this respect. The fault lies in the doctrine which incorporates the idea 
that progress depends on a worsening of circumstances.
21
 
 
Bernstein has an extremely deterministic interpretation of Marx’s theory of the crisis and 
collapse of capitalism. On a less determinist reading, if in the struggle to meet certain human 
needs we confront not only the political obstacles of what the ruling classes will concede but also 
the structural barriers of what the system can bear, then we have not only made more immediate 
and tangible the limits of capitalism, but in doing so, have developed the relations, institutions, 
and practices, that pose a viable alternative and inspire confidence in the plunges beyond those 
limits. Irrespective of whether we accept few, most, or even all of Marx’s predictions for the 
deepest long-term tendencies of capitalism, this was always the correct reading of Marx’s 
strategic orientation. 
Beyond this, Bernstein argues that historical events have disproven fundamental aspects 
of historical materialism, and in particular, its predictions of the simplification of class structures, 
the immiseration of the working class, and the imminence of cataclysmic crisis. Having called 
into question the self-proclaimed scientific status of historical materialism and the supposed 
inevitability of the proletarian victory, Bernstein rejects Marx’s assertion that revolutionary 
workers “have no ideals to realise but to set free the elements of the new society with which old 
collapsing society itself is pregnant.”22 Bernstein sought to develop not only a practice of 
reformism toward a more gradual, ‘evolutionary’ approach to socialism, but also a theory of the 
ethical justification for socialism. 
Bernstein seizes on Marx’s claim that, even though labour creates more value than the 
capitalist pays for it, “this circumstance is a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an 
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injustice towards the seller.”23 Bernstein argues that Marx’s description of exploitation as 
“robbery,” but not as unjust, “leaves the reader with the impression of an insoluble logical 
paradox.”24 There is in Marx a dualism between his attempts to be scientific and to maintain the 
formulas laid down by his utopian predecessors.
25
 For Bernstein, the distinction between Marx 
and the utopian socialists is only one of degree.
26
 To deny the necessarily utopian character of 
socialism is self-deception. 
Bernstein attributed these shortcomings to the influence of Hegel, and, in particular, his 
attempted reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason. This entailed the rejection of the 
distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be.’ Bernstein rejects the dialectic and 
advocates for a return to Kant. According to Bernstein, socialism always has ideals, is always a 
movement toward a “beyond” or “what ought to be.”27 Nevertheless, we must distinguish 
between, on the one hand, “cognition,” the objective knowledge of science, and on the other 
hand, “volition,” the doctrines, programmes, and theories of political parties.28 The scientific 
aspects of socialism must be “objective” and therefore non-partisan. Consequently, the only 
specifically socialist element is its conception of ethics and of justice, which can never be 
scientific.
29
 Bernstein’s appeal to Kant is taken up most enthusiastically by the ‘Austrian 
Marxists,’ such as Max Adler and Otto Bauer.30 They assert that the inevitability of socialism 
does not entail its desirability. This is an important point. As we will see, this argument returns 
time and again in the debates about Marxism and ethics. For the Austrian Marxists, socialism is 
justified because it alone can realize the Kantian imperative to treat every individual not merely 
as a means but an end. 
The rise of revisionism, neo-Kantianism, and ‘Ethical Socialism’ provoked a reaction 
from prominent members of the Second International. In response, theorists like Kautsky and 
Plekhanov adopted the mantle of “orthodox” Marxism. Since Marx has so little to say about 
ethics, much of their critique rests on statements by Engels, who we could describe as the first 
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orthodox Marxist. Engels asserts that all morality heretofore has necessarily been a class 
morality. A “really human morality” is only possible “at a stage of society which has not only 
overcome class contradictions but has even forgotten them in practical life.”31 Similarly, Kautsky 
argues that morality is merely an ideological weapon in the class struggle whose social 
significance depends entirely on the promotion of economic and social development.
32
 
Kautsky and Plekhanov were quite influenced by Darwinism and positivism.
33
 Kautsky 
argues that the only trans-historical aspect of ethics is the “social instinct” inherited from the 
gregarious animals.
34
 Nevertheless, the specifically human dimension of ethics, the “moral 
precepts,” are historically relative.35 Class struggle brings about a development of the social 
instinct. In an ascendant class, this “deep-rooted social need” will elicit a “burning desire” for 
something different than what currently exists.
36
 This, however, is “a purely negative 
phenomenon, nothing more than opposition to the prevailing morality.”37 For the orthodox 
Marxists, the question of morality, both within capitalism and in the future socialist society, 
becomes less significant because our fate is known: “Socialism is inevitable because the class 
struggle, the victory of the proletariat is inevitable.”38 Indeed, as important as morality is in the 
class struggle it has no place in the scientific investigation of history. Science is amoral. It stands 
above morality because it is solely concerned with “the recognition of the necessary.”39 The 
scientific perspective recognizes that morality is only a means, not the end or goal: 
 
It is of course true that under socialism the scientist is also a fighter, for a human 
being cannot be divided into two parts, one of which has nothing to do with the 
other. In a man like Marx, for example, the presence of a moral ideal occasionally 
breaks through into his scientific investigation. But he is continually aiming, and 
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rightly, to banish it wherever possible. For in science a moral ideal becomes a 
source of error if it gets to the stage of attempting to dictate goals.
40
 
 
Many of the subsequent iterations of this orthodox standpoint also feel the need to reconcile 
Marx the social scientist with Marx the moralist. As we will soon see, they are unconvincing. 
Despite his claims to orthodoxy, Kautsky affirms a fact-value distinction foreign to Marx. 
Consequently, he does not address the crux of Bernstein’s critique, namely, that a deterministic 
theory of history and the inevitability of socialism could permit only the most denuded, 
voluntarist ethics. Conversely, Bernstein, like most revisionists both old and new, refuted only a 
positivist, determinist, mechanical understanding of historical materialism. In this, Bernstein 
only ‘revised’ the likes of Kautsky, not Marx. Ultimately, there remained the tension between 
fact and value, between science and ethics.
41
 Failing to overcome this impasse, the first debate 
ended inconclusively: 
 
On the whole no intellectual resolution of this dispute over the role of Kantian 
ethics in Marxism emerged during this period, apart from the organizational 
‘resolution’ which Kautsky brought about in 1905, when he pushed those inclined 
toward neo-Kantianism off the editorial board of Vorwärts.
42
 
 
In its aftermath, Lukács asserted that the more deterministic and mechanistic the theory of 
history, the more utopian must ethics be.
43
 He attributes this opposition between positivist and 
neo-Kantian Marxism to the standpoint of civil society, which fails to see the social whole in its 
historical development. Lukács argues that to understand Marx we must return to Hegel. 
Nevertheless, Lukács’ own attempt to construct a Marxist ethics failed. At the time of his death it 
remained unfinished.
44
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2. 2: The Debate of the 1950s-70s 
 
The second substantive debate about the relations between Marxism and ethics began in the 
1950s. It was inspired by a number of events, including the death of Stalin (1953); Khruschev’s 
revelations of Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Congress (1956); the USSR’s suppression of 
revolution in Hungary (1956); the use of the language of humanism in the Hundred Flowers 
campaign in China (1957) and in the ‘Third World’ revolutions in the 1960s; the rise of the New 
Left; and the publication of Marx’s early, more philosophical writings, especially The Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
45
 Familiar oppositions between ethics and science re-
emerged. Humanist Marxists like E. P. Thompson, Erich Fromm, and Mihailo Markovic 
emphasized the young, ‘philosophical’ Marx, and in particular, his theory of alienation. 
Conversely, structuralist Marxists like Louis Althusser, Maurice Godelier, and Paul Hirst 
emphasized the mature, ‘scientific’ Marx, the theorist of objective structural laws. Of the three 
waves of debates, this one was the least concerned with matters specific to justice. 
In general, the Marxist-humanists de-emphasized the determinism of the objective laws 
of history in favour of a more active human subject impelled toward revolution by the alienation 
of our creative human essence. Nevertheless, for some of them, the critique of the Soviet Union 
and the affirmation of ‘socialism with a human face’ were not the only motivations. Like the 
revisionists before them, some of the Marxist-humanists argued that developments in capitalism 
had falsified significant aspects of Marx’s historical materialism. This required the adaptation of 
Marxism to new social realities, including a more robust role for ethics. 
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Lucien Goldmann, for example, argues that, in light of our experience since 1917, Marx’s 
theory requires two corrections. First, the theory of “progressive pauperization” and the 
evolution toward revolutionary class consciousness has been disproven because, in the West, 
there has been a dramatic expansion of productive forces and a rising standard of living for the 
working class.
46
 Second, the theory of commodity fetishism—in which value seems to reside in 
the material qualities of the commodity itself, thereby effacing its true source, human productive 
activity—has not only been proven correct, but is more significant than previously thought.47 
Thus, the terrain of struggle has shifted from the economic ‘base,’ which has proved adept at 
incorporating workers into the existing order, to a superstructural battle over the class-
consciousness of the working class, namely, the realm of culture.
48
 Citing attempts to counter 
Stalinist bureaucratization and centralization in Yugoslavia, Goldmann argues that the 
consummation of humanist values requires the dialectical reconciliation of socialist self-
management with production for the market.
49
 
Attempted ‘reconciliations’ of this kind are common among Marxist-humanists. 
Although he does not advocate for market socialism, Mihailo Markovic, another prominent 
socialist-humanist, argues for ‘reconciliation’ in a similar manner: 
 
In material production and other objective forms of social life one of the greatest 
problems contemporary socialism faces is how to build a social system in which 
self-management will be combined with flexible planning by some central, truly 
democratic, representative bodies. This may seem contradictory; that is why those 
who prefer a simple way of thinking and who are unhappy with one side of the 
contradiction between centralism and decentralization quickly jump to the other. 
However the (dialectical) solution seems to lie in a transformation of both such 
that they can be reconciled and mutually adjusted.
50
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These ‘reconciliations’ amount to a mere balancing of opposites. This maintains them in their 
tense unity without resolving the contradiction. If this is all the dialectical method could 
accomplish it would deserve the criticisms it so often receives. 
Despite this, the Hegelian notion that contradictions are the basis for historical 
development proved uncomfortable for the rulers of the Soviet regime who had declared the 
successful establishment of socialism. As Dunayevskaya notes: “In 1947 Andrei Zhdanov 
dramatically (or at least loudly) demanded that ‘the philosophical workers’ replace the Hegelian 
dialectic with ‘a new dialectical law’: criticism and self-criticism. By 1955 the critique of 
Marxian concepts concerned his humanism.”51 Althusser, the most influential theorist in the 
French Communist Party, enthusiastically embraced Zhdanov’s call. For Althusser, the humanist 
demand for “socialism with a human face” was in fact a market-socialism with a proletarian 
mask concealing a petty-bourgeois face. 
According to Althusser, Marx’s humanism was a youthful excess while he was still under 
the fleeting influence of Hegel. By 1845, however, Marx breaks with every theory that bases 
history on the essence of man. Instead, Marx offers a theoretical anti-humanism.
52
 For Althusser, 
the concept of socialism is scientific, but the concept of humanism is ideological.
53
 This is 
echoed by Hirst.
54
 He argues that some of Marx’s early articles criticize the enclosure of 
communal property in terms of principles of distributive justice. The young Marx bases this 
critique in a theory of the natural rights of individuals. Nevertheless, by the time he writes ‘The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in 1875, “Marx rejects the notion that socialism is a matter of 
distributive justice.”55 Marx’s perspective, having long abandoned his youthful humanism, is 
beyond justice as such. 
The structuralists heaped scorn not only on humanism, but also on the dialectical method, 
deeming it another of Marx’s youthful follies. According to Maurice Godelier, Marx only uses 
the language of the dialectic metaphorically. Hegel’s theory of the ‘identity of opposites’ is 
merely a “magic device” required to justify his claim to “absolute knowledge.”56 Conversely, for 
the mature Marx, capitalist exploitation does not require the dialectic. The criterion for the 
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superiority of a certain mode of production is not the realization of eternal justice or overcoming 
the alienation of the human essence. Rather, it is that socialist production relations more 
functionally correspond to the increasingly socialized productive forces created by capitalism.
57
 
In this, the structuralists rejected a Marxist ethics on the basis of a theory of historical 
development that is as functionalist and determinist as the ‘orthodox’ Marxists. Unlike them, 
however, the structuralists abandoned the language of the dialectic. 
Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Kruschev endorsed the development of a specifically 
Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist humanism at the Twenty-First Congress in 1959. Familiar 
tensions arose in the debates between Soviet scholars: 
 
One of the most significant, and most elusive, features of Soviet ethical theory 
lies in the relation asserted between this specific theory of history and the moral 
principles which are viewed as a lawful product of that history. The relation in 
question is understood by many Soviet philosophers to justify or demonstrate the 
rationality of specific moral principles. Explaining precisely how this justification 
occurs could be viewed as the central task and challenge of Marxist-Leninist 
ethical theory.
58
 
 
This gave rise to shortcomings similar to those that beset Kautsky. Right and wrong were defined 
entirely in terms of what is progressive and regressive according to what are deemed to be 
objective historical tendencies. Consequently, no question of the intrinsic worth of ethical 
activity can arise. If ethics is merely functional for a particular set of social relations at a given 
stage in history, ethics becomes a form of consequentialism whose grounding principle is, quite 
abstractly, whatever leads to full communism. 
Even the most respected of the Soviet ethicists, critical of both the “abstract humanism” 
of Fromm
59
 and the “estranged” science of Althusser,60 could not get beyond the tension between 
a scientific theory of history and the ethical justification of socialism: “Adherence to the norms 
of communist humanism is just as much part of modern Marxist-Leninist politics as is a sober, 
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scientific consideration of the clashing socio-political interests, the correlation of the class forces, 
of all the ups and downs and contradictions of the struggle.”61 These dialectical ‘reconciliations’ 
are as abstract as are those of Goldmann and Markovic. As De George notes, the debate within 
Soviet Marxist-Leninism did not substantively address the question of justice.
62
 Neither is it a 
major theme in Grier’s later account of these debates. 
Marcuse, in his critique of Soviet moral philosophy, argues that Marxism does not have 
an independent ethics. Rather, Marxism constitutes an extension of Hegel’s social theory and the 
realization of the humanism expressed by the Enlightenment.
63
 Marcuse argues that “there is no 
special discipline of ‘ethics’ in the otherwise all-embracing Hegelian system” because it is 
ultimately trumped by “History.”64 Soviet moral philosophy adopted this interpretation. Instead 
of establishing something wholly external to Western morality, they saw Soviet society as the 
development of this morality into a ‘higher’ form. This allowed the suppression of what were 
deemed false liberties in the name of ‘security,’ of freedom from want.65 In other words, the 
freedoms espoused by Western morality must be deferred until the successful development of the 
economic conditions which are the precondition of the realization of those freedoms without 
contradiction: 
 
Soviet ethics here contains a ‘safety valve’: the image of the future seems to 
perform a function corresponding to that of the transcendental elements of 
Western ethics—in this image we seem to have a real Soviet substitute for 
religion. However, there is an essential difference from which Soviet ethics 
derives much of its appeal. The transcendental goal in Soviet ethics is a historical 
one, and the road to its attainment a historical process—the result of a concrete 
social and political development. Final human fulfillment and gratification are not 
oriented on the ‘inner self’ or the hereafter, but on the ‘next stage’ of the actual 
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development of society. And the truth of this conception is to be, not a matter of 
faith, but a matter of scientific analysis and reason—of necessity.66 
 
In his immanent critique of Soviet moral philosophy, Marcuse contends that, ultimately, it 
becomes its opposite, adopting much of the Western morality that it seeks to transcend: “Care, 
responsibility, love patriotism, diligence, honesty, industriousness, the injunctions against 
transgressing the happiness of one’s fellow men, consideration for the common interest—there is 
nothing in this catalogue of values that could not be included in the ethics of the Western 
tradition.”67 
While the structuralist and Marxist-Leninist criticisms are cogent with regard to certain 
forms of humanist Marxism, they do not apply to its best representatives, such as Raya 
Dunayevskaya. She rejected the structuralist assertions that Marx abandons his theories of 
humanism or alienation in his later work.
68
 She argues that the opposition between centralized 
planning and self-management could not be resolved within the social relations of the USSR, but 
rather, that this identity of opposites requires a negation of the negation, a social revolution as 
profound as that which is required for the overthrow of capitalism. Nevertheless, she also rejects 
the dichotomy between commodity fetishism and immiseration formulated by other humanists 
such as Goldmann. Both are forms of the domination of wage-labourers by capital, of living 
labour by dead labour.
69
 This is also true of the so-called objective laws of capitalism, such as 
the rising organic composition of capital and the falling rate of profit. Due to the significance of 
the domination of living by dead labour, the fundamental aspect of socialism is not the collective 
ownership of the means of production, which, as in the USSR, is a merely juridical ownership 
that masks persisting class domination. Rather, the most fundamental aspect is the elimination of 
alienated labour. Thus, her humanist Marxism is not a ‘petty-bourgeois’ market-socialism. It 
calls for the abolition of the market, and in particular, the market in labour-power. 
Another example of a sophisticated socialist humanism that had no inclinations toward 
market socialism is that of E. P. Thompson. In an article for the first volume of The New 
Reasoner, the journal of the new left in Britain, Thompson initiated a debate featuring a number 
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of contributors.
70
 Against the dialectical materialism of Stalinist orthodoxy with its “belittling of 
conscious human agency in the making of history,” Thompson called for a socialist humanism.71 
Much of the ensuing debate was not only concerned with the role of ethics in historical action. It 
also concerned what can be attributed directly to Marx in contrast to Stalinist caricatures. For 
Thompson, that Marxism reduces all morality to class morality has some evidence in Marx and 
Engels, more in Lenin, but more accurately describes the Stalinist distortion of Marxism.
72
 In his 
subsequent article, Thompson argues that the current state of socialism cannot be entirely 
attributed to Stalinist ideology. It has some basis in certain ambiguities in Marx, Engels, and in 
particular Lenin, especially when they refer to human consciousness as a mere reflection of 
social circumstances.
73
 Ultimately, Thompson affirms a historical materialism that provides 
space for moral agency. He concedes that compassion is seriously constrained in certain 
historical circumstances, say, in the struggle against fascism. “Nevertheless,” Thompson 
continues, “the methods of violence inescapable in such contingencies must never be glorified; 
the Christian precept, ‘Forgive them, for they know not what they do,’ must re-assert itself 
whenever and to the degree that contingencies allow.”74 
 Thompson’s articles elicited a number of responses. Some decried his lapse into utopian 
socialism. Harry Hanson, for example, argues that, contrary to Thompson’s interpretation, Marx 
espouses ‘moral futurism.’75 Echoing Engels and Kautsky, Hanson asserts: 
 
We cannot be ‘really human’ under conditions of increasing immiseration. Our 
only alternative is militancy, as by doing so we speed the advent of the classless 
society, when all the moral ultimates we have been keeping tucked away in our 
kit-bags while the battle is raging can be released in an atmosphere which will no 
longer turn them to dust and ashes. But while the battle does rage, class militancy 
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is the only moral principle that is worth anything. As long as what we do 
contributes to the victory of the revolution, we can be satisfied that it is right.
76
 
 
Hanson attributes the rise of socialist humanism to a situation in which the living standards of the 
working class are getting better, not worse.
77
 He argues that, ultimately, Thompson is a utopian 
socialist who denies the dialectic of history.
78
 Tim Enright criticizes Thompson on similar 
grounds: “The logic of the situation is inexorable. The time-machine of Russian Communism 
metamorphosed the Middle Ages into the Twentieth Century in the space of forty years. In its 
path obstacles external and internal were crushed to dust. Accepting the goal, human suffering 
was inevitable”79 In other words, the ends justify the means. 
 Others criticize Thompson from the other side. Charles Taylor, for example, argues that 
Thompson pins too much on Stalinist distortions and therefore underestimates the inadequacies 
of genuine Marxism: “A really consequent critique of Stalinism cannot be a simple return to the 
original tradition, it must also involve a critique of the values of Marxist communism.”80 If Stalin 
distorts Marx it is because, in certain respects, Marx is quite amenably pulled in these directions. 
In one of the last contributions to the debate within The New Reasoner, Thompson comes around 
to Taylor’s critique: 
 
I can now see more clearly that if Stalinism is a mutation of Marx’s ideas, the 
very fact that they are capable of undergoing such a mutation while still 
remaining in a direct line of relationship indicates an original weakness which 
goes beyond mere ambiguity – and especially at the point where the crucial 
distinction between determinism and agency is to be found.
81
 
 
If there is not a straight line between Marx and Stalin, neither is there an insurmountably thick 
line separating them. 
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One of the most important contributors to this debate, Alasdair MacIntyre, would later go 
on to become one of the most influential moral philosophers of the latter-half of the twentieth-
century.
82
 He argues that we must find the dialectical middle-ground between, on the one hand, 
the Stalinist perspective in which the ‘ought’ of morality is swallowed by the ‘is’ of history, and 
on the other hand, the “isolated moral hero” who invokes moral principles independently of 
historical processes.
83
 Without making these historical processes sovereign, nonetheless, there is 
emerging a set of moral standards whereby duty can be reconciled with desire. MacIntyre argues 
that “industrial working-class life” provokes the inclination toward our common human nature 
among the proletariat: “Capitalism provides a form of life in which men rediscover desire in a 
number of ways. They discover above all that what they want most is what they want in common 
with others; and more than this that a sharing of human life is not just a means to the 
accomplishment of what they desire.”84 For this reason, communist morality is not futurist. It is 
about our common needs, duties, and desires in the here and now. 
Even though MacIntyre’s essays are probably the most sophisticated in this particular 
debate within The New Reasoner, he too is dependent on the notion of capitalism as 
unproblematically producing its own gravediggers. Written in the postwar era, MacIntyre would 
later repudiate these views amid the decline of the labour movement. Three decades later, 
MacIntyre, in his seminal work, After Virtue, argues that “the claim of Marxism to a morally 
distinctive standpoint is undermined by Marxism’s own moral history. In all those crises in 
which Marxists have had to take explicit moral stances […] Marxists have always fallen back 
into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism.”85 Similarly, Thompson 
would later assert that with regard to ethics, “the silence of Marx, and most Marxisms, is so loud 
as to be deafening.”86 Thompson’s fellow British historian and sometime antagonist Perry 
Anderson agrees: “Marx and Engels left no Ethics, and the resultant gap was never made good in 
the Marxism which ensued after their deaths—to the danger of historical materialism as a theory 
and of the socialist movement as a practice.”87 
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Despite these more cogent versions of Marxist-humanism and the calls for a return to 
Hegel, none of these theorists were able to produce a full-fledged and definitive ethics based in 
the concept of alienation. Sartre, who attempted to reconcile his existentialist commitments with 
Marxism, including its dialectical method and theory of history, proposed a grand treatise on 
ethics. Like Lukács before him, he failed to complete it. 
The debate ended in the familiar impasse. In the first debate a mechanistic application of 
the dialectical method provoked an idealist renunciation of the dialectic. In the second debate an 
idealist reading of the dialectic provoked a structuralist rejection of the dialectic. The idealist 
moment of the first debate and the structuralist moment of the second merged in the “analytical” 
Marxists, who, in their repudiation of the dialectic, applied the methods of analytical philosophy 
and rational choice economic theory to questions of justice, exploitation, and Marxism.
88
 This 
instigated the third debate. 
 
2. 3: The Debate of the 1970s-90s 
 
The most recent debate began in the late 1970s and lasted until the early 1990s. Much more than 
the previous two waves, this debate focused specifically on whether or not Marx condemns 
capitalism as unjust. It will therefore take up a considerable amount of our discussion. The 
debate focused on Marx’s seemingly contradictory statements about exploitation. This 
intensified the scrutiny of the paradox of justice and theft noted by Bernstein decades earlier. In 
this brief overview, I will go into less detail here than with the previous two waves because, in 
later chapters, I give the participants in the third wave of debates a much more detailed 
treatment. 
Some of the most influential participants in the third wave of debates actually began 
addressing the relation between Marx and justice before the end of the second wave of debate. 
Nevertheless, their concern is not the question of Marx’s humanism or structuralism, but rather, 
his relation to questions of justice. Two of the most influential participants in the third wave are 
Robert Tucker and Allen Wood. Indeed, their perspective has often been described as the 
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‘Tucker-Wood thesis.’ Nevertheless, both of them published their first contributions long before 
the debate began. Tucker published his works Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
89
 and The 
Marxian Revolutionary Idea
90
 in 1961 and 1972. He criticizes a few thinkers who argue that 
Marx deems capitalism unjust. These include Harold Laski, A. D. Lindsay, E. H. Carr, and 
Sidney Hook, who, in general commentaries on Marx, do not focus specifically on the question 
of justice. Tucker’s books did not stimulate a broader debate. Although Wood, in his 1972 
article, ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice,’91 raises Tucker’s arguments to a higher level of 
sophistication, he did not elicit any immediate responses. Tucker and Wood did not receive their 
first major rebuttal until 1978 with Ziyad Husami’s ‘Marx on Distributive Justice.’92 It is only 
then that the debate explodes into its third wave. What intervenes between 1972 and 1978? The 
landmark work of Rawls and the widespread debate about justice in liberal political philosophy. 
As we will see, liberal political philosophy proved hugely influential. Indeed, many participants 
attempted to synthesize Marx and Rawls. As with idealism and positivism in the first wave, and 
structuralism and humanism in the second, the third wave was often incorporated into the 
hegemony of liberal political philosophy. 
The third wave of debates featured three major sides. The first group is comprised of 
theorists like Tucker, Wood, Levine, and Reiman, who argue that Marx deems capitalism just; he 
criticizes it on other grounds. The second group is comprised of theorists like Husami, Cohen, 
and Geras, who argue that Marx criticizes capitalism because, among other things, it is unjust. 
The third group is comprised of theorists like Miller, Buchanan, and Lukes, who argue that Marx 
deems capitalism neither just nor unjust because he regards his own critique to be beyond justice 
as such.  
Among those who argue that Marx deems capitalism just according to the only possible 
standards under capitalism, namely, bourgeois justice, some approve, as do Tucker and Wood, 
and some disapprove, as do Levine and Reiman. Members of the latter sub-camp articulate 
versions of a Marxist theory of justice that are remarkably similar to the versions offered by 
those in the opposed camp who do think that Marx condemns capitalism as unjust. Everyone in 
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the second group, which argues that Marx deems capitalism unjust, agrees that he was right to do 
so. The major debate within this camp is whether or not Marx is consistent. In other words, the 
question is whether Marx’s critique of capitalism as unjust is done knowingly, as is argued by 
Husami, or unknowingly, as is argued by Cohen and Geras. For those in the latter sub-camp the 
question becomes: why did Marx hold this principle unconsciously? Among those in the third 
group who argue that Marx does not regard capitalism as just or unjust because he attempts to go 
beyond justice as such, the major difference is whether they approve, as does Miller, or 
disapprove, as do Buchanan and Lukes. 
Ultimately, as we will see in later chapters, the third debate became mired in an impasse 
similar to the first two. It could not resolve the mutually reinforcing tensions between 
determinism and formalism, of which orthodox and revisionist Marxism are the classical 
examples. What neither tendency in these three waves of debate could establish is when an 
affirmation of agency crosses over into voluntarism, and conversely, when an acknowledgement 
of historical and structural tendencies becomes determinism. Therefore, the debates often 
bifurcated into dichotomies between instrumental reason and formalistic reason, between 
consequentialism and deontology. The determinist tendency rejects the notion that ethics is an 
end in itself because it assumes that this necessarily entails utopian socialism. Similarly, 
although the formalist tendency rejects the deterministic reduction of ethics to a means, it also 
assumes that the only alternative to this ‘scientific socialism’ is utopian socialism. This provokes 
the question, is it possible to have a socialism for which ethics is an end but which is not 
utopian? 
Since these are two general tendencies with innumerable shades within them, not 
everyone within one or the other tendency can be criticized for all of the things that are generally 
true about that tendency.
93
 Nevertheless, the persistence of these tendencies throughout the three 
waves is profound. Like Bernstein before them, both Cohen and Geras argue that, in light of the 
refutation of the Marxist theory of history, Marxism must reclaim its ethics by affirming an 
explicitly utopian socialism. Similarly, like Kautsky and Althusser before him, Wood reduces 
ethics to a weapon in the class war and derides the humanist-Marxists. Although a third group of 
commentators argue that Marx’s theory attempts to go beyond justice, insofar as they agree with 
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Marx, as does Miller, they risk the consequentialism typical of Kautsky, Althusser, and Wood; if 
they disagree with Marx, as do Buchanan and Lukes, they are in danger of replicating the 
deontology of Bernstein, Goldmann, and Cohen. Indeed, these two general tendencies have 
proven so persistent, it provokes questions about the extent to which they are reflections of 
deeper imperatives in capitalist social conditions. I will address this in the next chapter. 
In actual practice, both formalism and determinism led to elitism in their own ways. 
Whether it was the gradualist parliamentarism of the Second International or the insurrectionary 
vanguardism of the Third International, what Marx describes as the ‘transforming of 
circumstances and people’94 became the purview of a privileged minority that claimed to 
represent the working class.
95
 There was no long-term and widespread cultivation of the 
democratic capacities necessary for the self-determination of the majority of workers and their 
allies.
96
 
As we saw, revisionism reduces historical materialism to its deterministic caricatures. 
Consequently, in their rejection of determinism, this ‘ethical socialism’ dismisses many of the 
insights that historical materialism provides about the structural limits of capitalism, its inherent 
tendencies, as well as the dynamics of class struggle. As a result, Bernstein and his progeny 
throughout the three waves often uncritically absorb significant features of capitalism. Therefore, 
their socialist politics risks being incorporated back into capitalism, as has been the tendency 
among the varieties of revisionism. This is the case in the first wave with the parliamentary 
elitism of evolutionary socialism;
97
 in the second wave with the adoption of market socialism;
98
 
and in the third wave with the widespread rejection of the labour theory of value.
99
 
When the determinist tendency has avoided being incorporated into capitalism it is only 
because they replaced it with something as bad or worse. The ‘orthodox’ Marxists and 
successive generations of vanguardists neglect that a key part of Marx’s critique of the utopian 
socialists was not merely what must be abolished to bring an end to capital, but what must be 
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established to create a genuine socialism. Indeed, some of Marx’s most trenchant criticisms of 
utopian socialism involved its elitism, the belief of certain individuals that they could decree a 
new social order to which everyone else will adhere. This is precisely what many of the 
determinists replicated in their practice, even while describing themselves as ‘orthodox’ 
Marxists. 
Of course, the revisionist insistence on a universal ethics risks naiveté about the nature of 
class societies, but this need not necessarily be so. Conversely, the determinist assertion that any 
truly human morality is impossible within class societies is much more dangerous. This claim is 
related to the similar assertion that until the classless society is realized, human nature remains 
latent. This too often leads to the notion that, in current conditions, we cannot be fully human, 
and therefore, we are not obliged to act fully human. Furthermore, the determinist tendency often 
assumes that social conflict is basically reducible to class conflict. Therefore, with the abolition 
of class differences, social conflict will come to an end. In other words, with the founding of the 
classless society, ethics will become more or less straightforward. When this set of beliefs is 
combined with deterministic notions of historical development, the content of ethics is neglected 
in both its ends and its means. Therefore, this disregards the fact that the ethics of socialism, 
which is not merely a set of social conditions but also of relations and practices, must be 
cultivated in the present if we are to become the kinds of people necessary to make something 
like a genuinely democratic socialism possible. Nevertheless, revisionism is no less deterministic 
than the orthodox Marxism to which it is opposed. It can rely on the gradualism of ‘evolutionary’ 
socialism precisely because it believes that the development of socialism is inevitable. Indeed, its 
interest in ethics is in large part an attempt to create order, to prevent the class conflict that it 
believes will disrupt the gradual achievement of socialism through parliamentary politics. 
Revisionism neglects that, for Marx, an integral part of class struggle is its agonism, its educative 
function, its fundamental role in developing democratic capacities. Marx contends that it is 
through struggle and revolution alone that workers “become fitted to found society anew.”100 
Put succinctly, the formalist tendency is capable of little more than principled inaction, 
whereas the determinist tendency engages in action that too readily sheds all principles. Whereas 
the formalists have a robust notion of the end but are devoid of the means to achieve it, the 
determinists have an excess of means precisely because they deny all independent status, all 
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substantive content, to the end. The question of means and ends can be helpfully theorized in 
general ways, but these dilemmas cannot be resolved entirely before the fact in philosophical 
treatises or political programmes. It also requires a socialist politics that fosters an extensive, and 
therefore, a de-centralized maturation of the ability to subtly reason about how to pursue the right 
ends, even if these require means we would not use otherwise, while maintaining the balance 
between means and ends, such that these means do not undermine the ends. The elitism shared 
by the revisionist and orthodox Marxists treat the question of means and ends as a set of 
principles to be adopted and applied, not as the development of a certain character, of specific 
capacities, in the majority of workers and their allies. This is inexcusable given the importance of 
praxis, of testing theory through experimental practice and struggle, in the Marxist theory of 
revolution: 
 
proletarian revolutions like those of the nineteenth century constantly criticize 
themselves, constantly interrupt themselves in their own course, return to the 
apparently accomplished, in order to begin anew; they deride with cruel 
thoroughness the half-measures, weaknesses, and paltriness of their first attempts, 
seem to throw down their opponents only so the latter may draw new strength 
from the earth and rise before them again more dramatic than ever, recoil 
constantly from the indefinite colossalness of their own goals—until a situation is 
created which makes all turning back impossible, and the conditions themselves 
call out: Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
101
 
 
Keeping in mind the need for the widespread development of a certain kind of character or 
disposition, we can begin to address the impasse struck in these debates by drawing out the 
connections between praxis and ethics. One such connection is what I will refer to throughout 
this text as ‘practical reason.’ This is a disposition that is as much ethical as it is intellectual, in 
which the understanding of how society functions and should function is a condition of 
connecting our own individual good to the common good of the social whole. Luxemburg asserts 
something similar to this when she states that socialism demands, among other things, “a 
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complete spiritual transformation,” and that “the only way to a rebirth is the school of public life 
itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion.”102 Practical reason is a 
process by which we cultivate ourselves as ethical persons who are habitually disposed to use 
both intelligence and integrity to adeptly read the complexity of circumstances, including the 
social barriers to cooperation, and develop our knowledge of the intricate interrelations between 
our own individual good and the goods of others, even if they do not recognize them as such. 
This does not avoid the potential need for violence or the dangers associated with its use, but it 
begins to develop a standard of the good that is independent of what has been expressed too 
abstractly heretofore, namely, whatever is ‘historically progressive.’ We should recall that 
history does nothing; it is we who act.
103
 
The idea of a robust practical reason oriented toward objective human goods is often 
deemed to be inherently paternalistic. For example, Heller asserts that any theorist who attempts 
to distinguish between objective or ‘real’ needs and imaginary or ‘false’ needs adopts the 
position of a god: “If the theoretician assumes that society is being objectively fetishized, he 
disqualifies his own knowledge as being ‘the’ correct one since his consciousness, too, is a 
product of society. As a consequence, the division of needs into ‘true’ and ‘false’ proves to be 
nonsensical.”104 Nevertheless, this renounces any potential scientific understanding of capitalist 
society. The way to avoid elitism is not by rejecting real needs or objective human goods. After 
all, the idea that human goods are necessarily subjective bolsters the elitism of capital, which, in 
its quest for profits, demands the neutrality of, and autonomy from, political regulations and 
social obligations. Rather, navigating the risks of elitism requires the cultivation of the 
understanding and pursuit of these objective goods on a mass-scale by the majority of workers 
and their allies. It requires the understanding of practical reason as a universal human capacity. 
This is one of the more significant connections between praxis and ethics. 
At the end of each of the first two debates there were theorists who rejected the common 
assumptions held by the formalists and the determinists. They often called for a return to Hegel 
                                                          
102
 Rosa Luxemburg, ‘The Russian Revolution (1918),’ in The Rosa Luxemburg Reader, eds. Peter Hudis and Kevin 
B. Anderson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), 306-7. Geras provides an excellent discussion of these 
passages: Norman Geras, ‘Bourgeois Power and Socialist Democracy: On the Relation of Ends and Means,’ The 
Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (Thetford, Norfolk: Verso, 1985), 182-83. 
103
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1956), 125. 
104
 Agnes Heller, ‘Can ‘True’ or ‘False’ Needs be Posited?’ in Human Needs: A Contribution to Current Debate, ed. 
Katrin Lederer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1980), 213-14. 
 33 
 
and to properly dialectical critique. As we will soon see, I am certainly sympathetic to this. I too 
attempt a return to Hegel as a precondition for the interpretation of Marx. Clearly, however, this 
return to Hegel has not been enough. As I have noted, both Lukács and Sartre left their treatises 
on ethics unfinished. One of the most important aspects of these debates is whether the 
ambiguities, and some would say, the downright contradictions, of Marx’s ethics arise from mere 
caricatures of his theory or from Marx himself. In other words, is the historical determinism that 
leads to a denuded ethics the product only of misinterpretations of Marx, or is it inherent to 
Marx’s historical materialism as Marx himself understood it? This raises the broader question of 
whether or not the dialectical method and its account of historical development necessarily leads 
to a dangerous consequentialism when it is used by those who, against all moral objections, 
claim to harness the progressive movement of history. 
To understand and properly interpret Marx on his own terms requires not only returning 
to what Marx says and the method he offers. It also requires that we use this method in our 
interpretation of Marx. I hope to prove throughout this text that if the impasse struck by the three 
waves of debate has any chance of being resolved, it will require that we turn Marx’s method on 
what Marx says about ethics. This, I believe, is the major shortcoming of all of these debates. In 
attempting to answer the questions about the relation between Marx and justice, they have used a 
distinctly non-Marxist, indeed, an idealist method. I therefore propose that the only way these 
conundrums can be resolved, if indeed any resolution is possible, is through a historical 
materialist critique of Marx. Nevertheless, we must hold out for the possibility that the dialectical 
method, the ‘circle of circles,’ cannot close upon ethics. This is what is ultimately at stake in 
these debates. Perhaps we must not only call into question Marx’s statements about ethics, but 
the historical materialist method as a whole. Perhaps ethics is the rock against which the dialectic 
breaks. 
 34 
 
Chapter 3: Toward A Historical Materialist Critique of Justice 
 
When we approach Marxism for the first time, usually one of the first things we learn is that it is 
a form of materialism. Marxism contends that human consciousness and practice is conditioned 
by material social relations, by the intersection between natural and historical laws, the 
comprehension of which is a precondition of our self-determination, of our ability to transform 
these conditions according to consciously held ends. For this reason, Marxism considers itself a 
science that engages in the critique of ideology, namely, that which generalizes what is merely 
particular, naturalizes what is historical, and casts as the common good what is only the 
particular interest of a ruling class. Furthermore, this is a critique of idealism, which separates 
ideas from their historical context and therefore acts as if history has been governed by the 
development of the best ideas rather than ruling classes that produce the dominant ideas that best 
conform to their interests. Given these theoretical commitments, when one reviews the extensive 
debates within Marxism on the relationship between Marx and justice, we should be immediately 
struck by their idealist character. Often the explanations of Marx’s theory of justice do little more 
than discuss his interactions with intellectual influences. Those commentators who are critical of 
Marx’s position usually explain it in terms of a theoretical or logical error. It is peculiar that self-
described Marxist commentators rarely, if ever, explain Marx’s theoretical errors in terms of his 
historical conditions. They do not ask whether or not Marx uncritically absorbs significant 
features of capitalist society. They do not ask if Marx engages in ideology. 
G. A. Cohen provides an illustrative example of this in an essay on Marxist 
interpretations of freedom and justice.
105
 In this article, Cohen anticipates potential objections to 
his method: analytical philosophy. He notes how some might argue that the precise techniques of 
analytical philosophy, which are adept at examining conceptual error, are not the appropriate 
way to critique ideology, which has its origins not in ‘intellectual malfunctioning’ but in class 
interests. Cohen rejects this contrast: “For the truth is that class interest generates ideology 
precisely by instilling a propensity to errors of reasoning about ideologically sensitive issues.”106 
This is true. Nevertheless, among innumerable potential examples, I focus on Cohen’s essay here 
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because, given what he says, he more than any other commentator should have avoided the 
aforementioned idealist approach. Alas, he does not. 
Cohen first discusses freedom. He exposes the ideological aspects of libertarianism by 
rooting its notion of liberty in the specific private property relations of capitalism. Cohen then 
moves to a discussion of justice in which he describes capitalism as an unjust society because he 
deems private ownership of the means of production, of the most essential conditions of life, as 
unjust. He asserts that all socialists fundamentally believe this whether or not they know it. 
Although many Marxists deny this, deeming justice illusory and irrelevant, Cohen asserts: 
“Revolutionary Marxist belief often misdescribes itself, out of lack of clear awareness of its own 
nature, and Marxist disparagement of the idea of justice is a good example of that deficient self-
understanding.”107 Indeed, Cohen attributes the denial of justice by revolutionaries to “ill-
conceived philosophical commitments.”108 It is evident that Cohen regards this ‘deficient self-
understanding’ as ‘conceptual error’ and ‘intellectual malfunctioning,’ but does he deem 
it…ideological? He does not say. Despite everything he says about the links between analytical 
philosophy and the critique of ideology, Cohen does not ask whether or not this popular belief 
among revolutionaries has its origins in the uncritical absorption of specific social conditions. 
In this essay, Cohen offers an interpretation of Marx’s view of justice. He notes how 
Marx, in his ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ criticizes socialists who argue for fair and 
equitable distribution. Cohen quotes Marx’s assertion that “any distribution whatever of the 
means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions (or means) of 
production themselves.”109 Cohen then offers his analysis of Marx’s assertions: 
 
Yet the standard Marxist view of the passage, a product of hasty reading, is that 
here Marx says that it is production, not distribution, which matters; and this 
misreading is one source of Marxist hostility to the idea of justice. So I want to 
emphasize that Marx is not saying: ‘Give up your obsession with just 
distribution.’ He is saying: ‘Prosecute your concern about distribution at the 
appropriately fundamental level.’110 
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Although I withhold judgement for now about Marx’s view on justice, I agree with Cohen’s 
assertions about focusing on fundamental causes. It is precisely for this reason that Cohen’s 
idealist analysis of justice is so inadequate. This is not due entirely to his analytical philosophical 
approach. As we will see, most commentators are guilty of these shortcomings irrespective of 
their methodology. They have not applied Marxism consistently. They have applied historical 
materialism to everyone…except Marx himself. 
 In order to engage in a historical materialist critique of Marx on the question of justice, 
we must understand the development of ethics in general and justice in particular throughout the 
course of human history. Otherwise, it would be impossible to comprehend the transformation of 
justice throughout the development of capitalism and the extent to which Marx has uncritically 
accepted these changes. In other words, we must compare historically the practices and theories 
of justice in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. We look in vain, however, when we try to find 
a Marxist critique of ethics on the scale of Marx’s critique of political economy in the four 
volumes of Capital. There is no specifically historical materialist account of ethics and religion 
on the scale of Weber’s The Sociology of Religion or Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life. While many Marxist commentators have critically discussed bourgeois ethics and 
justice, few have done so self-critically in a way that interrogates whether or not Marx and 
Marxism have absorbed aspects of the changes to justice under capitalism. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a full-fledged historical materialist 
critique of justice, let alone of ethics. Nevertheless, in order to begin to engage in a historical 
materialist critique of Marx, we must be able to understand what is unique to justice under 
capitalism. This requires a paradigm of pre-capitalist practices and theories of justice by which to 
compare and contrast our current circumstances. This, to a certain extent, is necessarily 
inadequate, because no theory of justice can provide an all-encompassing paradigm for all of the 
manifold forms of pre-capitalist societies. Depending on the choice of paradigm, however, this is 
the best way to proceed in the absence of a full-fledged historical materialist critique of justice. 
Indeed, a goal of this dissertation is to show the need for this broader critique. 
 The paradigm of pre-capitalist justice I have chosen is the schema originated by Plato and 
Aristotle and formalized by Aquinas. There are four compelling reasons to make this tradition 
the paradigm with which to contrast the transformations of justice under capitalism. 
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First, it attempts to be comprehensive. It includes ‘distributive justice,’ ‘commutative 
justice,’ ‘corrective justice,’ and ‘complete justice.’ This fourfold schema addresses most, if not 
all, of the major aspects of justice. This comprehensiveness makes it more difficult to take for 
granted anything about our own commonly-held assumptions about justice. Indeed, as we will 
soon see, it is much broader than most contemporary notions of justice. Furthermore, 
commentaries about the relation between Marx and justice have often focused on distributive 
justice, and, unwittingly, commutative justice, but very few have addressed the potential roles of 
corrective justice and complete justice in Marx’s work. This is also why I have structured this 
book in terms of the fourfold schema. 
Second, the schema has been incredibly influential, not only in Western, but also in 
Eastern philosophy.
111
 Until the early modern period, Aristotle’s theory of justice often set the 
terms of the discussion. The theory was supplemented, amended, and adapted to specific societal 
conditions, but it nonetheless remained dominant.
112
 
Third, because of these two factors, it was often the theory against which early modern 
theorists rebelled in their formulation of the specifically modern theories of justice.
113
 As we will 
soon see, Hobbes is a paradigmatic case. Therefore, the schema developed by Plato, Aristotle, 
and Aquinas is a good contrast to what have become the common-sense notions of justice today. 
Fourth, despite the rebellions against this notion of justice, there have been a number of 
periodic returns to Aristotle in modern thought. Indeed, we could say that Aristotelianism is the 
‘bad conscience’ of modern political theory. This has occurred within liberal thought, whether it 
is J.S. Mill’s revised utilitarianism in the nineteenth century or Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach in the twentieth century. A number of seminal works were published in 1958 that 
inaugurated a prominent neo-Aristotelianism, including Arendt’s The Human Condition, Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’114 
which launched modern virtue ethics. Indeed, the most famous virtue ethicist is Alasdair 
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MacIntyre, a former Marxist, and a number of Marxist theorists—we could call them 
‘NicoMarxians’—are attempting to develop a Marxist virtue ethics.115 
It is for these reasons that the schema of justice developed by Plato, Aristotle, and 
Aquinas throws into relief the transformations of justice, in both theory and practice, in the 
transitions to capitalism, and therefore, our common-sense assumptions about justice within 
capitalism. Although the schema of justice is quite complex, for our purposes here, a brief 
overview will suffice. 
For Aristotle, justice is a unique virtue. It contains within itself all of the other virtues. 
More than any other virtue it is directed toward the good of others.
116
 Therefore, it is a distinctly 
social virtue. Furthermore, for Aristotle, contrary to the sophists, not all justice is conventional 
justice.
117
 It is not reducible to the prevailing laws and customs. It also has a natural part. Since it 
is a virtue, it is an ontological part of our human nature. It exists in all humans irrespective of 
their social context. Indeed, it prescribes certain actions regardless of the prevailing conventions. 
Aquinas later describes this as the distinction between natural law and positive law.
118
 Natural 
law is based in nature, in human nature and in the broader cosmos. Its standards are true 
everywhere and at all times. Positive law is the particular body of laws adapted to specific 
societal circumstances. The natural law is the basis by which we judge the validity of the positive 
law. 
Let us now turn to the four major dimensions of Aristotle’s theory of justice. The first 
aspect of justice is ‘distributive justice.’ This involves the distribution of commonly-held things 
to individuals according to some notion of merit. The second aspect, ‘corrective justice,’ 
addresses crime and punishment. Corrective justice rectifies wrongs committed during 
transactions, whether they are initially voluntary, such as trades and loans, or involuntary, such 
as theft and adultery.
119
 The third aspect of justice concerns market exchange, which Aristotle 
describes as ‘reciprocity’ and which Aquinas later calls ‘commutative justice.’120 It has to do 
with the exchange of privately-held goods of equivalent worth. The final aspect, the capstone of 
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justice to which the other aspects are subordinate, is ‘complete justice.’ This is the individual’s 
ethical orientation to the common ends of the social whole and the objective goods of human 
nature. Aristotle deems it essential that we understand justice in all of its aspects. He asserts that 
most people focus on one or another facet of justice, but not justice as a whole in its authoritative 
sense. The political community is not merely for living together, for engaging in compacts to 
prevent injustice. Rather, it is for living well, for making its citizens good and just. Those who 
have the greater part in the city are not the most free, wealthiest, or best born, but those who 
contribute the most to the community on the basis of political virtue.
121
 Justice as a whole is the 
political good and its basis is the common good of society.
122
 
The two proprietary forms of justice are distributive and commutative justice. They are 
distinct from the non-proprietary aspects of justice, namely, corrective and complete justice. 
These latter are certainly concerned with property in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, unlike 
distributive and commutative justice, they are not primarily concerned with how individuals 
relate to each other through their property. In order to see why the proper distinction between 
distributive justice and commutative justice is crucial for our understanding of the dramatic 
changes undergone by justice as a whole throughout capitalist modernity, we must take a more 
detailed look at proprietary justice. 
Distributive justice is concerned with publicly-owned and commonly-held goods 
distributed by non-market institutions, such as the family or the state. In other words, distributive 
justice pertains to things divisible among those who share in a regime, such as public wealth, 
offices, and honours. This form of justice takes into account the status or merit of the people 
involved. Aristotle argues that distributive justice, like all justice, is concerned with equality. 
Nevertheless, this is not strict equality. Rather, it is a proportionate equality according to the 
different merits of the individuals involved. Aristotle contends that distribution is just when it is 
proportionate to these respective merits.
123
 In other words, this is equality between equals and 
proportionate inequality between unequals. Someone acts unjustly when she has more of the 
good things and less of the bad things relative to her merit, and conversely, she suffers injustice 
when she has less of the good and more of the bad things relative to her merit.
124
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Aristotle argues that social conflict arises because there are disagreements over what 
should constitute the standards of merit.
125
 The oligarchs argue that the primary standard is 
wealth. Some aristocrats argue that it is good birth and good education. Other aristocrats, 
Aristotle’s true aristocrats, argue that the standard is virtue. The demos argues that the standard is 
free-birth or citizen-equality because anyone who is a citizen deserves an equal share of the 
commonly-held things. Therefore, there is an integral relation between distributive justice and 
complete justice.
126
 As Strauss notes, “There is a meaning of justice which is not exhausted by 
the principles of commutative and distributive justice in particular. Prior to being the 
commutatively and distributively just, the just is the common good.”127 The dominant standard 
typically observed at any given time is based on the nature of the regime. In oligarchies, the 
supreme good or the common end of the regime is wealth; in aristocracies, it is good birth or 
education; in democracies, equality; and in Aristotle’s true aristocracy, it is virtue. These 
different regimes with their distinct conceptions of the supreme good provide the content for 
complete justice, the individual’s ethical orientation to the social whole. 
Justice is not only a judgement in the sense of evaluating when someone or something 
deserves praise or blame. It is also a guide to our own activity. Aristotle makes a distinction 
between, on the one hand, the just or unjust act, and on the other hand, the just or unjust 
person.
128
 A person may engage in a just or unjust act without thereby being a just or unjust 
person. It is only when justice or injustice become a stable, recurring aspect of our character that 
we can be described as just or unjust persons. This is why there is an intimate relation between 
complete justice and ‘prudence’ or practical reason. The just person has cultivated this capacity 
to such an extent that they are not overwhelmed by the complexity of circumstances and are 
capable of making innumerable minute judgements about what these circumstances require. 
Indeed, it is a character trait that becomes so integral to our personal identities and associations 
that it provides a stable compass even in the face of great personal danger and dramatic social 
change. For Plato and Aristotle, the better the regime, the more this capacity is cultivated in the 
citizenry. 
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In Plato’s best regime, property, offices, and tasks will be distributed according to 
whomever is most ‘suited’ to them, and therefore, can use them most virtuously according to 
their proper purpose.
129
 Aristotle agrees:  
 
If someone were preeminent in flute playing, but very deficient in good birth or 
fine looks, even if each of those goods is greater than flute playing (I mean good 
birth and fine looks), and even if they are proportionately more preeminent with 
respect to flute playing than he is preeminent in flute playing, the outstanding 
flutes nevertheless ought to be given to him.
130
 
 
In this way, the content of the standard of merit for distributive justice is provided by the 
character of complete justice, of whatever the ultimate purpose of the community is deemed to 
be. For Plato, this is not merely peace and stability, but the happiness of the whole. Therefore, 
the natural rulers are those who are most concerned with the common good and who use the state 
and its laws to educate the citizenry toward the good. The objective goods of human nature and 
the common ends of the societal whole do not necessarily demand sheer homogeneity. Rather, 
Plato and Aristotle aspire to a situation in which there are diverse paths to what nonetheless 
remains a single and coherent notion of the good life. 
Aristotle describes market exchange as ‘reciprocity,’ the root meaning of which is ‘to 
suffer in turn,’ or the lex talionis.131 Aquinas will later define this as ‘commutative’ justice. This 
form of justice has primarily to do with exchanges between individuals of their privately-held 
goods. Aristotle attempts to solve how different products are made commensurable. For 
example, he asks how one house can be made into the equivalent of five couches. Aristotle does 
not settle on a definitive answer. (As we will see, Marx argues that the basis of this 
commensurability is labour.) Nevertheless, the standard, whatever the basis of its 
commensurability, is a standard of equivalence. The question is how a certain kind of one thing 
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is made equal in value to another.
132
 This standard of equality, sheer equivalence, is distinct from 
the proportionate equality of distributive justice. Some have argued that Aristotle deems 
commutative justice a question of proportionate equality. Nevertheless, this misinterprets some 
of Aristotle’s admittedly opaque remarks. As Miekle notes, 
 
In the distribution of honours and public property, ‘if the people involved are not 
equal, they will not [justly] receive equal shares; indeed, whenever equals receive 
unequal shares, or unequals equal shares, in a distribution, that is a source of 
quarrels and accusations.’ Private property could not conceivably be exchanged 
in anything like this way, if, for reasons of hierarchy, one man could command in 
the market more for his goods than another, who would choose, without 
compulsion, to exchange with him, except someone of his own status on whom 
he could not pull rank? Even this person would try to avoid his equal because 
exchange with an inferior would be more advantageous. The idea is absurd, and 
Aristotle understood exchange far too well […] ever to have entertained it.133 
 
Therefore, commutative justice entails the exchange of things of equal value irrespective of the 
status or the merits of the individuals involved. In contrast to proportionate equality, its typical 
standard is arithmetic equality. In other words, the standard of commutative justice is ‘to each 
their due,’ if by due we mean sheer equivalence. 
Commutative justice is subordinate to distributive justice and both forms of proprietary 
justice are subordinate to complete justice. This means that commutative justice is bound within 
significant constraints. As Tawney notes, traditional theories of commutative justice cast 
transactions in terms of personal morality.
134
 A crucial dimension of this was to protect the 
peasant and the craftsperson from money-lenders. This is most evident in Aquinas’s theory of the 
‘just price.’135 In periods of dearth, no one should profit from the necessity of others because this 
is an affront to the common ends of the organic whole within which all legitimate interests must 
be integrated. Indeed, Aristotle describes buying cheap in order to sell dear as ‘unnatural’ 
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precisely because it undermines the integrity of the political community.
136
 This is significant 
because, as we will see, under capitalist modernity, it is distributive justice that becomes 
subordinate. Furthermore, the increasing predominance of commutative justice is such that many 
come to deny the very existence of complete justice, of an objective human good by which one 
could distinguish the ‘natural’ from the ‘unnatural’ use of products. 
As we have just seen, there are two fundamental differences between commutative and 
distributive justice. First, they are concerned with different kinds of property. Commutative 
justice is concerned with private property. Distributive justice is concerned with public or 
communal property. Second, these two forms of proprietary justice have different standards of 
equality. The standard of commutative justice is ‘arithmetical equality.’ In other words, this is an 
exact equivalence between the values of things. Conversely, the standard of distributive justice is 
‘geometric equality.’ This is the proportionate equality between persons according to their 
respective status or merit. From now on, I will often refer to these two standards as ‘equivalence’ 
and ‘proportionality.’ 
Even though the vast majority of commentators use an idealist method, they often do not 
use it very well. Indeed, many commentators seem unfamiliar with the history, and in particular, 
the premodern history, of political philosophy. For example, when we first approach the massive 
amount of material on the relation between Marx and ‘distributive justice’ we immediately find 
ourselves in a somewhat embarrassing situation. Most of these commentators do not focus on 
distributive justice at all. Instead, their discussions have usually been dedicated to what is 
traditionally described as ‘commutative’ justice. This is not a terminological triviality. It is worth 
demonstrating this in some detail here because, as we will see, we cannot understand the role of 
justice in capitalist modernity without first making the proper distinction between distributive 
justice and commutative justice. This is important in general because even those commentators 
with an avowedly historical method often produce theories of justice that are pervaded by 
ahistorical assumptions that uncritically absorb notions of justice specific to capitalist society. It 
is important in particular because, as we will see in later chapters, if Marx’s critique of 
commodity production is correct, then the principle of labour-contribution, an important version 
of the principle ‘to each their due,’ is impossible within a social system where commutative 
justice is the primary form of proprietary justice. 
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Few of the Marxist commentators even mention commutative justice, but when they do 
they are almost always mistaken about it. In an attempt to solve the question as to whether or not 
Marx regards exploitation as unjust, Arie translates Marx back into Aristotelian concepts: 
 
To use Aristotelian terminology, distributive justice, or the exchange in 
accordance with an endowed labour-quantity, does not realise itself under 
commutative justice, or the appearance of the exchange of equivalents, that is, 
labour and wages. I think that putting Marx’s idea of justice in the Aristotelian 
tradition is the only path to a consistent and plausible interpretation.
137
 
 
Arie argues that, on this basis, Marx deems capitalism unjust according to distributive justice. 
Nevertheless, he wrongly conflates distributive and commutative justice. Arie is correct to treat 
market exchange as an instance of commutative justice. He is wrong, however, to describe 
labour-contribution as a kind of merit warranting geometric or proportionate equality, as is 
typical of distributive justice. Under capitalism, labour-power is commodified on a general scale. 
This makes this labour-power subject to market-exchange. As soon as labour becomes a 
commodity it is made commensurable with every other commodity. It is therefore subject to the 
standard of equivalence, to arithmetical equality, to the commutative justice of the market. It is 
no longer directly a matter of distributive justice. 
Hancock argues that, for Marx, the wage-relation between labour and capital is not 
intrinsically unjust to the worker according to commutative justice.
138
 This is because they 
exchange equivalents. This only becomes unjust according to commutative justice if fraud and 
coercion are involved. Nevertheless, Hancock asserts that Marx deems capitalism unjust 
according to distributive justice, by which Hancock means the appropriation of surplus-value by 
the capitalist.
139
 While Hancock is to be commended for even mentioning commutative justice, 
there are two problems with his analysis. First, he neglects how, as we will soon see, Marx uses 
immanent critique to expose the internal contradictions of commutative justice. Second, and 
more relevant for our purposes here, Hancock misuses the concept of distributive justice. Not 
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only is commodified labour a matter of commutative justice, not distributive justice, but 
Hancock also confuses commutative with distributive justice when he describes progressive 
income taxes as an example of the former rather than the latter.
140
 These taxes, appropriated by 
the state, become a public good outside of the realm of market exchange. Therefore, they are 
beyond the realm of commutative justice. 
Daly also mentions commutative justice.
141
 Nevertheless, he too conflates it with 
distributive justice. Daly describes the ‘total injustice’ of capitalism as the vicious circle 
between, on the one hand, commutative injustice, the systematic theft of surplus-value in market 
exchange, and on the other hand, distributive injustice, the inequality in the primary distribution 
of the means of production.
142
 One of the things that makes capitalism unique from non-capitalist 
societies, however, is that the means of production are a part of market exchange. Commodities 
and money exist in many non-capitalist class societies, but they only become capital when the 
means of production enter general circulation as commodities that can be bought and sold.
143
 In 
other words, even if the ‘distribution’ of the means of production is more fundamental than the 
‘distribution’ of the means of consumption, under capitalism, both are primarily a matter of 
commutative justice. Similarly, Colletti criticizes Eduard Bernstein for locating the appropriation 
of surplus-value in the realm of exchange rather than in production, “as though surplus value 
originated, in other words, in a violation of commutative justice.”144 Colletti’s critique of 
Bernstein’s neglect of production is correct. Nevertheless, if the conditions of production are 
capital, are capable of being bought and sold, they too are within the realm of commutative 
justice. 
These confusions are not unique to Marxism. Among the non-Marxist commentators, the 
conflation of commutative and distributive justice is true even of Walzer despite the fact that the 
main goal of his theory of justice is maintaining the integrity of the distinct spheres of ‘social 
goods.’145 He describes as distributive justice all allocations of goods, whether they are acquired 
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through market exchange, the state, or elsewhere. This neglects important differences between 
commutative and distributive justice. 
Although the conflation of commutative and distributive justice indicates a lack of 
awareness of the long history of political philosophy, and in particular, premodern notions of 
justice, this mistake is not entirely theoretical. It also reflects changing social conditions. The 
method used by most of the recent accounts of the development of justice has been a ‘history of 
ideas’ or ‘intellectual histories’ approach. These studies often neglect how the dramatic 
transformations undergone by the theory and practice of justice, in all of its aspects, corresponds 
to material developments in the transitions to capitalism. We can understand neither the 
prevailing assumptions about justice, nor Marx’s ambiguous relation to them, unless we see both 
as the product of social development. In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine intellectual 
histories as well as more sociological and materialist explanations of changing theories and 
practices of justice in the modern period. One of the reasons why I draw from a variety of 
different explanations is so that I cannot be accused of ‘backward-reasoning.’ In other words, I 
do not start from what Marx says about justice and then identify specific transformations of 
justice under capitalist modernity in a way that prejudges whether or not Marx absorbs these 
historical changes uncritically. 
Throughout this chapter, I will offer tentative explanations as to how recent 
transformations of justice correspond to the historically unique characteristics of capitalist 
society. In other words, changing conceptions of justice are related to changing practices of 
justice. What I offer here are provisional hypotheses. It would take immense socio-historical and 
comparative-political research to fully confirm them. Nevertheless, that the historical materialist 
critique of capitalism can provide plausible explanations of the transformations of justice under 
capitalism is enough for our purposes here. It shows the inadequacy of all of those Marxist 
commentaries on the relation between Marx and justice that have not been posed in these terms. 
In other words, for our purposes here, it is sufficient that this is only the beginning of a historical 
materialist critique of justice. 
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The first major change is that, under capitalism, commutative justice replaces distributive 
justice as the primary form of proprietary justice. There is a reason why Aristotle discusses 
distributive justice ahead of commutative justice. In Aristotle’s society, like all non-capitalist 
class societies, production was primarily for the direct use of the immediate community.
146
 
Ruling classes appropriated surplus, usually in the form of compulsory services and tribute, 
directly from producers.
147
 Markets, even when they were prevalent, were always subordinate to 
production for use. Consequently, people acquired goods primarily through direct distribution, 
not exchange. It therefore makes sense for Aristotle to begin his account of the particular aspects 
of justice with distributive justice. Under capitalism, however, the dominant form of economic 
activity is production for exchange. The primary way to acquire goods is through the market. In 
the transitions from production for use to production for exchange, the priority of distributive 
justice over commutative justice is reversed. 
This has a significant impact on what constitutes the primary standard of proprietary 
justice, namely, ‘to each their due.’ The predominance of commutative justice over distributive 
justice entails that arithmetical equality, the standard of equivalence, overtakes justice as 
geometric equality, or proportionality according to merit. In non-capitalist class societies, since 
production is primarily for direct use, it is constrained by pre-determined patterns of 
distribution.
148
 The kind and the extent of each estate’s contributions and compensations are 
contested and coordinated before production begins. In other words, production is normatively 
regulated by, on the one hand, ruling classes using directly political and if need be military 
means, and on the other hand, the communal deliberation of producers who have at least partial 
ownership and control of their conditions of production.
149
 Conversely, under capitalism, since 
production is for exchange, it is not consciously directed according to a predetermined 
distribution of use-values.
150
 The basis of production is not political direction or communal 
deliberation. Rather, the socially-determined worth of products, their exchange-values, as well as 
                                                          
146
 Marx compares and contrasts production for use and production for exchange in their various forms in Marx, 
Grundrisse, op. cit., 156-65; 490-514; Marx, Capital: Volume One, op cit., 169-73. 
147
 For an excellent analysis of this, see Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997), 79-80; et passim. 
148
 Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., 496. 
149
 George Comninel, ‘English feudalism and the origins of capitalism,’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 27.4 (2000): 1-
53; 8. 
150
 Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., 156. 
 48 
 
their allocations to different individuals, are determined after the production process through the 
interplay of commodities in market competition, which no one directly controls. 
If, as we noted, economic activity was traditionally considered to be in the orbit of 
personal morality, it is now deemed a much more impersonal process. As we will see, this is one 
of the reasons why the sphere of ‘morality’ begins to shrink and the domain of what is called the 
‘non-moral,’ the ‘amoral,’ or the morally-indifferent, begins to expand. As always, the basis of 
proprietary justice is ‘to each their due’ or ‘to each what they are owed.’ The difference is that 
what is ‘due’ is the precise equivalent according to value rather than a notion of proportional due 
according to some standard of politically determined merit. Under capitalism, there is a vast 
array of legally-enforced regulations of exchange, but they only set the parameters within which 
the exchange of equivalents occur: they do not challenge the standard of equivalence itself. 
Indeed, as we will see, due-as-equivalence is often regarded as the principle of justice sine qua 
non for private property. 
It is for this reason that Hobbes argues that justice derives merely from the stipulations 
agreed to in the contract, not the respective merits of the parties involved. After explaining what 
he regards as the old-fashioned distinction between arithmetic (equivalent) and geometric 
(proportionate) equality, Hobbes asserts:  
 
But what is all this to justice? For neither if I sell my goods for as much as I can 
get for them, do I injure the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if 
I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the 
other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our Saviour 
himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of 
justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be denied but that justice is a certain 
equality, as consisting in this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one 
should not arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he 
have fairly gotten it by compact.
151
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As Macpherson notes, Hobbes has little time for the distinction between commutative and 
distributive justice, between equal value and relative merit, because value is whatever the market 
awards irrespective of the merits of the individuals involved.
152
 Therefore, the conflation of 
commutative and distributive justice begins in the early modern period. Indeed, as Hont and 
Ignatieff note, Grotius argues that the term ‘property’ should only apply to the modern notion of 
exclusive dominion, not to common property.
153
 Similarly, Rommen contends that Locke inverts 
the typical order and prioritizes commutative justice and self-interest over distributive justice and 
the common good.
154
 
The increasing prominence of commutative justice as the primary form of proprietary 
justice thereby provokes a dramatic change in distributive justice. Indeed, distributive justice 
becomes about redistribution intended to ameliorate the conflicts arising from commutative 
justice. As the regime of absolute private property spread, questions arose about the extent to 
which all allocations and distributions of goods could be accounted for in terms of commutative 
justice. Grotius argues that the realm of commutative justice, what he calls ‘expletive’ justice, is 
the domain of ‘perfect rights’ grounded by the natural law of ‘to each their own.’ Conversely, the 
realm of distributive justice, what he calls ‘attributive’ justice, within which the right of necessity 
is housed, is the domain of ‘imperfect rights’ commanded by humanity, but not by law.155 
This question was all the more pressing because, whereas pre-modern thinkers like 
Cicero condemned profiting from distress, early modern commentators increasingly argue that 
commutative justice is best served when one person’s hardship is another person’s gain.156 
Consequently, a crucial aspect of early modern jurisprudence was a debate about the precise 
boundaries between the right of private property and the right of necessity. In other words, how 
dire must the need be before seizing the property of another is no longer simple theft? As Hont 
and Ignatieff note, “Like Pufendorf, Locke admitted that merchants who exploited scarcity 
offended against the law of humanity, but he argued that they would only offend against strict 
justice if they actually caused someone to starve.”157 Although Smith argues that we must relax 
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the otherwise unlimited right of private property in cases of extreme necessity, by ‘extreme’ he 
means starvation.
158
 Anything less urgent than this means that the affront of private property is 
theft. 
As we saw, distributive justice has had a number of contested standards of what 
constitutes merit, including birth, wealth, citizen equality, and virtue. As numerous 
commentators have noted, in the modern era, for the first time in history, distributive justice 
includes a new standard: need. Formerly, need or ‘the right of necessity’ was deemed to be a 
matter of benevolence, charity, or liberality.
159
 Conversely, under capitalism, needs become a 
matter of distributive justice. Miller argues that notions of distributive justice based in the 
standard of need emerged during the transitions to the more corporatist, welfarist forms of 
capitalism, what Miller calls ‘organized capitalism.’ 160 If it is corporatism that explains the rise 
of justice as need, however, why is the ‘right of necessity’ given prominent expression by 
radicals in the transitions to capitalism as well as during periods of laissez-faire capitalism? For 
example, the first known modern expression of the famous principle, ‘to each according to their 
needs,’ is given by Morelly in 1755.161 As we will see, it was adopted during the French 
Revolution and by the socialist movements in Western Europe in the 1830s-1840s. Surely these 
periods cannot be described as ‘organized capitalism.’ Few commentators have noted that, 
throughout the history of capitalism, need has become the standard of distributive justice 
primarily because dispossessed producers are increasingly dependent on the market, which 
abstracts from needs in a number of historically-unique ways. 
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The basis of this market-dependence, and of capitalism in general, is the ‘primitive 
accumulation’ that violently separated producers from their conditions of production.162 In non-
capitalist class societies most producers possessed enough productive property to produce for 
their own subsistence. Furthermore, in times of dearth the ruling classes often provided 
subsistence. Although this was cast as their ‘mandatory obligations,’ it also preserved the long-
term relations of exploitation between producers and landed wealth.
163
 Under capitalism, 
dispossessed wage-labourers do not have the productive property necessary to produce for their 
own subsistence. They are dependent on the market for their daily and generational reproduction. 
Indeed, this is the only way in which wage-labour can become generalized. Producers must be 
forced to sell on the market the only piece of productive property remaining in their possession: 
their ability to labour. 
As will be explained in more detail in a subsequent chapter, under capitalism, while 
labour is the source of value, the worker is paid a wage for their commodified labour, their 
‘labour-power.’164 Labour produces more value than it costs the capitalist as labour-power. This 
is its use-value for the capitalist and the source of his profits. Although there is an exchange of 
equivalent values, of equal wages for equal labour-power, there is also the appropriation of 
uncompensated surplus-labour.
165
 One of the questions I will try to answer is whether or not 
Marx deems this exploitation commutatively unjust. In the meantime, for our purposes here, it is 
enough to note that dispossessed wage-labourers who are dependent on the market for their 
subsistence must enter into this disadvantageous exchange with the capitalist—that is, if workers 
are able to find a job. When the ability to labour becomes commodified labour-power, as with 
any other commodity, capitalists will only purchase it as an input for production if it can be 
deployed profitably. Since the market does not always require this commodified labour, 
unemployment is a structural feature of capitalism. Both systemic exploitation and structural 
unemployment reduce the capacity of producers to translate their needs into wages, into the 
exchange-values necessary for their consumption. 
                                                          
162
 Marx, Capital, op. cit., 873-76. 
163
 For an excellent discussion of these kinds of relations, as well as their transformation amid the transitions to 
capitalism, see E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,’ in Customs 
in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 1993). 
164
 Marx, Capital, op. cit., 274. 
165
 Ibid., 301. 
 52 
 
Market exchange only recognizes ‘effective’ needs, namely, needs that can be expressed 
through purchasing power. From the perspective of the market, if someone cannot express her 
felt need through purchasing power, it is as if her need does not exist. Consequently, we must 
distinguish between, on the one hand, those needs that are converted into actual consumption 
through exchange, and, on the other hand, those felt needs that are intentionally fixed on specific 
objects and which persist irrespective of whether or not they are successfully converted.
166
 It is 
the latter that is increasingly the terrain of distributive justice under capitalism. 
The standard of need arises because, when dispossessed producers can no longer produce 
for their own subsistence, the circumstances causing the right of necessity are no longer 
exceptional. Therefore, this necessity cannot be adequately addressed by individual acts of 
charity. If the right of necessity becomes a structural problem, then in the absence of active 
intervention, dire need becomes the rule. Although Miller rejects the idea that any social class is 
particularly predisposed to alternative communities and radical equality, it has primarily been 
precarious producers and their spokespersons who have elevated the standard of need from a 
principle of charity to a demand of justice.
167
 
Another significant transformation of distributive justice is that it becomes centralized in 
the state. This is the result primarily of the expansion, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of 
private property under capitalism. In non-capitalist class societies most families owned 
productive property. Therefore, there was substantial distribution within and between families. 
Furthermore, producers often had shared possession and control of communal property directly 
regulated by custom and obligation. This too was a significant site of communal distribution 
between subordinate classes. As a result, distributive justice was not only the concern of state 
institutions, but also of the family and community too. The transitions to capitalism, however, 
violently separated producers from the means of production. With the decline of the ancien 
régime, individuals continued to be deemed the bearers of interests, but these interests lost their 
familial and corporative character.
168
 Gradually, most families and community organizations 
could only acquire the means of consumption, not the means to produce them.
169
 Consequently, 
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where public property exists, it is now centralized in the one entity whose social power vies with 
that of capital: the state. 
This is related to the ways in which capitalist production abstracts from concrete needs. 
Things will only be produced if they are conducive to the expanded reproduction of surplus-
value.
170
 Every single form of production in human history has been constrained in what and 
how it produced by what it could afford in terms of material objects, labouring effort, and 
monetary resources. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between what can be afforded and what 
is profitable. In the former case, if production is social, conducted through the state or state-
regulated estates, certain things can be produced at a loss because they are deemed crucial for the 
community as a whole. Conversely, individualized production under capitalism will rarely, if 
ever, operate at a loss. It is dictated entirely by what is profitable. Thus, even if there is a felt 
need for something in the community, if it cannot be produced profitably, it will not be produced 
unless some other institution, typically government, does so. 
This is one reason why the right of necessity shifts from a question of charity to justice. 
For example, before the Reformation, not only was the relief of need considered mercy, but it 
was conferred to people insofar as they were Christians, not citizens. As Fleischacker notes: 
 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, states were at least nominally 
wresting control over poor relief from the church. Charles V tried to regularize 
relief throughout the Netherlands in 1531, decreeing that it should be centralized 
and laying down certain general conditions for the poor to receive support; his 
decree met, however, ‘with the determined and effective resistance of the Church 
and was fully implemented nowhere in the Northern Netherlands.
171
 
 
Programmes for poor relief were established in Hamburg in 1529, in Sweden in 1571, in the 
German Empire in 1577, and in England in 1601. Although this process was gradual, state 
redistribution decreasingly occurred through the church.
172
 As Gerstenberger notes, the 
centralization of redistribution was a crucial part of the formation of the modern nation-state: 
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In place of solidarity in the social neighbourhood, which could scarcely function 
any longer in the period of industrialisation, the state organised solidarity among 
strangers. This new model of inclusion, justice and control was especially 
pronounced in states where the right to existential security could be effected in 
the form of compulsory membership in social insurance funds. But, even in social 
states that were organised and financed differently from this, the state correction 
of the distributive results of the market was and still is bound up with methods of 
control designed to ensure that the supply of labour on the market is maintained 
at a sufficient level. Initially, the material benefits were very limited. But, from 
the very beginning, this social right meant a new form of constitution of political 
unity.
173
 
 
Thus, in the modern view, distributive justice is primarily the concern of the state in its relations 
to its citizens. 
When distributive justice becomes concentrated in the state, it seems less a virtuous 
disposition inherent to all ethical individuals and more a legal or juridical concern of particular 
individuals with specific institutional responsibilities. Finnis notes how in the traditional view 
exemplified by Aquinas virtually every citizen is responsible for certain public goods, for items 
of the common stock, and therefore has duties of distributive justice.
174
 After the sixteenth-
century, however, distributive justice is deemed to be a matter of the state as the personification 
of the community as a whole. Distributive justice is viewed less as the involuntary obligations 
that bind everyone in the community and more as the voluntary obligations conferred to 
particular individuals by their governmental responsibilities. This is connected to Hobbes’s 
rejection of the idea that justice has a predetermined standard of merit. Rather, justice is 
whatever is agreed to and follows from the covenant or contract. This is due also to the ways in 
which commutative justice deeply influences the character of distributive justice under 
capitalism. Although the standard of commutative justice is arithmetic equality, the exchange of 
equivalents, and the standard of distributive justice is geometric equality, or, proportional need, 
both are impersonal standards. As with allocations according to what is owed, redistribution 
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often aspires to neutrality toward the ultimate ends or purpose of those with the needs that must 
be satisfied, as long as they remain within the law. 
One of the more important reasons why we must distinguish between the commutative 
justice of the market and the distributive justice of the state is the conflict that arises between the 
standards of ‘due’ and of ‘need.’175 Under capitalism, the essential basis of the conflict between 
them is the tension between the private and public sectors. The commutative justice of the 
market gives rise to the principle ‘to each their due,’ where what is owed is the precise 
equivalence based on exchange-values. As we have seen, to the extent that the market is the basis 
upon which goods are allocated, it will provoke a widespread and dire necessity. Consequently, 
there will be struggles to expand the public institutions for which need is the primary standard of 
redistribution. Polanyi describes this as the ‘countermovement’: “For a century the dynamics of 
modern society was governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this 
movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions.”176 In 
other words, it is a struggle over the extent to which commutative justice dominates proprietary 
justice in general. We saw earlier the attempts by early modern jurists to reduce all property 
‘proper’ to private property, and therefore, all proprietary justice to commutative justice. That the 
conflation of both aspects of proprietary justice is now often described as ‘distributive justice,’ 
that ‘commutative justice’ has fallen out of our vocabulary, indicates perhaps how much we take 
for granted the prominence of market exchange. In a later chapter, I will determine whether or 
not Marx thinks there is a standard of distributive justice within capitalism. 
Under capitalism, although distributive justice has necessarily expanded to include needs, 
it has also contracted in certain ways. Miller defines the subject-matter of justice as the 
distribution of benefits and burdens.
177
 He excludes power from these benefits, “since we use 
other concepts to discuss and evaluate the distribution of power in society—concepts such as 
democracy and authority.”178 In non-capitalist class societies, however, distributive justice not 
only included material goods, but also offices and honours. In other words, political positions 
and public responsibilities were included in the things that could be distributed justly. Under 
capitalism, however, offices and honours are no longer considered a part of distributive justice. 
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They are more often deemed a matter of freedom, or freedom in a specifically political sense. It 
is not that distributive justice has been reduced to strictly proprietary goods. It is that offices are 
no longer regarded as property. This is a result of the peculiar character of production and 
accumulation under capitalism. 
In non-capitalist class societies, since producers had possession over their conditions of 
production, they could produce for their own subsistence. This gave them a measure of 
autonomy. Therefore, the appropriation of surplus required directly political coercion by the 
ruling authorities. Conversely, under capitalism, dispossessed producers must enter the labour-
market in order to acquire subsistence. Rarely do they need to be directly coerced into the 
market. The threat of starvation suffices.
179
 Thus, contrary to other forms of class society, 
political coercion need not be expressed at the point of production in order to appropriate 
surplus. Furthermore, a division of rule forms within the ruling class between economic 
appropriation and political domination. Capitalists whose economic power is increasingly 
dependent on discretion over their privately-owned productive property demand autonomy from 
direct political and communal control over what is produced, how, and for whom. Indeed, 
political control of production is increasingly deemed an intervention from the outside. Ellen 
Meiksins Wood describes this as the differentiation of the economic from the political under 
capitalism: 
 
the powers of the appropriator no longer carry with them the obligation to 
perform social, public functions. In capitalism, there is a complete separation of 
private appropriation from public duties; and this means the development of a 
new sphere of power devoted completely to private rather than social purposes. In 
this respect, capitalism differs from pre-capitalist forms in which the fusion of 
economic and political powers meant not only that surplus extraction was an 
‘extra-economic’ transaction separate from the production process itself, but also 
that the power to appropriate surplus labour – whether it belonged to the state or 
to a private lord – was bound up with the performance of military, juridical and 
administrative functions.
180
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As we will see, this narrowing of public functions is one of the reasons why the very idea of 
complete justice is often rejected by modern thinkers. For our immediate purposes here, 
however, this helps to explain why political offices are no longer deemed a form of property 
within the realm of distributive justice. 
When appropriation is separated from state rule, the achievement of certain measures of 
political power by subordinate classes does not necessarily threaten capitalist accumulation.
181
 
The differentiation of the economic from the political sets the conditions for the expansion of 
citizenship to the lower orders. Indeed, with this differentiation, the meaning of citizenship 
becomes more universal, but also more hallow. In capitalist societies, achieving citizen-status 
does not protect one from exploitation as it did for the demos in ancient Greece, which still 
featured the fusion of economic and political power.
182
 Under capitalism, the expansion of 
citizenship as well as democratic reform gradually undermines the property qualification for 
political rule, if not always de facto, then at least de jure. Therefore, political office is no longer 
deemed an aspect of distributive justice. Lacher notes that, in the era after the Absolutist states, 
ruling classes who derived substantial wealth and privilege from state offices were increasingly 
seen as corrupt.
183
 Therefore, what was formerly a significant aspect of justice is now separated 
from it and is regarded as more the concern of freedom. Furthermore, as citizenship increases in 
breadth and decreases in depth, justice is deemed increasingly formal. In other words, citizen-
status does not protect individuals from exploitation and it brings together into one category 
immensely unequal classes and individuals. Justice begins to cede some of what was traditionally 
considered its domain to freedom. This is one reason why, amid the transitions to capitalism, 
freedom begins to replace justice as the apex of the modern table of values. 
Corrective justice has also undergone significant transformations in the transitions to 
capitalism. Crime and punishment have become more impersonal in two ways. First, the 
expansion of citizenship and the instantiation of equality before the law has made the evaluation 
of crimes and punishments more universal and formal. In most non-capitalist class societies, the 
designation of crimes and the implementation of punishments were applied in different ways to 
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the unequal estates. For example, in feudal Europe, the punishment for convicted members of the 
upper classes was typically paying a fine, whereas lower class criminals often faced brutal 
corporal punishment.
184
 Under capitalism, however, as with commutative justice, corrective 
justice is increasingly based on the standard of arithmetic equality. As Rusche and Kirchheimer 
note, the evaluation of guilt and the calculation of punishment is, in principle, if not always in 
practice, meant to apply to all citizens, irrespective of their status or merits, however these may 
be defined.
185
 Furthermore, there is an attempt to create an exact relation of equivalence between 
the crime and the punishment. Indeed, Pashukanis notes that individuals often know the precise 
amount of punishment they will receive if they are caught doing the crime they are about to 
commit.
186
 The two most dominant theories of corrective justice, the theories of deterrence and 
of retribution, each put forward their own version of the standard of equivalence. The utilitarian 
tradition uses a pain calculus to determine the amount of punishment necessary to deter further 
crimes. The deontological tradition attempts to determine the kind and extent of punishment 
necessary to make equal restitution for the crime. In other words, crime is a debt for which 
punishment is repayment. 
Second, corrective justice is also increasingly impersonal because corporal punishment is 
gradually replaced with less directly violent forms of punishment. As we have seen, this 
corresponds to the decline of direct coercion and political control typical of capitalist social 
relations. It arises, in part, from the growing needs of the labour market. Cruel corporal 
punishments can either irreparably damage or kill a person whose labour can no longer be 
exploited.
187
 Indeed, the rise of mass-imprisonment emerges from the transitions to capitalism. 
Modelled on the workhouses developed in Holland and Britain, prisons were constructed to 
discipline and harness the labour power of ‘unproductive’ and ‘destructive’ members of 
society.
188
 Imprisonment as a form of punishment is depicted as losing a certain quantity of 
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freedom: “The deprivation of liberty is considered a natural result of the invasion of property, 
that is to say, property and personal liberty are assigned equal value.”189 
Since corrective justice has become more impersonal in both of these ways, it, like 
distributive justice, has become concentrated in the centralized state. In the agrarian economies 
of the feudal era, the organization of punishment fell primarily to local elites.
190
 This corresponds 
to a set of social conditions in which customary law, the normative force of custom based in the 
collective obligations of the different agricultural communities, was as important as the common 
law that regulated individualistic, exclusive property rights.
191
 With the rise of absolute private 
property, the common law becomes dominant, which requires a centralized state to monopolize 
the organization of enforcement. Therefore, corrective justice is increasingly the exclusive 
responsibility of the national governmental institutions. 
Indeed, a crucial aspect of disciplining people toward the new social conditions was 
cultivating a respect for the sanctity of private property. Consequently, the prohibition of theft 
gained much wider application and greater import. McNally has noted how the rise of absolute 
private property in the transitions to capitalism led to the criminalization of customary activities 
through measures like the Black Act of 1723.
192
 For example, ‘perquisites,’ the by-products of 
the production process, were traditionally considered the rightful property of labourers. 
Nevertheless, this, along with activities like gleaning fruit and appropriating timber, were 
gradually redefined as the theft of property which rightfully belonged to employers.
193
 Indeed, in 
the transitions to capitalism, the rights of private property increased, its obligations decreased, 
and affronts to property were punished with increasing severity.
194
 As we have already seen, with 
the displacement of distributive justice by commutative justice, the standard of equivalence 
becomes predominant. If the most significant principle of justice in conditions of private 
property is ‘To each what they are owed,’ then the prohibition that is the sine qua non of private 
property is ‘Do not steal.’ 
I noted that the notion of commutative justice as ‘to each their due’ confronts an 
alternative standard, distribution according to need. This conflict manifests in corrective justice 
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as well. Against the dominant theories of corrective justice as deterrence or retribution, there 
arise theories of ‘restorative justice’ that abandon the standard of equivalence or due.195 Rather, 
the standard is need, which includes not only the needs of the victim but also of the criminal. The 
goal is to hear those involved and, if possible, to restore the quality of their social relations. As 
we saw, modern theories of distributive justice incorporate the standard of need because stark 
inequalities and dire necessity are structural features of capitalist social relations. Similarly, 
theories of restorative justice incorporate the standard of need within corrective justice in order 
to account for the social determinants of crime. Indeed, the tension of conflicting standards 
between commutative and distributive justice also exists between commutative and corrective 
justice. As we will see in a later chapter, Marx, an avowed critic of the theories of deterrence and 
retribution, offers arguments that seem to favour rehabilitation that considers the needs of the 
criminal. Whether or not Marx deems this a theory of corrective justice is an open question. 
 The rise of restorative justice is also a response to another crucial change in conceptions 
of justice: the peculiarly rigid or inflexible character of its application. Indeed, the impersonal 
character of capitalist social relations and the predominance of the standard of due-as-
equivalence foster scepticism about exceptions to the rules. This is exacerbated by the 
widespread assumption that individuals are inherently self-interested. Consequently, if any 
opportunity to claim an exception exists, it is assumed that individuals will do so irrespective of 
its legitimacy. This is the culture of the ‘loop-hole.’ Hume notes the rigidity of justice: 
 
To make this more evident, consider, that tho’ the rules of justice are estalish’d 
merely by interest, their connexion with interest is somewhat singular and is 
different from what may be observ’d on other occasions. A single act of justice is 
frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand alone, without being 
follow’d by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man 
of merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a 
seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer. 
Nor is every single act of justice, consider’d apart, more conducive to private 
interest, than to public; and ‘tis easily conciev’d how a man may impoverish 
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himself by a signal instance of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with regard 
to that single act, the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the 
universe.
196
 
 
Indeed, as John Millar once said, justice, the sole allegiance between people whose ruling 
principle is avarice, is not the “delicate” virtue of a “refined humanity,” but rather, a “coarse 
though useful virtue, the guardian of contracts and promises, whose guide is the square and the 
compass, and whose protector is the gallows.’”197 As we will see later, Marx criticizes the 
inflexible, abstract character of the standard of ‘due.’ The question remains, is the principle of 
need he favours a principle of justice? 
 The rigidity of justice exists despite the fact that, as many of these commentators 
concede, justice is increasingly deemed to be a human construction. This is true not only for 
those who assert that justice is only established through some form of the social contract, but 
also for those like Hume who, though he is a critic of contractualism,
198
 nonetheless gives justice 
an empirical foundation. In other words, Hume deems justice an artificial construction the utility 
of which is established only after the fact: 
 
Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and 
injustice, as having two different foundations, viz. that of interest, when men 
observe, that ‘tis impossible to live in society without retraining themselves by 
certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observ’d; and men 
receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, 
and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. ‘Tis the voluntary convention 
and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place.
199
 
 
This, when combined with the reduction of justice to juridical and legal relations, leads to the 
widespread belief that justice is more a matter of positive law than of natural law. As MacIntyre 
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notes, for Aristotle, the virtues are independent of, and can therefore come into conflict with, the 
prevailing rules and laws.
200
 The positive law can be found wanting according to the natural law. 
After Hume, however, the virtues are “just those dispositions necessary to produce obedience to 
the rules of morality.”201 In other words, justice is often deemed to be a particular construction 
specific to concrete socio-historical circumstances rather than a natural right based in human 
nature, much less the broader structure of the cosmos. As Weinreb notes, when modern thinkers 
attempt to base ethics not in nature but in civil society, it shifts from ontology to deontology.
202
 
Indeed, even the profound disagreements within modern political thought show the extent 
to which one side is fundamentally shaped by that to which it is opposed. For example, Rousseau 
does not base his principles of right or justice in a notion of permanent natural justice, but rather, 
in the idea of freedom as obeying the law that we give ourselves. Despite Burke’s staunch 
opposition to Rousseau, his alternative is not based in a notion of trans-historical justice, but 
rather, a historical justice that is legitimate because it has gestated over a longer period and 
congealed into relatively fixed traditions.
203
 The assumptions common to both perspectives lend 
themselves to the idea that the purpose of justice is the stable reproduction of the given social 
order whatever its specific form rather than the basis by which different social orders can be 
judged. As we will see, this more functionalist notion of justice arises in Marx’s work. 
Finally, the capstone of justice, complete justice, also undergoes dramatic changes. 
Indeed, its transformation may be the most dramatic of all. Many commentators have noted how, 
in general, ‘justice’ traditionally meant the subordination of the individual to the common ends 
of the social whole. Now, however, justice usually means the opposite. As Raphael asserts, “A 
concept that began as a shield of the social order has come to be the shield of the individual 
against encroachment by social authority.”204 In order to understand why this occurs, we must 
weave together all of the threads I have developed so far. 
                                                          
200
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., 232. 
201
 Ibid. 
202
 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), 100-
101; 264. 
203
 Strauss, op. cit., 313-15. 
204
 Raphael, op. cit., 250; Daisuke Arie, op. cit., 68; Miller, op. cit., 289-91. 
 63 
 
As we saw, in non-capitalist class societies the division of labour is differentiated into 
tangibly unequal castes or estates.
205
 Furthermore, production is primarily for the direct use of 
immediate communities. In other words, it is the production of use-values for definite needs, not 
the abstract wealth of exchange-values. Therefore, the different societal needs, and thus, the 
various contributions by, and distributions to, the variety of castes or estates, are struggled over 
and coordinated before production begins.
206
 Production and consumption are directly connected. 
In other words, the needs of consumption determines production. From the outset, each caste or 
estate knows, at least roughly, the nature and extent of their contributions as well as what is 
owed to them in return. Supply and demand are linked from the beginning and the consequences 
are integral to the intentions. Since most producers have at least partial possession of their 
conditions of production, production and consumption are normatively regulated according to the 
customs of their collective associations, ranging from the family to the guild to the village 
proprietors of common land. Producers who can produce their own subsistence have a degree of 
self-sufficiency. Therefore, surplus appropriation by ruling classes is overtly political. 
Exploitation is directly bound to state power.
207
 Producers are more tied to particular forms of 
property than the abstract wealth embodied by money. They are therefore bound to more fixed 
social relations.
208
 Nevertheless, because they have a degree of self-sufficiency, they can demand 
certain obligations from ruling classes, including aid during times of dearth, which rulers 
typically provide because it preserves the long-term relation of exploitation. Therefore, producer 
and ruler are bound by mutual but unequal obligations.
209
 
 Since production is a means to consumption, to definite and predetermined needs, and 
because production is directly, normatively regulated by political authorities and communal 
associations, the typical ethos is that each estate should receive no more or less than what is 
necessary for that particular social function.
210
 It is already taken into consideration during the 
act of production that the accumulation of each estate is subordinate to the stable maintenance of 
the whole. These kinds of social conditions are more conducive to the idea that individuals can 
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only become what they essentially are in and through their relations with others. This tends to 
foster an ethics in which each individual is subordinate to the common ends rooted in objective 
human nature. Since production is primarily of incommensurable use-values, and because these 
particular forms of property have more limited and fixed uses and relations, not only are people 
more inclined to make qualitative distinctions between different kinds of activities, but products 
are deemed to have ‘natural,’ as distinct from ‘unnatural,’ uses. Indeed, these social conditions 
are more congenial to the idea that things are desired because they are good in themselves, 
irrespective of whether or not a particular individual recognizes them as such. The hierarchy of 
contributions are ordered under the supreme good of the social whole, which corresponds to the 
stratified castes or estates, at the apex of which stands a ruling political authority adopting final 
responsibility for the common ends of the social organism. Indeed, the societal order is often 
ascribed to the structure of the cosmos.
211
 Tangible political inequality is deemed to be based in 
the natural hierarchy of humankind. 
Conversely, under capitalism, production is primarily for exchange. In other words, it is 
not production for the tangible needs of the immediate community, but rather, of exchange-
values to be sold. Production and consumption are thereby separated by market exchange. 
Consequently, production is not only free from direct political control, but due to competitive 
imperatives, it is production for the sake of production, or production as an end in itself. What is 
produced and how is not socially coordinated. It is the result of individualized, narrowly 
economic decisions. The societal worth, the exchange-value, of labour and its products is 
determined after the production process through market exchange. These individual exchanges 
are largely indifferent to the totality of exchanges, which is only an aggregate of all of these 
more or less private pursuits. The rationality of these decisions can only be evaluated after the 
production process according to the degree of profitable market exchange. After a given 
production period, the allocation of goods is the unintended result of these private activities. 
Consequently, individualized choices become the measure of social worth.
212
 Capitalist 
production reduces activities and goods to commensurable units of abstract-labour and 
exchange-value. Whereas possession of particular use-values entails specific activities that 
satisfy definite needs as well as a limited set of possible social relations, exchange-value or 
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money is wealth in a general form. There are inequalities in different holdings of exchangeable 
property, but anyone who owns it is formally equal with all other owners of exchange-values. 
Furthermore, they are also formally free to choose with whom to exchange.
213
 Therefore, 
possessors of exchange-value, of wealth in the abstract, are less dependent on particular 
individuals. Their relations are less fixed. When the dominant economic activities, goods, and 
social relations are made quantitatively comparable, there is also less impetus to maintain the 
existence of a hierarchy of goods, much less a supreme good that confers meaning on all of the 
others. Instead, there can be only a plurality of subjective goods. The common perception is that 
things are not desired because they are good, but rather, are good because they are desired. 
These developments are more congenial to the idea that individuals are who they 
essentially are independent of their social relations. Consequently, justice shifts from a positive 
to a more negative connotation.
214
 The positive connotation of justice is more typical of non-
capitalist class societies. Justice is not merely a protection from others, but how the fulfilment of 
our natures necessarily occurs in and through our common efforts with others. The good of each 
is subordinate to the common ends of the organic social whole. Consequently, the worth of a 
human being is based in their merit as determined by the extent to which, and by the ways in 
which, they contribute to these common ends. The modern, more negative connotation is quite 
different. This is best illustrated in Adam Smith’s depiction of justice: 
 
There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and it merits, upon that 
account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real 
positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon more 
occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. 
The man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the 
reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, 
however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing 
which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish 
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him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and 
doing nothing.
215
 
 
With the increasingly negative and individualized character of justice, complete justice is more 
an aggregate of the individuals and their subjective ends. As Schneewind, Buckle, and 
Fleischacker note, from Grotius on, each individual is deemed to have intrinsic worth regardless 
of their contributions to the community.
216
 
In premodern systems of justice there is a close connection between distributive and 
complete justice.
217
 This is because the notion of merit by which public goods are justly 
distributed is provided by the kind of regime, and thus, the dominant notion of the common end 
to be achieved. With the inversion of the priority between distributive and commutative justice, 
however, complete justice is now related primarily to commutative justice because the most 
common way to acquire goods is market exchange. Its standard, geometric equality irrespective 
of the concrete attributes of the participants, is not conducive to the idea of merit beyond the 
minimum rules stipulated by the contractual relation. This is a reflection of the differentiation of 
the economic from the political. In their productive activities, the capitalist class, separated from 
the state and organized into competitive units, seeks the reproduction of these individual units, 
not society as a whole. This is why complete justice becomes more individualized, more a 
protection from the state and from society itself. This is also why ‘neutrality’ becomes the norm 
for politics. For the increasingly capitalist state, legislating morality is deemed authoritarian. 
Consequently, the notion of a ‘complete’ justice oriented toward a substantive common end of 
the social whole is superseded by the principle of liberty: you may do whatever you want with 
what is yours insofar as it does not hinder the ability of others to do whatever they want with 
what is theirs. 
Some theorists altogether deny the existence of complete justice. For example, Miller 
reduces the meaning of ‘legal justice’—one of the ways in which Aristotle’s notion of complete 
justice is translated—to corrective justice: “We are perhaps fortunate that we have lost one of the 
senses which the term had for the Greeks, the sense in which justice was equivalent to virtue in 
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general.”218 Indeed, the conventionalism traditionally espoused by groups like the sophists and 
Epicureans has become the dominant conception of justice. Nevertheless, as Taylor notes, the 
contract theorists of the seventeenth century are different from their predecessors because, 
whereas the latter were concerned with establishing the authority of government by contract, the 
former thought that there was a more pressing need to establish, by contract, society itself.
219
 
Modern thought has become increasingly skeptical that justice is an ontological part of our 
human natures in the way that, say, freedom is. Even when someone like Rawls offers a robust 
theory of a ‘sense of justice,’ it is based in the “background institutions” of society, not an 
objective good of human nature.
220
 Taken to its logical extent, this affirms a separation between 
values and facts. Justice, a subjective value, plays no role in what is regarded as our essentially 
biological natures. Justice is therefore made to seem reducible to prevailing legal and juridical 
relations enforced by the state. In other words, justice adopts a much more functionalist 
character. 
As we saw, Marx has substantial differences with theorists of ‘classical’ natural right, 
whether they are ancients like Plato and Aristotle or moderns like Strauss. Their fundamental 
disagreement is about whether or not the achievement of our objective human goods, the 
actualization of the human essence, is rooted in nature or in history. Nevertheless, the theorists of 
modern natural right, whether they are empiricists like Locke or idealists like Kant, share a 
common disagreement with both Marx and the proponents of classical natural right. Unlike 
them, the theorists of modern natural right affirm the objectivity of rights, of principles of justice, 
but also the subjectivity of the good, of human happiness. In other words, they attempt to 
articulate principles of right that remain “neutral among competing conceptions of the good 
life.”221 Only each individual can determine for themselves what they deem to be good. This 
corresponds to the unique form of rule under capitalism. As Gerstenberger notes, the “class 
character” of the capitalist state does not consist primarily in “overt class justice” and “direct 
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forms of oppression,” but rather, in the “neutrality of state power vis-à-vis any kind of private 
property.”222 
In these conditions, practical reason, whereby the individual orders her qualitatively 
distinct needs toward the communal whole, often bifurcates into, on the one hand, the 
instrumental reason typical of consequentialism, and most famously, of utilitarianism, and on the 
other hand, the formalistic reason typical of deontology.
223
 Both of these frameworks assume 
that material or corporeal needs are self-interested pursuits for subjective goods or ‘preferences.’ 
The consequentialist tendency reduces the ‘Natural Law’ to instinctive pursuits, to the ‘natural’ 
or ‘factual.’ This transforms ethics into a physical science that analyzes ‘enlightened self-
interest’ in a self-regulating market whose impersonal laws of supply and demand rationally 
determine the common good, the aggregate of purely individual goods. Alternatively, the 
deontological tendency distinguishes between, on the one hand, the ‘moral,’ the ‘natural laws’ of 
reason, such as duty for its own sake, and on the other hand, that from which it is autonomous, 
the ‘non-moral,’ the realm of physical or causal laws. The latter include necessarily self-
interested pursuits, such as ‘happiness.’ In other words, the Right, which comprises all of our 
duties, is absolute, because the Good is deemed to be necessarily subjective and relative. 
The bifurcation of these two forms of thought explains the prevalence of the fact-value 
distinction in modern thought. One form of thought rejects all values that cannot be reduced to 
fact or consigns them to the realm beyond scientific understanding; the other rigidly separates 
them. This is another cause of the inflexible character of the rules of justice. The application of 
general rules to particular circumstances, including a sensitivity to plausible exceptions, has 
traditionally been the domain of practical reason predicated on the assumption that individuals 
are naturally oriented toward their common ends. The very existence of an objective human 
good, the basis of our substantive common ends, is denied by both consequentialism and 
deontology. Indeed, for these systems of ethics, although we must adhere to principles of justice, 
we are in large part relieved from the burdens of practical reason. Formerly, we had to situate 
ourselves in society as whole in order to constantly connect our own individual good to the 
common good. It is now commonly supposed that this function, at least as far as our happiness is 
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concerned, is in large part taken care of by the self-regulating market. Consequentialism and 
deontology, as well as the fact-value distinction that maps onto them, offer only instrumental 
reason or formal reason, not practical reason. As we saw, these dichotomies arise in the impasse 
struck by each of the three waves of debate about Marxism and ethics. 
Taking account of all of these changes, justice as a whole is reduced in status in the 
modern era. Formerly, in the best plausible human communities (in other words, excluding 
utopias and the afterlife), justice is the highest and most complete virtue. Amid the transitions to 
capitalism, however, justice has been utterly routed by freedom in the hierarchy of virtues. 
Where it has not been totally replaced by freedom, it is subordinate to it, its value determined by 
the extent to which it creates the conditions for freedom. Even when justice is exalted, it is rarely 
described as anything but the junior partner to liberty. This is true especially of the notion of 
complete justice, typically the capstone of the comprehensive notions of justice. Even for 
someone like Hegel, who affirms an objective human good, by far the most important principle 
in his worldview is freedom.
224
 We should be wary of attempts to collapse justice into freedom 
because the modern tendency to begin from principles of freedom is often based in the 
assumption that society as a whole must abstract from, or be indifferent to, conflicting ideas of 
our substantive human ends. 
Before we go on, let us briefly summarize our results so far. 
 
 Since capitalism is based on production for exchange, commutative justice displaces 
distributive justice as the primary form of proprietary justice. Consequently, arithmetic 
equality, or the equivalence of values, becomes the predominant standard of proprietary 
justice, to which any standard of proportionate equality, of merit, is subordinate. 
 Formerly, the competing standards of distributive justice included wealth, virtue, and 
citizen-equality, whereas need was addressed by benevolence or charity. Under 
capitalism, however, distributive justice increasingly includes need as its basic standard. 
This is often to ameliorate the material inequalities arising from commutative justice. 
 Traditionally the realm of distributive justice included familial and public associations as 
well as small-scale private property and communal property. Since genuinely communal 
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property is significantly reduced amid the absolute private property of capitalism, 
distributive justice becomes increasingly centralized in the state. As such, distributive 
justice is deemed less an ontological aspect of our human natures and more a voluntary 
obligation arising from participation in specific institutions. In other words, justice is 
deemed reducible to legal and juridical relations. 
 Distributive justice traditionally includes not only material goods but also political 
offices. Under capitalism its scope is narrowed to the former. The question of political 
power is increasingly viewed as the terrain of freedom, of democracy and authority. 
Freedom therefore absorbs what were once deemed to be crucial aspects of justice. 
 The prominence of commutative justice has important effects on corrective justice, 
which, like distributive justice, becomes concentrated in the state. Furthermore, it 
becomes less corporal, more impersonal, and it attempts to make punishment more 
equivalent to crimes. Finally, theft becomes a paradigmatic case of injustice in a society 
based on absolute private property. 
 As they become more impersonal, the laws of justice are deemed increasingly rigid. We 
are more sceptical about potential exceptions to the rule. These formal laws abstract from 
the immense complexity of concrete circumstances. 
 At the same time, justice is deemed to be a product of historical circumstances, a human 
construction based in prevailing conventions, rather than a natural law arising from our 
human nature or the order of the universe. Consequently, the purpose or function of 
justice is deemed to be the stable reproduction of the prevailing social relations, whatever 
their specific form. 
 Whereas complete justice traditionally means the common ends to which individuals are 
subordinate, under capitalism, justice in its general sense is regarded as the protection of 
the individual against society. Justice becomes much more individualized. 
 Complete justice, which was often deemed a positive virtue that is achieved when we are 
actively contributing to something, becomes a negative virtue that is fulfilled merely by 
abstaining from interference with something. 
 Traditionally, complete justice meant the ethical orientation of the individual toward the 
common ends of the social whole. Justice was deemed an ontological part of our 
inherently social nature. Under capitalism, however, justice is deemed less a part of 
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human nature and more a human construct. In other words, justice is much less an 
integral part of our natural fulfilment and more the creation of a set of conditions that 
provides the basis for a self-realization that is associated more with freedom than justice. 
 In general, then, justice, once deemed the paramount virtue, is displaced by the supreme 
ideal of the modern age: freedom. 
 
Marx, in one of his more sustained discussions of historical materialism as a method, asserts that 
“Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher 
development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the 
higher development is already known.”225 In other words, the current era may reveal truths that 
are hidden to all preceding periods. This may be true, but it still raises the question, how do we 
determine the difference between, on the one hand, what is true of all history but is only apparent 
to us now, and on the other hand, what is merely particular to the current conditions but which 
we falsely impose on all of the other eras? These are open questions. A full and complete 
historical materialist critique of ethics—in other words, a universal history of ethics—may reveal 
that everything that Marx assumed about justice is actually true. Nevertheless, this would have to 
be demonstrated in ways that, to my knowledge, have not been done. 
Before we can interpret Marx’s theory of justice, we must first turn to Hegel. Although I 
have stressed here the importance of a historical materialist critique of justice, we cannot neglect 
the significance of Marx’s intellectual influences, especially Hegel. Without a close scrutiny of 
Hegel it is impossible to comprehend Marx’s assertions about ethics and justice. Indeed, we will 
find that in each of the sections on the four major aspects of justice, we will need a preliminary 
chapter on Hegel before we can turn to Marx and Marxism. Curiously, although many of the 
commentators engage in the ‘history of ideas’ approach, they often miss crucial aspects of the 
dialogue between Marx and Hegel as well as other important thinkers. This is in part a result of 
the extent to which the much-maligned dialectical method has been deemed incoherent and 
irrelevant. 
The first aspect of justice I will address is commutative justice. As we have seen, 
capitalism is historically unique in that production for exchange becomes predominant over 
production for use. This is the basis for the prominence of market exchange in contemporary 
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society. Therefore, in this historically grounded study, it is appropriate to begin with 
commutative justice. Nevertheless, we must always keep in mind the historical contingency of 
this. If we neglect the dramatic transformations of justice amid the transitions to capitalism, it is 
impossible to understand Marx’s evasiveness about justice. The participants in the debates about 
Marx and justice, despite their pretensions to materialism, have often approached the debate as a 
question of intellectual history. This is one of the reasons why the successive waves of this 
debate have ended in more or less the same impasse. These Marxists have not applied the 
method to the master. They have not engaged in a historical materialist critique of Marx. 
This is also why the debates about Marxism and justice have tended to focus on 
exploitation. Unmasking the character of surplus appropriation is, of course, important, but the 
full implications of the decline of justice under capitalist modernity only become clearly 
apparent when we consider justice in all of its aspects. It is only with a comprehensive notion of 
the justice, and in particular, of complete justice, that it becomes not merely a principle of 
judgement, but also a guide to activity. A more robust theory and practice of practical reason 
could be crucial for overcoming the impasse struck in the three waves of debate and achieving a 
genuinely democratic socialism. 
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Part 2: Commutative Justice 
Chapter 4: Hegel on Commutative Justice 
 
We begin with commutative justice, the aspect of justice concerned with the equal exchange of 
privately-held property. In certain respects, Hegel’s theory of commutative justice is similar to 
liberal accounts. Insofar as individuals are owners of private property, they engage in contractual 
relations with each other. These relations are motivated by mutual or corresponding self-interests 
and are guided by negative rights, namely, one is free to do what she wants with what is hers 
insofar as she allows others to do the same. Furthermore, each must adhere to the obligations of 
the contract into which they voluntarily enter. This relation is commutatively just if they respect 
each other as property owners and engage in fair and equal exchanges. Nevertheless, unlike most 
liberal accounts, Hegel thinks that this is only a small part of human freedom. There are other 
aspects of justice that Hegel deems to be more important than our rights as owners of private 
property and that can trump the claims of commutative justice. 
We cannot fully appreciate Hegel’s contributions to theories of commutative justice 
without first comprehending his dialectical method as well as the way in which he situates his 
historical account of private property and exchange in his critique of modern moral philosophy. I 
cannot provide here a systematic commentary on Hegel’s dialectical method. Instead, I provide 
only a sketch in this chapter in order to ground what he and Marx say about ethics and justice. 
Hegel is critical of philosophical systems that begin with first principles that are not 
subsequently proven in the logical course of the philosophical inquiry. This makes them reliant 
on ‘transcendental’ ideas that are beyond the possible experience of most individuals. 
Conversely, Hegel begins with what he deems to be a non-dogmatic starting point, an element of 
everyday experience, the existence of which is recognized by everyone. Consequently, if Hegel 
can close his system into a self-contained whole, he never has recourse to transcendental truths. 
For Hegel, we are eminently historical beings. We always already exist within a certain historical 
period with its particular forms of thought. We cannot gain objectivity by attempting to abstract 
from our own historical period. Rather, objectivity is achieved when we can account both for 
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historical development as a whole and for ourselves as products of, and contributors to, that 
history. 
The immersion in prevailing historical circumstances can only avoid dogmatism under 
two conditions. First, we must deploy the principle of contradiction and weigh every system of 
knowledge against itself, against the opposed systems to which it may give rise, in order to 
discover the system of knowledge capable of accounting for the true grounds of history in its 
entirety without recourse to transcendental principles. Second, the contemporary period must be 
the end of history in its essential development, or at least reveal the end of history. Otherwise, 
our fundamentally historical knowledge cannot determine whether or not it has discovered its 
foundations such that no procession of time could alter what we have taken to be the true 
grounds of thought in the present. Hegel refers to this as Absolute Knowing.
226
 
A crucial aspect of Hegel’s conception of Absolute Knowing is his distinction between, 
on the one hand, the  ‘spurious’ or ‘bad’ infinite, and on the other hand, the ‘genuine’ or ‘good’ 
infinite. If what is meant by the infinite is something that is limitless or without end, this, for 
Hegel, is merely the mirror opposite of the finite. It is a bad infinite that has not escaped finitude 
because, as an infinite regress, it is incapable of determining the true grounds of thought. Each 
ground can give way to still other grounds, and so on, ad infinitum. For Hegel, the good infinite 
means that in which everything is contained within possible human experience. Unlike the bad 
infinite, which, because it is limitless, is transcendental, the good infinite is immanent. This, the 
Absolute, is the goal of Hegel’s theoretical system and that upon which his framework stands or 
falls. The dialectic must begin and end immanently without ever resorting to an unknowable 
beyond. Therefore, the way in which Hegel tests thought against itself by means of what he 
deems to be an immanent critique is not merely rhetorically persuasive. It is the essential method 
of a system that claims to culminate in the Absolute. With regard to questions of justice, a crucial 
aspect of Absolute Knowing is what Hegel calls ‘Ethical Life.’ 
Hegel distinguishes ‘Ethical Life’ from ‘Morality.’227 He is deeply critical of modern 
morality because it tends to cast humans as isolated, atomized individuals. Modern philosophers 
tend to regard morality as a relation between an individual and her duties, between an individual 
and a thing. When ethics is reduced to morality in these ways, it becomes a question merely of 
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what we ought to do, of how we ought to act. Conversely, for Hegel, ethics is better understood 
as ‘Ethical Life,’ as a question of who we are and should be given the nature of our 
circumstances. Ethics is a social relation, not a thing or a relation to things. Acting in accordance 
with our obligations does not fulfill the duty, but rather, the social relationship which grounds 
that duty. In other words, the duty is the means, the mediating factor, not the end or purpose of 
the social relation.
228
 
For Hegel, one of the most profound tensions in modern morality is that between desire 
and duty, between “sensuous inclination” and the “cold command”: 
 
These are antitheses which have not been invented, either by the subtlety of 
reflection or by the pedantry of philosophy, but which have from all time and in 
manifold forms preoccupied and disquieted the human consciousness, although it 
was modern culture that elaborated them most distinctly, and forced them up to 
the point of most unbending contradiction. Intellectual culture and the modern 
play of understanding create in man this contrast, which makes him an 
amphibious animal, inasmuch as it sets him to live in two contradictory worlds at 
once.
229
 
 
For Hegel, it is the task of philosophy to undo such contradictions.
230
 While we should not 
pursue our desires without consideration for others, neither should our happiness be purely 
incidental to the pursuit of our duties. Both modes of activity assume that the happiness of each 
individual is totally subjective. Conversely, through the reconciliation of our duties and desires, 
Hegel aspires to an objective happiness pursued in concert with others. Ultimately, for Hegel, the 
abstract particular of the self-interested will and the abstract universal of the moral will can only 
become the concrete universal of mutual recognition in a certain kind of community. This 
universal is ‘concrete’ because it embodies difference in unity. In other words, this concrete 
universal, this recognition, is Freigabe, a mutual ‘releasing’: “Freigabe makes it clear that the 
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‘We’ Hegel is after is a community of freedom that does not absorb or reduce individuals to 
some abstract homogeneity but rather presupposes, requires, and accepts individuals in their 
differences.”231 It is a “nonreductive union” that aspires to unity, not uniformity.232 This, the 
concrete universal, is the basis of Hegel’s ethics. 
A fundamental aspect of ‘Ethical Life’ is that it is grounded in certain social conditions 
that are subject to historical development. In other words, for Hegel, the morality of the ‘ought,’ 
which proposes universal duties applicable at all times and places, does not account sufficiently 
for specifically socio-historical conditions in their development: “Hegel’s criticism of morality is 
that an ethics of conscience or conviction is incapable of deducing determinate duties from an 
indeterminate universality.”233 The individual’s free will must be directed toward a certain 
community within which everyone’s freedom, in its moral, legal, and ethical senses, is bound.234 
Hegel notes that many different forms of ethics, both religious and secular, praise transcendental 
ideals embodied in rigid self-discipline, the all-consuming and selfless pursuit of a single 
definitive virtue, or other-worldly notions of human perfection. But, if we take seriously the idea 
that ‘ought implies can,’ Hegel responds, then these unattainable ideals are not grand or noble, 
but defective and false.
235
 
Hegel often expresses this broad critique through a particular critique of Kant, whom he 
deems paradigmatic of modern moral philosophy. Hegel contends that Kant, as is typical of 
Enlightenment thought, thinks in terms of the ‘understanding,’ which tends to keep things in 
their polar opposition. For example, Kant will pose his morality of the categorical imperative as 
the exact opposite of the merely prudential rationality of the hypothetical imperatives typical of 
utilitarianism. Conversely, Hegel seeks to go beyond the ‘understanding’ with ‘reason,’ with a 
method capable of overcoming stark oppositions by reconciling the best parts of both polarities. 
Therefore, when Hegel poses an ethics based in ‘Ethical Life,’ it is not in stark opposition to 
Kantian ‘Morality.’ It is not an embodiment of what later commentators will describe as the 
‘non-moral.’ Rather, Ethical Life is meant to reconcile the formal obligations of Morality with 
their circumstances, with socio-historical content. With his theory of Ethical Life, Hegel intends 
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to overcome both an isolated consequentialism in which the ends justify the means as well as an 
isolated deontology in which duty is done purely for duty’s sake. Both forms of ‘Morality’ 
represent the one-sidedness of the ‘understanding.’ 
In his criticisms of Kant’s categorical imperative, Hegel likes especially to focus on 
Kant’s discussion of the prohibition of theft. As we will see, Hegel’s general critique of Kantian 
morality, as well as this specific critique of one of Kant’s categorical imperatives, deeply 
influences Marx’s theory in Capital. In Kant’s discussion of the prohibition of theft, he borrows 
from Hume the example of a deposit that has been entrusted to our safety. Hume, in his 
explanation of the origins of justice, asserts: “Now to apply all this to the present case; I suppose 
a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restor’d in a few days; and also 
suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he demands the sum: I ask, What reason 
or motive have I to restore the money?”236 Hume argues that the principles of justice, including 
that principle which prescribes the return of deposits, are conventions the continuation of which 
is based on utility, on the stability they offer to society. Unlike Hume, however, Kant does not 
deem this prohibition an artificial creation that has arisen in specific historical circumstances. 
Nor does Kant justify the prohibition according to its utility. Rather, Kant tests the prohibition 
according to a categorical imperative that, arising from our reason, is true in all possible times 
and circumstances: 
 
What form in a maxim is fitting for universal legislation, and what form is not, 
can be distinguished without instruction by the commonest understanding. I have, 
for example, made it my maxim to increase my assets by every safe means. Now 
I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is deceased and has left no 
record of it. Naturally, this is a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know 
whether that maxim can also hold as a universal practical law. I therefore apply 
the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a 
law and I could thus indeed, at the same time, give through my maxim such a law 
as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove to him to have 
been made. I immediately become aware that such a principle, as a law, would 
annihilate itself, because it would bring it about that there would be no deposit[s] 
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at all. A practical law that I cognize as such must qualify for universal legislation; 
this is an identical proposition and therefore self-evident.
237
 
 
For Kant, any attempt to universalize the theft of deposits would eliminate the possibility of 
deposits altogether. Therefore, it is self-contradictory. 
 Hegel criticizes Kant’s example of the categorical imperative in a crucial section of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit which we will study in a number of different chapters. It occurs at the 
very end of “Part C (AA): Reason,” in the last sub-section, “Individuality which takes itself to be 
real in and for itself.”238 Hegel criticizes Kant for his abject formalism and his methodological 
individualism. For Hegel, these two things are deeply intertwined. Hegel asserts that there is 
nothing contradictory about the absence of deposits. It is only contradictory if we take as given 
the institution of deposit-making. In other words, Kant presents as substantive content what is 
merely formal. The content of this form, of deposits, is private property. Wherever private 
property exists, it will necessarily give rise to a certain notion of right that includes laws against 
theft. Nevertheless, neither the existence nor the non-existence of private property, and thus of 
deposits, is in itself contradictory. The categorical imperative prohibits theft only because it 
assumes the existence and legitimacy of private property. It does not justify this content itself. 
Thus, despite its claims to universality, the categorical imperative endorses historically-specific 
practices. 
It is not that Hegel rejects private property. Rather, he criticizes Kant because he cannot 
account for private property historically. The principle of non-contradiction is not a sufficient 
guide to concrete ethical action. Kant’s moral theory is an example of an ‘abstract universal.’ It 
is a moral formalism that fails to address the circumstances and motivations that give rise to it. 
Hegel’s criticism of Kant is situated within his broader critique of the moral formalism endemic 
to the perspective of isolated, atomized individuals. The individual may believe that she knows 
immediately what is right and what is good.
239
 For example, it is a common-sense rule that one 
should tell the truth. Nevertheless, this imperative assumes that we know the truth. As soon as 
this commandment is made dependent on this knowledge, however, it is revealed to be abstract: 
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“For speaking the truth is made contingent on whether I can know it, and can convince myself of 
it; and the proposition says nothing more than that a confused muddle of truth and falsehood 
ought to be spoken just as anyone happens to know, mean, and understand it.”240 Thus, this 
commandment loses its unconditional, imperative-form. 
These commandments must give up all claims to have an absolute content.
241
 They are 
only formal or abstract universals. The most they can claim is that they are not self-
contradictory. They must take their content as given despite the contingency and particularity 
inherent to their reality.
242
 In fact, this content is as acceptable as its opposite.
243
 Property does 
not contradict itself, but neither does the absence of property. These formal laws cannot tell us 
anything significant about the content. They cannot tell us whether property should belong to the 
first person to lay her hands on it or to no one at all. They cannot tell us whether or not a regime 
of private property is better than communal property. As we will see, Hegel’s critique of this 
formalistic morality is quite similar to Marx’s critique of utopianism. 
Hegel criticizes modern morality, of which Kant is paradigmatic, because it does not 
provide sufficiently robust notions of practical reason. The attempt to create a pure morality 
based entirely in universal duties for their own sake is unable to account for the contingencies of 
specific circumstances, both immediate and broadly historical. Imagine a slight modification of 
Kant’s discussion of the deposit. What if the holder of the deposit knew that the would-be 
inheritors of the recently deceased depositor are malicious people who would use the inherited 
money in socially destructive ways? How then should the deposit-holder frame her maxim? 
Should she say, ‘Everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove to have been made’? Or, 
should she add the stipulation, ‘when it serves her self-interests’? Or, should it be the 
qualification, ‘when returning the deposit would help fund malicious acts’? Each of these 
formulations is consistent with the intention of the deposit-holder, but not all of them would pass 
the test of universalizability. How can the deposit-holder frame the maxim in a way that ensures 
it does not reflect her own self-interests and moral biases?
244
 This is why Hegel regards as 
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abstract and formal modern morality in general and Kantian morality in particular. In certain 
respects, Hegel is attempting to construct a practical reason that is as robust as that offered by 
Plato. Take, for example, Plato’s assertion that a typically just act, returning to someone the 
weapons they have given to you for safe-keeping, becomes an unjust act when the owner of the 
weapons has gone insane and might use them to hurt themselves or others.
245
 Nevertheless, for 
Plato, a sufficiently robust practical reason is based in the contemplation of immutable nature 
and natural right whereas Hegel bases it in the comprehension of the development of human 
history as a whole. 
Perhaps Hegel’s critique of Kant’s discussion of the deposit can be accused of missing 
the point. For Kant, maintaining the institution of honesty may be more important than the 
institution of deposit-making. Perhaps the latter is only an example of what, for Kant, is the 
priority, namely, telling the truth. Hegel is primarily addressing Kant’s statement of the example 
in The Critique of Practical Reason, where property is the focus, but Hegel also seems to be 
synthesizing this with Kant’s other discussion of the deposit in The Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, where honesty is indeed the priority.
246
 As we saw, Hegel does discuss 
truth-telling. Furthermore, Kant may show similar shortcomings in this respect. 
Take, for example, Kant’s famous confrontation with King Friedrich Wilhelm II. The 
King and his censors considered Kant’s theories to be disparaging to religion and demanded that 
he sign a pledge that he would no longer write on the subject. Kant complied by offering this 
precisely worded response: “As your Majesty’s faithful subject, I shall in the future completely 
desist from all public lectures or papers concerning religion.”247 Kant worded the statement this 
way because he knew that the elderly King would probably die soon, which would absolve him 
of the pledge. After Wilhelm II did in fact die a few years later, Kant openly explained that he 
had misled the King without lying to him. Kant argued that one must tell the truth, but not 
necessarily the whole truth. At the outset we must say that Kant acts immorally according to his 
own standards. In deceiving Wilhelm II, he does not treat him as a rational being, as an end-in-
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himself, and thereby contradicts one of the foundational aspects of the categorical imperative. 
Putting this aside, however, the attempt to formulate this action as a maxim is beset with the 
same problem as is the example of the deposit above. Should Kant’s maxim be, ‘Everyone must 
tell the truth’? Or, should he add the qualification, ‘but can occasionally do so in a misleading 
way’? Or, should he include the stipulation, ‘when it serves to preserve his own freedom’? Or, 
‘when it is a response to an unjust curtailing of my freedom’? Or, ‘when it is for the sake of a 
higher truth’? Again, all of these are consistent with Kant’s intention, but not all of them may 
pass the test of universalizability. Kant has no way of separating the purity of his duties from the 
impurity of his circumstances, self-interests, and moral biases. 
Kant’s brush with political power exposes tensions in the relation between his moral 
philosophy and his political philosophy. Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative 
culminate in his imagining a ‘Kingdom of Ends’ for which each individual must act as if 
everyone else acts from duty and treats each other as ends.
248
 Nevertheless, Kant rejects any 
attempt to use revolution to bring about this Kingdom of Ends because, no matter how well 
intentioned, it necessarily contradicts the basis of sovereign law. Instead, Kant argues that history 
is tending toward the universal realization of rationality by means of natural laws: “The means 
which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism 
within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed 
social order.”249 This is Kant’s famous notion of the ‘unsocial sociability’ of humankind.250 Now 
that we have reached the age of Enlightenment, however, it would be better to let this natural 
process unfold, to allow the wisdom of public intellectuals to finally reach and convince the 
rulers.
251
 
The parallels between Kant and Bernstein’s morality are obvious, but few have noted that 
both are undergirded by historical determinism. This is the only way that Kant’s political 
philosophy could be reconciled with the ultimate vision of his moral philosophy. In the end, 
Kantian morality is formal because those who espouse it can only keep their hands clean by 
holding them above their heads in an act of surrender as the tide of blood creeps up past their 
waists. Kant famously says, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
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and reverence, the more frequently and persistently one’s meditation deals with them: the starry 
sky above me and the moral law within me.”252 In light of Hegel’s critique, perhaps Kant should 
have said that my reverence is for the moral law…above me. 
For Hegel, when someone tests a given law according to a formal standard, its content is 
contingent and their judgement is arbitrary.
253
 They can claim a personal knowledge that argues 
them into freedom from the law. Indeed, they can do this with all laws. In this form of 
immediacy, our knowledge and will is that of a particular, isolated individual.
254
 It is not yet the 
‘spiritual substance,’ the historical development of human society through a series of phases we 
can rationally comprehend. In other words, ‘Morality’ is based in methodological individualism, 
not the social ontology appropriate for a social and historical being. 
We can draw out some of the key aspects of Hegel’s critique of Kant by relating it to 
another of Hegel’s texts, his early essay on natural law.255 There he offers the same critique in a 
much more lucid and explicit way. There is also overwhelming evidence that Marx was familiar 
with this text.
256
 Hegel does not critique the premodern, ‘classical’ forms of natural law typical 
of theorists like Aristotle, Cicero, or Aquinas. Rather, he criticizes those liberal forms of natural 
law that have become dominant in the modern period.
257
 Hegel associates this with the 
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displacement of the feudal nobility by the ascending bourgeoisie.
258
 Although Hegel 
distinguishes between the ‘empirical’ natural law of Hobbes and Locke and the ‘idealist’ natural 
law of Kant and Fichte, he asserts that, despite their claims to the contrary, neither are scientific. 
By failing to understand the historical structure of social laws, they both impose abstract ideals 
on social relations in ways that only reproduce the problems they attempt to solve. Both forms of 
natural law adopt uncritically the perspective of market relations. Therefore, they impose the 
atomized market-actor on the whole of society. Ultimately, Hegel rejects modern natural law and 
the variety of social contract theories because a genuine common interest can never be formed 
from competing individuals.
259
 Even in this early essay, Hegel distinguishes between Morality, 
the standpoint of civil society, and Ethics, the standpoint of the state, which he regards as the 
perspective of society as a whole. 
The empirical natural law typical of Hobbes and Locke argues that, because all human 
institutions are historically contingent, we must abstract from this contingency in order to get at 
the truth of human nature. In doing this, however, empirical natural law takes a specific set of 
circumstances, the relations between individuals in modern market relations, and casts them as 
the primordial situation of humankind. Everyone is assumed to be atomized or non-social 
individuals from the very start. Therefore, conflict can never be overcome.
260
 Any system of law 
or political society can only bring these individuals together as an aggregate. It cannot genuinely 
unify them. Thus, empiricism represents “chaos” both as an imaginary state of nature and as the 
destiny of humankind, which is a “blatant contradiction.”261 
Like empirical natural law, the idealist natural law of Kant and Fichte assumes that the 
individual is the primary being.
262
 Nevertheless, they separate the empirical realm of necessity 
from the moral realm of freedom.
263
 Natural law becomes the science of the rights and duties of 
the rational part of our being as distinct from our empirical aspects. Due to this separation, 
however, freedom is merely negative. It is freedom from necessity.
264
 This is a formal practical 
reason in which the moral ideal cannot attain reality because the ideal and real are defined in 
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irreconcilable ways.
265
 Since idealist formalism pronounces universal laws the content of which 
is assumed, some material thing must always be smuggled into the relation.
266
 Hegel’s example 
here is again the prohibition against theft.
267
 
These two moral standpoints, the empirical and idealist versions of modern natural law, 
overlap with the so-called fact-value distinction. The empirical natural law, or, ethical 
positivism, reduces value to fact. It casts humans as a piece of nature that is subject to the same 
natural laws, namely, the pleasure calculus. Conversely, idealist natural law, or, ethical 
formalism, creates a strict dichotomy between natural and human laws. Human nature, or, human 
rationality, is something qualitatively distinct and separate from the external nature of everything 
else, including the empirical aspects of human nature. 
Hegel’s critique of modern natural law is situated within an account of broader historical 
trends, an early version of his universal history. With the decline of ancient Greece, and 
especially with the development of the Roman Empire, there is a long historical process wherein 
the individual becomes more prominent and citizenship becomes increasingly de-politicized.
268
 
Hegel seems to be suggesting that each time market relations emerge with any prominence, it 
throws the organic unity of broader society into crisis. For Hegel, the unparalleled rise of civil 
society, of the market, in modern life gives rise to a class distinct from the nobility: 
 
The status of this class is accordingly determined by the fact that its province is 
possession in general and the justice which is possible in this context, that it at the 
same time constitutes a coherent system, and that, as a direct consequence of the 
elevation of the relation of possession to formal unity, each individual who is 
inherently capable of possession is related to all the others as a universal entity, or 
as a citizen in the sense of a bourgeois.
269
 
 
Hegel contrasts the formal logic of the ‘system of reality,’ of civil society, with the “genuine and 
complete justice” of Ethical Life.270 He asserts that in liberal, specifically contractarian thought, 
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market relations, what he calls the “system of universal mutual dependence,” dominate the 
whole.
271
 The ‘external justice’ of civil society intrudes on the ethical totality in the same way 
that the principles of mechanics have become dominant for the whole of natural science.
272
 
Resisting these developments, Hegel asserts that civil society must be subordinate to the 
state, to the social whole. Otherwise, this system of market relations will develop into “ever 
greater difference and inequality in keeping with its natural tendency.”273 To support his claims 
about adopting the perspective of the good of the whole, Hegel quotes Plato’s critique of the 
formalism of most laws: 
 
It is clear that lawmaking belongs to the science of kingship; but the best thing is 
not that the laws be in power, but that the man who is wise and of kingly nature 
be ruler […] Because law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest 
and most just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the 
differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing, I may say, in human 
life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule 
for everything and for all time […] But we see that law aims at pretty nearly this 
very thing, like a stubborn and ignorant man who allows no one to do anything 
contrary to his command, or even to ask a question, not even if something new 
occurs to some one, which is better than the rule he has himself ordained […] So 
that which is persistently simple is inapplicable to things which are never 
simple.
274
 
 
Again, like Plato, Hegel aspires to a practical reason capable of accounting for the complexity of 
circumstances. 
When we turn back to the previously discussed passages in Hegel’s Phenomenology, we 
see he has retained this theory of historical development. Indeed, that sub-section, “Individuality 
which takes itself to be real in and for itself,” occurs right before he transitions to “Part (BB): 
Spirit.” In other words, Hegel makes the transition from the formal standpoint of the isolated, 
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atomized individual to the standpoint of society, or of individuals who are situated within 
specific social relations. Ultimately, we will find that, for Hegel, these societies are subject to 
historical developments that can be rationally comprehended. In this initial immediate or 
uncritical form, however, the social standpoint is that of the customary order. As with the early 
essay on natural law, Hegel begins his discussion of our social ontology with ancient Greece. 
For Hegel, at this stage, the spiritual substance is comprised of the laws as described by 
Antigone: “They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting / Though where they came from, 
none of us can tell.”275 The attempt to give or test these laws according to my isolated insight is 
already to deny their unshakeable substance: 
 
It is not, therefore, because I find something is not self-contradictory that it is 
right; on the contrary, it is right because it is what is right. That something is the 
property of another, this is fundamental; I have not to argue about it, or hunt 
around for or entertain thoughts, connections, aspects, of various kinds; I have to 
think neither of making laws nor of testing them. All such thinking on my part 
would upset that relation, since, if I liked, I could in fact just as well make the 
opposite conform to my indeterminate tautological knowledge and make that the 
law. But whether this or the opposite determination is the right, that is determined 
in and for itself. I could make whichever of them I liked the law, and just as well 
neither of them, and as soon as I start to test them I have already begun to tread 
an unethical path. By acknowledging the absoluteness of right, I am within the 
ethical substance; and this substance is thus the essence of self-consciousness. 
But this self-consciousness is the actuality and existence of the substance, its self 
and its will.
276
 
 
It is not that Hegel is endorsing an uncritical attitude to the prevailing customary order. This is 
proven, as we will see later, when Antigone, the personification of the old laws, finds herself in 
an irreconcilable death-struggle with Creon, the personification of the new laws, which foretells 
a fundamental destabilization of the customary order and dramatic historical change. Rather, 
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what Hegel is arguing is that any such critique of the customary order, of certain social relations, 
must first understand that order on its own terms. Otherwise, the attempt to impose formal laws 
will meet with recalcitrant social conditions. Indeed, our social conditions are the true ground of 
all action. That is why they are the spiritual substance.
277
 
 By pointing to the inherently social and historical character of our thinking and acting, 
Hegel is beginning to show the grounds of his method: immanent critique. We cannot impose a 
priori standards in our evaluation of society because there is no way for the thinking subject to 
separate herself from these objective conditions. The subject is already an object in the world. 
She is already necessarily a part of those objective conditions. Therefore, genuine objectivity in 
thought cannot be achieved by attempting to become a pure subject free from these objective 
conditions. Rather, it comes from our accounting for the ways in which we as thinking and acting 
subjects are already situated within objective, socio-historical conditions. Otherwise, in our 
attempts to completely transcend historical bias, we will uncritically absorb it. This is precisely 
what happens to Kant when, in attempting to develop a priori moral rules, his categorical 
imperatives unwittingly sanctify what is the product of specific historical circumstances. 
If we are inescapably social and historical beings, genuine objectivity in our thinking and 
acting can only come from an appreciation of how we are the product of specific socio-historical 
developments. In other words, this requires the comprehension of history as a rational process. 
This is Hegel’s idea of universal history. If, as thinking and acting subjects, we are always 
already situated within this universal history, we cannot impose external or transcendental 
standards. Indeed, a penchant for these formal rules of thought and action may itself be 
something we have uncritically absorbed from historically-specific social relations. Rather, our 
method must be immanent, must be internal to the various phases of human history in their 
development. This includes any comprehension of our own society. 
 Hegel’s universal history attempts to rationally comprehend the development of 
humankind through the dominant modes of thought and action in its successive phases. This 
universal history is immanent because nothing is attributed to it that is outside of possible human 
experience. Hegel’s method does not judge these phases according to a transcendental standard 
or according to our own standards which we uncritically impose from without. Rather, it 
comprehends these phases on their own terms. The only way that this method can avoid 
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dogmatism is by weighing each mode of thought against itself. We must comprehend these 
forms of thinking, these concepts, on their own terms, and then discover if and how they 
necessarily give rise to tensions, to oppositions, to contradictions that are irreconcilable in their 
given configuration. In other words, we need not judge our circumstances according to an 
external, transcendental, or a priori standard because the negative, the basis of societal 
transformation and historical development, already exists internal to the present. As we will see 
in the next chapter, the death-struggle between Antigone and Creon is of supreme historical 
significance because it embodies a contradiction at the heart of Greek society: the inability to 
reconcile, on the one hand, the subjective freedom of the individual animated by her conscience, 
and on the other hand, the objective freedom embodied in a state that necessarily enforces 
adherence to its laws. 
Hegel, in his Science of Logic, during a critique of Kant’s formalism, describes the 
method of immanent critique in the following terms: “Further, the refutation must not come from 
outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in question and 
inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to recognize those assumptions; the defect is a 
defect only for him who starts from the requirements and demands based on those 
assumptions.”278 Hegel continues, “The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s 
stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him 
somewhere else and defeating him where he is not.”279 These modes of thought are not 
contradicted by the external criteria of some external observer. They are self-contradictory. The 
basis of the conflict and its resolution through the development into a new configuration can only 
be internal to these concepts themselves. This is the basis of Hegel’s dialectical method.280 This 
explanation of Hegel’s immanent critique is crucial because many of the commentators in the 
debates over the relation between Marx and justice have missed the significance of immanent 
critique in Marx’s work. 
For Hegel a crucial aspect of immanent critique is his rejection of the method typical of 
Enlightenment thought which attempts to strip away false appearances to reveal the underlying 
essence. Hegel insists that this does not explain why this essence has these false appearances. It 
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does not explain why this essence must appear in these particularly mystifying ways. It does not 
explain why what is essentially true is not immediately intelligible. By failing to do this, it 
cannot achieve what it claims, namely, comprehending the underlying essence itself. For Hegel, 
if essential relations give rise to abstract and therefore mystifying appearances, it is not because 
these appearances are merely incidentally related to this essence. Rather, it is because something 
about the essence itself is abstract: “Thus essence appears. Reflection is the showing of illusory 
being within essence itself.”281 
To put this in perspective, we can relate it to Hegel’s critique of Kant on the prohibition 
of theft. For Hegel, a complete critique of Kant cannot simply point to the formalism and 
atomism of his thought. We cannot simply critique Kant for uncritically accepting false and 
mystifying appearances. We must also explain why the essential grounds of Kant’s thought, 
modern social relations, promotes these abstract appearances, and thus, these formal modes of 
thought. In other words, for Hegel, to get to the bottom of modern society entails the realization 
that there is something essentially abstracting and atomizing about it. Therefore, the tensions 
within Kantian morality cannot be resolved through a critique of that morality alone. It requires 
also the immanent critique of the social relations, the ‘spiritual substance,’ that grounds this 
morality. As we will see in later chapters, for Hegel, this is because the principle of conscience, 
first initiated by figures like Antigone, comes back with a vengeance in the modern era. 
In the meantime, we can return to Hegel’s discussion of private property and exchange. 
Hegel’s fullest explanation of this occurs in the Philosophy of Right.282 Unlike Kant, Hegel 
thinks that the justification for private property arises historically through the development of an 
initial, albeit abstract, form of mutual recognition between individuals. Hegel thinks that modern 
society is alone capable of securing this abstract recognition. Modernity is distinct from antiquity 
because we can only have a right over things, not people. For Hegel, individuals have a right to 
possess things insofar as they are legally-recognized citizens, or as he defines it, ‘persons.’ This 
right is limited to negative liberty, to prohibitions against violations of ‘personality.’ Therefore, 
the ‘person’ is an abstract universal whose freedom is arbitrary will. The command of abstract 
right is to be a ‘person,’ a property-owner, and respect others as such. At this phase of 
development, it is only as owners of property that two people exist for each other. Their relation 
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is one of contract, of corresponding self-interests, of equal exchange. For Hegel, this is the basis 
of what we have called here ‘commutative justice.’ The free individual becomes an object to 
herself, becomes her own end, through what she possesses. Since things have no internal end or 
purpose, when the thing becomes mine, it becomes a means to my ends. Therefore, property is 
the first or most basic form or shape of freedom. 
 As we will now see, Marx’s Capital invests much importance in how it will begin, with 
which form of property he will start his immanent critique of capitalist society. We will find that 
Marx’s ‘Critique of Political Economy’ cannot be fully understood without an appreciation for 
Hegel’s ethics in general, his discussion of private property and exchange in particular, and 
specifically, his critique of Kant’s abstract formalism in the prohibition of theft. 
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Chapter 5: Marx on Commutative Justice 
 
Marx’s evasiveness about questions of justice has inspired numerous debates. As we have seen, 
there are three basic sides in these debates. The first group argues that Marx criticizes capitalism, 
but not according to a notion of justice. The second group argues that Marx criticizes capitalism 
for being, among other things, unjust. Both of these groups can find evidence for their positions 
in Marx’s seemingly contradictory statements. In a number of places, Marx explicitly rejects the 
notion that capitalism is unjust. Indeed, he seems to argue that capitalism is just according to the 
only form of justice possible under capitalist social conditions, bourgeois justice. In several other 
places, however, Marx seems to undermine bourgeois notions of justice. He describes capitalist 
exploitation as ‘theft,’ ‘robbery,’ and ‘plunder.’ Therefore, he appears to critique capitalism as 
unjust according to a more fundamental standard. The apparent confusion between Marx’s 
statements is one of the reasons why a third group in these debates asserts that Marx deems 
capitalism neither just nor unjust because his theory is beyond justice as such. 
Those who argue that Marx does not deem capitalist exploitation as unjust tend to dismiss 
as ‘rhetorical’ those passages where Marx speaks of the ‘theft’ of surplus labour.283 Those who 
do think Marx deems exploitation unjust often dismiss those passages where Marx seems to 
affirm the bourgeois notion of justice. They describe them as ‘tongue-in-cheek,’284 ‘satire,’285 or 
as ‘ironic.’286 Geras, who tends to side with these latter theorists, is correct when he asserts that 
interpreting Marx’s assertions as rhetorical or sarcastic allows each side of the debate to ignore 
the evidence for the other.
287
 Nevertheless, as we will see, Geras also imputes things to Marx that 
cannot be found in the text. That so much hinges on whether or not Marx’s assertions are ironic 
or rhetorical demonstrates the paucity of the textual material. That we must resort to debates over 
text-fragments should, from the very outset, frame the debate: Marx’s evasiveness is the first 
question. 
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To avoid falsely imputing things to Marx in order to justify my interpretation, I will take 
Marx literally. Furthermore, this engagement with Marx is not selective, but systematic. 
Ultimately, I argue that all three sides of the debate are partially correct, but each has 
fundamental shortcomings. In this exploration of Marx’s theory of exchange and its implications 
for theories of commutative justice, I will focus primarily on Capital: Volume One. Nevertheless, 
I will also supplement this exegesis of Capital with relevant passages from other of Marx’s texts. 
There are two reasons for this overall strategy. First, Marxists have often accused each other of 
quote-mongering, of removing quotes from their context in order to support a particular 
interpretation. As one commentator has put it, “the power to think dwindled to the power to find 
enough words to connect two quotations.”288 This is particularly true of the debates about Marx 
and ethics because his discussion of ethics is so fragmentary. By studying the theoretical 
developments as they occur in Capital, we preserve as much as possible their proper context 
without having to reproduce the whole work. We will find that some of the interpretations of 
certain of Marx’s statements can be demonstrably refuted by pointing to their specific locations 
in the broader theoretical developments of the text. 
The second and more important reason for this exegetical strategy is that it gives 
sufficient attention to Marx’s immanent critique. As we will see, the debates about Marxism and 
ethics have been unsuccessful largely because the participants do not sufficiently appreciate the 
ways in which Marx is using immanent critique in his assertions about justice and exploitation. 
The importance of immanent critique is evident in a letter from Marx to Engels. After 
proofreading Marx’s draft of Capital, Engels asks Marx to anticipate and answer in advance 
potential objections. Marx responds: “If I were to cut short all such doubts in advance I would 
spoil the whole method of dialectical exposition. On the contrary, this method has the advantage 
of constantly setting traps for those fellows which provoke them to an untimely manifestation of 
their asininity.”289 By showing fidelity to the progression of the argument in Capital, an 
Immanent Critique of Political Economy, I will begin to expose some of the shortcomings in 
these debates. I will not offer a definitive solution to the questions of Marx and justice in this 
chapter. For reasons that will soon become apparent, I cannot begin offering such conclusions 
until the chapter on Marx’s contributions to theories of distributive justice. Nevertheless, as I 
                                                          
288
 Jack Lindsay, ‘Discussion: Socialist Humanism,’ The New Reasoner, No. 3 (Winter 1957): 95-102; 95. 
289
 Quoted in Kevin Anderson, ‘The ‘Unknown’ Marx’s Capital, Volume I: The French Edition of 1872-75, 100 
Years Later,’ Review of Radical Political Economics, 15.4 (1983): 71-80; 74. 
 93 
 
hope will also be made apparent in this and other chapters, this exegesis of Capital is absolutely 
necessary for a correct interpretation of Marx on the question of justice. 
Since this chapter is an exegesis it is necessarily quote-laden. For those who are already 
familiar with these debates this may be somewhat tedious. Nevertheless, this method is 
unavoidable. All I can promise here is that amid this frenzy of worked-over material there rests a 
purloined letter. It is ‘purloined’ because with it rests the true meaning of theft, and ‘letter’ 
because we must stay to the letter of what Marx says in order to understand the spirit of what he 
says. 
 William Blake once wrote, “To see the World in a Grain of Sand…”290 This is precisely 
why Hegel asserts that genuine beginnings are always difficult.
291
 For the dialectical method, the 
beginning must find that one thing which contains within it all of the contradictions whose 
continuous unfolding propels us to the highest resolution: the system in which everything, 
including that beginning, is explained in their own terms without resort to external or 
transcendental standards. Hence, one must scour the desert for that one grain of sand which will 
disclose an entire world. Hegel begins his Philosophy of Right, a treatise on freedom, with 
freedom in its most immediate form, abstract right, or the property relation between individuals. 
Similarly, Marx starts with the commodity in a world of commodities. Had Marx been able to 
travel the full distance of this world as he had initially intended, Das Kapital would bring us 
from a single commodity all the way to the global exchange of every commodity. If he did this 
successfully, he would never have to leave the internal dialectic initiated by the commodity, the 
‘cell-form’ of capitalism. In the transitions from the commodity to money through to capital 
there is summarized the entire epoch of private property. The end of that epoch, forged by 
nothing but its own internal contradictions, is also foretold. Let us begin with this grain of sand. 
After all, we have a world to win! 
 Marx argues that the commodity has two fundamental dimensions. To the extent that the 
commodity is something useful, it is a use-value.
292
 This is based on its material properties 
irrespective of the amount of labour required to produce it. If its use-value is its qualitative 
aspect, then the second fundamental dimension of the commodity is quantitative, namely, the 
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amounts in which commodities compare to each other. This, the exchange-value of the 
commodity, is its specific form under capitalism. If we abstract from the use-values by which 
commodities are incommensurable qualities, they have only one thing in common: they are 
products of human labour.
293
 The amount of labour embodied in each commodity is the basis by 
which they, as exchange-values, are comparable. For Marx, this solves Aristotle’s question about 
how two qualitatively different things, one house and five beds, can be made commensurable. 
This is Marx’s much-maligned labour theory of value. 
Under capitalism, labour-power is itself a commodity. As a use-value, labour is ‘concrete 
labour,’ namely, all of the qualitatively different useful forms of labour.294 As commodified 
labour-power, as an exchange-value, labour is ‘abstract labour,’ namely, labour insofar as it is 
quantitatively comparable to every other form of abstract labour. In other words, this is labour 
that is made interchangeable with all other commodified labour. Indeed, the exchange-value of a 
commodity is not the actual labour-time of each act of concrete labour. Rather, it is the socially 
necessary labour time, the average productivity in the current production of commodities. The 
comparative productivity of each act of labour, and thus, the relative exchange-values fetched by 
its commodities, are only determined after the production process through market exchange. It is 
not the specific duration or intensity of concrete labour that is remunerated, but rather, abstract 
labour. Insofar as an act of abstract labour does not match average productivity, it will not be 
fully compensated. In the long run, this will lead to bankruptcy. Consequently, since production 
itself is subject to market competition, there is a relentless drive to constantly increase 
productivity under capitalism. Indeed, one of the reasons why Marx describes abstract labour as 
alienated labour is because its societal worth is determined by an uncontrollable price 
mechanism.
295
 
Like any commodity, the exchange-value of commodified labour is determined by the 
amount of labour that goes into it, namely, the labour necessary for its daily as well as 
generational reproduction. This will be represented by the wage it is awarded for its use as a 
commodity. Marx argues that the discovery that labour is the basis of commensurability can only 
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become apparent under capitalism when labour adopts an abstract form. In other words, Marx is 
grounding his thought in historical developments. 
Marx’s first explicit assertions about justice in Capital occur after ‘Chapter 1: The 
Commodity,’ at the beginning of ‘Chapter 2: The Process of Exchange.’ Commodities cannot 
bring themselves to market. This requires people. In order for objects to interact as commodities, 
people must recognize each other as the owners of these commodities. This is a relation of 
mutual consent. Each individual can only appropriate the commodity of the other by alienating 
their own. This should remind us of Hegel’s theory of the abstract rights of the legal ‘person.’ 
These juridical relations, which take the form of contracts, are determined by the 
economic relations: “the characters who appear on the economic stage are merely 
personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of these economic relations that they 
come into contact with each other.”296 First, we should note that Marx’s depiction of ‘characters’ 
on an ‘economic stage’ will soon become all the more poignant when we discuss Hegel’s theory 
of tragedy. Second, it is passages like these that provide one of the reasons why some 
commentators believe that Marx has a purely juridical conception of justice. It is also one of the 
reasons why they believe that Marx does not deem capitalism unjust. Instead, he deems it just 
according to the only possible notion of justice under capitalist economic relations. This is 
bourgeois justice typified by contractual exchanges. 
 Amid these assertions Marx offers a critique of his French nemesis, Proudhon. We cannot 
underestimate the significance of Marx’s critique of Proudhon. As we will see, much of what 
Marx says in Capital is motivated by a critique of him and other proponents of what Marx calls 
‘utopian socialism.’ Acknowledging this is crucial for our interpretation of Marx’s apparently 
disparate assertions about justice. It is in this critique of Proudhon that Marx makes his first 
explicit mention of justice: 
 
Proudhon creates his ideal of justice, of ‘justice éternelle,’ from the juridical 
relations that correspond to the production of commodities: he thereby proves, to 
the consolation of all good petty bourgeois, that the production of commodities is 
a form as eternal as justice. Then he turns round and seeks to reform the actual 
production of commodities, and the corresponding legal system, in accordance 
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with this ideal. What would one think of a chemist who, instead of studying the 
laws governing molecular interactions, and on that basis solving definite 
problems, claimed to regulate interactions by means of the ‘eternal ideas’ of 
‘naturalité’ and ‘affinité’?297 
 
What is the basis of Marx’s distinction between his own ‘scientific socialism’ and the ‘utopian 
socialism’ of Proudhon? Marx’s critique of utopianism is quite similar to Hegel’s critique of 
moral formalism. Marx argues that the utopian tends to focus on formal ideas, such as justice, 
equality, and freedom, without determining scientifically the character of their content. 
Therefore, these forms can give rise to a particular content as easily as its opposite. Indeed, the 
form can be the site of two irreconcilable contents. Consequently, Marx argues that there are 
several reasons why we must begin from the immanent critique of present social conditions. 
 First, this is the precondition of determining whether or not socialism is necessary at all. 
Unless we are able to ascertain that various social maladies are inherent to capitalism itself, 
socialists will have no rebuttal to those who argue that the solution is not the overthrow of 
capitalism, but the development of a better form of capitalism that finally, so to speak, gets it 
right. To take a current example, utopian socialists will be ill-equipped to refute a libertarian who 
defends his predictions about the free market by arguing that nowhere has the market been 
sufficiently free to prove these predictions true. Second, unless we begin from the critique of 
present conditions, we will not have an understanding of what those conditions ultimately make 
possible, in however latent and stultified a form under capitalism, as well as the obstacles 
capitalism creates for attempts to fully realize those potentials. In other words, because the 
utopian socialists begin from the future society, they do not have objective conceptions of the 
character that society should take or of how to achieve it, of the ultimate end and its necessary 
means. And third, Marx rejects utopian socialism because its constructions of the future social 
order resolve in thought the practices that can only be figured out in the experience of struggling 
against capitalism, overthrowing it, and building a socialist society. Marx believes this will 
require a great deal of experimentation.
298
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Marx argues that all of these shortcomings combine in the utopian socialism of Proudhon. 
As we will see, Proudhon believes that the prevailing inequality is the result of a particular form 
of commodity exchange distorted by monopolies, not generalized commodity exchange itself. 
His solution is therefore the creation of ‘People’s Banks’ and exchangeable labour vouchers 
based on actual labour-contribution. Furthermore, Proudhon deems the current conditions unjust 
according to what he regards as an eternal idea of justice, but which is actually a notion of justice 
drawn directly from the historically-specific conditions of commodity production and exchange. 
Therefore, his notion of socialism actually contains elements that are integral to capitalist society 
and which do not address the inequality endemic to capital, to commodity production, itself. 
Proudhon’s utopian socialism can do nothing but reproduce capitalism in another form, along 
with all of its essential inequalities. For example, Marx demonstrates that, under capitalism, it is 
not merely money that is abstract. Labour vouchers will necessarily fail because generalized 
commodity production entails the reduction of labour to abstract labour. Consequently, on the 
rare occasions when specific acts of labour are remunerated for their actual duration and 
intensity, this will be incidental. Furthermore, the drive to increase average productivity will 
remain a relentless imperative beyond the control of workers. As with Kant and private property, 
Proudhon unknowingly ‘smuggles’ the content of a particular kind of production—commodity 
production based on small-holdings of private property—into a form of justice he deems 
universal. 
Conversely, Marx’s scientific socialism attempts to critique specifically capitalist social 
relations in order to uncover the societal laws of development, the material contradictions 
through which that society transforms into something beyond itself. For Marx, ethical ideals, no 
matter how sophisticated, could not provoke a qualitative transformation of social conditions if 
the material development of the latter was not sufficiently advanced. We must draw from those 
conditions the ideals that they necessarily put forward and determine whether or not they are 
adequate to them. If they are not, if they prove systemically incapable of meeting their own 
principles, this indicates the limits of reform. It also exposes the contradictions through which 
there can occur the genuine transformation of the social relations and the realization of these 
principles. In contrast to Proudhon’s transcendental standards, Marx engages in immanent 
critique. Therefore, Marx remains within the logic of the laws of exchange, within the laws of 
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private property, to explore whether or not they give rise to relations and ideals that herald a new 
and better form of property relations. 
After he describes the exchange process, Marx, in the third chapter, explains how money 
is the universal representative of commodities. The process of the exchange in which 
commodities are sold in order to buy other commodities can be represented by the formula C-M-
C.
299
 In the fourth chapter, Marx explains capital. It is money that buys commodities in order to 
sell them. This formula is M-C-M. The possessor of money becomes the capitalist and as such he 
is “capital personified and endowed with consciousness and will.”300 As Marx notes in chapter 
five, however, the point of this exchange must be to make more money than one has initially 
spent. The formula is then M-C-M’.301 What Aristotle deemed to be an ‘unnatural’ distortion of 
the prevailing social relations, namely, buying in order to sell at a profit, is the predominant form 
of economic interaction under capitalism. 
Marx asks, how does the capitalist withdraw increased value from the process of 
exchange? In chapter six, Marx asserts that “the money-owner must be lucky enough to find 
within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose use-value possesses the 
peculiar property of being a source of value.”302 This commodity is labour-power. For Marx, the 
peculiar use-value of labour-power is that it produces more value than it costs. The value of 
labour-power is the same as any other commodity: the amount of labour necessary to produce it. 
Therefore, the value of labour-power is the cost of its daily and generational subsistence. If the 
use-value of labour-power is that it produces more value than it costs, we must turn to the 
consumption of this labour-power by he who has purchased it. 
The consumption of the use-value of labour-power occurs, like all consumption, outside 
the exchange process: “The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose 
boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate 
rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham.”303 Marx 
asserts that the realm of exchange provides the vulgar apologists of capitalism with the basis for 
their views. Nevertheless, to understand how profit arises, we must turn to the setting of the 
consumption of labour-power, the realm of production. When we do, Marx asserts: 
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a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our dramatis 
personae. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a 
capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks 
self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like 
someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to 
expect but – a tanning.304 
 
As we will see, it is significant that Marx is referring to the capitalist and the worker as dramatis 
personae. This is intimately connected with his depiction of individuals as the ‘bearers’ or 
‘personifications’ of economic categories and social processes. 
During a portion of the working day the worker produces enough to match the value of 
their own as well as their dependents’ daily and generational reproduction. Nevertheless, in the 
contract they sign with capital the working day extends beyond this amount of time. This is the 
source of surplus-value, and thus, of profit. The worker is paid for the first portion of the 
working day, but not the second. Following from this, Marx makes an assertion that has received 
some of the most intense scrutiny in the debates about Marx and justice: 
 
The use-value of labour-power, in other words labour, belongs just as little to its 
seller as the use-value of oil after it has been sold belongs to the dealer who sold 
it. The owner of the money has paid the value of a day’s labour-power; he 
therefore has the use of it for a day, a day’s labour belongs to him. On the one 
hand the daily sustenance of labour-power costs only half a day’s labour, while 
on the other hand the very same labour-power can remain effective, can work, 
during a whole day, and consequently the value which its use during one day 
creates is double what the capitalist pays for that use; this circumstance is a piece 
of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice towards the seller.
305
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Marx appears to be arguing that, according to the only available standards of justice, this 
appropriation of surplus-labour is not unjust. Indeed, according to the laws of private property, 
the capitalist is entirely correct to ensure that the worker is not idle or lazy: “He has bought the 
use of the labour-power for a definite period, and he insists on his rights. He has no intention of 
being robbed.”306 
These are not isolated statements. Marx makes similar assertions elsewhere. For example, 
in Capital: Volume III, Marx argues that the standards of ‘just transactions,’ what we call here 
commutative justice, can only arise from a specific mode of production. Marx quotes James 
Gilbart: “That a man who borrows money with a view of making a profit by it, should give some 
portion of this profit to the lender, is a self-evident principle of natural justice.”307 In response, 
Marx describes as “nonsense” Gilbart’s assertions about natural justice: 
 
The justice of transactions between agents of production consists in the fact that 
these transactions arise from the relations of production as their natural 
consequence. The legal forms in which these economic transactions appear as 
voluntary actions of the participants, as the expression of their common will and 
as contracts that can be enforced on the parties concerned by the power of the 
state, are mere forms that cannot themselves determine this content. They simply 
express it. The content is just so long as it corresponds to the mode of production 
and is adequate to it. It is unjust as soon as it contradicts it. Slavery, on the basis 
of the capitalist mode of production, is unjust; so is cheating on the quality of 
commodities.
308
 
 
For those theorists who argue that Marx does not critique capitalism as unjust, these statements 
provide some of their strongest evidence. 
 Marx then describes the specific characteristics of capitalist exploitation. In chapter eight, 
he explains the distinction between constant capital and variable capital, between the capital that 
is expended on means of production and the capital spent on labour-power. Marx then turns in 
chapter nine to the rate of surplus-value. To determine the ‘degree of exploitation’ of labour-
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power, we must know the ratio between that part of the day in which the worker produces the 
amount of value equivalent to her own subsistence, and that part in which she works solely for 
the capitalist. Marx calls this the distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘surplus’ labour. In his 
depiction of this, Marx makes a statement that seems to be in some tension with his assertion that 
the wage-transaction is not an injustice to the seller of labour-power: 
 
What distinguishes the various economic formations of society – the distinction 
between for example a society based on slave-labour and a society based on 
wage-labour – is the form in which this surplus labour is in each case extorted 
from the immediate producer, the worker.
309
 
 
Marx asserts that surplus labour is “extorted” from all subordinated, non-ruling, producing 
classes, including the working class. This is not the only time Marx depicts appropriation in this 
way. Along with multiple invocations of the term extortion,
310
 he also describes it as robbery,
311
 
theft,
312
 stealing,
313
 and plunder.
314
 Those commentators who think that Marx criticizes 
capitalism as unjust often focus on passages like these. And yet, as we will now see, a few pages 
later Marx’s critique continues to operate within the laws of private property and exchange. 
Whether or not Marx deems there to be a tension between his assertions about justice and theft 
remains an open question. 
Marx then examines the working day. He repeats the now familiar claim that, as per the 
laws of private property, the capitalist has purchased labour-power at its daily value: “He has 
thus acquired the right to make the worker work for him during one day.”315 If the worker does 
not work for the entirety of the contracted time, “he robs the capitalist.”316 The capitalist 
demands the maximum benefit from his commodity and in doing so “takes his stand on the law 
of commodity-exchange.”317 Suddenly, a new change occurs in our dramatis personae. A strange 
commodity distinguishes itself from all of the others. Equipped with a voice and reason, the 
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commodified labour-power rebels against the unlimited extension of the working day. The 
worker proclaims to the capitalist: 
 
You and I know on the market only one law, that of the exchange of 
commodities. And the consumption of the commodity belongs not to the seller 
who parts with it, but to the buyer who acquires it. The use of my daily labour-
power therefore belongs to you. But by means of the price you pay for it every 
day, I must be able to reproduce it every day, thus allowing myself to sell it again. 
Apart from natural deterioration through age etc., I must be able to work 
tomorrow with the same normal amount of strength, health and freshness as 
today. You are constantly preaching to me the gospel of ‘saving’ and 
‘abstinence.’ Very well! Like a sensible, thrifty owner of property I will husband 
my sole wealth, my labour-power, and abstain from wasting it foolishly. Every 
day I will spend, set in motion, transfer into labour only as much of it as is 
compatible with its normal duration and healthy development.
318
 
 
Like the capitalist, the worker takes her stand on the laws of private property. She does not frame 
her protest according to an abstract ideal or transcendent principle: “You pay me for one day’s 
labour-power, while you use three days of it. That is against our contract and the law of 
commodity exchange. I therefore demand a working day of normal length, and I demand it 
without any appeal to your heart, for in money matters sentiment is out of place.”319 
The worker does not oppose the rights of private property according to a different notion 
of right. Rather, the worker reveals that this right itself features an internal tension that causes 
conflict. The right is turned against itself. Marx asserts: 
 
We see then that, leaving aside certain extremely elastic restrictions, the nature of 
commodity exchange itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to 
surplus labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to 
make the working day as long as possible, and, where possible, to make two 
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working days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity 
sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the worker maintains 
his right as a seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a particular 
normal length. There is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both 
equally bearing the seal of the law of the exchange. Between equal rights, force 
decides. Hence, in the history of capitalist production, the establishment of a 
norm for the working day presents itself as a struggle over the limits of that day, a 
struggle between collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective 
labour, i.e. the working class.
320
 
 
This passage has been discussed innumerable times. Nevertheless, it has two peculiar aspects 
that, to my knowledge, have not received any attention from commentators. The first is the 
historical precedent underlying Marx’s assertion that, ‘Between equal rights, force decides.’ The 
second is Marx’s use of the term ‘antinomy,’ which is full of theoretical significance. We will 
look at each in turn. 
The first thing that must be pointed out is that Marx is not the first to say that, ‘Between 
equal rights, force decides.’ As far as I know, that honour goes to…Hegel. Indeed, he says it in a 
number of different places. The instance where Hegel’s assertion of this most resembles that of 
Marx is, oddly enough, the one that Marx could not have read. It appears in Hegel’s unpublished 
essay, ‘The German Constitution’: “War or some other means must decide the issue, precisely 
because both contradictory rights are equally true; hence a third factor – i.e. war – must make 
them unequal so that they can be reconciled, and this occurs when one gives way to the other.”321 
From here on in, when I point to instances of Hegel’s asserting something more or less along 
these lines, I will only refer to texts with which Marx was familiar. 
When Hegel articulates one or another version of the idea that, ‘Between equal rights, 
force decides,’ it is almost always amid a discussion of tragedy as a form of art. For Hegel, the 
tragedies that most inspire us speak to a fundamental contradiction within society as it is 
presently constituted. This contradiction only becomes apparent when two tragic figures become 
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the obsessive embodiment of each of the opposed sides in this societal contradiction. Dare we 
say that these characters, these dramatis personae, are the ‘personifications’ of social processes? 
For Hegel, the quintessential example of tragedy is Sophocles’ Antigone. Creon, the ruler 
of Thebes, declares that Polyneices, lying dead on the battlefield immediately after a civil war, is 
not to receive proper burial rights. Antigone, the sister of Polyneices, defies the edict in the dark 
of night, burying her brother and fulfilling her familial and religious obligations. She is perfectly 
aware of the repercussions of her actions. Creon condemns Antigone to death. Haemon, Creon’s 
son, is engaged to Antigone. Upon her death, Haemon kills himself, which causes his mother, 
Creon’s wife Eurydice, to curse Creon before she too kills herself. Creon’s edict ultimately 
stands, but in the process, his pathological adherence to the rule of law destroys his own family. 
Antigone and Creon are tragic figures because they embody ‘pathos.’ They are whole-heartedly 
committed to what they deem right. Indeed, they are willing to die for it. For Hegel, these 
characters have ethical significance for us because they embody broader social conflicts. 
Antigone is the personification of the old gods, of familial obligations and the religious 
imperatives that seem older than time itself. Creon is the personification of the new gods, of our 
duties to the emerging and consolidating state whose laws, though recent, bring society to a 
higher order. 
Hegel speaks of Socrates in the same terms. Indeed, for Hegel, both Antigone and 
Socrates represent the same commitment to the integrity of individual conscience that foretells 
the doom of the Greek society unable to account for it. Hegel argues that Socrates’s fate is truly 
tragic because it represents a “rational misfortune.”322 It is not simply that a great and innocent 
man is killed. This is merely sad. “Misfortune is only rational,” Hegel asserts, “when it is 
brought about by the will of the subject, who must be absolutely justified and moral in what he 
does, like the power against which he wars—which must therefore not be a merely natural 
power, or the power of a tyrannic will.”323 Hegel continues: “Hence, in what is truly tragic there 
must be valid moral powers on both the sides which come into collision; this was so with 
Socrates.”324 In other words, these rights are equal: “Two opposed rights come into collision, and 
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the one destroys the other. Thus both suffer loss and yet both are mutually justified.”325 Hegel 
contends that both Antigone and Socrates embody the subjective freedom, the individual 
conscience, coming into opposition with objective freedom, the state as the apex of ethical life. 
As we will see later, Hegel thinks subjective and objective freedom can only be reconciled with 
the onset of modernity. 
Hegel distinguishes between ancient and modern tragedy. In ancient tragedy, as we have 
seen, the tragic figures are personifications of social processes, of the fundamental ethical 
contradictions. Therefore, their conflict speaks to the grandest possible collisions. They foretell 
the end of civilizations. In modern tragedy, specifically romantic poetry, the tragic figure has a 
merely individual passion for a wholly personal end that is stifled within exceptional 
circumstances.
326
 It is obvious which form of tragedy Hegel prefers: “Primitive tragedy, then, 
consists in this, that within a collision of this kind both sides of the contradiction, if taken by 
themselves, are justified.”327 
The significance of ancient tragedy for Hegel is what is revealed in these profound 
conflicts: “The tragic downfall of figures of the highest ethical worth can interest us, elevate us, 
and reconcile us to its occurrence only in so far as such figures appear in mutual opposition, with 
equally justified but distinct ethical powers which have unfortunately come into collision.”328 In 
contrast to the downfall of the “self-important rogues and criminals” that pervade modern 
tragedy, the conflicts between ancient tragic figures expose the right and wrong of both parties, 
from which emerges the true ethical idea purified of one-sidedness: “Accordingly, it is not the 
highest thing in us which perishes, and we are elevated not by the downfall of the best but, on the 
contrary, by the triumph of the true. This is the true and purely ethical interest of ancient 
tragedy.”329 
For Hegel, a conflict that reveals the two essential and mutually antagonistic principles of 
the social order is the basis of historical development. The tragic figures choose one or the other 
law. They deem all of the right to be on their side, all of the wrong on the other.
330
 In the 
conflict, however, they realize their deed is one-sided. From the perspective of the other law, 
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which has its own adherents, it is a crime.
331
 It now appears that there is right on both sides. And 
yet, the tragic figures, animated by pathos, cannot diverge from the law they have chosen: “The 
ethical individuality is directly and intrinsically one with this his universal aspect, exists in it 
alone, and is incapable of surviving the destruction of this ethical power by its opposite.”332 The 
mutual downfall reveals the basic contradiction of this form of society: “In point of fact, 
however, the ethical substance has developed through this process into actual self-consciousness; 
in other words, this particular self has become the actuality of what it is in essence; but precisely 
in this development the ethical order has been destroyed.”333 It is also the basis by which society 
develops into something qualitatively different, something able to reconcile the contradictions 
represented in the embattled tragic figures. Indeed, this is Hegel’s agonism. It is through this 
conflict that we gain self-consciousness of our society. 
Hegel’s notion of pathos extends Aristotle’s idea of the peripety that is the basis of tragic 
poetry: “A Peripety is the change of the kind described from one state of things within the play 
into its opposite, and that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of 
events.”334 For Hegel, this has obvious parallels with the dialectical inversion through which 
something confronts its opposite, revealing a contradiction that demands a higher unity. We can 
also relate pathos and the peripety to Hegel’s discussion of ‘passion’ in his more 
historiographical writings. For Hegel, the principle of spirit is only abstract and general; by itself, 
it is powerless. Therefore, it requires the motive power of will, the activity of humans to be 
realized: “we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished 
without passion.”335 In the passionate pursuit of their interests, humans often produce an 
“additional result” in history that is beyond their intentions: “They gratify their own interest; but 
something further is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to 
their consciousness, and not included in their design.”336 The substance of the act recoils on its 
perpetrator, “reacts upon him with destructive tendency.”337 For Hegel, this is why that more 
profound form of conflict which arises from the very substance of society is the basis of all 
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historical development. When Marx asserts that, ‘Between equal rights, force decides,’ he 
invokes this tradition of thought. Although he was a fanatic reader of Shakespeare, Marx shows 
the basis by which tragedy can be made Sophoclean again. 
The second peculiar aspect of the aforementioned passage is that Marx does not describe 
this conflict as a contradiction. Rather, he calls it an ‘antinomy.’ To understand what is meant by 
antinomy we must return to Kant. His discussion of the antinomies is intended to show the 
inadequacy both of the dogmatic rationalism he associates with Plato as well as the skeptical 
empiricism he deems typical of Locke. Both modes of thought appear to offer arguments that are 
plausible and yet are mutually opposed. In his explanation of the antinomies Kant discusses four 
conflicts of the ‘transcendental ideas.’ Let us look at the third conflict, the antinomy between 
freedom and necessity. First, Kant offers us the rationalist conception of freedom and necessity: 
“Thesis: Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate 
the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these 
phenomena.”338 Second, Kant gives us the empirical conception: “Antithesis: There is no such 
thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature.”339 
Kant then argues that both the rationalist and empiricist assertions appear correct. If they are both 
correct and yet mutually opposed, however, then something about the assumptions is wrong. 
Kant argues that this is why we need his critical philosophy. 
Quite interestingly, Kant describes these conflicting ideas, these ‘antinomies,’ as…a 
struggle. The passage is worth quoting at length: 
 
These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a battle-field, where that 
side obtains the victory which has been permitted to make the attack, and he is 
compelled to yield who has been unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. 
And hence, champions of ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are 
certain to carry away the crown of victory, if they only take care to have the right 
to make the last attack, and are not obliged to sustain another onset from their 
opponent. We can easily believe that this arena has been often trampled by the 
feet of the combatants, that many victories have been obtained on both sides, but 
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that the last victory, decisive of the affair between the contending parties, was 
won by him who fought for the right, only if his adversary was forbidden to 
continue the tourney. As impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the 
consideration whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong 
side, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first decided. 
Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other, they will discover 
the nothingness of their cause of quarrel, and part good friends.
340
 
 
For Kant, the thesis treats the thing-in-itself, or ‘noumena,’ like the thing as it appears to us, or 
‘phenomena.’ In other words, it treats the thing in itself as if it can be directly experienced.341 
That is why it is dogmatic rationalism. Conversely, the antithesis treats phenomena like 
noumena, as if our sense experience of appearances revealed the thing in itself. This is dogmatic 
empiricism. Conversely, critical philosophy treats phenomena as phenomena and therefore 
recognizes the limits of this knowledge. Humans are both rational and empirical beings. To the 
extent that we are rational, we are free from the necessity of the natural laws that determine our 
empirical selves. Nevertheless, though this thesis is true, we cannot claim to have ‘objective’ 
knowledge of it. What we know is beyond possible human experience. 
Hegel, in his Science of Logic, criticizes Kant’s transcendental solution to these 
antinomies. According to Hegel, Kant’s resolution occurs only in consciousness, not in the real 
world: “It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then 
to transfer the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point 
of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that 
knows how to resolve it.”342 In place of Kant’s ‘subjective idealism,’ Hegel posits an ‘objective 
idealism’ for which contradictions exist not only in consciousness, but in the world. Indeed, for 
Hegel, this is what human history is. It is not merely contradictions in thought, or even 
contradictions in the objective world, but the ongoing and successive phases in the attempt to 
heal the separation, the contradiction, between the subject and object, between humans and our 
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world. This is why, for Hegel, human history is the story of the development of freedom through 
necessity. 
Hegel explains this most fully in a part of the Science of Logic which we have already 
discussed. It is where he explains immanent critique. Recall that Hegel describes this, like Kant, 
as a battle: “The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on 
his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and defeating him 
where he is not.”343 Surely this is an allusion to Kant’s discussion of antinomies, just as Marx’s 
discussion is an allusion to both Kant and Hegel. In this section of the Science of the Logic, 
Hegel explains the relation between the dialectical method and freedom. 
For Hegel, the method of immanence which weighs concepts against themselves need not 
impose external criteria of judgement. When a thing confronts its opposite, this is only a 
negation in a purely negative sense. The two sides remain one-sidedly true and necessarily 
opposed. It takes a negation of the negation, a reconciliation of what is essential to each in a 
higher unity, to create a positive negation, a determinate negation. By tracing the oppositions to 
which these concepts necessarily give rise, reason penetrates to the essence of a concept and 
traces its development into a higher unity through its own internal dialectic. In other words, the 
reason of the thinking subject corresponds to the rational development of the object. Far from 
posing a ‘noumena’ that is fixed in its separation from the subject, the subject and object are 
unified in the reason they share. Hegel takes Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ to its logical 
conclusion. The thinking subject encounters the object and makes the object her own: 
“According to this exposition, the unity of the notion is that whereby something is not a mere 
mode of feeling, an intuition, or even a mere representation, but is an object, and this objective 
unity is the unity of the ego with itself. In point of fact, the comprehension of an object consists 
in nothing else than that the ego makes it its own.”344 
This is Hegel’s notion of freedom. Conditions are ‘external’ to the extent that the subject 
has not incorporated them into her being. Transforming ‘external’ nature into something for 
human use subjectifies it, and objectifies ourselves, by rendering what was external into an 
internal relation. The human subjectification of nature constitutes its transformation, and the 
transformation of ourselves is an objectification by nature. A humanization of the world is 
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constituted by rendering external conditions—that which is not understood by us, that which 
imposes necessity on us—internal. Through our understanding of it via our worldly interactions 
with it, it becomes of us and we by it. This notion of freedom overcomes the antinomy posited by 
Kant. Engels later expresses Hegel’s notion in a more popular, accessible form: “Freedom does 
not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and 
in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends.”345 
If an antinomy is something that, at least as it is currently formulated, is an unresolvable 
conflict, then a contradiction is something that is formulated in such a way that its opposing sides 
reveal the basis of its resolution in a higher unity. Why, when Marx is describing the struggle 
between the equal rights of labour and capital, does he use the term ‘antinomy’? Perhaps he is 
indicating that the conflict between the owner of the exchange-value of labour-power and the 
owner of the use-value of labour-power cannot be resolved at this level of analysis. The conflict 
internal to the right of private property is established, but it remains in abeyance. In other words, 
this immanent critique is far from complete. Other conditions must be satisfied in order for there 
to be a determinate negation. In other words, there are more aspects of necessity, more natural 
laws that we must recognize and comprehend, before it is possible to determine the content of a 
genuine freedom. 
In the meantime, Marx points to one of the most important results of the struggles that 
arise amid the antinomy of rights. This is the legislation protecting, at least to a certain extent, 
the workers’ sole piece of productive property: 
 
For ‘protection’ against the serpent of their agonies, the workers have to put their 
heads together and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social 
barrier by which they can be prevented from selling themselves and their families 
into slavery and death by voluntary contract with capital. In the place of the 
pompous catalogue of the ‘inalienable rights of man’ there steps the modest 
Magna Carta of the legally limited working day, which at last makes clear ‘when 
the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.’346 
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As important as this is, it nonetheless remains within the confines of bourgeois right and the laws 
of private property. 
Much intervenes between Marx’s assertions about the antinomy of rights, which is in 
‘Part Three,’ and his next invocation of justice at the beginning of “Part Six: Wages.’ In “Part 
Four: The Production of Relative Surplus-Value,” in chapters 12-15, Marx distinguishes between 
absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value. The former concerns increasing the surplus-
value by lengthening the time or by intensifying the effort of the working day. Conversely, 
relative surplus-value entails increasing the amount of the working day that is comprised of 
surplus-labour relative to necessary-labour. This is done by technological improvements that 
increase the productivity of labour-power. In “Part Five: The Production of Absolute and 
Relative Surplus-Value,” chapters 16-18 examine how to establish the correct ratio between 
absolute and relative surplus-value in the examination of capitalist production processes. 
Marx does not mention justice again until the first chapter of “Part Six: Wages.” In 
“Chapter 19: The Transformation of the Value (and Respectively the Price) of Labour-Power 
into Wages,” Marx distinguishes between labour and labour-power. Although labour is the 
substance or the measure of value, it does not itself have value. Rather, it is labour-power that 
has value.
347
 In other words, it is labour that determines the amount of value created by the 
worker, but it is labour-power that determines the amount that the worker makes in wages. Since 
the total labour expended over the course of an entire working day extends beyond necessary 
labour, the labour-power that is paid in wages, the working day includes the surplus labour that 
produces surplus value, which is the basis of profits. It is in this context that Marx asserts: 
 
All the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the 
mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism’s illusions 
about freedom, all the apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis 
the form of appearance discussed above, which makes the actual relations 
invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation.
348
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By describing justice as illusory, Marx appears to overthrow his earlier assertion that the 
exploitation of labour-power is by no means an injustice to the labourer who sells it. As we will 
see, many of the commentators who believe that Marx deems capitalism unjust cite this passage. 
They argue that when Marx depicts the wage-exchange as, if not just, then not unjust, this 
depended on the assumption that the wage-relation between workers and capitalists was an equal 
exchange. This is only formally true. Underlying it is the appropriation of uncompensated 
surplus-labour. Marx therefore exposes the earlier view as false. The wage-relation is not an 
exchange of equivalents and therefore it is unjust. Nevertheless, other commentators argue the 
opposite perspective. They contend that the notion that workers should receive back the 
equivalent of the amount of value they produce, what is called their ‘labour-contribution,’ is 
based on the false idea that workers exchange wages for labour, not labour-power. Marx shows 
here that workers are only entitled to the equivalent of their labour-power. Therefore, we cannot 
critique the wage-relation as unjust according to a theory of labour-contribution. Consequently, 
the wage-relation is just according to the only possible standards. When Marx speaks of the 
illusion of justice, he is not referring to those who deem capitalism just, but to those who critique 
capitalism according to a misguided theory of justice. 
Much of the debate about these passages does not give sufficient attention to the process 
of Marx’s immanent critique. To my knowledge, no one has asked what dialectical movements 
intervene between this and the preceding mention of justice. Why does Marx decide to address 
the question of justice again here? After all, Marx explains the distinction between necessary 
labour and surplus labour as early as page 325, only 24 pages after the last explicit mention of 
justice. This is 357 pages before this current mention of justice. That discussion of necessary and 
surplus labour was also the passage where Marx describes the relation between labour and 
capital as ‘extortion.’ Could he have described the illusions of justice then? That he did not 
provides significant indication as to what Marx is doing with the conception of justice here. 
There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is what occurs between these two assertions 
about justice, and in particular, what must occur immediately before the later one. The second 
reason is what must occur immediately after it. Both are inherent to those parts of the dialectical 
method that Marx adopts from Hegel. 
 The first reason is explained in the sentences immediately after the above-quoted 
passage: “World history has taken a long time to get to the bottom of the mystery of wages; but, 
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despite this, nothing is easier to understand than the necessity, the raise d’être, of this form of 
appearance.”349 Recall that in Hegel’s critique of the ‘understanding’ typical of Kant, we cannot 
merely expose false appearances. Our explanation of the essential relations must also explain 
why they have these false appearances, why they must appear in this way. Marx adopts this 
aspect of the dialectical method. What intervenes between these two distant and seemingly 
disconnected statements about justice is the way in which Marx’s explanations have set the 
conditions for not only exposing the abstractions and formalisms of ideology, but also why the 
essential relations underlying them are themselves abstract in some significant way. This is 
significant because if one wants to address the problems arising from these abstractions it is not 
enough to expose the ideology as false. It also requires going to the root cause: the material 
conditions. In other words, the solution is not only a question of correct theory, but of 
transformative practical activity. 
With the explanation of relative surplus-value, and in particular, its priority over absolute 
surplus-value, Marx can now explain the self-valorization of capital. The previous section, “Part 
Five,” ends in the following way: 
 
Capital, therefore, is not only the command of labour, as Adam Smith thought. It 
is essentially the command over unpaid labour. All surplus-value, whatever 
particular form (profit, interest or rent) it may subsequently crystallize into, is in 
substance the materialization of unpaid labour-time. The secret of the self-
valorization of capital resolves itself into the fact that it has at its disposal a 
definite quantity of the unpaid labour of other people.
350
 
 
In other words, Marx is almost able to show how the capitalist system, as a system, reproduces 
itself on an ever-expanding scale. A phase of capitalist production can only renew itself because 
it culminates in capitalist appropriation, which is necessary for the subsequent phase. All that is 
left is the short section on this ‘unpaid labour’ where he introduces the distinction between 
labour and labour-power. This is directly tied to the second reason why Marx now deems it 
appropriate to speak about the illusions of justice. 
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 The reason why Marx could only invoke justice here at this point is indicated one page 
after the above-quoted statement about the illusions of justice: “The forms of appearance are 
reproduced directly and spontaneously, as current and usual modes of thought; the essential 
relation must first be discovered by science. Classical political economy stumbles approximately 
onto the true state of affairs, but without consciously formulating it. It is unable to do this as long 
as it stays within its bourgeois skin.”351 What does Marx mean here by the need to shed the 
bourgeois skin? As is evident in the next section, it means exactly what Hegel means by it: we 
must leave the perspective of the isolated person and enter the realm of Spirit. In other words, to 
explain the shortcomings of methodological individualism we need a genuinely social ontology. 
Even more profoundly, we must explain how these historically-specific social relations give rise 
to the prevalence of methodological individualism itself. 
The first chapter of “Part Seven: The Process of the Accumulation of Capital” is “Chapter 
23: Simple Reproduction.” Its opening sentences are: 
 
Whatever the social form of the production process, it has to be continuous, it 
must periodically repeat the same phases. A society can no more cease to produce 
than it can cease to consume. When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and 
in the constant flux of its incessant renewal, every social process of production is 
at the same time a process of reproduction.
352
 
 
Marx is now explicitly providing the social content to the formal laws of capitalist society: “The 
illusion created by the money-form vanishes immediately if, instead of taking a single capitalist 
and single worker, we take the whole capitalist class and the whole working class.”353 Similarly, 
a few pages later, he asserts that our perspective changes qualitatively when we shift from “an 
isolated process of production” to “capitalist production in full swing, and on its actual social 
scale.”354 As we have seen, the dialectical method shows why essential relations have specific 
forms of appearance. Following from this, the most robust critique of ideology not only exposes 
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its false claims, but also explains why they appear to be true. In other words, it reveals the 
conditions that give rise to that falsity. 
A few pages later, Marx explains why methodological individualism is so prevalent in 
political economy. This has broader implications for modern thought as a whole. It is the 
peculiar character of commodity exchange that buyers and sellers meet each other as mutually 
indifferent individuals. They are related to each other only for the length of the contract. Any 
subsequent transactions between these individuals need not follow from, and are therefore 
incidental to, the preceding transactions.
355
 Consequently, it makes sense (and it makes ‘sense’) 
that our perspective would apprehend only particular exchanges between specific individuals 
rather than the long-term processes of exchange between social classes. 
Amid these remarks, Marx makes a claim quite similar to his earlier assertion about 
‘extortion.’ Now, however, he is not describing a single, isolated exchange between wage-labour 
and capital, but the ongoing social processes between classes through which capitalist society as 
a whole is reproduced: 
 
The means of production with which the additional labour-power is incorporated, 
as well as the necessaries with which the workers are sustained, are nothing but 
component parts of the surplus product, parts of the tribute annually exacted from 
the working class by the capitalist class. Even if the latter uses a portion of that 
tribute to purchase the additional labour-power at its full price, so that equivalent 
is exchanged for equivalent, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of 
the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has 
stolen from them.
356
 
 
More significantly, on the next page, Marx returns to the language of the dialectic: “It is quite 
evident from this that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws based on the 
production and circulation of commodities, become changed into their direct opposite through 
their own internal and inexorable dialectic.”357 I noted earlier that Marx used the term 
“antinomy” in his depiction of the conflict of rights between labour and capital. I suggested that 
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Marx may have been indicating that at the preceding level of analysis the internal conflict 
embodied in private property rights was unresolvable. In his return to the language of the 
dialectic, Marx may be demonstrating that this antinomy can now become an outright 
contradiction, thereby setting the stage for its resolution through a determinate negation. 
This explains why with many of his earlier assertions, including the ones that have been 
relevant for us, he had to allow certain assumptions to hold at that point of his exposition. We 
began with equal exchange, but this was only an “apparent exchange.”358 In the exchange 
between wage-labour and capital, the form is “alien” to the content and “mystifies” that 
content.
359
 Marx asserts: 
 
Originally the rights of property seemed to us to be grounded in a man’s own 
labour. Some such assumption was at least necessary, since only commodity-
owners with equal rights confronted each other, and the sole means of 
appropriating the commodities of others was the alienation of a man’s own 
commodities, commodities which, however, could only be produced by labour. 
Now, however, property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to 
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and the impossibility, on 
the part of the worker, of appropriating his own product. The separation of 
property from labour thus becomes the necessary consequence of a law that 
apparently originated in their identity.
360
 
 
For many commentators, this solves the problem. Workers and capitalists have different rights. 
Whereas before there was an antinomy between equal rights, we now see that it is a contradiction 
between unequal rights, though force still decides. Since the earlier notion of equal rights was 
based on a false assumption, the exchange between labour and capital is an injustice to the 
former. Despite these revelations, however, Marx asserts that, although capitalist appropriation 
appears to violate the laws of commodity production, it is what inevitably results from their 
application.
361
 Indeed, on the very next page, Marx makes a familiar claim: “If, therefore, the 
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amount of value advanced in wages is not merely found again in the product, but augmented by a 
surplus-value, this is not because the seller has been defrauded, for he has really received the 
value of his commodity; it is due solely to the fact that this commodity has been used up by the 
buyer.”362 This is because the law of exchange requires only the equality of exchange-values, not 
of use-values: 
 
Thus the original transformation of money into capital takes place in the most 
exact accordance with the economic laws of commodity production and with the 
rights of property derived from them. Nevertheless, its result is: 
(1) that the product belongs to the capitalist and not to the worker; 
(2) that the value of this product includes, apart from the value of the 
capital advanced, a surplus-value which costs the worker labour but the capitalist 
nothing, and which none the less becomes the legitimate property of the 
capitalist; 
(3) that the worker has retained his labour-power and can sell it anew if he 
finds another buyer.
363
 
 
The seller has not been defrauded. The surplus-value becomes the legitimate property of the 
capitalist. Marx seems to be arguing that the wage-relation is both just and that this justice is 
illusory. In the wage-contract between labour and capital, with regard to exchange-values the 
seller is not defrauded, but according to the use-values, the buyer is guilty of theft. The question 
arises, why, in certain places, does Marx describe capitalist appropriation as theft? We must 
defer this question for the time being. 
 The key to this section of the text is revealed in the following passage and its footnote. In 
these passages, Marx connects in a massive arc this section of the text with his early critique of 
‘eternal justice’ in the second chapter: 
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Only where wage-labour is its basis does commodity production impose itself 
upon society as a whole; but it is also true that only there does it unfold all its 
hidden potentialities. To say that the intervention of wage-labour adulterates 
commodity production is to say that commodity production must not develop if it 
is to remain unadulterated. To the extent that commodity production, in 
accordance with its own immanent laws, undergoes a further development into 
capitalist production, the property laws of commodity production must undergo a 
dialectical inversion so that they become laws of capitalist appropriation.
364
 
 
The footnote to this passage reads: “We may well, therefore, feel astonished at the cleverness of 
Proudhon, who would abolish capitalist property – by enforcing the eternal laws of property 
which are themselves based on commodity production!”365 Marx indicates that much of what he 
discusses here is directed not only at apologetic bourgeois political economy, but also the petty-
bourgeois socialism unable to fully emancipate itself from it. 
Elsewhere, Marx castigates the French socialists who think that exchange and exchange-
value are originally a system of universal freedom and equality that have become perverted by 
money and monopoly capital. They therefore regard socialist society as the genuine realization of 
these bourgeois ideals. Conversely, Marx demonstrates that, historically, communal production 
necessarily leads to capitalist commodity production and that this necessarily leads to capitalist 
appropriation. What Proudhon and his ilk condemn as distortions are actually inherent to 
exchange-value. In other words, commodity production and exchange entail “the realization of 
equality and freedom, which prove to be inequality and unfreedom.”366 When Marx rejects the 
idea that socialism should achieve bourgeois ideals, this is not because he lacks alternative 
conceptions of freedom or equality. Rather, it is because these alternative notions cannot be 
based on commodity production and exchange value. Nevertheless, whether or not Marx has an 
alternative to Proudhon’s notion of justice remains to be seen. What I can say at this point is that 
Marx’s critique of commodity production is one of the reasons why I have insisted on the 
distinction between commutative justice and distributive justice. If Marx is correct, then, as we 
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will see, contrary to Proudhon, the principle of labour-contribution cannot be achieved within a 
social system in which commutative justice is the primary form of proprietary justice. We should 
keep this in mind when we consider why Marx describes the relation of exchange between wage-
labour and capital as, on the one hand, ‘not unjust,’ but on the other hand, ‘theft.’ 
Although we cannot say definitively what Marx is referring to when he speaks of the 
‘illusions of justice,’ some interpretations are stronger than others. We must take into 
consideration that it comes immediately after his explanation of the distinction between labour 
and labour-power. It also comes right before a discussion of the laws of private property that is 
explicitly directed, at least in part, at the Proudhonists. It is more likely that Marx is not 
criticizing capitalism as unjust, but rather, is criticizing those who condemn capitalism as unjust 
according to standards uncritically adopted from capitalism itself. In other words, Marx is 
referring to the illusion that one could critique capitalism according to a notion of justice based 
upon ideas of labour-contribution. Nevertheless, this can only be a tentative speculation for the 
time being. 
One of the most important achievements of that school of thought, the self-described 
‘Hegelian-Marxism’ of which Raya Dunayevskaya is the paramount example, is to show the 
prominence of Marx’s critique of Proudhonism throughout his writings. For example, 
Dunayevskaya notes that Marx, in later editions of Capital, greatly expanded the sections on 
commodity fetishism.
367
 She contends that Marx did this because of the defeat of the Paris 
Commune. Marx attributed this defeat, in part, to the unhealthy respect that the Communards 
showed for the privately-owned banks. Marx regarded this as the insidious influence of 
Proudhonism and its fetishizing of the money-form. McNally notes that the extent of Marx’s 
career-long battle against Proudhonism has been neglected. For example, it is significant that the 
124-page “Chapter on Money” in the Grundrisse not only begins with a citation of Darimon, a 
disciple of Proudhon, but is in its entirety a response to it.
368
 Hudis notes how Marx had written 
many drafts of a treatise on political economy, of which the Grundrisse is an example, before 
writing and publishing Capital. Hudis asserts that in all of the previous drafts, the distinction 
between abstract and concrete labour eluded Marx. It was only when he discovered it that he 
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produced Capital.
369
 Hudis points to a passage where Marx asserts, “I was the first to point out 
and examine critically this twofold nature of the labour contained in commodities.” Hudis 
contends that “this is the only time Marx uses the first person in Capital, aside from the prefaces 
and postfaces.”370 This is significant because, as Hudis points out, Marx’s major critique of 
Proudhon is that it is not merely money that is abstract, but labour itself. Therefore, exploitation 
resides not merely in the distorting influence of money, but in the character of labour endemic to 
capitalist society. 
Marx, in letter to J. B. Schweizer in 1865, discusses his critique of Proudhon.
371
 What 
Marx says there confirms my interpretation here. Marx asserts that Proudhon’s first major work, 
What is Property?, is marred by the fact that Kant was the only German philosopher who 
Proudhon had read at the time. Consequently, Proudhon imitates Kant’s treatment of the 
antinomies, “and he leaves one with a strong impression that to him, as to Kant, the resolution of 
the antinomies is something ‘beyond’ the human understanding, i.e., something about which his 
own understanding is in the dark.”372 For this reason, Marx criticizes Proudhon on terms that are 
remarkably similar to Hegel’s critique of Kant on the prohibition of theft. 
 
The most that can be got out of this is that the bourgeois juristic conceptions of 
‘theft’ apply equally well to the ‘honest’ gains of the bourgeois himself. On the 
other hand, since theft as a forcible violation of property presupposes the 
existence of property, Proudhon entangled himself in all sorts of fantasies, 
obscure even to himself, about true bourgeois property.
373
 
 
Marx then takes some of the blame for Proudhon’s later attempts to apply the dialectical method 
to bourgeois property. During Proudhon’s visit to Paris in 1844, Marx introduced him to the 
work of Hegel, which Proudhon attempted to deploy in a subsequent work, The Philosophy of 
Poverty. Marx asserts, “In place of Kant’s insoluble ‘antinomies,’ the Hegelian 
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‘contradiction’ was to be introduced as the means of development.”374 Needless to say, Marx 
does not think that Proudhon understood the dialectical method and the principle of 
contradiction. Marx’s response, The Poverty of Philosophy, ended his friendship with Proudhon 
for good. 
The radical differences between Marx and Proudhon are somewhat obscured by the fact 
that both associated a certain form of property with ‘theft.’ This, however, is where the 
similarities end. For Proudhon, exchange based on commodity production entails a relation of 
equality: “What is it, then, to practise justice? It is to give equal wealth to each, on condition of 
equal labour.”375 Proudhon argues that exploitation is not the result of private property as such, 
but of monopoly. It is in this sense that property is theft. Therefore, his conception of socialism 
entails the end of monopoly and the establishment of genuinely free exchange. Proudhon 
envisions a synthesis of original communism and private property. This is a society of 
independent, small-scale production. The way to accomplish this is a mutualism that will 
envelop capitalism.
376
 Therefore, Proudhon condemns strikes, which disrupt free exchange by 
raising prices, as well as political struggles for state power: “It is not for the proletaire to 
reconcile the contradictions of the codes, still less to suffer for the errors of the government. On 
the contrary, it is the duty of the civil and administrative power to reconstruct itself on the basis 
of political equality.”377 Proudhon’s anti-politics is the direct opposite of the agonism that Marx 
inherits from Hegel. As McNally notes: 
 
By accepting the premises of political economy, Proudhon can merely engage in 
the tedious exercise of showing how political economy contradicts itself. He does 
not grasp that these theoretical contradictions are necessary results of the real 
contradictions of capitalist production. As a result, he hopes to resolve these 
contradictions through the purely intellectual exercise of separating the ‘good’ 
aspects of capitalism (individual production, competition, exchange of 
equivalents) from the ‘bad’ (private property, monopoly, exploitation). Rather 
than show the inevitable self-contradictions of modern society which need to be 
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exploded, he regresses to the standpoint of an abstract moralizing – praising the 
‘good,’ bemoaning the ‘bad.’ As Marx notes, with Proudhon ‘there is no longer 
any dialectics but only, at most, absolute pure morality.’378 
 
In other words, Proudhon expresses an ‘excessive fondness of the world.’ These contradictions 
exist in commodity production, not merely in our moral consciousness of it. As early as 1844 
Marx asserts that, when Proudhon attempts to construct socialism on the basis of labour 
contribution, he fails to transcend the level of political economy.
379
 Marx points out that private 
property is not the cause of, but results from, alienated labour. They are two sides of the same 
coin. Therefore, a genuine socialism must address not only the ownership of property, but also 
the alienation of labour. This is one of the reasons why Marx invokes the illusions of justice 
amid his explanation of the distinction between labour and labour-power. It is not merely money 
or monopoly that causes the abstractions that result in exploitation. Rather, it is that labour under 
capitalism is itself abstract. This is the basis of exploitation. This is what gives rise to all of the 
other abstractions. This is the significance of Marx’s assertion that what at first appeared to be 
property based in labour in fact suffers a dialectical inversion and becomes the separation, the 
alienation, of labour from its proprietary basis. 
 The elimination of small-scale private property, which Proudhon condemns and seeks to 
reinstate, is, for Marx, the only historical justification for capitalism. Soon after the passages we 
have been exploring, Marx points to how the capitalist is as subject to the laws of private 
property, the imperatives of the generalized market, as are workers. Thus, the capitalist 
“fanatically,” perhaps pathologically, forces the whole of society into production for the sake of 
production: “In this way he spurs on the development of society’s production which alone can 
form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free development 
of every individual forms the ruling principle.”380 This is directly relevant to a number of 
marginal notes criticizing Adolph Wagner written by Marx near the end of his life. They are 
worth quoting in full because they have been scrutinized time and again in the debates on Marx 
and justice. Marx asserts: 
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In fact, in my presentation, capital profit is not ‘merely a deduction or ‘robbery’ 
on the labourer.’ On the contrary, I present the capitalist as the necessary 
functionary of capitalist production and show very extensively that he does not 
only ‘deduct’ or ‘rob,’ but forces the production of surplus value, therefore the 
deducting only helps to produce; furthermore, I show in detail that even if in the 
exchange of commodities only equivalents were exchanged, the capitalist – as 
soon as he pays the labourer the real value of his labour-power – would secure 
with full rights, i.e. the rights corresponding to that mode of production, surplus 
value. But all this does not make ‘capital profit’ into a ‘constitutive’ element of 
value, but only proves that in the value not ‘constituted’ by the labour of the 
capitalist, there is a portion which he can appropriate ‘legally,’ i.e. without 
infringing the rights corresponding to commodity-exchange.
381
 
 
Marx goes on to say: 
 
The obscurantist falsely attributes to me [the view] that ‘the surplus value 
produced by the labourers alone was left to the capitalist employers in an 
improper way.’ Well, I say the direct opposite; namely, that commodity-
production is necessarily, at a certain point, turned into ‘capitalist’ commodity-
production, and that according to the law of value governing it, ‘surplus value’ is 
properly due to the capitalist, and not to the labourer.
382
 
 
Marx demonstrates that, according to the laws of private property, commodity exchange 
necessarily becomes commodity production, which necessarily becomes general commodity 
production, which becomes capitalist appropriation on an ever-increasing scale. 
This is the inadequacy of the utopian socialist’s notion of exchange. Proudhon asserts: 
“Two men encounter each other, their interests opposed. The debate is joined; then they come to 
terms: the first conquest of droit, the first establishment of Justice.”383 This is the exact opposite 
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of Marx’s assertion about the antinomy of rights. Although Marx rejects the idea that the worker 
and capitalist have different rights, he asserts that their equal rights create profound inequalities 
and power disparities. By transitioning to simple reproduction, by examining these relations on 
their social scale (at least in its first approximation), Marx prepares the way for the transition 
from the antinomy between wage-labour and capital to its outright contradiction. This 
contradiction is the very substance of capitalist society. For Marx, it foretells the collision that 
will bring its doom. 
Indeed, if we return to Capital, Marx now explains how capitalist appropriation 
necessarily becomes ‘the general law of capitalist accumulation.’ Marx asserts that, “within the 
capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the 
cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a 
dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the 
producers.”384 The common condition of all class-societies, whether capitalist or non-capitalist, 
is that the limited character of the productive forces requires that the development of the general 
wealth of the species, both economic and cultural, comes at the expense of the individual.
385
 
What is unique in the long-range tendencies of capitalist accumulation is the ability to overcome 
these productive limits. Nevertheless, this leads to the most profound contradiction of capitalist 
society, which is also the culmination of the long epoch of private property. On the one hand, 
production is increasingly socialized, giving rise to both quantitative and qualitative expansions 
that foster the potential for previously unthinkable abundance. On the other hand, it features the 
concentration and centralization of the ownership and control of this increasingly socialized 
production in fewer and fewer hands: “Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the 
same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and 
moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product 
as capital.”386 In other words, with the destruction of small-scale private property and communal 
property, absolute private property is inexorably tending toward its highest pitch. 
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It is only after Marx has laid out all of the systemic, and dare we say logical, steps 
necessary to explain the general law of capitalist accumulation that he then turns to the history 
preceding the development of capitalism. This, the concluding section of Capital, is Marx’s 
famous discussion of ‘primitive accumulation.’ Marx is often at his most vitriolic in these pages. 
He describes with a great deal of moral condemnation the mass expropriation of producers of 
their conditions of production, of their common and private property: “this history, the history of 
their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”387 Many of 
the commentators who argue that Marx deems capitalism unjust dwell on these pages. They 
argue that, though Marx does not explicitly use the term ‘justice,’ one of his main tasks in this 
section is to expose the injustices of the origins of capitalism, and thus, of capitalism itself. 
Certainly, Marx is combatting the moralizing explanations of the origins of capitalism 
offered by liberal historians and political economists. For example, Marx derides the “stoical 
peace of mind with which the political economist regards the most shameless violation of the 
‘sacred rights of property’ and the grossest acts of violence against persons, as soon as they are 
necessary in order to lay the foundations of the capitalist mode or production.”388 Nevertheless, 
although Marx obviously undermines moral tales about the origins of capitalist private property, 
it does not necessarily follow that Marx has a coherent, alternative theory of morality with which 
to replace it. It is as likely that Marx is only showing the hypocrisy of these views, not offering 
an alternative standard by which these processes, and capitalism as a whole, can be criticized as 
unjust. One goal of the section on primitive accumulation may be to show that the standard of 
justice arises from the changes in the property-relations. 
This was certainly the opinion of Engels, always much more willing than Marx to discuss 
questions of ethics. Engels uses the historical character of the prohibition against theft to deny 
the existence of natural right: “From the moment when private property in movable objects 
developed, in all societies in which this private property existed there must be this moral law in 
common: Thou shalt not steal. Does this law thereby become an eternal moral law? By no 
means.”389 If for Proudhon ‘property is theft,’ for Marx, theft is property.390 Indeed, in a 
revealing passage, Marx first quotes Thomas Hodgskin: “The power of the capitalist over all the 
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wealth of the country is a complete change in the right of property, and by what law, or series of 
laws, was it effected?”391 Marx then responds, “The author should have reminded himself that 
revolutions are not made with laws.”392 On the next page Marx famously states: “Force is the 
midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one.”393 
In this, Marx is also criticizing Proudhon’s focus on the so-called injustice of 
appropriation through unequal exchange. Marx shows that the appropriation of the workers’ 
labour-power is much less profound than that which makes this possible, the expropriation of the 
workers’ conditions of production. This expropriation is the basis of commodity production, of 
capital. This is why Marx asserts that the utopian socialists, who deem unequal commodity 
exchange the problem, want capitalism without capital. For Marx, this is akin to wanting 
Catholicism without the Pope.
394
 The problem is not a particular form of capitalism, but capital 
itself. 
The importance of the labour theory of value is not only its bearing for the question of 
whether or not workers are exploited, but also, what is necessary in order to bring that 
exploitation to an end. The utopian socialists locate exploitation in the wrong place, and 
therefore, their socialism only reproduces it in another form. Marx contends that only a scientific 
approach to capitalism can comprehend its inequalities. His discovery of abstract labour reveals 
that these inequalities cannot be brought to an end merely by abolishing money, the commodity 
market, or private property. This is the mistake of the utopians who advocate for mutualism and 
workers’ cooperatives; the revisionists and social democrats who affirm the mixed economy or 
market socialism; and of the vanguardists who establish state-controlled command economies. In 
all of these cases, since the law of value, the imperative of average productivity, mediates 
between production and consumption, labour is necessarily reduced to abstract labour and 
production goals are beyond the control of workers. The inequalities inherent in capitalism can 
only end when workers have collective control over the conditions of production, and, before 
production begins, democratically deliberate about the diverse societal needs and the requisite 
distributions of labour-time and intensity across the different branches of production. Only then 
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is production reconciled with consumption such that workers can be compensated according to 
their actual labour-time.
395
 
In the concluding chapter of this final section of Capital, Marx distinguishes between 
three phases of property in the course of human history. The first phase comprises all non-
capitalist class societies. In it, producers own and possess their conditions of production. 
Although this phase includes forms of personal dependence such as slavery and serfdom, its 
‘classical form’ occurs only where workers are free proprietors of their conditions of production. 
For Marx, this is the classical form because, when peasants own their land or artisans own their 
tools, they are able to pursue their ‘free individuality.’ Nevertheless, even in its classical 
expression, since private property and production is small-scale, it is fragmented and dispersed: 
“As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so it also excludes co-operation, 
division of labour within each separate process of production, the social control and regulation of 
the forces of nature, and the free development of the productive forces of society.”396 Marx 
asserts that at a certain stage it initiates forces that bring about its destruction: “From that 
moment, new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society, forces and passions 
which feel themselves to be fettered by that society. It has to be annihilated; it is annihilated.”397 
Recall that Hegel also speaks of grand historical developments in terms of ‘passions,’ of pathos. 
For Marx, the transitions to the second phase of private property, the capitalist mode of 
production, occur through primitive accumulation, through the expropriations of the mass of 
producers. The competitive imperatives initiated by capitalist production break through and 
dissolve private property on a small-scale. The inexorable tendency of capitalism is to 
concentrate and centralize production on a grand social scale. As a first approximation, this is 
one of the reasons why Proudhon’s conception of socialism as small-scale ownership is 
inadequate. Indeed, for Marx, the annihilation of the “universal mediocrity” of small-scale 
production is precisely the historical justification for capitalism.
398
 It is for this reason that Marx 
casts the transition to the third phase, socialism, as the expropriation of the expropriators. In 
other words, Marx describes it in terms of the dialectic: 
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The capitalist mode of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist mode of 
production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of 
individual private property, as founded on the labour of its proprietor. But 
capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own 
negation. This is the negation of the negation. It does not re-establish private 
property, but it does indeed establish individual property on the basis of the 
achievements of the capitalist era: namely co-operation and the possession in 
common of the land and the means of production produced by labour itself.
399
 
 
The essential foundation of Marx’s historical materialism, of his universal history, is freedom. In 
the classical forms of non-capitalist class societies, workers own their conditions of production, 
which allows for small pockets of genuine freedom and community that are nonetheless enclosed 
in relations of direct unfreedom. The capitalist mode of production allows for formal freedom, 
which is ‘universal’ but ‘abstract,’ and thus, contains actual unfreedom. The socialist mode of 
production combines both moments. It is a qualitatively distinct form of society because it 
abolishes alienated labour and establishes genuinely cooperative production on a universal scale. 
The development of the general wealth of the species need no longer come at the expense of the 
individual. This is why Marx declares that, in socialism, “the free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all.”400 
Why does Marx describe capitalist social relations as being both ‘not unjust’ and ‘theft’? 
Marx seems to show that there is a contradiction between the bourgeois notions of justice, stated 
positively, to each their due, and stated negatively, do not steal. In other words, Marx appears to 
assert that capitalist property contravenes its own paramount values. Therefore, Marx does not 
reject Proudhon’s utopian socialism because Proudhon bases his critique in the self-
contradictions of capitalism, but because Proudhon sees these self-contradictions in a distorted 
form of capitalism rather than in capitalism itself. In other words, if Marx rejects Proudhon’s 
coquetting with dialectics and with immanent critique, this does not mean Marx is not engaging 
in what he deems to be a genuine immanent critique. 
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There are three reasons why Marx’s immanent critique is more substantive than 
Proudhon’s. First, when Marx describes the appropriation of surplus-value as the age-old trick of 
the conqueror, he is undermining Proudhon’s belief that capitalism represents something 
qualitatively different in this respect. Exploitation is not merely the result of exceptional 
distortions of capitalist exchange, but rather is inherent to it. The laws of private property exist 
across the history of class societies. The tendencies of all of the previous forms of private 
property are revealed in their culmination: capital. Thus, when Marx engages in an immanent 
critique of capital, it is also a critique of that which is the crystallization of private property in its 
sweeping iron arc. Second, when Marx asserts that inequality is not a perversion of, but the 
realization of, exchange-value, he is asserting that to actually confront capitalism with its own 
contradictions is to demand that we go beyond capitalism as such. Indeed, Marx’s invocations of 
‘dialectical inversions’ are, in part, to demonstrate the correct use of the dialectical method 
against its mishandling by Proudhon. Third, contrary to Proudhon’s strictures against political 
agitation, for Marx, immanent critique and the contradictions upon which it is based require an 
agonism in which history is propelled forward through educative conflict. As we saw, this is why 
Marx argues that the working class must become revolutionary, not only because the ruling class 
must be overthrown, but also because it is through struggle alone that workers become ‘fit to 
rule,’ to “found society anew.”401 
Although Marx contends that Proudhon tries to overthrow capitalism using the standards 
drawn from capitalism itself, is this not what Marx is doing with immanent critique? Marx 
weighs these standards against themselves and determines whether or not they can survive the 
confrontation with their opposites. He argues that the standards put forward by capitalism cannot 
be realized within capitalism. They are necessarily contradictory. Is this not what Kant does with 
his principle of non-contradiction? It is not. The difference between, on the one hand, Kant and 
Proudhon, and on the other hand, Hegel and Marx, is that the former believe that non-
contradictory moral action is possible in the prevailing conditions whereas the latter believe in 
the ‘principle of contradiction’ because, until the end of history, there are genuinely tragic 
situations where two actors or groups of actors can both be equally justified and yet necessarily 
opposed. In other words, for both of them to act morally requires either their mutual destruction 
or the permanent victory of one over the other. Hegel and Marx argue that morality is often 
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formal because it could just as easily affirm a content opposite to that which it currently 
endorses. Indeed, abstract forms can give rise to two equally legitimate but necessarily opposed 
contents between which force alone decides. This is the basis of tragic situations in which 
conflict is necessary to render the form less formal, to make it more concrete. When a victor 
emerges and the conflict is resolved, the content better corresponds to its form. For Marx, the 
bourgeoisie is only ever a temporary victor over the proletariat because if it annihilated them, it 
would annihilate itself. Conversely, workers are the harbinger of a new age because, with their 
victory, with the abolition of capital, they not only survive, but flourish as free, de-alienated 
labour. 
What does all of this entail for Marx’s own conception of justice, if indeed he has one? I 
must end this chapter without answering this crucial question. We do not yet have enough 
information to resolve it definitively. We must first explore Marx’s assertions about production 
and distribution in socialist society. Therefore, I cannot begin to offer definitive conclusions until 
the chapters on distributive justice. In later chapters, we will find that this exegesis of Capital 
was absolutely necessary for providing the context within which this question can be resolved. 
We will find that the discussions of the relations between property, justice, and theft, in the work 
of Hume, Kant, and especially Hegel, provide crucial philosophical context for Marx’s method in 
Capital and in other works. Commentators, despite their predominantly idealist method, have 
missed this philosophical context. We will also find that other commentators have not resolved 
this question because they have neglected significant aspects of the dialectical movement 
expressed in Marx’s Capital. In particular, we will see that a great deal of the confusion about 
Marx and justice has come from a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, Marx’s 
rejection of Proudhon’s false immanent critique, and on the other hand, Marx’s own immanent 
critique. Nevertheless, we will also have to ask the question of whether or not Marx casts his 
critique of utopianism too wide and defers to the future crucial questions about socialist practice 
which must actually be answered in the present. 
In the meantime, we must turn to an exploration of the third wave of debates about the 
relation between Marx and ethics. Of the three waves of debate, it focuses most intensely on the 
question of justice, and in particular, on the question of the exploitative wage-relation between 
workers and capitalists. In other words, it centers on the question of commutative justice under 
capitalism, although, as we will see, they often wrongly describe it as a distributive justice. As I 
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have already briefly mentioned, three basic interpretations emerged from this third wave of 
debates. Extending what has come to be described as the ‘Tucker-Wood thesis,’ I refer to the two 
other sides as the ‘Cohen-Geras thesis’ and the ‘Buchanan-Lukes thesis,’ naming each after the 
most sophisticated or influential proponents of their respective interpretations. It is to the famous 
Tucker-Wood thesis that we now turn. 
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Chapter 6: The Tucker-Wood Thesis: Marx Deems Capitalism Commutatively Just 
 
In this chapter and the two that follow, I offer close readings of a number of thinkers.
402
 This 
may seem tedious at times, but since I make quite strong claims about all of the participants in 
these debates, and in particular, the third wave, I feel it is necessary to engage with all of them in 
some detail. When I assert that, as far as I know, no one has asked the questions or has used the 
method I pursue here, ‘as far as I know’ should count for something. 
In this exploration of the most recent wave of debates about the question of Marx and 
justice, I will look first at those who argue that Marx does not condemn capitalist exploitation as 
unjust. Irrespective of whether or not they ultimately approve or disapprove, this side of the 
debate must not only demonstrate that Marx did not deem capitalism unjust, but on what grounds 
he does critique capitalism. The first sub-group we will study distinguishes between ‘moral’ and 
‘non-moral’ goods. They argue that Marx deems capitalism just because he criticizes it according 
to ‘non-moral’ standards. This is argued by Tucker, Wood, Smart, Graham, McCarney, and 
Allen. This side of the debate also features another sub-group of theorists who, as we will see, 
argue that although Marx deems capitalism just, he criticizes it according to other moral 
principles that are separate from justice. This group includes Nasser and Brenkert. Finally, there 
is another sub-group, comprised of Reiman and Levine, who agree with Wood’s interpretation of 
Marx, but argue that Marx was wrong to deem capitalism commutatively just. I will look at each 
sub-group in turn. 
 We will find that the strongest evidence in favour of the Tucker-Wood thesis is that, first, 
Marx does not explicitly describe capitalism as unjust, and second, he explicitly states that, 
because standards of justice are historically-specific, one standard of justice cannot be used to 
condemn as unjust the social conditions in another historical context. Nevertheless, the greatest 
weakness of the Tucker-Wood thesis is that it neglects Marx’s use of immanent critique. Marx 
may deem bourgeois justice the only possible standard in capitalist conditions, but by describing 
exploitation as ‘theft,’ ‘robbery,’ and ‘plunder,’ he seems to undermine bourgeois justice on its 
own terms. Therefore, although Marx does not describe capitalism as unjust, this does not 
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necessarily mean that he regards it as just either. In other words, Marx may not deem capitalism 
as positively just in any non-self-contradictory sense of the term. 
 In this chapter I will also single out for critique the frequently made distinction between 
‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’ goods. This is one of many different examples of what I call ‘saving 
distinctions.’ I call them this because the commentators impute to Marx a distinction between 
two opposed things—a distinction that Marx does not explicitly state—in a way that saves the 
particular interpretation of Marx by that group of commentators. The proponents of the Tucker-
Wood thesis are by no means alone in this. In the next two chapters, I will critique similar 
practices by the two other sides in this debate. In and of itself, there is nothing wrong with 
fleshing out latent distinctions or oppositions in Marx’s work, or extending Marx’s work by 
introducing new theoretical distinctions in illuminating ways. I critique something as a saving 
distinction when the commentators have misinterpreted Marx because they have prioritized the 
needs of their interpretation, as well as the worldview that follows from it, rather than first 
understanding Marx on his own terms according to his intended meaning. 
 Finally, I must note that in the next several chapters, I focus more on the accuracy of the 
interpretations of Marx rather than on the moral and political implications of these 
interpretations. I will save the latter for the final two chapters because the full ramifications of 
these interpretations can only be truly comprehended after we have explored each of the major 
aspects of justice, and in particular, complete justice. For the same reason, I reserve comments 
on some of Marx’s most problematic assertions, such as his aforementioned statements about the 
justice of slavery under a slave-based mode of production, until the final chapter. The study and 
unmasking of exploitation is important, but if this is all we focus on, as has been the tendency in 
the debates about Marxism and justice, the stakes are too low. This does not consider the full 
implications of a theory of justice. Even if we deem exploitation unjust according to a robust 
principle of commutative justice, this only gives us one or a few means by which to condemn 
capitalism as unjust. It does not give us much indication as to how these social circumstances can 
be changed. In the absence of a more comprehensive notion of justice, we have only the 
economic and political, but not the ethical preconditions of fundamentally transforming societal 
relations. 
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6. 1: Marx Criticizes Capitalism on Non-Moral Grounds 
 
Robert Tucker, in Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, argues that the discovery of Marx’s early 
texts changed the interpretation of Marx.
403
 Whereas previously it was thought that he is a social 
scientist who offers little or no ethical content, now Marx is seen more as a moralist. Tucker 
asserts: “Now a distinguishing mark of inquiry, whether in moral philosophy or other branches 
of philosophy or in science, is that thought proceeds from a methodological doubt, a suspension 
of commitment.”404 It is according to this criterion that Tucker argues that Marx is a moralist, but 
is emphatically not a moral philosopher: 
 
His system, comprised within the comprehensive framework of the Materialist 
Conception of History, is not constructed in the manner of a system of ethics. It is 
not an example of ethical inquiry. It does not start by raising the question of the 
supreme good for man or the criterion of right conduct; these questions are not 
raised by Marx as questions. What is more, he is adamantly opposed to raising 
them.
405
 
 
Tucker’s assertions about Marx are structured, in part, as a response to Karl Popper’s 
interpretation of Marx as a moral philosopher.
406
 Popper, a former Marxist, came to reject it as 
pseudo-scientific. He asserts: “Marx, I believe, avoided an explicit moral theory, because he 
hated preaching. Deeply distrustful of the moralist, who usually preaches water and drinks wine, 
Marx was reluctant to formulate his ethical convictions explicitly.”407 Nevertheless, Popper 
believes that Marx’s Capital is a treatise of social ethics. It expresses a historically-relative 
ethics, a ‘moral futurism’ that embraces the morality of that social force whose victory is 
destined. 
Popper argues that, if these questions were put to Marx, he would have answered as 
follows. Since moral ideas are weapons in the class struggle, I, as a social scientist, can examine 
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them without adopting them. Nevertheless, I must inevitably choose a moral system because 
even aloofness means taking certain sides. 
 
Now since a decision is ‘moral’ only in relation to some previously accepted 
moral code, my fundamental decision can be no ‘moral’ decision at all. But it can 
be a scientific decision. For as a social scientist, I am able to see what is going to 
happen. I am able to see that the bourgeoisie, and with it its system of morals, is 
bound to disappear, and that the proletariat, and with it a new system of morals, is 
bound to win.
408
 
 
Popper rejects Marx’s moral futurism because he finds untenable the assertion that one can come 
to certain moral commitments on the basis of ‘scientific’ predictions.409 Indeed, choosing a moral 
system is itself a moral decision. Although Popper declares scientific socialism dead, he 
nonetheless believes that Marx’s “moral radicalism,” the true basis of Marx’s influence, is worth 
preserving.
410
 
Against Popper’s interpretation of Marx as a ‘moral futurist,’ Tucker argues, as did the 
‘Austrian Marxists,’ that the inevitability of something says nothing about its desirability.411 If 
anything, Tucker argues, Marx can be better understood as a religious rather than an ethical 
thinker: “The religious essence of Marxism is superficially obscured by Marx’s rejection of the 
traditional religions.”412 Marxism shares a number of a features with traditional religions. They 
both provide an “integrated, all-inclusive view of reality”; both tell history in terms of a 
beginning, middle, and end; both offer a theme of a salvation; and both affirm the unity of theory 
and practice.
413
 
In Tucker’s subsequent book, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, he focuses specifically 
on justice. Tucker argues that Marx and Engels are not really concerned with justice at all: 
“Their condemnation of capitalism was not predicated upon a protest against injustice, and they 
did not envisage the future communist society as a kingdom of justice. In general, they were 
                                                          
408
 Ibid., 203-4. 
409
 Ibid., 205. 
410
 Ibid., 211. 
411
 Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, op. cit., 21. 
412
 Ibid., 22. 
413
 Ibid., 22-24. 
 136 
 
opposed to the notion that socialism or communism turns principally on the matter of 
distribution.”414 This assumes that justice is reducible to matters of ‘distribution.’ Tucker affirms 
the functionalist interpretation of justice. The exploitation of wage labour is just according to the 
only “applicable” notion of justice in the existing mode of production.415 Marx rejects 
Proudhon’s assertion that profit derived from wage-labour is theft.416 Nevertheless, Tucker has to 
contend not only with Marx’s critique of Proudhon, but all of those occasions when Marx 
describes appropriation as theft, robbery, and plunder. Tucker does not do so. 
According to Tucker, Marx’s basic criterion is not justice, but freedom. Marx criticizes 
capitalism because its intensified division of work turns it into a torment and dehumanizes 
workers: “Thus, capitalism for Marx and Engels is evil but not inequitable.”417 Therefore, Marx 
affirms communism not because it is a more just society, but because it would permit the full-
realization of the “producing animal” who pursues creative activity as an end in itself.418 
The assertion that Marx rejects principles of justice but affirms principles of freedom is 
often repeated by subsequent commentators. As we have seen, the displacement of justice by 
freedom is a widespread tendency under capitalism. I have tried to explain this in terms of the 
historically-specific relations of capitalism. For all of those theorists who argue that, for Marx, 
the critique of capitalism and the praise of socialism are based in a principle of freedom, not 
justice, the question arises: is this an uncritical absorption of capitalist social relations? Is this 
ideological? As we will see, these commentators have never even asked this question, let alone 
answered it. This, after all, is when ideology is at its strongest. They need not provide the 
answers for questions they do not think to ask. 
Bertell Ollman disagrees with Tucker’s assertion that Marx is a religious thinker, but he 
largely agrees with Tucker’s analysis of the relation between Marx and ethics.419 Following 
Tucker, Ollman asserts that ethical inquiry requires that we suspend our commitments and 
consciously choose to approve or disapprove of a certain state of affairs. Ollman argues that 
Marx does neither. We cannot say that with regard to the matters that Marx studied, he could 
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have judged otherwise.
420
 This would appear to attribute dogmatism to Marx. Nevertheless, 
Ollman has a very specific notion of what ethics entails. Ollman asserts that ethical judgement 
exists outside of what it evaluates, makes its judgement according to a conscious choice. This, 
however, is not an unproblematic notion of ethics. To take but one example of a different 
perspective, Yves Simon relates modern notions of the purely mechanistic universe with the 
idea, quite prevalent in economic theory, that the value of a thing has nothing to do with its 
relation to the good human life. Rather, this is determined entirely by what individuals are 
willing to pay for it: “At any rate, when we hear today of moral values, etc., we should know 
where these come from. They come from the mind, they come from outside the things, they are 
not embodied in entities, in nature.”421 Indeed, that Ollman separates the judgement from what is 
judged is all the more peculiar because it may very well be an example of the fact-value 
distinction he rejects.
422
 
Ollman also gives a functionalist explanation of ethics. He argues that the attempt to 
establish universal values is necessarily abstract because it cannot account for unequal conditions 
and incompatible interests. Therefore, every attempt to do so is motivated by the defusing of 
class conflict.
423
 This assumes, however, that these universal values must be based in consensus, 
a distinctly liberal idea. Ollman does not consider that these universal values could be based in 
an objective standard by which some individual, groups, or classes, can be found wanting. As we 
will see, the assumption that justice entails consensus is frequent in these debates. It is a 
particular aspect of a broader problem. Marxist commentators deny that Marx and Marxism has 
or should have an ethics because, in a functionalist manner, they assume that ethics is reducible 
to the liberal variant of ethics. The real question, however, is whether or not this historical 
relativism and functionalism is as much a product of contemporary social relations as are the 
moral theories they reject. 
Ollman ultimately argues that Marx and Marxism do not have or need an ethics: 
 
to accept that Marxism either is or contains an ethic, to admit that Marx operated 
from fixed principles (whatever content one gives them), is to put Marx on the 
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same logical plane as his opponents. It is to suggest that Marx, for all his effort at 
historical explanation and despite his explicit denial, criticized them because he 
favored different principles. In which case, the capitalist ideologist easily 
removes the noose Marx has placed around his neck by the simple device of 
rejecting what passes for the latter’s principles.424 
 
First, we must ask, what is wrong with being on the same logical plane with one’s opponents? 
When Marx developed his conception of the labour theory of value, did he not enter the realm of 
Petty, Smith, and Ricardo? Ollman can only assert these things because, despite his earlier 
rejection of the separation between description and prescription, he believes that a discussion of 
the labour theory of value is not inherently normative in its choice of subject, method of analysis, 
or conclusions. Only by being mired in this inconsistency can Ollman assert that Marx’s purely 
descriptive analysis places him on a different logical plane. Furthermore, it would not be too 
difficult for opponents to reject Marx’s historical explanations either. In fact, that is what 
inspired Popper’s critique of Marx’s claim to scientific status. Finally, perhaps it was the excess 
of historical explanations devoid of fixed principles by which world socialism slipped the noose 
around its own neck. 
Allen Wood is the most influential proponent of the idea that Marx does not deem 
capitalism unjust.
425
 Wood, like Tucker, more or less assumes that justice is reducible to 
historically-specific juridical relations. In other words, the purpose of justice is functionalist: it 
preserves the prevailing social order. Therefore, in Wood’s interpretation of Marx, capitalism is 
just according to the only possible standard under capitalist social relations: the bourgeois notion 
of justice as equal exchange. That justice is a merely legal or juridical concept means that it is 
not a particularly important concept in the critique of society. Since juridical institutions play 
only a supporting role in social life, they cannot be the fundamental standpoint from which to 
judge social reality.
426
 More importantly, justice cannot be an abstract standard by which human 
reason evaluates the institutions in different modes of production. Rather, justice is how each 
mode of production evaluates itself.
427
 Otherwise, justice becomes an “empty and useless” 
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philosophical principle abstracted from its concrete contexts: “the justice of the act or institutions 
is its concrete fittingness to this situation, in this mode of production.”428 
Wood is highly critical of imposing historically-specific ideas about justice on different 
historical contexts. Since the institution of slavery is not functional for the capitalist mode of 
production, we who are in capitalist society tend to deem slavery unjust. Nevertheless, it would 
be ahistorical for us to impose our notion of justice on the era of slave-based modes of 
production. For the same reason, it would be incorrect to evaluate capitalism according to any 
principle of justice other than that which corresponds to it. Although Wood argues that Marx has 
a functionalist theory of justice, he denies that Marx is a relativist. This is because Wood has a 
very specific concept of relativism. For Wood, relativism means that certain actions are only just 
or unjust as judged by a specific individual, culture, or epoch. Therefore, relativism means that 
justice is purely subjective and that there is no rational means by which to resolve disagreements 
about it. Conversely, Marx is able to discuss justice rationally. If historical analysis reveals that 
slavery was functional to that mode of production, it was a just institution. This evaluation of that 
institution is true not only for them, but for anyone, including us.
429
 Slavery only becomes unjust 
in a different mode of production. Consequently, anyone who asserts that the institution of 
slavery was unjust in a slave-based economy is simply wrong. Nevertheless, though Marxism 
may not be a form of relativism in Wood’s sense of the term, it may be relativist in other relevant 
senses. I will address this in later chapters. 
Wood takes to its logical extent the argument that the wage-relation, though exploitative, 
is just according to the only possible standards: 
 
Under a capitalist mode of production the appropriation of surplus value is not 
only just, but any attempt to deprive capital of it would be a positive injustice. 
Marx rejected slogans like ‘a just wage’ and ‘a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s 
work’ because in his view the worker was already receiving what these slogans 
were asking for. A ‘just wage,’ simply because it is a wage, involves the purchase 
of labor power by capital. The worker is exploited every bit as much when he is 
paid just wages as when he is paid unjust ones.
430
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In support of this view, Wood cites those passages where Marx describes the sphere of 
commodity exchange as “a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of 
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham.”431 Wood’s assertions here have received much scorn 
from Marxists. It should be noted that when Wood speaks of a ‘positive injustice,’ he is not 
referring to adjustments in wages that affect the degree of exploitation. Rather, he is critical of 
attempts to condemn exploitation as unjust while we remain within the capitalist mode of 
production. Therefore, Wood’s assertions are not implausible. Many of those who critique Wood 
invest much importance in Marx’s assertions about robbery and theft. We must recall, however, 
that Marx speaks not only of the capitalist robbing the worker. He also speaks of the worker 
robbing the capitalist: “The time during which the worker works is the time during which the 
capitalist consumed the labour-power he has bought from him. If the worker consumes his 
disposable time for himself, he robs the capitalist.”432 This is enough to show that, at the very 
least, Wood’s assertions cannot be immediately dismissed. 
 There are reasons, however, to find fault with Wood’s assertion that depriving capitalists 
of surplus-value would constitute a ‘positive injustice.’ Take, for example, Marx’s speech to the 
General Council of the First International around the time he was completing Capital. This 
speech was later published in the pamphlet Value, Price, and Profit. In this speech, Marx offers a 
justification for workers using class struggle to improve their wages. In doing so he appeals to 
what is due to the labourer. Nevertheless, this is a political tract. It does not adhere as closely to 
the method of immanent critique as do Marx’s works in scientific political economy. He is 
therefore less concerned with remaining within the laws of private property. Marx argues that 
when productivity declines, and thus, the value of labour increases, workers, in their demands for 
higher wages, can appeal to standards internal to the market: the higher value of their 
commodified labour-power. Marx then argues, however, that even when productivity increases, 
as is the general tendency under capitalism, wage increases can be justified as recompense for 
the contribution that appropriated surplus labour makes to the technological developments that 
lead to greater efficiency.
433
 Therefore, Marx argues in favour of increasing wages irrespective 
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of the economic conditions.
434
 It seems that, for Marx, the ultimate criterion here is whatever is 
in the interests of the working class. We will return to this point in later chapters. What this 
indicates for our purposes here, however, is that, although Marx may not regard capitalism as 
unjust, perhaps he does not deem it positively just either. Therefore, he may not regard the 
seizure of surplus-value by workers as positively unjust in any meaningful sense. We will also 
return to this claim in later chapters. 
If Marx does not critique capitalism as unjust, what is the basis of his critique? Wood 
distinguishes between ‘moral’ goods and ‘non-moral’ goods. Moral goods are things we value 
because of conscience or obligation. They include things like virtue, right, duty, and justice. 
Non-moral goods are things we value because they satisfy our needs and wants. These include 
health, freedom, and self-actualization.
435
 For Wood, Marx bases his critique of capitalism and 
his affirmation of socialism on non-moral goods.
436
 Wood concedes that Marx describes socialist 
society as bringing an end to alienation and inaugurating the free and full development of each 
and all. Indeed, Wood depicts these statements as “the liturgy which self-styled ‘Marxist 
humanism’ never tires of chanting.”437 Nevertheless, Wood argues that Marx rejects any notion 
of a “disinterested human good,”438 including justice. Instead, he roots social practice in class-
interest and the expansion of non-moral goods. 
Although, as Wood notes, Marx does not explicitly draw the distinction between moral 
and non-moral goods, “it is not implausible to think that Marx might be tacitly aware of it and 
even make significant use of it without consciously attending to it.”439 In order to sustain his 
position, therefore, Wood must impute things to Marx. He must go beyond the letter of what 
Marx says and speculate about the spirit of what he says. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
moral and non-moral goods may be a manifestation of the separation between values and facts. 
Perhaps Wood goes beyond the spirit of Marx too. 
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Wood’s distinction between moral and non-moral goods corresponds to his assertions 
about the use of the concept of justice in historical analysis. Wood asserts, 
 
Marx’s conception of nonmoral goods is different from his conception of moral 
goods. Marx believes that judgments about the nonmoral good of men and 
women can be based on actual, objective (though historically conditioned and 
variable) potentialities, needs and interests of human beings. But he sees moral 
norms as having no better foundation than their serviceability to transient forms 
of human social intercourse, and most fundamentally, to the social requirements 
of a given mode of production.
440
 
 
If the non-moral goods are historically-conditioned, however, it is not clear how they are more 
‘objective’ than historically-conditioned moral goods. It appears that Wood is making an 
assumption, common among proponents of his interpretation, that freedom and self-realization 
are material, objective, ontological aspects of human beings. Even if a non-moral good like 
freedom has various forms of expression across human history, it has an objectivity by which 
these different modes of production can be compared. Conversely, ‘moral’ goods such as justice 
are not ontological aspects of human nature. Rather, they are functional to the reproduction of 
the prevailing social order. 
The idea that anything but a functionalist account of justice is necessarily ahistorical and 
abstract is one of the most common assumptions in these debates. It is often stated but rarely 
argued. Wood follows Engels’s assertions that what people describe as ‘natural right’ and 
‘eternal justice’ are merely what all of the distinct legal systems have in common.441 Therefore, 
the only alternative to a functionalist idea of justice is the idea of eternal justice, which, for 
Wood, is an abstract expression by which everyone means something different. First, as Peffer 
notes, that a concept is wracked by differences of opinion does not constitute an immediate 
reason for refuting it.
442
 The assertion that profound disagreement precludes the idea of justice 
assumes that it, and ethics in general, is supposed to be immediately intelligible and self-evident. 
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This is not necessarily the case. This, like the distinction between moral and non-moral goods, is 
a common assumption under capitalist modernity. It is worth asking whether or not Wood 
uncritically absorbs these assumptions. 
As Norton notes, when compared to the broader history of ethics, modern moral 
philosophy is a kind of ‘moral minimalism’ in two different ways. 443 First, rather than regarding 
ethics as something by which the various social spheres are integrated, it minimizes the moral 
realm to a small part of human experience which is enclosed within vast ‘non-moral spheres.’ 
Indeed, many things currently deemed ‘non-moral’ are ‘moral’ according to classical ethics. 
Norton offers as an example the choice of vocation. Second, Norton argues that modern moral 
philosophy is minimalist because it makes minimal demands on the individual in terms of the 
life-long development of their character. Modern moral philosophies often rely on a relatively 
simple and universally applicable moral principle which anyone should be able to comprehend 
more or less immediately. In other words, modern moral philosophy often puts forward an 
overarching moral rule, criteria for distinguishing moral from non-moral situations, and a subset 
of rules for applying that principle to any possible moral situation. Moral conduct is therefore the 
duteous application of this rule.
444
 These two forms of moral minimalism often converge. For 
example, J. S. Mill drastically reduces the scope of the moral realm. He regards ninety-nine 
percent of all human actions as morally-indifferent because demanding that we promote the 
greatest happiness with every single action would entail unbearable burdens.
445
 
Norton offers a few reasons to be critical of modern moral minimalism. First, it exempts 
certain actions from normative scrutiny if they fall into self-described non-moral spheres. His 
examples are science and economics. Second, it is unable to account for the contingency of 
circumstances. And third, it does not take sufficient account of the lifelong development of our 
personal character amid specific social relations.
446
 Indeed, Norton’s critique of modern moral 
minimalism is quite similar to Hegel’s critique of the morality of the ‘ought,’ of the formalism he 
attributes to moral philosophers like Kant. Norton’s arguments are complimented by Beiner’s 
commentary on the differences between Habermas’s neo-Kantianism and Gadamer’s neo-
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Aristotelianism.
447
 Beiner argues that what is absent from modern morality is the way in which 
prudence or practical reason relates abstract theory to concrete practice: “Part of the explanation 
for the primacy of ethos is that in order for moral convictions to have force within the life of 
concrete societies, ethical intuitions must possess a great deal more self-certainty than they could 
possibly gather from merely theoretical demonstrations.”448 Even the most robust theory must 
still address how it is to applied to particular situations. Beiner ultimately contends that, “Good 
theory is no substitute for good socialization, and even the best theory is utterly helpless in the 
face of bad socialization.”449 When Wood separates the moral from the non-moral, he may be 
stripping practical reason of its ethical considerations and thereby turning it into a form of 
instrumental rationality. This risks the consequences typical of Kautsky and his followers. 
I raise here the arguments of Norton and Beiner because, even though Wood may reject 
bourgeois morality, in the process, he may have unwittingly adopted some of its basic 
assumptions. We have seen, for example, that in the modern view, justice is often deemed to be 
the attempt to create consensus, or at least, to limit conflict, between self-interested individuals. 
In other words, justice should foster peace and stability by constructing the minimal amount of 
rules necessary to regulate the otherwise purely subjective goods pursued by individuals. It is 
therefore possible that Wood projects this historically-specific conception of justice on all modes 
of production as such. By evaluating institutions of slavery and wage-labour in terms of whether 
or not they are functional to the slave mode of production and to the capitalist mode of 
production, he may be imposing a historically-specific idea of justice on every form of society 
across history. Wood may have uncritically absorbed the idea that justice is not based in some 
notion of the objective goods, but rather that it entails a specific set of juridical relations 
functional for its particular economic base. Indeed, Wood may be engaging in the ahistoricism he 
so often condemns. 
Paul Smart agrees with Wood’s interpretation, and in particular, his distinction between 
moral and non-moral goods. Smart is more vitriolic about the moral goods, describing them as 
“things which we pursue because we believe (or perhaps more pertinently, others believe) we 
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ought to, and which conform to pre-existing virtues, rights, duties and codes of justice.”450 Smart 
contends that Marx’s positions on justice are in part a response to the old-fashioned notions of 
the labour theory of value, typical of Locke, which assert that workers have a right to the fruits of 
their labour.
451
 According to Smart, this idea applied to a time when individuals confronted each 
other as not only the owners of products, but also the means of production. With the 
development of capitalism, however, there has been a widespread dispossession of workers of 
the means of production. Consequently, this traditional labour theory of property, as well as the 
expectation that workers should possess the full fruits of their labour, have become outmoded. 
Hence, Smart argues, Marx does not deem the appropriation of surplus-labour as unjust. 
As evidence for this perspective, Smart quotes a statement by Marx which we addressed 
in an earlier chapter: 
 
Now, however, property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to 
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the impossibility, 
on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his own product. The separation of 
property from labour has become the necessary consequence of a law that 
apparently originated in their identity.
452
 
 
As is often the case in these debates, Smart misses how Marx’s assertion here is not a historical 
explanation describing the transition from one form of proprietary relations to another. Rather, as 
we have seen, this is an immanent critique of political economy and the moral principles it 
espouses. This is why the most overtly historical chapters in Capital, the section on primitive 
accumulation, come after this passage. This is not to deny every aspect of Smart’s assertion. In 
the chapter on Marx’s Capital I offered reasons to suggest that Marx is sceptical of criticizing 
capitalism according to principles of justice that are rooted in labour-contribution. Nevertheless, 
when Smart neglects Marx’s immanent critique, he also ignores the extent to which Marx 
undermines liberal political economy according to its own notions of justice. 
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 Smart takes the functionalist account of justice to its logical conclusion. He argues that, 
for Marx, the communist ethic cannot be applied to practices within capitalism.
453
 Even in the 
period when socialists thought that capitalism could be overthrown in a single insurrection, the 
idea that the intervening period between modes of production is totally devoid of ethics would be 
hard to sustain. Every serious socialist must now concede that this intervening period would be 
much longer than initially anticipated. Any revolutionary rupture would require a great deal of 
prefiguration within and against capitalism. This makes it even more difficult to displace the 
question of the new ethics to the communist future. Indeed, neglect of the former may have been 
a major factor in the failure of the latter. 
Keith Graham argues that Marx does not appeal to principles of justice in his critique of 
capitalism. Marx’s primary aim is not a fairer distribution of goods. Rather, it is putting an end to 
the “literal loss of life consequent on the need to sell one’s labour-power.”454 Like Smart, 
Graham rejects the idea that Marx bases a principle of justice in the notion of labour-
contribution. With regard to the passage in Capital when Marx speaks of the ‘illusions of justice 
held by both worker and capitalist,’ Graham asserts: “The conception of justice itself arises from 
misperception of the nature of the exchange between worker and capitalist, and the mistaken 
notion that it is labour rather than labour-power which is sold.”455 The wage-relation only 
appears unjust to those who, like Proudhon, think the worker exchanges labour instead of labour-
power. Only if it were the former would the worker be entitled to all of the value they produce, 
the full fruits of their labour. Nevertheless, like all of the commentators who hold these positions, 
Graham must contend with those passages where Marx describes exploitation as theft. 
Graham offers a number of arguments as to why Marx describes exploitation as ‘robbery’ 
but does not deem it unjust. Graham asserts: 
 
Robbing is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as depriving someone of 
something by unlawful force or superior power. This mirrors well the distinction 
between de jure and de facto ownership, and indicates a similar distinction in the 
case of robbery. It can be specified in a way entirely free of reference to legal or 
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moral notions. Marx’s characterization of capitalist exploitation as involving 
robbery does not, therefore, commit him to the claim that it is unjust.
456
 
 
Graham’s distinction between the de facto and the de jure is based on a misinterpretation of the 
following statement by Marx: “Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the 
monopoly of disposing of particular portions of the globe…Nothing is settled with the legal 
power of these persons to use and misuse certain portions of the globe. The use of this power 
depends entirely on economic conditions…”457 Graham argues that this supports the distinction 
between de facto and de jure ownership of property, which corresponds to the distinction 
between base and superstructure. Graham misunderstands Marx here. It is certainly true that 
Marx deems economic conditions more fundamental than legal relations and that revolutionary 
changes in the economic conditions precede their normalization by new legal relations. 
Nevertheless, these ‘de facto’ economic conditions are not so separate from the ‘de jure’ 
character of their legal relations that the ruling class could constantly and visibly affront them. A 
power resting purely on coercion tends to be unstable. This makes it more likely that when Marx 
speaks of exploitation as a form of theft, he is speaking not only in this ‘de facto’ sense, but also 
with the intention to show how, if we look below the surface, it consistently affronts its ‘de jure’ 
laws and rules. In other words, Graham’s distinction between de facto and de jure neglects 
Marx’s immanent critique. 
Graham, like Wood, assumes that justice is reducible to juridical relations: “When [Marx] 
speaks scathingly of notions of morality and justice, this is on the grounds not of their dubious 
cognitive status but of their dubious social function in reinforcing existing attitudes and 
relations.”458 It is not clear how we can distinguish between the cognitive status of a thing and its 
social function when what we are talking about is Marx’s social theory, a theory that purports to 
explain society. At the very least, there is no evidence that Marx would support some such 
distinction. Graham continues: “In normal circumstances it would be entirely inappropriate to 
confront one’s robber with the proposition that they are acting unjustly. Their conduct already 
shows that they allow that fact no influence on their conduct.”459 The mugger and the capitalist 
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are not analogous. This is precisely the need for immanent critique. The mugger knows that they 
are engaged in robbery, in a crime. There is no dominant ideology that tells them otherwise. 
Conversely, the capitalist does not necessarily know where surplus-value comes from, and thus, 
that they are engaged in theft. In fact, the whole point of the ideological mystification of the 
exchange relation is to hide the fact that it is robbery at all. 
Joseph McCarney contributes to this debate in two separate works. The first is more 
dismissive of the debate than the second. In his first contribution, Social Theory and the Crisis of 
Marxism, McCarney rejects those who would ascribe a theory of justice to Marx. McCarney 
argues that this turn to ethics is inspired in large part by the decline of world socialism and the 
labour movement: 
 
Deprived of the possibility of being the mouthpiece of a world-transforming 
movement, they may seek to retain a link with practice by becoming providers of 
practical reasons; that is, reasons for acting to bring about change. These reasons 
have to be grounded in a negative evaluation of the object to be changed. Thus, 
socialist theory becomes in essence normative theory.
460
 
 
This may be an accurate description of many of these Marxists. Nevertheless, it does not refute 
them. Indeed, it does not consider whether or not the study of ethics was as necessary—more 
necessary—when world socialism was at the height of its power. It is clear why McCarney does 
not consider this. He asserts that, with the decline of world-historical movements, “Ethics has in 
the end to replace ontology.”461 This assumes uncritically that ethics is not ontological. In other 
words, it assumes a fact-value distinction. 
 McCarney revisits this debate in a subsequent article, ‘Marx and Justice Again.’462 He 
notes how some argue that, although Marx depicts capitalist exchange as just, he believes that 
the more fundamental production relations are unjust. McCarney responds that, while Marx does 
not describe these production relations as just, it is equally significant that he does not describe 
them as unjust: “It is perhaps well to be cautious about assuming that Marx, or any serious 
thinker, is doing ‘in effect’ what he or she is perfectly capable of doing ‘in so many words’ and 
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yet omits to do in those words at every conceivable opportunity.”463 This is entirely correct. 
Nevertheless, his subsequent arguments are less compelling. 
 McCarney argues that Marx has an extremely narrow concept of justice that, in a 
positivist manner, reduces it to the conventional juridical norms internal to the capitalist social 
order.
464
 For this concept of justice, the exploitation in the wage-relation is necessarily invisible. 
Even the best of the classical political economists could not penetrate to these depths: 
 
He explicitly connects the ability to do so with his own distinctive achievements 
in political economy, the discovery of the true nature of surplus-value and of the 
distinction between abstract and concrete labour. These are plainly matters that 
fall outside the scope of the prevailing or conventional norms. Hence, Marx 
makes no attempt to deal with them in terms of a concept governed by those 
norms.
465
 
 
And yet, Marx’s critique of the labour theory of value results in his own version of that theory. 
Why is justice different? If Marx rejects a narrow conception of capitalist exchange and insists 
we interrogate the ‘hidden abode’ of production, why is he content with the narrow conception of 
justice? Is there a ‘hidden abode’ of justice? Even if capitalist production determines juridical 
norms, does this warrant a positivist conception of the latter? Must our critique of the 
‘superstructure’ be superficial? 
McCarney notes how Marx speaks of exploitation in terms of ‘theft’: 
 
What Marx’s practice may reasonably be taken to imply is that the negatively 
evaluative terms noted above have, unlike ‘just’ and ‘unjust,’ some element of 
absolute or trans-historical meaning, or at any rate of meaning which is not 
wholly relativized to a particular social order. It is hard to see why such an 
implication should not be allowed. We are, after all, under no compulsion to treat 
justice and robbery or theft as logically interdependent notions at the same 
theoretical level. Indeed, various writers on Marx have sought to exploit the 
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fluidity of the situation precisely by holding them categorically apart for their 
own interpretative purposes. Their efforts meet with no resistance from everyday 
thinking. We find no strain in agreeing both that Robin Hood did indeed rob the 
rich to give to the poor and that what he did was just or not unjust. Marx may 
analogously be allowed to hold that what the capitalist does with labour-power is 
robbery without being committed to holding that it must be a breach of justice.
466
 
 
There are a number of problems here. First, Marx does not deem the prohibition against theft to 
be trans-historical. Like Hegel, he deems it the consummate principle of private property. In 
other words, it is a historical phenomenon. Second, McCarney contradicts himself. He is 
vindicating what he deems to be Marx’s extremely narrow concept of justice. Therefore, 
according to McCarney, Marx would say that, according to the only principle of justice now 
available, Robin Hood acts unjustly. McCarney must then ask why we ‘find no strain’ in 
thinking otherwise. Finally, why is ‘everyday thinking’ an appropriate standard? Marx, in the 
preface to the first edition of Capital, explicitly rejects it: “I welcome every opinion based on 
scientific criticism. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion, to which I have never made 
concessions, now, as ever, my maxim is that of the great Florentine: ‘Segui il tuo corso, e lascia 
dir le genti.’”467 In other words, ‘Go on your way, and let the people talk.’ Making philosophy 
practical and subordinating it to ‘everyday thinking’ are not the same thing. 
 McCarney concludes that, since neither Marx nor any other commentators have a 
“copyright” on their notions of justice, each is as entitled to their views as are any of the 
others.
468
 McCarney can only argue this because, as we saw, he believes that ethics, or at least 
justice, is not ontological: “We do find it easy to think of justice as a context-bound, and 
specifically juridical, notion in a way that, say, freedom or self-realization are not.”469 Perhaps 
the belief that justice is context-bound is itself context-bound. Furthermore, even if the 
discussions about justice had no real referent, one would still be obliged to achieve some 
objectivity by studying the history of the theories of that concept. Even this is all too rare in these 
debates. 
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Derek Allen argues that the fundamental issue in this debate is if Marx assesses 
capitalism with the standards that correspond to it or with alternative standards.
470
 Allen agrees 
with Wood that, for Marx, different notions of justice are functional for or correspond to 
different modes of production. Nevertheless, Allen also argues that notions of justice are not 
necessarily specific to each mode of production.
471
 He cites the following assertion from Marx’s 
depiction of distribution under the first phase of socialism: “equal right here is still in 
principle—bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no longer in conflict.”472 We will 
examine this passage more closely in the chapters on distributive justice. In particular, we will 
focus on what Marx regards as a conflict between principle and practice. As we will see, Marx 
asserts that capitalism and the first phase of socialism share the same principle in the allocation 
or distribution of goods, although socialism adheres to it more adequately.
473
 This is why Allen 
thinks that these standards are functional for the modes of production but not necessarily specific 
to them. If Marx thought that these standards were specific to each mode of production, his 
comparison between capitalism and the first phase of socialism would not make sense. 
Allen speaks of “transactional justice,” a term he gets from Marx’s aforementioned 
commentary on Gilbart in Capital: Volume Three. Allen asserts: “Among the transactions which 
correspond to the capitalist mode of production are wage transactions, interest transactions, and 
rent transactions.”474 According to Allen, neither Marx nor Engels define justice, but their 
assertions about it are compatible with the classical view of economic and social theory, namely, 
“the essence of distributive justice lies in treating persons according to their deserts.”475 Allen 
seems to be distinguishing between, on the one hand, the ‘transactional’ justice specific to 
capitalism, and on the other hand, ‘distributive’ justice, not because they are materially different, 
but because the latter as a conception has a long philosophical pedigree that includes the former 
within it. Allen asserts that the standard of ‘desert,’ or what we could call ‘due,’ is relative to the 
existing mode of production.
476
 Nevertheless, transactional justice is the ‘distributive’ principle 
for both capitalism and socialism, although in the latter, this does not entail the exchange of 
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commodities.
477
 We will determine whether or not Allen is correct about these matters in the 
chapter on Marx and distributive justice. It is enough to note here that, with regard to capitalism, 
what he describes as distributive justice is actually commutative justice. 
For Allen, as for Wood, Marx believes that insofar as the exchange is genuine, it is just 
according to the only possible standard: bourgeois justice. Nevertheless, Marx then makes a 
series of statements which Allen deems to be potentially contradictory. First, Marx asserts that, if 
we look at the relation between entire classes, the relation between wage-labour and capital is not 
a genuine exchange. Marx then seems to repudiate this view, however, when he argues that, 
according to the laws of commodity exchange, we can only consider the relation between wage-
labour and capital as a relation between individuals.
478
 Allen is referring to Marx’s assertion that, 
 
To be sure, the matter looks quite different if we consider capitalist production in 
the uninterrupted flow of its renewal, and if, in place of the individual capitalist 
and the individual worker, we view them in this totality, as the capitalist class and 
working class confronting each other. But in so doing we should be applying 
standards entirely foreign to commodity production.
479
 
 
Allen’s interpretation of this passage is quite distinct from those commentators who argue that 
Marx deems exploitation unjust. They argue that, for isolated individuals, the wage-relation 
appears to be a genuine exchange. Therefore, it seems just. Conversely, Marx denies that this is a 
genuine exchange. This seems to entail that the wage-relation is unjust. Allen responds: 
 
But this is not so. Marx intends rather to contrast two ways of regarding a wage 
transaction in which the wage is realized surplus value: one sees it as a relation 
between individuals, the other as a relation between classes. To regard it in the 
latter way is to apply standards foreign to commodity production. So, we seem 
warranted to infer, the correct way to regard it is as a relation between 
individuals.
480
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Allen asserts that, although this would seem to render Marx inconsistent, it is only the result of 
the differences between the French and German editions which are combined in the English 
edition: “It might be argued, then, that when Marx made his revisions for the French edition of 
the text, he did not notice that his new remarks on wage transactions with realized surplus value 
conflicted with his earlier ones.”481 Allen argues that Marx’s preferred way of viewing the wage-
relation is as a relation between individuals, not classes: “The central point of the 1872 passage 
is that surplus value is ‘the legitimate property of the capitalist,’ assuming that commodities 
exchange at their values.”482 In other words, when assessing the “mode-relative justice” of these 
transactions, we must adopt the perspective of individuals.
483
 Therefore, these are genuine 
exchanges. Consequently, they are just. 
By imposing his analytical philosophical method on Marx here, Allen fundamentally 
misinterprets him. Marx is not espousing methodological individualism when he speaks of the 
standards of commodity exchange. He is explaining it. As we have seen, it is inherent to the 
dialectical method, both in Hegel and in Marx, to critique the ‘understanding’ typical of 
Enlightenment thought. Marx rejects the notion that we need only peel away appearances in 
order to reveal the underlying essences. We must also explain why those essences must give rise 
to their forms of appearance. This reveals that it is not merely the appearances, but also the 
essential relations that are abstract and formal. This is a crucial dimension of Marx’s critique of 
ideology. Admittedly, Marx could have been clearer in his presentation of this method, but he is 
not inconsistent. This immanent critique shows why things appear the way they do. He is not 
affirming these appearances as the proper way to look at these relations. 
Despite all of this, Allen disagrees with Wood’s assertion that Marx’s critique of 
capitalism is not based in the contention that it contravenes its own principles.
484
 As we will see, 
Marx argues that in the first phase of socialism the principle of distribution is the same as the 
principle of allocation in capitalism, namely, to each their due. Socialism is superior in this 
respect because in it principle and practice do not contradict each other. Since there is no longer 
commodified labour, and therefore, no distinction between labour and labour-power, workers do 
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not produce more than they receive back in another form. According to Allen, this statement 
would not make sense if Marx did not critique bourgeois justice as self-contradictory. It would 
therefore seem that Allen does not deem capitalism just according to a consistent standard. Allen 
soon makes it clear, however, that Marx is not exposing the internal contradictions of bourgeois 
justice as such. Rather, he is only undermining the vulgar, apologetic notions of it, whether they 
are held by bourgeois theorists or utopian socialists. Allen asserts: 
  
Suppose that the wage transaction really were the sale of living labour and that 
living labour has a Ricardian value: what would the worker be paid if the 
transaction were an exchange of equal values? In Ricardian theory, things of 
equal value contain the same quantity of labour. So if living labour has a 
Ricardian value, it is equal to the value which the worker creates in the form of a 
product, because this latter value is simply a materialization of the same quantity 
of labour. Thus the wage transaction (considered as the sale of living labour with 
Ricardian value) is an equal exchange only if the worker receives a wage 
equivalent to the value he creates.
485
 
 
Allen argues that this confuses labour and labour-power. The worker does not have a legitimate 
claim to her labour, to the amount of value she creates. She has a claim to her labour-power, the 
value of which is only that portion of the working day comprised of necessary labour. Though 
the worker is paid less than all of the value she creates, she does not suffer an injustice according 
to the standards relative to capitalism. 
Allen contends that the juridical standards of capitalism falsely deem the transaction of 
labour, not labour-power, as the basis of the wage-relation. Thus, this genuine exchange seems to 
contravene its principle: 
 
The disclosure of the real nature of the transaction is enough to refute apologist 
and socialist alike. And the revelation of the fact that it is impossible for the 
worker to be paid an equivalent of the value he creates is enough to show that 
from its own juridical point of view (which sees the wage transaction as the sale 
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of labour) and it seems by its own ‘theoretical principles’ (by which it seems that 
labour has a value) bourgeois society will have to consider the wage transaction 
necessarily unequal and therefore necessarily unjust.
486
 
 
It is according to these vulgar, apologetic conceptions of the wage-relation that the principle of 
justice is contradicted by its practice. Allen, like Graham, is reversing the argument of those who 
hold that the wage-relation between labour and capital appears to be an equal and just exchange, 
but in essence is unequal and unjust. Allen is saying that, in appearance, the worker is paid for 
her labour for which she should receive all the value she produces. In essence, however, she is 
paid for her labour-power. Therefore, she should be paid for the value of her commodified 
labour-power, not for the value it produces. Thus, according to the surface appearance, 
capitalism seems unjust, but in essence, it is not. Although Allen does not explain this very 
clearly, he seems to argue that there are successive levels of appearance. The first level is the 
exchange of equivalents, the second is the unequal exchange of labour and value, and the third is 
the equal exchange of labour-power and value. For Allen, according to the non-vulgar standards 
of capitalism, the wage-relation is a genuine and just exchange. If indeed this exchange is 
genuine, however, it raises the question as to why Marx also describes the appropriation of 
uncompensated surplus labour as theft. 
Unlike anyone else who affirms Wood’s view, Allen deems Marx’s assertions about 
capitalist ‘theft’ to be inconsistent. Allen disagrees with Wood’s assertion that, although Marx 
thinks that the capitalist robs the worker, this robbery is not unjust given Marx’s notion of 
justice: “This argument is unsatisfactory. If the capitalist’s appropriation of surplus is just 
relative to capitalism then the surplus value is his legitimate property and his appropriation of it 
cannot be robbery, relative to capitalism.”487 With regard to Marx’s ‘Notes on Wagner,’ Allen 
responds: 
 
There is no reason to think that Marx is speaking rhetorically here when he uses 
the word ‘rob.’ But then he is speaking falsely, for he is misrepresenting his 
account of the earnings on capital: he does not ‘show at length’ that the capitalist 
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really does take what rightfully belongs to the worker, that is, that he robs him. 
On the contrary, he shows that the worker has no title to surplus value relative to 
capitalism, and he considers the matter from no other point of view.
488
 
 
To maintain his interpretation Allen must accuse Marx of inconsistency. Otherwise, Marx would 
be pointing to the self-contradictions inherent not only to apologetic depictions of the wage-
relation, but to the wage-relation itself. This conclusion is impossible, however, according to the 
methodological individualism that Allen imposes on Marx in those very passages where he was 
speaking about the inadequacy of anything but a social ontology. If we acknowledge Marx’s 
social ontology, it raises the question of whether or not Marx invokes capitalist ‘theft’ in order to 
undermine bourgeois notions of justice. Perhaps Marx does not deem capitalism unjust. This 
does not entail, however, that Marx deems it positively just either. Perhaps Marx’s assertion 
about the correspondence between principle and practice, which Allen cursorily notes, holds the 
key. Again, I cannot demonstrate this until we explore Marx’s assertions about distribution under 
socialism. 
As I conclude this section on this particular group of commentators, I must note that the 
most significant tension within this particular interpretation of Marx is their distinction between 
moral and non-moral goods. Like Kautsky, they must attempt to explain the tenuous relation 
between Marx’s objective social scientific standpoint and his occasional outbursts of moral 
condemnation. For example, Wood asserts that there is no contradiction between, on the one 
hand, Marx’s moral invectives against particular capitalists, and on the other hand, his refusal to 
critique capitalism on moral grounds.
489
 Individual capitalists are not to blame: “they as 
individuals do not create exploitative social relations but only live out the role in which these 
relations cast them.”490 Wood asserts that Marx’s outrage is not aimed at the fact that certain 
individuals cause suffering. Indeed, these individuals are more of an effect than the cause. 
Rather, Marx’s indignation is inspired by indifference or callousness in the face of suffering.491 
Wood’s assertions here are deeply unsatisfactory. By implication, Marx’s indignation would end 
if every capitalist continued to exploit workers but felt genuinely upset about it. 
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 Smart argues that Marx’s personal outrage was not inspired by the injustice of 
capitalism.
492
 Rather, it results from the constant affronts to non-moral goods, such as freedom, 
creative activity, and health. Smart argues that Marx’s scientific analysis, which refutes all 
notions of morality and justice, “should be contrasted with those isolated, acerbic instances of a 
personal ‘moral outrage’ which are clearly the product of individual emotion rather than the 
expression of an exhaustive, universal ethic.”493 McCarney argues for something similar. 
Although Marx “does indeed regard capitalism as immoral in various ways, he does not suppose 
that making or elaborating such judgements is a necessary part of his role as a revolutionary 
theorist.”494 McCarney continues: “It would then be possible to hold together in a unitary 
framework Marx’s occasional outbursts of savage indignation and his resolutely non-normative 
conception of the status of his work.”495 
 To get some clarity on this matter, let us leave for a moment the domain of social science 
and enter that of natural science. Our aspiring scientist, knowing full well the strict separation 
between facts and values, takes a job testing cosmetic products on animals. These experiments 
often cause great discomfort for these test-subjects. Indeed, they often irritate the skin, fur, and 
eyes, which occasionally makes the animals cry. No matter: morality ends on the other side of 
the laboratory door. Therefore, the scientist, who never tests these products on himself, has no 
rational explanation as to why, during these experiments, a tear occasionally comes to his own 
eye. For science, at least as it is conceived by Kautsky and his progeny, such phenomena are 
inexplicable. They are isolated instances of ‘moral outrage’ and ‘savage indignation.’ Perhaps 
this is a shortcoming of natural science, and even more so, of social science. After all, it is 
peculiar that Marx, who is said to critique capitalism on entirely ‘non-moral’ grounds, does not 
always treat its excesses with a ‘non-moral’ demeanor. 
 
6. 2: Marx Criticizes Capitalism on Moral Grounds Other Than Justice 
 
There is another group of theorists who argue that Marx does not critique capitalism as unjust, 
but unlike Wood, they argue that Marx does not critique capitalism on non-moral grounds. 
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Rather, he criticizes it according to a different moral principle or ethical standard. It would seem 
that this group thereby avoids the thorny issues arising from the distinction between the non-
moral and moral, namely, the fact-value distinction. Nevertheless, this group is embroiled in 
other tensions. If Marx’s critique of capitalism is based, at least in part, in ethics, they must 
explain why justice is not an integral part of that ethics. 
 Alan Nasser argues that Marx roots ethics in human nature. This puts him in the naturalist 
tradition of ethics.
496
 Marx criticizes capitalism according to what Nasser calls the ‘ergon 
argument,’ which is given classical expression in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This argument 
contends that human nature has an ergon, a special function, a kind of activity unique to humans, 
which constitutes our moral good.
497
 According to Nasser, Marx conceives of human nature as 
homo faber. Translated literally, this means ‘tool-making animal.’ Consequently, Marx criticizes 
capitalism because wage-labour stifles the creative activities that make us truly human.
498
 This is 
not, however, a trans-historical critique. Nasser argues that, although every pre-communist 
society stifles the human ergon, this only becomes ethically wrong when historical developments 
create the potential conditions for the universal expression of the essential capacities of our 
species. Thus, it is capitalism alone that Marx deems worthy of this ethical critique. 
 Nasser asserts that this ethical critique is not a critique of injustice. He agrees with Wood 
in this respect. For Nasser, the basic point of Marx’s commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right is that the political state and its legal concepts are not the foundation of society. Rather, 
they reflect the mode of production: “Hence, one must not speak of ‘justice’ per se, but of, for 
example, ‘feudal justice’ or ‘bourgeois right,’ each accommodated to its respective productive 
mode.”499 Therefore, Marx’s ethical critique of capitalism is not a juridical, but rather, an 
anthropological critique. 
There are two basic problems with Nasser’s account, the second much more significant 
than the first. The first problem is Nasser’s assertion that Marx conceives of humankind as homo 
faber. Other theorists, such as Habermas and Markus, have also argued this.
500
 The depiction of 
humans as homo faber arose in the early modern period. It was a reaction against the aristocratic 
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conception of humankind. Whereas, for Aristotle, the life of production and the family are only a 
precondition of the good life, of leisure, with the Reformation, there arises the affirmation of the 
intrinsic value of labour and of ‘everyday life.’501 Taylor deems Marx the inheritor of this 
modern tradition.
502
 Interestingly, other commentators seem to attribute to Marx the near-
opposite conception, Aristotle’s zoon politikon.503 For Aristotle, this is the ‘political animal’ 
freed from the slavish confinement of the oikos: “nature herself, as has been often said, requires 
that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once 
again, the first principle of all action is leisure.”504 It is said that Marx envisions the working 
class political party as a modern polis whose task is complete liberation from the realm of 
necessity.
505
 Nasser’s commentary on the ergon argument seems to combine elements of both of 
these interpretations. 
Those who attribute to Marx the notions of homo faber or the zoon politikon have 
neglected that passage where he explicitly rejects both. Marx asserts: “man, if not as Aristotle 
thought a political animal, is at all events a social animal.”506 In the footnote he says: “This is 
quite as characteristic of classical antiquity as Franklin’s definition of man as a tool-making 
animal is characteristic of Yankeedom.”507 In other words, these conceptions of our so-called 
eternal human nature actually arise from and reflect historically specific social conditions. If 
Marx rejects both the ‘political’ and ‘tool-making’ animals, what is his conception of human 
nature? 
Marx asserts that human activity, human labour, changes external nature as well as our 
own internal nature.
508
 As an inherently historical being, what makes humans unique is the 
capacity to consciously transform ourselves. Human nature is the totality of all preceding social 
conditions because it is the actualization of the potentialities within these social conditions. Thus, 
humans are not content to remain what we have become, but rather are “in the absolute 
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movement of becoming?”509 If Fromm introduced the distinction between what it means to have 
and to be,
510
 perhaps we also need to distinguish between what it is to be and to become. For this 
reason, humans are neither homo faber nor the zoon politikon, but their reconciliation in Homo 
seipsum faciens, or ‘Humans who make themselves.’ 
Although I think this is an accurate explanation of Marx’s concept of human nature, it 
still leaves open an important question: what aspects of human nature can change, can be made 
and re-made, and what aspects are permanent and unchangeable? After all, our creations would 
seem to presuppose a creative capacity that is not itself subject to creative changing (although it 
could lay dormant as unfulfilled potential). Failing to acknowledge this question can lead to the 
conundrum that besets Howard Selsam. He basically follows Marx in arguing that ethics is a 
human creation based in the material practices typical of the specific historical social 
conditions.
511
 With regard to the question of freedom, Selsam asserts: “The content of this 
conception must be supplied by each generation for itself. This is so for the simple reason that 
human nature is subject to infinite change and development.”512 If human nature is ‘subject to 
infinite change,’ however, there would be nothing about capitalism or any other society that 
could contravene this nature. There would be no social conditions or practices to which the 
permanent aspects of human nature would offer resistance. The concept of ‘de-humanization,’ 
and, in fact, the concept of ‘unfreedom,’ would be unthinkable. 
This leads to the second and more significant shortcoming of Nasser’s contribution. For 
Aristotle, an integral part of human nature, of the human function, is natural justice. In other 
words, justice is not merely juridical, but as Nasser would say, anthropological. Let us assume 
for a moment that Nasser and Wood are correct in their interpretation of Marx. As we have seen, 
the impersonal, contractual character of capitalist economic relations, as well as the 
centralization of distributive justice in the capitalist state, have made common the idea that 
justice is not an involuntary, ontological obligation, but rather a voluntary, institutional 
responsibility. If Marx, Wood, and Nasser all regard justice as merely juridical, is this an 
uncritical reflection of these social conditions? They do not engage with this question. Perhaps 
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they, like most moderns, deem the idea of an ontological justice absurd. Nevertheless, 
commonly-held opinion is not a safe ground for philosophical or scientific theory. 
George G. Brenkert, like Wood, asserts that Marx’s basic standard is freedom, not 
justice.
513
 Unlike Wood, however, Brenkert describes freedom as a moral principle. For 
Brenkert, the most significant difference between justice and freedom is their respective relation 
to the fundamental economic conditions.
514
 Whereas justice is a superstructural reflection of the 
mode of production, freedom is inextricably integral to it: 
 
a society is not more just because it possesses a more highly developed mode of 
production. There is, then, given Marx’s views on ideology, no basis for 
transcultural appraisals of justice. Freedom, however, is different. There is a basis 
for appraising freedom, as opposed to appraising justice, in the ontological 
dimension that freedom possesses. Freedom, like justice, is not an autonomous 
principle, not an ideal which Marx imposes on society. Unlike justice, freedom 
should be appraised, not simply as an outgrowth of, but as an integral part of the 
development of the forces and relations of production upon which all societies are 
based. The basic criterion of freedom is the self-development of man and society 
through the development of the productive forces of society.
515
 
 
Unlike freedom, other moral principles, such as responsibility, beneficence, or justice, are not 
related to the mode of production in such a way that its development toward a higher mode gives 
rise to ‘higher’ forms of these moral principles.516 According to Brenkert, Marx ultimately 
opposes private property because of its negative effects on individual personality and the 
freedom of self-development. 
Brenkert is right to assert that the basic criterion of Marx’s theory of universal history, of 
the rationality of the historical process, is freedom. In this respect, Marx is like Hegel before him 
and Croce afterward. Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with Brenkert’s account. 
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First, it is by no means clear that the development of freedom follows that of the 
productive forces so closely, even on Marx’s own terms. Indeed, Brenkert cites a passage in 
which Marx seems to argue the opposite. While Marx argues that capitalism is the highest 
development of productive forces so far, he also asserts that it is the height of unfreedom: “in 
imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because 
their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are 
more subjected to the violence of things.”517 For Marx, capitalism does not entail unmitigated 
progress beyond the non-capitalist class societies that precede it. Temporally, it is closer to 
socialism and is therefore progressive. As far as its human impact is concerned, however, there 
are certain respects in which capitalism is freer, and in other respects, less free than what 
precedes it. 
Second, putting aside the aforementioned problems with the unargued assumption that 
freedom is ontological and justice is not, it is not self-evident that a more developed mode of 
production cannot result in ‘higher’ principles of justice. Take, for example, Hume’s influential 
conception of the conditions of justice. As we will see, Marx’s conception of the development of 
the forces and relations of production is often compared to this conception. Hume asserts: 
 
Thus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and 
condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that 
utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. 
Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men: Produce 
extreme abundance or extreme necessity: Implant in the human breast perfect 
moderation and humanity, or prefect rapaciousness and malice: By rendering 
justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its 
obligation upon mankind.
518
 
 
Hume’s notion of justice is primarily negative. It protects individuals from each other. If scarcity 
were eliminated, justice would become unnecessary. Nevertheless, if scarcity were only reduced, 
but not eliminated, justice would still be necessary. We could say that the circumstances of 
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justice would have improved. At the very least, this proves that it is not inconceivable to think of 
an integral and developing relation between fundamental social conditions and justice, even 
within the common-sense premises of capitalist modernity. Indeed, one wonders what it would 
look like to construct a universal history in which the ruling principle was not the development 
of freedom, but of justice. More interesting still would be a theory in which one principle is not 
subordinate to the other. 
The most significant shortcoming of the interpretation offered by Nasser and Brenkert is 
that, even if Marx condemns capitalism on moral grounds, we would still need to explain why 
justice does not have the same ontological status as freedom. Like Tucker and Wood, Nasser and 
Brenkert do not explain why the principle of freedom, whether it is conceived as a moral or non-
moral principle, is not purely functionalist in the way justice is purported to be. 
In general, these two sub-groups adopt uncritically the liberal notion of justice. Initially, 
this statement may appear absurd. After all, they castigate the formalism of a liberal justice that 
sustains the stifling of our moral and non-moral goods. The problem is that, in doing so, they 
believe that they are criticizing not merely a particular notion of justice, but what in the 
prevailing circumstances is justice as such. They assume that what justice means is the even-
handed balancing of separate and antagonistic interests.
519
 Of course, this notion of justice is 
irreconcilable with Marx’s theory of revolutionary class struggle. It is also distinctly liberal. It 
presumes that there is no objective good forming a standard independent of the different 
parties.
520
 It reduces this good to the manifold subjective interests. Therefore, it must rely on 
neutral arbitration between them. These authors do not seriously consider the possibility of 
conferring to justice the objectivity they attribute to, say, freedom or self-realization. If they did, 
justice need not be an even-handed arbiter between conflicting interests. Indeed, some of those 
interests may reflect that objective good better than others. 
Even if a theorist rejects a particular notion of justice, they uncritically accept it if they 
deem it to be justice as such, or the only possible notion of justice. This is significant because, 
despite their rejection of this notion of justice, their alternative may nonetheless be determined 
by it. Developing the exact opposite of a rejected position must share much with that to which it 
is opposed. This is one of the key insights of the dialectical method. Proponents of the Tucker-
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Wood thesis can reject what they deem to be a historically specific conception of justice and 
counter-pose to it another historically specific conception of justice. Nevertheless, by uncritically 
accepting the framework imposed by the rejected notion of justice, their alternative does not 
consider whether or not a genuine negation, not a mere opposition, might entail a notion of 
justice that is not, or at least not merely, historically relative. Therefore, they do not even 
consider whether or not justice can have the kind of ‘objectivity,’ the ontological status, which 
they attribute to freedom or to other so-called ‘non-moral’ goods. In this, the proponents of the 
Tucker-Wood thesis are like Kautsky, who rejected ‘morality’ because, for him, all morality is 
essentially Kantian morality. 
This is confirmed by those who agree with the Tucker-Wood interpretation of Marx, but 
who disapprove of what they take to be Marx’s stance on justice. As we will see, this 
undialectical tension between opposites is reflected in Jeffrey H. Reiman and Andrew Levine, 
who, in their rejection of Marx’s stance, shift to what they regard as the only plausible 
alternative, the neo-Kantian morality of Rawls. If Tucker and Wood are like Kautsky, then 
Reiman and Levine are like Bernstein. 
 
6. 3: Marx Deems Capitalism Commutatively Just, But Was Wrong To Do So 
 
So far, all of the theorists we have examined in this third wave of debates have argued that, first, 
Marx deems capitalism just according to the only available standards, and second, he was right 
to do so. There are a few theorists, however, who agree with this first point while disagreeing 
with the second. Both Jeffrey H. Reiman and Andrew Levine agree with Wood’s interpretation 
of Marx. Nevertheless, they argue that Marx and Marxism needs a theory of justice that is able to 
compare modes of production according to a broader standard. Indeed, both attempt to reconcile 
Marxism with modified versions of Rawls’s theory of justice. In this, Reiman and Levine serve 
as a good segue between, on the one hand, the proponents of the Tucker-Wood thesis, and on the 
other hand, those theorists who argue that Marx did critique capitalism as unjust. Like Reiman 
and Levine, many of these theorists attempt to reconcile Marx with contemporary liberal political 
philosophy. 
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Reiman argues that Wood is correct about what Marx thought about justice.
521
 What 
Marx ought to have thought is a different matter. Taking Capital as a whole it is clear that, 
whatever Marx thought he was doing, he demonstrates how to condemn capitalism on its own 
terms. Workers sell their labour at its value and therefore the appropriation of surplus-value by 
capital is not theft. Nevertheless, workers only need to sell themselves after they have been 
separated from their means of production. For Reiman, these processes of primitive 
accumulation do constitute theft and therefore capitalism is unjust.
522
 
Reiman argues that Rawls’s method, but not the principles he derives from it, allows us 
to determine whether or not a social structure is exploitative.
523
 He argues that there can be 
“cooperation” between this theory of justice and Marxist theory.524 The social contract need not 
take it for granted that only some will own the means of production. Therefore, it can show how 
such a society is exploitative and unjust.
525
 Although some might argue that Rawls’s ‘original 
position’ is ideological because it is inherently individualist, Reiman retorts that this mutual 
indifference does not determine what kinds of individuals the participants are.
526
 Furthermore, 
the absence of this mutual indifference opens the potential for the suppression of individuals by 
supra-individual groupings like the state or the Volk.
527
 
Reiman argues that this modified version of Rawls’s difference principle expresses the 
real tendency toward justice. This is embodied in the transitions from the succession of dominant 
theories, namely, utilitarianism, liberalism, Rawls’s two principles of justice, and Marx’s 
concepts of the first and second phases of socialism. The development of the forces of 
production increases the standard of living of the least advantaged. This is reflected in the 
relations of production by a reduction of the range of permissible inequalities.
528
 
Levine, like Reiman, argues that Wood’s interpretation of Marx is “cogently argued” and 
“likely correct.”529 Nevertheless, certain aspects of the classical account of historical materialism 
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are no longer tenable.
530
 Levine argues that historical materialism proposes four basic principles: 
(i) the development of productive forces account for epochal transformations; (ii) the economic 
base accounts for legal and juridical superstructures; (iii) the general course of historical 
development is progressive; and (iv) the only feasible future alternative to capitalism is 
socialism.
531
 Since the third and fourth of these principles have become increasingly 
questionable, Levine argues that it is worth seeing whether or not a historical materialist concept 
of justice is possible: “Capitalism’s claims of formal equality, and even of equality of 
opportunity, help to bring about a profoundly egalitarian concept of justice and to establish its 
pre-eminence among social values.”532 This is significant because capitalism puts forward ideals 
of formal equality and justice that its material inequalities violate. To realize these ideals, 
capitalism must be superseded. It should be noted that capitalism may put forward the value of 
formal equality, but not necessarily of justice as it is broadly conceived. Levine’s assertions 
reflect a myopic view of the recent debates about specifically ‘distributive’ justice. This masks 
the extent to which the ‘social value’ of justice as a whole, in each of its aspects, has declined. 
Levine attempts to reconcile Marx’s social theory with a ‘materialist’ reading of Rawls. 
The problem with Rawls’s theory is not its contractarian character but its level of abstraction.533 
The original position does not include fundamental property relations in its considerations.
534
 A 
materialist version of the original position includes not only equal opportunity for political office 
and the just distribution of the means of consumption, but also the just distribution of the means 
of production. This provides a basis for comparing different modes of production: “A Marxian 
theory of justice would be a theory that advocates maximin distributions of those goods that, for 
one reason or another, are best not distributed equally, while putting fundamental social 
structures and property relations in question.”535 We can thereby critique capitalism according to 
this standard of justice. 
As is typical in these debates, moral formalism is undergirded by an unacknowledged 
determinism. It is true that Marx claims that coherent theories of freedom (and perhaps, of 
justice), must be rooted in the means necessary to accomplish them. Nevertheless, this is not 
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simply a question of whether or not the productive forces are sufficiently advanced to make 
socialism possible. It is also about the recognition and development of how fundamental class 
interests relate to the potential higher interests of society. This cannot be derived from an original 
position in which our interests are hidden behind a veil of ignorance. Indeed, for Marx, it 
depends entirely on the clear and conscious awareness of our interests, whether shared or 
antagonistic. 
This is true especially given that, contrary to Reiman’s assertions, the methodological 
individualism inherent to this hypothetical situation already privileges a particular conception of 
our interests. Rawls’s theory of justice precludes from the outset a socialist society because the 
original position is pervaded by liberal assumptions. First, Rawls’s notion of what is ‘rational’ is 
based in neoclassical conceptions of self-interest. Therefore, what it means to be ‘better off’ is 
defined in terms of quantity, the share of the total product. This neglects the qualitative 
dimension, how it is decided what will be produced and how. Ignoring this latter dimension, 
questions of alienation cannot arise. Therefore, the only plausible motivation for activity is 
‘incentive.’ Second, the impersonal indifference between individuals is assumed. Consequently, 
the only reason why one would critique this arrangement is ‘envy.’ This neglects ‘recognition,’ 
which includes the conviction that inequality also dehumanizes the rulers. Although Reiman 
denies the inherently individualist character of the original position, Rawls explicitly confirms 
that this is its intention: 
 
The essential ideal is that we want to account for the social values, for the 
intrinsic good of institutional, community, and associative activities, by a 
conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic. For reasons of 
clarity among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of 
community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its own 
distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one 
another.
536
 
 
Of course, this neglects how capitalist social relations, despite their impersonal character, impose 
stratified functions on individuals as surely as does any more ‘organic’ society. Indeed, this is the 
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bias of atomism. The capitalist can act as an isolated individual and still appropriate surplus-
labour. Conversely, workers can only defend themselves against the worst effects of the 
uncoordinated activities of isolated individuals, much less fundamentally challenge the social 
system upon which this is based, by engaging in collective activity. 
Ultimately, Reiman and Levine reject Wood’s neo-orthodox Marxism from the 
perspective of a neo-revisionism. As we will see, this is generally true of Wood’s critics. Posing 
the exact opposite position without a genuine synthesis, a determinate negation, also occurs 
among the proponents of what I call here the ‘Cohen-Geras thesis.’ 
 
6. 4: Critical Assessment of These Commentators 
 
As we have seen, the first significant problem with the Tucker-Wood thesis is that it does not 
take seriously Marx’s immanent critique of capitalism. It dismisses Marx’s assertions that 
capitalist appropriation constitutes theft, robbery, and plunder. Or, in the case of Allen, this is 
deemed an inconsistency in Marx’s thought which need only be acknowledged before it can be 
whisked away. It may be true that Marx deems bourgeois justice the only possible standard of 
justice under capitalism. Nevertheless, his immanent critique seems to undermine it by 
confronting it with its opposite. The principle of ‘to each their due’ is contradicted by the 
principle of ‘do not steal.’ Therefore, if Marx does not deem capitalism unjust, this does not 
necessarily mean that he deems it positively just. In other words, it does not mean that Marx 
regards capitalism to be just in a non-self-contradictory way. Indeed, we must hold out for the 
possibility that Marx deems his perspective beyond justice as such. 
 The second major problem with the proponents of the Tucker-Wood thesis is that they do 
not use immanent critique in their explanations of Marx. In other words, their use of historical 
materialism is selective. This is not only true of the two clusters of commentators around Tucker 
and Nasser, who tend to agree with Marx as they interpret him, but also of Reiman and Levine 
despite their disagreements with Marx. Therefore, they do not consider whether or not the 
functionalist, narrowly juridical, definition of justice that they attribute to Marx is an uncritical 
absorption of certain aspects of capitalism, such as the widespread dissolution of communal 
property and the concentration of distributive justice in the state. They also do not consider if the 
precedence of freedom over justice in Marx’s work, an assumption held in common with liberal 
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thought, is uncritically adopted from, among other material developments, the establishing of 
absolute, individually-held private property. In other words, they fail to ask whether or not 
Marx’s statements about justice, as well as their own interpretations of them, are ideological. 
 Finally, I must offer the reminder that although the moral and political implications of 
these interpretations are profound, as is also true of the other interpretations which we will soon 
explore, I prioritize assessing the accuracy of these interpretations and save an assessment of 
their broader implications to the final two chapters. We must first understand Marx and these 
Marxists on their own terms before any substantive judgement can proceed. 
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Chapter 7: The Cohen-Geras Thesis: Marx Deems Capitalism Commutatively Unjust 
 
We turn now to those who argue that Marx deems capitalism unjust. I refer to this interpretation 
of Marx as the ‘Cohen-Geras thesis,’ named after its two most influential proponents. The 
strongest argument made by these commentators, the argument that proponents of the Tucker-
Wood thesis have difficulty accounting for, is that Marx clearly seems to undermine bourgeois 
justice as self-contradictory. Nevertheless, proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis have a hard 
time accounting for the strongest arguments in favour of the Tucker-Wood thesis, namely, that 
Marx explicitly asserts, first, that capitalism is not unjust, and second, that any mode of 
production cannot be condemned as unjust according to the standards of another mode of 
production. 
As we saw, the proponents of the Tucker-Wood thesis often support their theories with a 
‘saving distinction’ between moral and non-moral goods. Similarly, those who argue that Marx 
criticizes capitalism as unjust also have their own ‘saving distinctions.’ Despite Marx’s 
occasional assertions that capitalism is not unjust, these theorists point to more fundamental 
phenomena or criteria that they believe prove that he does in fact deem capitalism unjust. For 
example, if Marx says that capitalist exchange is not unjust, that is because he regards as unjust 
the much more fundamental production relations. Common to all of these saving distinctions is 
that it is the latter term in the binary that saves the argument. In other words, whereas Marx often 
explicitly describes the first term in the binary as maintaining bourgeois justice, the second term 
is supposed to demonstrate that, on a deeper level, he deems capitalism unjust. These saving 
distinctions include, exchange vs. production;
537
 sociology of morals (‘explanation’) vs. Marx’s 
morality proper (‘evaluation’);538 similarly, the internal (emic) perspective vs. the external (etic) 
perspective;
539
 the capitalist standpoint vs. the post-capitalist standpoint, or, the perspective of 
capital vs. the perspective of labour;
540
 formal freedom vs. substantive freedom;
541
 formal justice 
vs. real justice;
542
 equivalent exchange values vs. non-equivalent use-values;
543
 buying labour-
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power vs. using labour-power;
544
 methodological individualism vs. social ontology;
545
 and de 
jure justice vs. de facto justice.
546
 If we take Marx literally, we can call into question the former 
term in each of these binaries. In other words, we need not go beyond the letter of what Marx 
says to show that he undermines liberal conceptions of justice in its various aspects. 
Nevertheless, each of these theorists must contend with the fact that Marx never describes any of 
the latter terms in these binaries using the language of justice. It is not enough to simply impute 
to Marx the distinction between formal justice and substantive justice by pointing to these saving 
distinctions. These theorists must find further grounds to support these distinctions. As we will 
see, they are largely unsuccessful in this endeavour. 
The purpose of my criticism of saving distinctions is not to turn Marx’s work into a 
catechism. As I have said, in and of itself, there is nothing wrong with drawing out distinctions 
latent in Marx’s work or using Marx’s work to make further theoretical distinctions of which he 
is unaware. My criticism of saving distinctions is that too often in these debates commentators 
prioritize explanation over interpretation. Frequently, these commentators come to these debates 
with pre-formed ideas about the position Marx had to have held, and therefore, they are tempted 
to impute certain distinctions to Marx in order to save what they already expected to find. 
Conversely, I take Marx literally. I adhere to the letter of what Marx says precisely because this 
is the best strategy to understand the spirit of what he says. I prioritize interpretation without 
thereby neglecting explanation. 
One of the more important divisions among those who argue that Marx deems capitalism 
unjust is whether or not he does so consistently and consciously. Some theorists argue that Marx 
obviously and consistently criticizes capitalism as unjust. Other theorists take more seriously the 
Tucker-Wood thesis. They argue that, although it is not obvious and he is not entirely consistent, 
Marx ultimately criticizes capitalism as unjust, even if he is not aware of it. In general, the first 
sub-group tend to rely more on unquestioned assumptions than the second sub-group. 
Nevertheless, we will find that, although the second sub-group offers a more sophisticated 
interpretation of Marx than the first sub-group, making sense of Marx does not require the claim 
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that he is inconsistent. Reconciling Marx’s statements about justice and theft require a dialectical 
method that most of these ‘analytical’ Marxists reject. 
Like their antagonists in these debates, the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis tend to 
neglect Marx’s immanent critique, although they do so from the other side of the opposition 
between justice and theft. Although Marx describes exploitation as theft, this does not 
necessarily mean that he regards this theft as unjust according to any available standard, whether 
it be a socialist standard or a trans-historical standard of natural right. We turn now to the first 
sub-group. 
 
7. 1: Marx Consistently Criticizes Capitalism As Unjust 
 
Donald van de Veer argues that it is more plausible that Marx rejects the rhetoric of ‘justice,’ so 
often abused by moralists, rather than justice as such.
547
 We noted earlier how theorists like 
Wood, Smart, and McCarney distinguish between Marx’s scientific method and his occasional 
personal outbursts of moral rage. Interestingly, van de Veer makes the exact opposite distinction. 
He distinguishes between, on the one hand, what he regards as Marx’s severe personal 
shortcomings, and on the other hand, the humanity of Marx’s theory.548 Van de Veer will focus 
on the latter. First, he establishes what he means by ‘justice’: 
 
In regard to the question of Marx’s attitude toward justice, what is at issue is 
obviously a dispute about ‘justice’ in one of its several senses. We are not 
concerned with justice as regarded as a personal trait or disposition exhibited by 
the just man. Rather ‘justice’ here is a term which is significantly applicable to an 
actual or possible mode of distributing benefits or burdens. Our concern, then, is 
with one of Aristotle’s two kinds of ‘particular’ justice, namely, the kind 
‘…exercised in the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other divisible assets 
of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or unequal 
shares.’549 
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Van de Veer is one of the few commentators to not only speak of proprietary justice, but also of 
the virtue of justice. Unfortunately, it is confined to a footnote. He does not pursue any further 
the question as to why it is only a particular aspect of justice that is of concern for Marx and 
Marxism. Furthermore, he fails to make the proper distinction between commutative and 
distributive justice. 
 Van de Veer asserts that, although Marx appears to espouse historical relativism, there is 
an ‘ethical absolutism’ underlying his critique of capitalism. For van de Veer, ethical absolutism 
entails moral principles that are rationally justifiable across cultures and epochs. He argues that 
when Marx appears to denounce ethical absolutism, he may be doing it with regard to “low 
level” judgements, such as “having thirty or more children is morally permissible,” but not 
“generic moral principles,” such as “one ought to maximize the net balance of happiness over 
pain.”550 Marx may also be denouncing a dogmatic adherence to the prevailing candidates for 
‘ethical absolutism,’ but not ‘ethical absolutism’ as such.551 Neither distinction is found in Marx. 
As is often the case, apparent tensions between Marx’s explicit statements are explained in terms 
of distinctions that, however plausible or sophisticated, must be imputed to Marx rather than 
derived from him. As we have seen, Marx states explicitly that principles of right cannot be 
‘higher,’ cannot be more developed, than the prevailing economic conditions. 
 Van de Veer also argues that the affirmation of ethical absolutism is not incompatible 
with the assertion that moral concepts have their specific genesis in particular cultures or epochs. 
Their origins do not tell us whether or not they are valid: “Aristotelian and Einsteinian physics 
are both historical products but not, therefore, equally plausible.”552 This is true, but it is not 
clear that Marx would deem Aristotelian and Einsteinian physics analogous to, say, Aristotelian 
and existentialist ethics. Marx explicitly asserts that an ethics that vindicates slavery, as 
Aristotle’s apparently does, is valid for a slave mode of production,553 whereas Marx would 
surely deny that the Aristotelian physics was true of nature in Aristotle’s time. 
 Van de Veer ultimately concludes: 
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If it is correct and if it were true that Marx was a relativist, then I think we should 
have to conclude, quite simply, that Marx was inconsistent. Such a move is far 
more plausible than the alternative of maintaining that Marx was not committed 
to normative moral principles. More specifically, if one had to choose, it is more 
plausible to maintain that Marx was theoretically inconsistent than that Marx was 
averse to the idea of justice.
554
 
 
As we will soon see, several theorists will indeed argue that Marx is inconsistent in precisely 
these ways. 
Ziyad I. Husami’s 1978 response to Tucker and Wood, ‘Marx on Distributive Justice,’ 
launched the third wave of debates.
555
 He argues that, contrary to Tucker and Wood, it is obvious 
that Marx clearly and consistently criticizes capitalism as unjust. Like Bernstein before him, 
Husami asserts that “there is no meaningful sense in which the capitalist can simultaneously rob 
the worker and treat him justly.”556 He asserts that, with regard to Marx’s assertion that the 
wage-relation is by no means an injustice to the seller, “Marx is plainly satirizing capitalism.”557 
Husami argues similarly with regard to Marx’s depiction of the sphere of commodity exchange 
as “a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, 
Property and Bentham.”558 Husami rejects Wood’s attempt to marshal this passage as evidence: 
“The terms ‘justice’ and ‘just exchange’ nowhere appear in the passage to which Wood refers. 
But even if we grant Wood his paraphrase of the passage in question, its ironic tone should have 
alerted him to the ‘formal’ character of this justice. Like formal equality and freedom, this justice 
would produce and perpetuate its own opposite.”559 Although I too an tempted to describe 
Marx’s assertion here as ‘ironic,’ I must refrain because Husami’s interpretation is immediately 
faced with a significant problem. 
Although Marx explicitly distinguishes between formal and substantive freedom, as well 
as formal and substantive equality, he never distinguishes between formal and substantive 
justice. Marx explicitly describes a ‘materialist’ freedom, a “positive power” to assert our “true 
                                                          
554
 van de Veer, op. cit., 386. 
555
 Husami, op. cit. 
556
 Ibid., 45. 
557
 Ibid. 
558
 Marx, Capital: Volume One, op. cit., 280. 
559
 Husami, op. cit., 67-8. 
 175 
 
individuality,” as distinct from a mere “negative” freedom to “avoid this or that.”560 Marx also 
describes a formal equality that results in substantive inequality.
561
 Furthermore, he distinguishes 
between, on the one hand, socio-historical inequality, and on the other hand, the unequal talents 
and needs of individuals.
562
 Nevertheless, in Marx’s critique of capitalism, he does not explicitly 
distinguish between formal justice and substantive justice. Marx never explicitly describes a 
materialist justice. Indeed, it remains an open question whether or not Marx thinks materialism 
precludes a theory of substantive justice. 
 Husami neglects the nature of Marx’s immanent critique: “To be sure, Marx could not 
have passed such a judgment by evaluating capitalism from its own juridical standpoint since, on 
his own simplifying supposition, capitalist practice does not violate capitalist economic laws or 
juridical norms.”563 This misunderstands Marx’s immanent critique. As we saw, we must 
distinguish between Marx’s critique of Proudhon, who attempts to show that a particular form of 
capitalism contradicts itself, and Marx’s demonstration that capitalism itself, in every possible 
form, is deeply self-contradictory. Husami fails to make this distinction. It is on this basis that he 
argues that Marx must be criticizing capitalism from the perspective of a socialist principle of 
justice. Husami can only account for this by imputing to Marx something that he never explicitly 
acknowledges. Husami distinguishes between explanation and evaluation, between the sociology 
of morals and morality proper: “It bears repeating that the explanation of the functioning of 
capitalism is made on the basis of capitalist institutions, as it must be, but the evaluation is made 
on the basis of Marx’s ethics.”564 Husami does not address why Marx is not explicit about the 
basis upon which he makes his evaluations and in what ways this basis is distinct from his 
explanations. 
 Despite these shortcomings, Husami does make two important points. First, he argues 
that the societal origin of an idea does not invalidate it.
565
 The adequacy of a theory must be 
determined through rational argument. That justice, or at least a particular conception of it, has 
‘bourgeois’ origins is not enough to discredit it. Otherwise, Marx would not have adopted the 
labour theory of value from bourgeois political economy. This is cogent and answers some of the 
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objections raised by Ollman without becoming the ‘ethical absolutism’ that van de Veer affirms 
and which Marx would surely reject. 
Second, and more importantly, Husami argues that Tucker and Wood ignore how 
elements of the superstructure, including justice, have two levels of determination. They have not 
only a social determination but also a class determination.
566
 In other words, Tucker and Wood 
argue that moral conceptions are determined only by the mode of production, abstractly 
conceived. They neglect that moral ideas, like all ideas, also derive from the opposition of social 
classes. They therefore imply that Marx’s sociology of morals is a form of positivism.567 
Conversely, Husami argues that Marx adopts the proletarian standpoint. This is the basis of his 
critique of capitalism. Husami makes an important point. To a certain extent it is vindicated by 
Marx’s assertions about the struggles to enact labour laws: 
 
This struggle about the legal restriction of the hours of labour raged the more 
fiercely since, apart from frightened avarice, it told indeed upon the great contest 
between the blind rule of the supply and demand laws which forms the political 
economy of the middle class, and social production controlled by social foresight, 
which forms the political economy of the working class. Hence the Ten Hours 
Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was 
the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class 
succumbed to the political economy of the working class.
568
 
 
We can also point to historical precedent. The feudal mode of production did not rigidly 
determine the superstructure to such an extent that there was only a single possible notion of 
morality. During the feudal crisis, distinctly bourgeois notions of morality were indispensable for 
the hegemonic class-formation of the bourgeoisie and for their eventual triumph. As Tawney 
notes, “Virtues are often conquered by vices, but their rout is most complete when it is inflicted 
by other virtues.”569 
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Although Husami is correct about the class-determination of the superstructure, for Marx, 
this may not necessarily transfer over to morality or justice under capitalism. Marx concedes the 
importance of these alternative notions of right in past revolutions. Nevertheless, he also asserts 
that these ascending classes had to deceive themselves about the extent to which their particular 
class interests were reconcilable with the general interest.
570
 Contrary to Husami’s suggestions, 
Marx may deem justice inherently ideological. When he argues that the working class needs no 
such illusions when it wages its revolution, these illusions may include justice. At the very least, 
the applicability of Husami’s important assertions about the class-determination of knowledge to 
questions of justice requires more argument than he offers. 
 This is revealed in Husami’s interpretation of Marx’s account of primitive accumulation. 
Typically, bourgeois political economy gives three justifications for capitalist profit: it is a 
reward for superintendence, for abstinence, and for risk.
571
 Husami argues that Marx obliterates 
these moralizing assertions with his historiography of these ‘original accumulations.’ Husami 
asserts that Marx does this in order to show that both the origins and the reproduction of 
capitalism are unjust. Husami is correct in one respect. Marx certainly destroys the myths of 
bourgeois morality in its ‘heroic’ age. Nevertheless, Husami neglects that Marx does not replace 
this shattered moral edifice with an alternative theory of the just acquisition of property. Instead, 
he casts it as the expropriation of the expropriators. With this, Marx sounds quite like Rousseau: 
“The uprising that ends in the strangulation or the dethronement of a sultan is as lawful an act as 
those by which he disposed of the lives and goods of his subjects the day before. Force alone 
maintained him; force alone brings him down.”572 While it is true that Marx speaks of the 
proletarian standpoint in terms of the ‘political economy of the working class,’ when does he 
ever make comparable assertions about the ethics of the working class? Of course, he 
occasionally praises the distinctly ethical actions of the working class. For example, Marx exalts 
the Paris Commune: “The moderation of the Commune during two months of undisputed sway is 
equalled only by the heroism of its defence.”573 Nevertheless, nowhere in Marx’s work are these 
scattered comments about ethics raised to the level of a science in the way that Marx describes 
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the ‘political economy of the working class.’ He does not assert whether or not such a thing is 
possible. Perhaps Marx deems ethics inherently unscientific. 
Gary Young, who also contends that Marx deems capitalism unjust, bolsters his argument 
with three ‘saving distinctions,’ each of which map onto the others.574 He distinguishes between 
the realms of exchange and production, between market and non-market rights, and between 
methodological individualism and a social ontology. Young asserts that Wood and Allen neglect 
how, for Marx, the ‘distributions’ of values in the market may be just, but the way these values 
enter the market, the unequal ‘distribution’ of the means of production between different classes, 
is unjust.
575
 Wood and Allen therefore miss that exploitation is unjust theft. This is not because 
this theft contravenes market-based rights. Rather, this theft is unjust because it offends against 
the more foundational set of background rights.
576
 Young contends that Allen’s methodological 
individualism renders him unable to see how the wage-exchange is mere appearance. When we 
account for long-term processes between entire classes, this market exchange and its ‘justice’ are 
non-real.
577
 
Young’s critique of methodological individualism is warranted, but this does not entirely 
disprove Allen’s assertions. Although Marx’s social ontology penetrates to the more 
foundational production relations between entire classes, this does not necessarily entail that he 
has a positive conception of justice. Young asserts: 
 
The capitalist’s right to profit arises from the laws of commodity exchange, 
which are market rights, rights one has only in one’s role as owner and buyer or 
seller. As a living component of capital, the worker has no market rights. But it is 
as a living component of capital that the worker is exploited. When Marx says 
that capitalist exploitation is theft – and therefore unjust – he presupposes a 
background of rights that do not arise from one’s status in the market.578 
 
And yet, right before this statement, Young quotes from Marx’s ‘Notes on Wagner,’ which 
includes the line: “I further indicate in detail that even if in commodity exchange only 
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equivalents are exchanged, the capitalist – as soon as he has paid the labourer the real value of 
his labor power – quite legally, i.e. by the law [Recht] corresponding to this mode of production, 
obtains surplus value.”579 Marx does not say that the capitalist is legally entitled to the surplus 
value according to the law corresponding to commodity exchange. Rather, it is the law 
corresponding to the mode of production. Marx does not recognize the distinction Young 
imposes on him. Therefore, Young has not demonstrated that “and therefore unjust” follows 
from the theft of surplus value. This undermines Young’s distinction between market rights and 
the more real background rights arising from the realm of production. 
 Young notes how, for Marx, there are both juridical and substantive versions of freedom 
and self-realization. Marx deems all “value concepts” or “value expressions” to have both critical 
and uncritical applications.
580
 Young asserts that Wood and Allen ascribe to Marx a concept of 
justice that makes it impossible to deploy it as a critical concept: “If Marx understood not only 
justice, but all value concepts, in this way, he would be precluded from criticizing capitalist 
production.”581 This is true, but we cannot assume that justice is a value concept like any other. 
This is not to endorse the fact-value distinction. It is to point to historical processes in the 
transitions to capitalism that transform the accepted meaning of justice. It is possible that Marx 
isolates justice as an inherently ideological moral category that has no critical form of 
application. 
Richard T. Arneson also deems it fairly obvious that Marx condemns capitalism as 
unjust.”582 Like Husami, he argues that we must distinguish between sociology and morality. In 
other words, we must distinguish between, on the one hand, Marx’s explanation of how people 
come to adopt ideological conceptions of certain things, and on the other hand, Marx speaking 
‘in his own voice’ about the correct perspectives.583 Otherwise, Arneson contends, Marx would 
be inconsistent: 
 
It is true that Marx occasionally seems to characterize as ‘just’ aspects of 
capitalism that strike us and him as fairly horrible. But when Marx uses terms of 
moral evaluation he is often employing them in what has been called the inverted-
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comma use, and this is almost invariably so when characterizations of justice are 
being mooted: that is, Marx’s ‘this is just’ can almost always appropriately be 
rendered ‘this is what is called ‘just.’584 
 
Of course, Arneson’s claims would be stronger if Marx ever used the inverted commas in this 
way. This provokes the question: why didn’t he? The use of inverted commas is not entirely 
foreign to Marx. For example, in Capital he not only uses them, but does so for a word that has 
received a great deal of scrutiny in these debates: “The act of 1844 certainly ‘robbed’ the silk 
manufacturers of the ‘liberty’ of employing children under 11 for longer than 6 ½ hours each 
day.”585 This makes it all the more significant that when Marx describes the wage-relation as not 
unjust, or when he describes it as robbery, he puts neither term in inverted commas. That Marx 
says it is not unjust and is robbery rather than ‘not unjust’ and ‘robbery’ is one of the reasons 
why I insist on taking him literally. 
Arneson, like Young, argues that Marx’s notion of justice must be similar to other moral 
values: “However, one would ransack Marx’s texts in vain for any reason to think that ‘this is 
unjust’ is always ideological sham whereas ‘this is unfree’ or ‘this is uncommunal’ may be 
reasonable evaluations. No such reason exists, so it cannot be found.”586 Arneson continues: 
“The situation is not that Marx talks a great deal about freedom and other nonmoral values and is 
strangely silent about justice in a way that demands some special explanation. Marx is generally 
taciturn about norms.”587 And yet, Marx speaks about freedom in a number places: 
 
 “Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all 
directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community.”588 
 “If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to 
avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality, crime 
must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social source of crime must be 
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destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his 
being.”589 
 “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall 
have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all.”590 
 “In this way he spurs on the development of society’s production which alone can form 
the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in the full and free development of 
every individual forms the ruling principle.”591 
 “The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-
made utopias to introduce par decret du people. They know that in order to work out 
their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is 
irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long 
struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men.”592 
 
Where does Marx ever speak about justice in such exalted terms? 
Kai Nielsen notes how, in the interpretation of Tucker and Wood, Marx deems capitalism 
as exploitative, dehumanizing, and enslaving, but not unjust.
593
 Nielsen responds, 
 
If Tucker and Wood accept the previous social descriptions as genuine Marx, 
then they must conclude that as the term ‘justice’ is plainly and unequivocally 
used in everyday life, Marx and Engels were condemning capitalism as unjust. 
All that Tucker and Wood could show is that if their own readings are correct, in 
a specialized, quasi-technical use of the term ‘justice,’ or more accurately, 
‘Gerechtigkeit,’ that Marx and Engels did not, in that special sense, claim that 
capitalism is unjust.
594
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First, we must note that the way that terms are ‘plainly and unequivocally used in everyday life’ 
is not a legitimate standard for argument in any plausible philosophical method. This is true 
especially of Marxism for which the prevailing common-sense is rife with ideology. Indeed, 
Marx refers to fetishism as the “religion of everyday life.”595 The basis of Nielsen’s ‘ordinary 
language’ approach is his belief that ethics is basically composed of truisms: “A Marxist critique 
of society proceeds not by way of presenting new moral tablets but by way of showing people 
with ordinary human feelings and moral beliefs how societies really function and what the world 
could become with the development of the productive forces.”596 One need not propose a trans-
valuation of all values to assert that this common-sense approach provides insufficient grounds 
for the critique of ideology. 
 Second, we must say something about the stakes of these debates. Wood asserts that these 
debates are not based in mere verbal quibbling—they represent substantive disagreements: 
 
When Marx limits the concept of justice in the way he does, he is not by any 
means making a terminological stipulation. He is basing his claim on the actual 
role played in social life by the concept of justice, and the institutional context in 
which this term has its proper function. His disagreement with those who hold 
that capitalism is unjust is a substantive one, founded on his conception of society 
and having important practical consequences.
597
 
 
Nielsen, on a number of occasions, dismisses Wood’s assertions as ‘quasi-technical’ quibbling: 
 
But, oddly and indeed quixotically, Wood did not regard talk of exploitation, 
dehumanization, and enslavement as talk of distinctively moral notions. Here 
again we seem at least to have a purely verbal issue, with Wood pointlessly 
making what are in effect verbal stipulations about the range of ‘the moral.’598 
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Nevertheless, we may disagree with Wood’s distinction between the moral and non-moral 
without describing it as pure idiosyncrasy. It is only one contribution to a vast literature on the 
fact-value distinction. Is all of this trivial too? Wood’s distinction cannot be so easily dismissed. 
Indeed, given the pervasiveness of these distinctions in the modern era, we would do well to 
explore the extent to which they are determined by specifically capitalist social relations. Rather 
than dismiss Wood’s assertions about the range of the moral as terminological, we should 
explore whether or not it is rooted in broader historical circumstances. Perhaps this is the key to 
making what seems to be a verbal quibble into something more substantive. This is the least we 
could expect from Marxists, no? 
 Nielsen nonetheless seems determined to narrow the significance of these debates. He 
asserts that if we were to accept Wood’s premises, all it would mean is that in our depictions of 
socialism as a higher or better society, we would have to drop terms like “fairer” or “juster.”599 
Nielsen asks whether or not this really matters that much. Instead, many of these commentators 
need to ask, what are the stakes of this debate? What would happen if either side conceded to the 
other? It seems the stakes are very low. It appears that this would be only a nominal victory, 
‘nominal’ meant in the literal sense. Either we would or we would not attach the word ‘justice’ to 
our criticisms of capitalism, every other aspect of this critique remaining untouched. Rarely, if 
ever, is the debate conducted in a way that would render the stakes high. All that is fought for is 
the imputation of a name. It is not a struggle over a genuine concept and practice, a qualitatively 
different worldview and ethical activity, the stakes of which may not only entail a thoroughgoing 
critique of Marx, but of modernity itself. Instead, the warring factions have dug hundred-foot 
trenches on either side of an anthill. In the bluster of their battle, they miss the mountain in the 
near-distance. 
 Another crucial problem of Nielsen’s more linguistic approach, a problem that is also 
critical for the stakes of these debates, is his overemphasis of moral justifications and his neglect 
of moral activity. It seems that, for Nielsen, the primary significance of these debates is 
argumentative. In other words, we need a Marxist theory of justice in order to describe 
capitalism as unjust and socialism as just. Nevertheless, this neglects the significance of justice 
as a guide to activity, including revolutionary struggle. This results in significant tensions. 
Nielsen asserts: 
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However, the socialist who wishes to condemn capitalism as an unjust system 
because it systematically treats some human beings, in their conditions of 
servitude, as means only, could still recognize that sometimes such evils and such 
injustices are necessary. Not infrequently in morality, we have to choose the 
lesser evil. Such socialists could grant, as John Rawls would not, that sometimes, 
in grim circumstances, utility outweighs justice and that we then must accept 
injustice as morally necessary.
600
 
 
It is not at all clear how someone who argues for the importance of a coherent notion of justice 
could then justify acting unjustly. What are the stakes of these debates if what is won need not be 
followed consistently? 
Nielsen asserts: “I am, however, much more concerned with the soundness of such a 
Marxist account of justice on its own, quite apart from anything Marx or Engels may or may not 
have said about the justice and moral preferability of socialism.”601 Nevertheless, his Marxist 
conception of morality will attempt to correspond with the “canonical core of Marxism.”602 
Ultimately, he is not concerned with an exegesis of Marx but with what Marxists can 
consistently say about morality.
603
 Nielsen’s method does not address the fundamental question. 
This question is not whether or not Marx condemns capitalism as unjust. The first question 
should be why is Marx so evasive about ethics and justice? This question should have come 
before Nielsen’s attempt to establish a Marxist morality independent of Marx. This is not 
because we demand a slavish adherence to what Marx says. Far from it. Rather, it is because the 
very fact of Nielsen’s project implies the absence of a coherent theory of ethics in Marx’s 
system, an absence which may call into question a theory that claims to be systematic. We 
pursue the more fundamental question because, rather than leading to a potential historical 
materialist ethics, it may result in significant criticisms of historical materialism as a whole. 
These debates would then become substantive. Instead of an exegesis of Marx, Nielsen engages 
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in an exegesis of subsequent Marxists. In doing so he has traded the Marxist for Marxists of 
inferior quality. Surely this is the unjust exchange they are always quibbling over! 
Finally, there are certain theorists who make their claims that Marx deems capitalism 
unjust primarily dependent on two ideas. First, they argue that the third wave of debate has 
faltered because of its dependence on analytical philosophy. Second, they contend that it is only 
with a sufficient understanding of the dialectical method that we can appreciate the ways in 
which historical development embodies progress in the principles of justice. In other words, 
these theorists contend that, if Marx condemns capitalism as unjust, it is according to a higher 
principle of socialist justice. 
Sean Sayers argues that the conflict between Wood and, as we will see in the next 
section, Cohen and Geras, results from the way in which their analytical philosophical 
approaches demand an either/or choice between moral relativism and absolutism.
604
 For Sayers, 
Wood rightly argues that justice is an ideological notion for which we must provide a socio-
historical account, but wrongly argues that these standards are purely internal to the social 
conditions and therefore cannot provide a basis by which to critique them. Nevertheless, Sayers 
continues, Cohen is right to assert that Marx deems capitalism unjust but is wrong to assert that 
Marx makes this judgement according to trans-historical principles of justice.
605
 For Sayers, 
these are insufficiently dialectical approaches. The pure relativism of Wood and the pure 
absolutism of Cohen neglect that, from the perspective of justice, as with any other standard, 
history is not an arbitrary succession of incommensurable social forms. Rather, it is a progressive 
development through these forms.
606
 Sayers asserts that, 
 
by the standards of bourgeois society, the feudal order, with its ranks and 
privileges, seems unjust, and capitalism seems a higher form. However, these 
standards, and the society which produces them, themselves come to seem limited 
and unjust, as the conditions for a new and still higher form of society—
socialism—emerge, and as the morality associated with it becomes clearer.607 
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Ultimately, for Sayers, human nature hitherto has only existed as latent potential. It will only be 
actualized in socialism and communism. 
 Similarly, Philip J. Kain argues that neither Wood nor Husami adequately account for 
Marx’s dialectical method, especially as it develops from the Grundrisse on.608 Kain argues that, 
with regard to the ‘Notes on Wagner,’ because Marx believes that the capitalist both acts in 
accordance with right but also robs the worker, he acts both justly and unjustly. Although Kain 
agrees with Husami more than Wood, he believes that Husami’s arguments about a specifically 
proletarian moral standpoint are more indebted to Engels than to Marx. Rather, for Kain, Marx 
deems capitalism just according to the everyday experience of its surface appearances, but unjust 
according to a scientific method that grasps capitalism in its essential relations.
609
 It is for this 
reason that Kain also disagrees with Wood’s assertion that slavery was just in a slave-based 
mode of production. Rather, like capitalism, Marx would deem slavery just according to surface 
appearances, but essentially unjust.
610
 Kain concludes that, when Marx says in the ‘Critique of 
the Gotha Programme’ that the present distribution is the only fair distribution in the present 
social conditions, “he is not claiming that no higher standard of justice can be envisioned or 
appealed to, but that no other form of distribution can be realized on the basis of capitalist 
production.”611 
Sayers and Kain’s interpretation of Marx features significant shortcomings. Although 
Marx explicitly asserts that from the perspective of one mode of production every other mode of 
production is unjust, he never asserts that one mode of production can be judged as more or less 
just than another. Furthermore, Kain’s assertion that, for Marx, a higher standard of justice can 
be appealed to even if it cannot be realized in present conditions, defies Marx’s rejection of 
utopianism and his use of immanent critique with respect to the standards of justice. Both Sayers 
and Kain assume that, for Marx, as with any other standard, principles of justice are subject to 
continuous and progressive historical development. This neglects all of the evidence that Marx 
deems justice a standard different from all of the others. Finally, as Eagleton has argued, Sayers 
is more of a romantic than a Marxist because his affirmation of socialism does not tell us which 
of the vast panoply of human capacities are beneficent: 
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To reply that we should actualize only those capacities which make for socialism 
is simply to beg the question, since, if socialism is valuable because it is a 
positive form of self-realization, what is to count as such positive self-realization 
still needs to be determined.
612
 
 
In general, this sub-group does not take seriously enough the Tucker-Wood thesis. They 
are dismissive of the strongest arguments in favour of that position. Consequently, they are 
overly reliant on imputing things to Marx without sufficient fidelity to his intended meaning. We 
turn now to those commentators who do take seriously the Tucker-Wood thesis despite their 
opposition to it. 
 
7. 2: Marx Criticizes Capitalism As Unjust…Without Knowing It 
 
This sub-group accounts for the Tucker-Wood thesis by making certain concessions to it. They 
argue that, although Marx sometimes says something to the contrary, for the most part, he deems 
capitalism unjust. Therefore, Marx is somewhat inconsistent. Nevertheless, this sub-group 
believes that most of the evidence is in their favour. In later chapters, I will argue that Marx is 
inconsistent, but not in the ways these commentators think he is. An unstrained reading of Marx 
proves that everything he says about justice is internally consistent if we have a sufficient 
appreciation for his dialectical method and his use of immanent critique. Where Marx might be 
inconsistent is the way in which he separates justice from other aspects of ethics like freedom. 
This can only be shown if we apply immanent critique to Marx himself. 
We begin with G.A. Cohen.
613
 Earlier, I cited Cohen’s essay, ‘Freedom, Justice and 
Capitalism,’ as an example of the curious habit among Marxists who fail to apply the methods of 
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Marxism in their study of Marx. As we saw, Cohen asserts that Marxists hold theories of natural 
right without knowing it. In particular, Marxists believe that private ownership of the means of 
production contravenes a natural law of justice. Ultimately, Cohen attributes a similar lack of 
awareness to Marx. 
Cohen, in a review of Wood’s Karl Marx, argues that when Marx describes the 
appropriation of surplus-labour as ‘theft,’ he cannot mean that it is theft according to the rules of 
capitalism since the wage-exchange obeys those rules: “Wood treats the assertion of equivalence 
as though Marx intended it to show that moral condemnation of capitalism is out of place, when 
its purpose, for Marx, is to emphasize that the transaction he goes on to condemn does not 
violate the rules of market exchange.”614 We saw earlier that Wood neglects Marx’s immanent 
critique. He thinks that Marx deems capitalism unproblematically just because Wood misses 
Marx’s efforts to undermine the bourgeois notion of justice as equal exchange. Although Cohen 
comes to the opposite conclusion, he also ignores Marx’s immanent critique: 
 
Now since, as Wood will agree, Marx did not think that by capitalist criteria the 
capitalist steals, and since he did think he steals, he must have meant that he 
steals in some appropriately non-relativist sense. And since to steal is, in general, 
wrongly to take what rightly belongs to another, to steal is to commit an injustice, 
and a system which is ‘based on theft’ is based on injustice.615 
 
Whereas Wood argues that Marx is theoretically consistent in his assertions that capitalism is 
just, Cohen argues that Marx ultimately believes capitalism is unjust but held this belief 
inconsistently: 
  
And perhaps Marx did not always realize that he thought capitalism was unjust. 
For there exist texts, ably exploited by Wood, which suggests that, at least when 
writing them, Marx thought all non-relativist notions of justice and injustice were 
moonshine. If the texts really show that he thought so, then I would conclude that, 
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at least sometimes, Marx mistakenly thought that Marx did not believe that 
capitalism was unjust, because he was confused about justice.
616
 
 
As we will soon see, one finds frequently in this debate assertions about what Marx would have 
said had he known his own mind. 
 The application of the methods of analytical philosophy in Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory 
of History, in which Cohen provides a self-described functionalist reading of Marx’s historical 
materialism, inspired a sea-change among many Marxists who later identified as ‘Analytical 
Marxists’ or ‘No-Bullshit Marxists.’ Gradually, however, Cohen came to reject Marx’s theory of 
history. Cohen argued that the impelling force of Marx’s socialism, the working class, was 
disappearing. Cohen attributes the decline of the working class to “technological change.”617 In 
this, Cohen’s rejection of Marxism is as technologically determinist as his earlier affirmation of 
it. As we have seen, this has a long pedigree in these waves of debate. 
Cohen argues that, according to the traditional communist conceptions, the working 
class: 
 
1. constituted the majority of society; 
2. produced the wealth of society; 
3. were the exploited people in society; and 
4. were the needy people in society […] 
5. would have nothing to lose from revolution, whatever its upshot might be […] 
6. could and would transform society.618 
 
Cohen concludes that because there is now no group in advanced industrial capitalism that 
combines the first four aspects, the last two are false. There are a number of problems with this. 
The three waves of debate about Marx and ethics, and indeed, the history of Marxism in 
general, are pervaded by overly myopic, short-term perspectives. Bernstein declared that Marx’s 
theory of the immiseration of the working class had been refuted not too long before the Great 
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Depression threw masses of workers into dire conditions. Goldmann did the same soon before 
the recession of the 1970s overturned the post-war ‘golden age’ of capitalism. Cohen made 
similar claims in the period before the current Great Recession obliterated the anemic recovery 
of the 1990s. Indeed, many are now speaking of the ‘precariat’ and ‘precarious work.’ If theorists 
like Cohen had been more careful when conveying Marx’s ideas, more people would understand 
that this is precisely what Marx means by the proletariat and proletarianization.
619
 Instead, Cohen 
asserts: 
 
It is necessary to emphasize that the point I am laboring has nothing to do with 
the scholastic question about what is the correct way to use the phrases ‘working 
class’ or ‘proletariat.’ Under some orthodox definitions of these terms, where, for 
example, the essential condition for inclusion in their denotation is that one must 
sell one’s labor power to get one’s living, the overwhelming mass of the 
population is, some would argue, now proletarian. But that, if indeed a fact, is an 
entirely boring fact, in face of the nonverbal, and politically fateful, truth that the 
four features I listed have come apart. That truth has nothing to do with the 
proper meaning of the expression ‘proletariat’ (or ‘working class’), and is 
therefore not refutable on the basis of whatever anyone thinks its proper meaning 
is.
620
 
 
We agree that the defeats of the working class have been ‘politically fateful.’ Nevertheless, 
treating the theorization of the working class as a ‘scholastic’ discussion precludes from the 
outset any serious explanation of its fate. 
Cohen’s technological determinism shows not only in his commentaries on developments 
in the working class, but also in his conception of socialism. He argues that, according to the 
traditional Marxist account, two “irrepressible historical trends” would lead to “ultimate 
economic equality.”621 The first is the rise of the organized working class. The second is the 
growth of the productive forces: “That growth would issue in a material abundance so great that 
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anything that anyone needed for a richly fulfilling life could be taken from the common store at 
no cost to anyone.”622 Cohen dramatically exaggerates the importance of abundance relative to 
transformed social relations in Marx’s and Marxism’s account of socialism. The three waves of 
debate reveal time and again how the critique not of historical materialism, but of determinist 
readings of it, usually provoke some form of deontological ethics. After all, even Kantian winds 
can blow over a straw-Marx. 
Cohen rejects the distinction between scientific and utopian socialism and calls for an 
openly utopian moral justification for the project of socialism: 
 
The decisive reason for not abandoning community and equality is that the moral 
force of those values never depended on the social force supporting them that is 
now disappearing. No one who believed in the values could have said that she 
believed in them because they expressed the sentiments of a social movement. 
Anyone who believed in them believed in them because she thought them 
inherently authoritative, and the withering of the social force that backed them 
cannot justify ceasing to think them authoritative.
623
 
 
Like Bernstein before him, Cohen is inspired to pursue the question of ethics because he calls 
into question significant aspects of the classical (or at least what he deems to be the classical) 
theory of historical materialism. If the scientific aspects of historical materialism are refuted, we 
must recover what is unique to socialism, its ethics. This assumes that the question of ethics was 
not as pertinent, or more pertinent, when historical materialism was more widely respected as a 
scientific theory, and when world socialism was at the apex of its power. This also fails to ask 
the question of whether or not the lack of a coherent ethics in historical materialism can be 
subjected to a historical materialist critique. All of this derives from Cohen’s misinterpretations 
of Marx and his historical materialism. 
In the aforementioned essay on freedom and justice, Cohen, after a critique of Nozick’s 
libertarianism, attempts to persuade his leftist audience about the plausibility of claims of natural 
right by asking them to imagine a scenario in which the government has outlawed protest: 
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one way of expressing anger at the government’s decision would be to say: 
people have a right to protest against any part of government policy. Since ex 
hypothesi that would not be true at the level of legal rights, we would be claiming 
to possess a right which is not a merely legal one. And that is what is meant, at 
any rate by Nozick and me, by a natural right.
624
 
 
This argument is not decisive. Marx and Marxists can argue that people protest not because they 
object to positive laws on the basis of a natural law, but rather, because the positive law is 
against their material interests. Cohen argues that one of the reasons why socialists should adopt 
the notion of natural right is to counter social democrats whose style of argumentation leaves 
them vulnerable to conservative arguments. He contends that the primary critique that social 
democrats level at laissez faire capitalism is not that it is unjust, but that it harms the weak.
625
 
Consequently, a conservative like Nozick can respond that while this may be true, it would be 
unjust to force others to provide aid to the weak through welfare state policies. Cohen argues that 
socialists must be able to meet conservatives on these grounds: 
 
And to this position it is not a principled reply to sketch forth vividly the inhuman 
effects of absence of coercive transfer payments. The principled reply is that the 
socializing state is not violating rights, or even overriding them in the interest of 
something more important, but righting wrongs: it is rectifying violations of 
rights, violations inherent in the structure of private property.
626
 
 
This does not answer the strongest arguments of what Cohen would no doubt deem to be an 
orthodox Marxism. According to them, Marxists do not necessarily need natural right to counter 
the social democrats. Again, they can appeal to interests. Indeed, for Marx, as we have seen, 
struggle is not about ‘righting a wrong.’ Rather, it is about the inevitable antagonism between 
two equal rights which shows the contradiction through which a new society devoid of such a 
contradiction must be forged. 
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Cohen concludes his If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? with an 
epilogue titled “Envoi.” It begins by invoking the task of Marxism: liberating humanity from the 
oppression of the capitalist market.
627
 It ends with the following: 
 
Business is, among other things, people treating people according to a market 
norm—the norm that says they are to be dispensed with if they cannot produce at 
a rate which satisfied market demand. Of course that promotes ‘efficiency,’ but it 
also corrupts humanity. Business turns human producers into commodities. Nor 
does it spare their employers—‘For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his own soul?’ (Mark 8:36).628 
 
Cohen goes from Marxism to Markism. This is a path frequently trod by those who begin with a 
crude, deterministic version of scientific socialism. When they engage in ethical questions, they 
turn to an equally crude, idealistic, utopian socialism. Cohen’s ‘Envoi,’ this sending off, sends us 
off course. 
Norman Geras raises Cohen’s arguments to a higher level of sophistication and provides 
what in all likelihood is the best contribution to this debate.
629
 Ultimately, I will disagree with 
Geras’s interpretation. Nevertheless, anyone coming to these debates for the first time would do 
well to start with his articles. After laying out a fairly exhaustive overview of the main 
arguments for the two major sides we have discussed so far, Geras offers two reasons to doubt 
that following the letter of Marx’s texts can give a definitive resolution to this debate.630 First, 
Marx is dismissive of overtly normative theorizing. Second, Marx’s true intentions are obscured 
by his dialectical theorization of the formal equivalence and the substantive non-equivalence 
embodied by the wage-relation. Those who argue that Marx does not deem capitalism unjust 
tend to emphasize the wage-relation as an exchange of equivalents, while those who take the 
opposite position emphasize the illusory character of the wage-relation: “The problem is that 
[Marx] equivocates as to which of them is the one relevant to the moral question.”631 Marx 
seems to say that, as far as justice is concerned, what matters is the exchange of equivalents 
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according to the laws of private property. Subsequently, however, he asserts that these laws 
become their opposite. Geras asserts that this is merely a “logical trick.”632 The dialectic is only 
the “enjoyment of intellectual paradox”:  
 
A thing cannot be its opposite. If the wage relation is an exchange of equivalents 
and just, then that, finally, is what it is, and this can be maintained, even to the 
point of extreme stubbornness, in the face of Marx clearly speaking otherwise. 
But if it does indeed turn into its direct opposite, then it is not, finally, an 
exchange of equivalents or just, and therefore Marx cannot really mean what he 
says when he says that it is.
633
 
 
Geras concludes that because mere exegesis will not solve the debate, some textual 
reconstruction is also required.
634
  
Geras sides with those who argue that Marx deems capitalism unjust. Geras criticizes the 
view that Marx’s depiction of primitive accumulation only registers violations of pre-existing 
property rights without condemning primitive accumulation.
635
 Geras correctly asserts that this 
interpretation cannot explain the vitriol with which Marx describes these processes. With regard 
to the Tucker-Wood thesis, Geras asserts: “The argument, in other words, is merely an 
explanation of convenience. It responds to a need that must be met if that view is to be sustained, 
and has no independent textual foundation.”636 Nevertheless, when Geras, a few pages later, 
argues that Marx challenges the moral propriety of the distribution of the conditions of 
production, he is guilty of precisely the same thing for which he criticizes Tucker and Wood: 
 
The challenge, by its nature, cannot be anything else than a critique of injustice. 
We have seen this with respect to the matter of robbery: to say that that is what 
capitalists are engaged in just is, so long as one has no well-founded alternative 
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explanation of its meaning, to question their right to what they appropriate and so 
the justice of the appropriation.
637
 
 
Not only should we be wary of ‘just is’ arguments in philosophy, but by arguing in this way, 
Geras seems to be relying on the needs of the interpretation, not the texts. As we have seen, 
while we have no reason to doubt that Marx morally condemns primitive accumulation, this does 
not entail that he does so according to a principle of justice.  
Anyone who does not take the dialectic seriously will deem immanent critique, at the 
most, a particular rhetorical strategy, not a vital methodological practice. Accordingly, Geras 
rejects the argument that Marx is engaged in an immanent critique: 
 
It is true that he seeks to expose an ideology of bourgeois society according to 
which the worker receives full recompense for all the value his or her labour-
power creates. The worker, Marx holds, receives the equivalent only of some of 
that value, of a part of it equal to the value of labour-power itself. However, this 
is all that the capitalist is required to pay according to the laws of commodity 
production and exchange, and it is these which Marx plainly takes as the real 
standard of bourgeois right in this matter. If, therefore, the ideology is a deception 
or hypocrisy, the relation between capitalist and worker still satisfies what are for 
him the sole effective juridical norms of capitalist exchange. So the claim is 
unconvincing.
638
 
 
This interpretation cannot explain why Marx asserts that the practice of commodity exchange 
conflicts with its principle.
639
 Furthermore, Geras has missed the philosophical context informing 
Marx’s arguments, especially the integral relation between private property and the prohibition 
against theft in the writings of Hume, Kant, and Hegel. 
In support of his general argument, Geras makes a claim that, he admits, seems quite 
paradoxical. Geras, like Cohen, asserts: “Marx did think capitalism was unjust but he did not 
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think he thought so.”640 Although Geras provides a more robust explanation of this than does 
Cohen, he also diagnoses this as a merely conceptual confusion. Geras does not ask whether or 
not the fallacy is rooted in the social conditions which give rise to it. Even though he interprets 
Marx as a ‘moral realist’ who acknowledges the social determinants of moral thought, Geras 
applies no such ‘realism’ to Marx himself.641 This may result, in part, from his not taking Marx’s 
immanent critique seriously. Geras therefore fails to apply it to Marx. 
 Geras asserts that Marx has a particularly narrow conception of justice that reduces it to 
juridical norms and the distribution of consumption goods.
642
 Geras argues that Marx also held 
an implicit, unformulated, and unacknowledged conception of ‘distributive’ justice. This is 
broader than the typical conception of ‘distributive justice.’ First, it includes not only the means 
of consumption, but also the means of production. Second, it not only includes the distribution of 
material goods, but also the capacities necessary for freedom and self-realization.
643
 Third, Geras 
argues that this ‘distributive’ justice is not merely juridical, legal, or conventional, but also 
moral.
644
 Therefore, he ascribes to Marx a theory of natural right. Geras admits that this 
conclusion is “mildly shocking” given Marx’s condemnations of the natural right tradition.645 
For Geras, Marx necessarily holds the belief, whether he acknowledges it or not, “that people are 
not morally entitled to exclusive use of the productive resources of the earth; saying that private 
ownership of these constitutes a wrong.”646 As we saw, Cohen argues for something similar. 
 In support of these assertions, Geras cites a passage in which Marx describes the private 
ownership of land: 
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From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property 
of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private 
property of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all 
simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth. 
They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an 
improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias.
647
 
 
On this basis, Geras concludes: “He is saying no more nor less than that people are not morally 
entitled to exclusive use of the productive resources of the earth; saying that private ownership of 
these constitutes a wrong.”648 Nevertheless, this quotes Marx in a misleading way. Geras 
excludes an important part the passage, which, because it points to the historically determined 
character of what constitutes legitimate property, belies his claims about natural right: 
 
For the buyer, therefore, his claim to rent does not appear as something obtained 
for nothing, without labour, risk or the entrepreneurial spirit of capital, but rather 
as the return for his equivalent. Rent seems to him, as we have already noted, 
simply interest on the capital with which he has purchased the land, and with it 
the claim to rent. In exactly the same way, it appears to the slaveowner who has 
bought a Negro slave that his property in the Negro is created not by the 
institution of slavery as such but rather by the purchase and sale of this 
commodity. But the purchase does not produce the title; it simply transfers it. The 
title must be there before it can be bought, and neither one sale nor a series of 
such sales, their constant repetition, can create this title. It was entirely created by 
the relations of production. Once these have reached the point where they have to 
be sloughed off, then the material source, the economically and historically 
justified source of the title that arises from the process of life’s social production, 
disappears, and with it all transactions based on it. From the standpoint of a 
higher socio-economic formation, the private property of particular individuals in 
the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other 
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men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies 
taken together, are not the owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its 
beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding 
generations, as boni patres familias.
649
 
 
As we will now see, Geras’s affirmation of natural right ultimately derives from a somewhat 
ambiguous rejection of this historical method.  
In a subsequent essay on these debates, Geras, like most forms of revisionism, argues in 
favour of a recuperation of utopian socialism: 
 
To be anything at all socialism, now as before, will have to be, as this once upon 
a time would have been put, scientific: materially based in genuine social forces 
and making use of every resource of knowledge available to it. But socialism 
now, it must clearly also be acknowledged, is utopian socialism—in the way 
Marxists used to mean that. It is a moral idea; a protest; the refusal to take for 
acceptable, much less for the best, what is today triumphantly commended as 
being that. And no one presently knows how, or even if, socialism will be 
achieved.
650
 
 
This is the logical outcome of what Geras argues in the prior essay, namely, that Marxists must 
stop deceiving themselves and must begin contributing to debates about justice: 
 
It is a discussion in which Marxists, deceiving themselves as to what they were 
about, have not been prominent. Rather has it been the thinkers of liberalism who 
developed a rich and impressive philosophical literature on the subject of justice. 
Socialists of Marxist formation have to recognize finally (those who have not 
already done so) the spurious nature of the long polemic Marxism waged in this 
area, against the ethical advocacy and analysis of others. They have to learn about 
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these things, to put it bluntly, in liberalism’s more advanced school. The case for 
socialism is obliged now to pass through this more advanced school.
651
 
 
Nevertheless, despite his advocacy of natural right, of permanent standards of justice, Geras 
pursues this in a strangely historicist way. After all, it is not only liberals who have advanced 
schools of justice. Aside from modern conservatism, to which he cedes this terrain, Marxists can 
learn from the vast stores of pre-modern philosophical discussion. Despite the sophistication of 
his contribution, Geras’s theory is a contradictory hodgepodge of natural right and historicism. 
We will return to this in later chapters. For now, Geras concludes his seminal essay with the 
following: “The last and the largest paradox here is that Marx, despite everything, displayed a 
greater commitment to the creation of a just society than many more overtly interested in 
analysis of what justice is.”652 
Jon Elster asserts that “No interpretation of Marx’s various remarks on justice and rights 
can make them all consistent with one another.”653 Nevertheless, he thinks his interpretation is 
the most compatible with the central texts. Elster affirms Cohen’s assertions that Marx must have 
meant that the capitalist steals in some non-relativistic sense.
654
 He also agrees with Cohen and 
Geras that Marx did not think he thought that capitalism is unjust. Whether he knew it or not, 
Marx’s Capital: Volume One criticizes capitalism for its injustice and his ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’ praises socialism for its justice: “Like M. Jordain, he did not know how to describe 
correctly what he was doing; unlike him, he actually went out of his way to deny that the correct 
description was appropriate.”655 Elster’s reference is to Molière’s play The Bourgeois 
Gentleman: 
 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN: And when a man talks, what’s that? 
PHILOSOPHY MASTER: Prose. 
MONSIEUR JOURDAIN: What? When I say: ‘Nicole, bring me my slippers and 
give me my nightcap,’ that’s prose? 
PHILOSOPHY MASTER: Yes, sir. 
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MONSIEUR JOURDAIN: Well, I’ll be hanged! For more than forty years I’ve 
been talking prose without any idea of it.
656
 
 
According to Elster, Marx argues that capitalist transactions have the appearance of being 
trans-historically just. When Marx criticizes this appearance, he does not argue that they are 
actually trans-historically unjust: “When denying their transhistorical justice, he denied the 
‘tranhistorical’ not the ‘justice’ part. This, in my view, is the only unstrained interpretation of the 
passages cited.”657 If Elster thinks that Marx criticizes capitalism as unjust, but not according to a 
trans-historical standard of justice, it is unclear why he affirms Cohen’s ascription to Marx of a 
non-relative principle of justice. Perhaps this is because Elster roots principles of justice in their 
historical context, but thinks it appropriate to evaluate one historical period by the standards of 
another, ‘higher’ period. This is the only ‘unstrained’ interpretation of Elster. He continues: 
 
When referring to the ‘defects’ of the contribution principle, Marx is implicitly 
invoking a higher principle of justice. In fact, after the quoted passage he had set 
out a devastating argument against any abstract theory of justice, and did not 
notice that in doing so he invoked a theory of the kind he wanted to dispense 
with.
658
 
 
As we will see, Marx criticizes the principle of distribution in the first phase of socialism, the 
‘contribution principle,’ and posits a superior principle in the second phase, the ‘principle of 
need.’ Marx does this while criticizing other socialists for their preoccupation with principles of 
fair distribution. Elster responds: “the contribution principle provides a second-best criterion 
when the needs principle is not yet historically ripe for application. Capitalist exploitation is 
doubly unjust, since it obeys neither principle. The ‘equal right’ of the first stage of communism, 
is also unjust, but less so, since only the needs principle is violated.”659 This provokes the 
question, what if the contribution principle is not historically ripe for application? Does this 
mean that there is no standard by which to critique capitalism? Must we then choose either of the 
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stances that Elster rejects, namely, deem capitalism just or critique it as unjust according to trans-
historical standards? 
Despite these shortcomings, Elster makes an important contribution to these debates. He 
quotes Marx from the Grundrisse: 
 
The recognition by labour of the products as its own, and the judgement that its 
separation from the conditions of its realization is improper (ungehörig) – 
forcibly imposed – is an enormous awareness (enormes Bewusstsein), itself the 
product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its 
doom as, with the slave’s awareness that he cannot be the property of another, 
with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a 
merely artificial vegetative existence and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis 
of production.
660
 
 
Elster than asserts: 
 
Now one may argue that the word ‘ungehörig’ is ambiguous, and need not be 
taken in the sense of ‘unjust.’ Also, the passage would appear to be quite atypical, 
almost unique in its insistence on the cognitive conditions for revolution. Both of 
these objections evaporate in the face of the remarkable fact that in the 1861-3 
Critique, written a few years after the Grundrisse, Marx repeats the same passage 
almost verbatim, with one main exception. This is that the separation from the 
means of production that in the Grundrisse was referred to as ‘ungehörig,’ in the 
later manuscript is called ‘ein Unrecht.’ If Marx had not believed in the injustice 
of capitalist property he would hardly, when singling out this passage for 
excerption, have sharpened the ‘improperness’ of alienation into ‘injustice.’ And 
had it not been representative of his thinking, it would hardly have been singled 
out in the first place.
661
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We cannot ignore this one exception. It is significant. It alters somewhat any potential 
interpretation of Marx on the question of justice. Nevertheless, Elster invests too much 
significance in this passage. That it is the only such example does not indicate that this is 
representative of Marx’s thought. Rather, it indicates the opposite. That Marx does not use the 
term in the 1857-58 draft, then uses it in the 1861-63 draft, but then does not use it in Capital, 
published in 1867, or in any of the subsequent translations, or in the drafts of Capital Volumes II 
and III, indicates more that Marx uses ‘ein Unrecht’ as a kind of shorthand than as a foundational 
concept. 
Despite Elster’s claims about the rarity of Marx’s statements about the ‘cognitive 
conditions for revolution,’ we can compare the two aforementioned passages from the 
Grundrisse and the Manuskript 1861-63 with a similar one from Capital: Volume One. This is 
one of his final and most sweeping statements in that text: 
 
Along with the constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates, who usurp 
and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the mass of 
misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but with this 
there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in 
numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the 
capitalist process of production. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon 
the mode of production which has flourished alongside and under it. The 
centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labour reach a 
point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This 
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integument is burst asunder. The knell of private property sounds. The 
expropriators are expropriated.
662
 
 
As with the previous two passages, Marx speaks of the ‘knell’ of capitalism. Furthermore, his 
use of ‘integument,’ or in the German original, ‘Hülle,’ is significant. He uses this term sparingly 
in Capital: Volume One. It is almost always to describe the ‘integument,’ or, as it is sometimes 
translated, the ‘material shell,’ that masks the true character of capital, namely, that its value is 
the product of labour that has been alienated and appropriated from the labourers themselves. 
Indeed, the term ‘Hülle’ is most often used in the chapter on commodity fetishism, which is 
Marx’s most sophisticated statement about the cognitive obstacles to proletarian revolution: 
 
Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relation with each 
other as values because they see these objects merely as the material integuments 
of homogenous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different 
products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of 
labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it. Value, therefore, 
does not have its description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every 
product of labour into a social hieroglyphic.
663
 
 
With his sparing use of ‘Hülle,’ Marx intends to link this passage near the beginning of the text 
with the aforementioned passage at its end. In the concluding sections of Capital: Volume One, 
Marx offers his most eloquent explanation of how the deciphering of the social hieroglyphic is 
the product of capitalist development. And yet, nowhere in this section does he characterize this 
as a revelation of the injustice of capital. Surely, if the passage from the Manuskript 1861-63 had 
the importance that Elster attributes to it, Marx would have used the terminology of justice again 
in 1867 in the culmination of his life’s work. He does not. 
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 If the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis cannot demonstrate independent reasons to 
think that Marx deems capitalism unjust according to a robust concept of justice, then Elster’s 
piece of evidence is not enough. Even if more passages like it were found, where Marx appends 
the words ‘justice’ or ‘injustice’ to already-formulated ideas without a substantive statement 
about justice, my argument still stands. While we cannot say definitively whether or not Marx 
held a secret notion of justice, we can say that he deems it to be of so little importance in his 
writings, and gives so few hints toward one, that even if he held one it was necessarily 
impoverished. Our fundamental question remains: why does Marx neglect the concept of justice? 
Why is he so evasive about ethics? 
R. G. Peffer agrees with Cohen, Geras, and Elster that, with regard to questions of ethics 
and justice, Marx is inconsistent.
664
 Peffer also agrees with Elster that the “normative element 
constitutes the sine qua non of Marxism” whereas the “explanatory element can to some extent 
be modified and revised without loss of identity.”665 Part of this modification means bringing 
analytical philosophy to bear on Marxism: “We should not even be surprised, I think, to find that 
there is considerable overlap in the ethical views espoused by contemporary left-liberal moral 
and social philosophers within the analytic-linguistic tradition and Analytical Marxists (or, 
indeed, Marxists in general).”666 
Peffer attributes some of Marx’s inconsistencies to his criticisms of morality in general. 
First, Marx seems to think that all morality necessarily espouses the eternal principles for which 
he criticizes Proudhon. Second, he also seems to think that profound disagreements about ethics 
preclude objective criteria. Third, Marx thinks that all morality necessarily supports the social 
status quo and is therefore ideological. Fourth, Marx deems all ethics as unrealistic and 
ineffective in practice, at least in truly historical moments.
667
 Nevertheless, Peffer contends that 
Tucker and Wood are wrong to argue that Marx deems capitalism just.
668
 They argue that when 
Marx describes capitalist exploitation as just, he is making not only a factual, but also a 
normative claim. Conversely, Peffer separates these claims. As we have seen, this is a familiar 
‘saving distinction’: 
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It seems to me that rather than taking a normative position here, Marx is really 
taking an internal point of view with respect to capitalism, but an external point of 
view with respect to his own standards, and then reporting certain facts about 
how capitalism is to be judged from its own operational normative standards. He 
is really simply pointing out that by the rules of the game it has set up, so to 
speak, capitalism is not unjust.
669
 
 
Peffer likens this to the anthropological distinction between the ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ points of view, 
which differentiates reporting on a culture according to its own internal perspectives from the 
external perspective of the ethnographer.
670
 
Another piece of evidence presented by Peffer deserves some extended scrutiny. In 
documents co-written for the International Working Men’s Association (IWMA), Marx seems to 
affirm principles of justice and morality: 
 
They declare that this International Association and all societies and individuals adhering 
to it, will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality, as the basis of their conduct towards 
each other, and towards all men, without regard to colour, creed, or nationality. 
They hold it the duty of a man to claim the rights of a man and a citizen, not only 
for himself, but for every man who does his duty. No rights without duties, no duties 
without rights.
671
 
 
Nevertheless, Marx, in a letter to Engels on November 4, 1864, says the following: “My 
proposals were all accepted by the subcommittee. Only I was obliged to insert two phrases about 
‘duty’ and ‘right’ into the preamble to the statutes, ditto ‘truth, morality, and justice,’ but these 
are placed in such a way that they can do no harm.”672 Peffer asserts: 
 
Now these proclamations may well be rather bizarre exceptions to the 
overwhelming majority of Marx’s remarks about morality, rights, and justice—
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which view them as ‘ideological nonsense,’ unhelpful in the revolutionary 
struggle, or at least headed for obsolescence in coming communist society—but it 
is most interesting that he chooses the occasions on which he has the most direct 
and immediate impact on the socialist movement to acquiesce and put them 
forward. Together with the other passages cited above does this not indicate that 
Marx actually put more store in such concepts or principles as motivating factors 
than he was willing to admit? It seems to me that it does.
673
 
 
Paul Blackledge agrees with Peffer: “Marx on many occasions seemed to betray his acceptance 
of an implicit conception of justice that moves beyond the morality of self-realization.”674 
Ultimately, all of this is very wishful thinking. The obvious explanation as to why these are the 
circumstances in which Marx articulates these moral values is because he was writing by 
committee, which is, as anyone who has done it knows, a process of relentless compromise. In 
his own works, which he hoped would be widely read by the workers movement, these moral 
terms are conspicuously absent. 
 Although Draper is not responding directly to these debates, he offers a similar 
interpretation.
675
 In his usual rigorous manner, he offers the strongest arguments for this general 
position. Draper argues that Marx’s critique of moral principles like justice did not forbid 
appeals to them. Rather, it was to anchor such appeals to class struggle.
676
 When Marx asserts to 
Engels that these principles are placed so as to do no harm, Draper does not interpret this to 
mean that Marx thinks they can be ignored. Instead, they are placed so as to have a concrete 
content. Truth, justice, and morality are not tied to eternity, but to the IWMA.
677
 This is also the 
case with how Marx concludes the Inaugural Address, a vindication of ‘the simple laws of 
morals and justice.’678 This is plausible, but it ignores that Marx had plenty of opportunities to 
give concrete content to principles of justice in his own writings when he was not beholden to a 
broader committee. He does not do so. 
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 Draper also notes how Marx, in his report to the congress of the IWMA in 1868, 
describes attempts by the Bonaparte regime to imprison the executive members of the French 
section: 
 
As against the well-known lying and dirty tricks characteristic of Louis 
Napoleon’s government, Marx chose to contrast—the International’s insistence on 
‘truth, justice, and morality.’ 
 
The [French government] tribunal had the naiveté to declare in the 
preamble of its judgment that the existence of the French Empire was 
incompatible with a working men’s association that dared to proclaim 
truth, justice, and morality as its leading principles. 
 
It would appear that Marx had clasped the dreadful phrase to his very bosom.
679
 
 
This too is well-argued, but not decisive. It could just as easily be a critique of the hypocrisy of 
the French government rather than an affirmation of a positive alternative. This is Marx’s 
tendency in the domain of ethics. What he reduces to rubble he does not rebuild into an 
alternative structure. 
 Before we turn to a critical assessment of this group of theorists who argue that Marx 
criticizes capitalism as unjust, it is worth noting an internal disagreement about what is most 
significant about exploitation. In other words, this is a disagreement about what it is that makes 
capitalism unjust. 
 
7. 3: What is the Basis of Commutative Injustice? 
 
As we saw, theorists like Husami argue that the main injustice of exploitation is that it 
contravenes the principle of labour-contribution.
680
 Workers do not receive the fruits of their 
labour. Consequently, the problem with exploitation is primarily a matter of ‘distribution,’ or, if 
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we account for the proper distinction between commutative justice and distributive justice, a 
matter of allocation. There are other theorists, however, who think that exploitation is unjust 
primarily because it entails servitude. These power disparities are sometimes translated into the 
language of distribution. Capitalism not only features unequal allocations of property, but also of 
power and control within the community. In other words, it is unjust in part or in whole because 
it allocates unequally the conditions and the capacities necessary for freedom and self-
realization. This is argued by theorists such as Arneson, Ryan, van der Linden, Geras, and 
Warren.
681
 We will look in particular at two theorists who argue for this, Lawrence Crocker and 
Carol Gould. 
Crocker, writing in 1972 at the time of the second wave of debates, argues that the 
emphasis on alienation neglects the significance of exploitation.
682
 He argues that this occurs 
largely because Marx’s theory of exploitation has been misunderstood. For Marx, what is truly 
significant about exploitation is not the equal ‘distribution’ of goods and services, but rather the 
undemocratic control of production. Crocker argues that the ‘distributive’ interpretation of 
exploitation is harder to maintain amid the increasing standards of living of the working class. If 
exploitation is about the unequal control of social life, however, it can coexist with high wages 
and a robust welfare state: “Marx’s chief concern was power. Once power is wrested by the 
majority from the dominant minority, and democracy extends into every aspect of human 
activity, Marx was optimistic that the problems of welfare, in the broadest sense, could be 
solved.”683 Therefore, Marx is more of a revolutionary democrat than he is a radical welfarist. 
Although this interpretation of Marx is adapted too much to the tactical needs of 
Crocker’s immediate circumstances, he raises important points. Nevertheless, not only does he 
fail to distinguish between commutative justice and distributive justice, he assumes that, for 
Marx, democratic control is a question of justice, albeit, an expanded notion of justice. As we 
have seen, however, Marx may deem this more a question of freedom than justice. This occurs 
frequently among this sub-group of theorists. 
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Carol Gould argues along similar lines. At the outset we should note her discussion 
occurs in a chapter titled “The Ontology of Justice: Social Interaction, Alienation and the Ideal of 
Reciprocity.”684 It is rare that justice is regarded as ‘ontological’ in these discussions. Gould 
believes that it is obvious that Marx criticizes capitalism as unjust. Since he demonstrates that 
workers do not gain ownership over the products of their labour, “Marx’s critique here amounts 
to the claim that capitalism is unjust in that it violates the very principle of abstract justice which 
it enunciates in its principle of property right.”685 Nevertheless, Gould asserts that Marx also 
deems capitalism unjust in a deeper sense. His theory of exploitation and alienation shows that, 
in these historical social relations, some groups are deprived of freedom by others.
686
 Gould 
speculates that Marx says so little about justice in either its abstract or deeper senses because he 
is opposed to substitutions of “abstract moralizing for the criticism of society.”687 It is unclear, 
however, why Marx did not react the same way about freedom, which is as susceptible to such 
moralizing. 
Gould asserts that Marx is not a historical relativist because freedom is based in the 
nature of human activity: “it characterizes all individuals in all historical periods, though it is 
realized to varying degrees in different forms of society.”688 It is on this basis that Gould deems 
not only freedom, but also justice as ontological. In one of its senses, justice describes a set of 
social relations in which no one deprives another of the conditions for their positive freedom.
689
 
This is ‘abstract justice.’ Nevertheless, justice requires not only a specific form of instrumental 
relations with the conditions of production, but non-instrumental relations between individuals. 
This more positive conception of freedom, and therefore, of justice, requires “mutuality.”690 In 
other words, it is not simply about providing the space and conditions for others to pursue their 
freedom, but rather, it is actively contributing to the positive freedom of others.
691
 Gould’s 
overall project is to prove that, because we are inherently social beings, the study of human 
societies demands a social ontology. With regard to what concerns us here, she concludes that 
since justice is so important for our ontological freedom, justice is also ontological. 
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Gould argues that for Marx, private ownership of the conditions of production is unjust 
because it ensures unequal access to the conditions of our positive freedom.
692
 Gould more or 
less assumes that Marx deems capitalism unjust without adequately demonstrating this. 
Furthermore, her notion of justice is quite dependent on her notion of freedom, which, for her, is 
the paramount value. The independent merits of justice are not sufficiently emphasized. 
Nevertheless, Gould is to be commended for at least considering as a possibility that justice has 
ontological status.  
Ultimately, this sub-group of theorists fails to subject Marx to historical materialist 
critique. They argue correctly that, for Marx, exploitation is about more than unequal 
transactions. It is also about power disparities and the stifling of self-realization. It is not clear, 
however, that Marx’s condemnations of systematically unequal transactions and class 
domination are based in principles of justice. Indeed, as we have seen, it is a common premise in 
capitalist modernity that, in general, self-determination, and in particular, equal access to 
political control, are considered to be matters more of freedom than of justice. Marx may have 
adopted this assumption. In his commentary on the Paris Commune, Marx’s most sustained 
discussion of the expansion of political control and the capacities for self-determination, he 
speaks in terms of ‘emancipation,’ not justice.693 It seems that Marx’s critique is not based in a 
more just distribution of freedom, but rather, a more universal and qualitatively better kind of 
freedom. 
 
7. 4: Critical Assessment of These Commentators 
 
The first important shortcoming of the Cohen-Geras thesis is its neglect of the role of immanent 
critique in Marx’s work. Some theorists in this general cluster of thought, such as Gould694 and 
Blackledge,
695
 explicitly identify the importance of immanent critique. But even they, as we have 
seen, take it for granted that Marx criticizes capitalism as unjust according to socialist standards. 
Due to the lack of an explicit critique of capitalist injustice in Marx’s work (except for, as I 
noted, one paltry use of the term in his unpublished notes), this group of commentators can only 
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maintain their interpretations by imputing to Marx ‘saving’ distinctions that are not found in his 
text. 
In my critical assessment of the Tucker-Wood thesis, I argued that although Marx does 
not describe capitalism as unjust, he undermines bourgeois notions of justice. Therefore, it does 
not necessarily follow that Marx describes capitalism as just in any non-self-contradictory sense 
of that term. Now, in light of the Cohen-Geras thesis, we must note that, although Marx 
undermines bourgeois notions of justice, this does not necessarily entail that he deems capitalism 
unjust. Indeed, even if Marx argues for a higher principle of justice in socialism, which, as we 
will see, he does, this does not mean that Marx deems that socialist principle of justice applicable 
to the critique of capitalism. Marx seems to regard this as the imposition of an external principle 
on capitalist social conditions. In other words, he appears to condemn this as utopian socialism. 
It is surprising that these theorists are not more amenable to the idea of immanent 
critique. After all, if they are committed to exposing capitalism as unjust, it is at least plausible 
that Marx, using immanent critique, might be demonstrating that capitalism is unjust according 
to its own standards. Nevertheless, not even this can save their interpretation. For Marx, 
capitalism is not the field of an ‘epic’ battle of the just against the unjust, of right against wrong. 
Rather, it is the ‘tragic’ conflict between equal rights. This does not mean that Marx’s argument 
that force decides, that ‘might makes right,’ is purely relativist. Rather, he contends that the 
course of history culminates in the universalization of the breadth and the depth of freedom. That 
is his principle. 
The second major shortcoming of the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis is that they 
do not use immanent critique in their interpretation of Marx. For example, they criticize Marx’s 
narrow notion of purely juridical justice and assert that, as with his evident distinction between a 
merely formal freedom and a substantive freedom, Marx needs a notion of substantive justice. 
They do not ask, at least not in any profound way, why Marx is explicit about a substantive 
freedom but not a substantive justice. They do not ask whether or not Marx has uncritically 
absorbed the conquering of justice by freedom under capitalist social relations. Therefore, in 
their abandonment of scientific socialism for utopian socialism, they regard significant aspects of 
historical materialism as simply wrong. They do not pursue the much more meaningful project of 
subjecting historical materialism itself to historical scrutiny, of determining whether or not it, or 
certain aspects of it, are self-contradictory and ideological in Marx’s sense of those terms. 
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Although Marx would deem the Cohen-Geras thesis utopian, nevertheless, they assert 
that, without knowing it, Marx is a utopian socialist in this respect. Throughout the first wave of 
debates about Marxism and ethics, revisionists espoused an explicitly utopian socialism because, 
on the basis of their deterministic readings of history, they rejected scientific socialism. As we 
have seen, this is often true of the latest wave of debates, especially with Cohen. More 
significant, however, is the question of Marx’s inconsistency, whether it is Allen on the one side 
of these debates, or on the other, the cluster of thinkers around Cohen. The problem with the 
inconsistency argument is not only that it is deemed to be a purely theoretical inconsistency and 
not also an ideological one. The problem is also that they locate Marx’s inconsistency in the 
wrong place. Marx may be inconsistent, but not in the ways they think he is. As I will show, 
everything Marx says about justice is internally consistent. If he is inconsistent, it is because of 
how he separates justice from other aspects of ethics such as freedom. The reasons for this can 
only be discovered through an immanent critique of Marx. Consequently, in addressing the 
shortcomings of Marx’s ethics, my strategy is not to resort to utopian socialism. This risks 
abandoning the correct insights of Marx’s critique of socialists like Proudhon. Rather, my 
strategy is to show why, for ideological reasons, Marx casts his critique of utopianism too wide. 
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Chapter 8: The Buchanan-Lukes Thesis: Marx Deems Capitalism Neither Just Nor Unjust 
 
We turn now to those who argue that, ultimately, Marx deems capitalism neither just nor unjust 
because his critique does not have a concept of justice or is beyond justice in some sense. In 
general, this interpretation is stronger than either the Tucker-Wood thesis or the Cohen-Geras 
thesis because it is able to account for the strongest arguments made by both. Ultimately, it is 
best able to explain how Marx can describe exploitation as theft, and yet, as not unjust, without 
becoming mired in inconsistencies. 
There are three major differences within this interpretation: first, whether they think that 
Marx is an amoralist or a moralist of some kind; second, whether or not they note the 
significance of immanent critique in Marx’s discussion of justice; and third, whether they 
approve or disapprove of Marx’s attempt to go beyond the notion of justice. Miller and Ryan 
both interpret Marx as an amoralist. They also tend to downplay the significance of immanent 
critique, although Ryan hints toward it. Finally, both approve of Marx’s rejection of justice, 
although Ryan is somewhat ambiguous about this. Conversely, Buchanan and Lukes see a moral 
theory in Marx, but distinguish it from any principle of justice. Furthermore, they notice Marx’s 
use of immanent critique without necessarily describing it as such. Finally, they disapprove of 
Marx’s attempts to go beyond justice. They argue that Marxism needs a concept of justice. 
Although I will offer criticisms of each of these thinkers, Buchanan and Lukes’s interpretation of 
Marx is the closest to my own in all of these debates. Nevertheless, they too neglect immanent 
critique in a certain sense. They neglect the role of immanent critique not in Marx’s work, but in 
the evaluation of it. They engage in the idealist method. They account for Marx’s theory only in 
terms of his intellectual influences and diagnose its problems as primarily theoretical 
shortcomings. 
 
8. 1: Marx is Right to Think Beyond Justice 
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Richard W. Miller, like Wood, distinguishes between the moral and non-moral.
696
 For Miller, 
morality proper is comprised of three aspects: (i) ‘equality,’ which means that all people should 
be shown equal concern and respect; (ii) ‘general norms,’ which are the valid rules that can 
resolve political disputes in every society; and (iii) ‘universality,’ which means that any rational 
person would accept these rules. For Miller, this makes morality distinct from the pragmatic 
orientation to interest, whether it is self-interest, class-interest, national-interest, and so on. 
According to Miller, Marx is an anti-moralist. In other words, he deems the moral point of view, 
in all three of its aspects, as inappropriate in the choosing of social arrangements.
697
 This does 
not mean that Marx rejects all decency. It means that, although Marx’s preferred social 
arrangements would make people more equal, he prefers them not because they conform to an 
ultimate standard of equality, but because they would enhance people’s lives.698 “When its 
foundations are brought to light,” Miller asserts, “Marx’s rejection of morality as the basis for 
social and political choice turns out to be complex, well-argued, and humane, though, in an 
important sense, anti-humanitarian.”699 This decency distinguishes Marx from the anti-moralism 
of, say, Nietzsche and Weber. 
Miller attempts to offer “plausible” reasons for rejecting the moral point of view, “at least 
as philosophers have conceived it.”700 Miller’s method is idealist. He speaks of moral 
philosophers like Aristotle and Rawls as if, despite certain differences, they both affirmed 
something called the moral point of view.
701
 He does not consider whether or not what he 
describes as the moral point of view is historically-specific. Indeed, as we have seen, the idea of 
a distinctly ‘moral’ point of view tends to arise only when vast swathes of human experience are 
deemed to be ‘non-moral.’ This assumption goes unquestioned. 
The potential pitfalls of Miller’s method is manifest in Rawls himself. For example, 
Rawls associates his notion of justice with certain aspects of Aristotle’s conception of justice: 
 
The more specific sense that Aristotle gives to justice, and from which the most 
familiar formulations derive, is that of refraining from pleonexia, that is, from 
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gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what belongs to another, his 
property, his reward, his office, and the like, or by denying a person that which is 
due to him, the fulfillment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the showing of 
proper respect, and so on.
702
 
 
Rawls assumes that he is participating in a single, long conversation, addressing questions 
similar to those of someone like Aristotle. Nevertheless, this misunderstands fundamentally 
Aristotle’s notion of pelonexia and thereby his theory of justice. Aristotle distinguishes between, 
on the one hand, the just or unjust person, and on the other hand, the just or unjust action.
703
 One 
may incidentally engage in unjust actions, but they are not an unjust person unless injustice is a 
constant and recurring aspect of their character. One of the crucial dimensions of the unjust 
person is that they are constantly grasping for more. For Aristotle, this is what pleonexia means: 
it is not human nature, but a habituated corruption of human nature. In light of this, let us 
consider Rawls’s conception of human nature, of the ‘rational,’ as it is depicted in the original 
position, in which it is assumed that individuals are naturally self-interested. In other words, 
Rawls assumes that people, if they had the choice, would desire a greater share of the total 
product. Far from being an extension of Aristotle’s notion of justice, Rawls’s conception of 
human nature is precisely what Aristotle would condemn as pleonexia. Neglecting crucial 
disagreements such as these are a danger of the idealist method adopted by Rawls in his 
interpretation of Aristotle as much as by Miller in his interpretation of Rawls and Aristotle. 
Having defined morality as the ‘moral point of view,’ Miller believes that there are four 
reasons why Marx rejects it in its entirety: 
 
1. Various needs of the vast majority are in such conflict with those of minorities 
that an ultimate standard of equality would have intolerable costs. 
2. Strategies for effective change require obstruction and, sometimes, violence 
that are incompatible with concrete sentiments of equal concern for all involved. 
3. In the course of history, normal people have had deep moral differences that 
were not due to unreason or ignorance. Similarly, in the present day, there are 
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conflicting conceptions of the good that cannot be resolved through rational 
persuasion. 
4. The conflicts between the long run and the short run, culture and minimal well-
being for all, productivity and leisure, have sometimes been so acute that no set of 
basic institutions was the best. Only historical change has removed this 
incoherence.
704
 
 
If Marx rejects the moral point of view, it follows that he rejects justice too. In this, Miller goes 
even further than Wood. Miller asserts that, although Wood’s case against the injustice of the 
wage transaction is “conclusive,” this does not make it “positively just.”705 In fact, justice is not a 
“real property” of institutions, not even in Wood’s sense of something that functionally stabilizes 
the prevailing social relations. 
What Miller means by justice, however, is quite specific: “an evenhanded balancing of 
interests is the basic property of justice as everyone uses the term in deliberations over whether 
to accept or oppose institutions. And Marx’s arguments would show that no coherent notion of 
evenhandedness is available to be applied to institutions.”706 Miller’s argument reveals the 
shortcomings of his idealist approach. Like Tucker and Wood, he assumes typically liberal 
notions of justice to be the only available ones, irrespective of social conditions. 
 Miller also engages in a number of ‘saving distinctions,’ but curiously, he reverses their 
usual intention. First, Miller dismisses Marx’s occasional mention of terms like ‘justice’: 
 
If Marx uses such terms, it is to refer to people’s moral beliefs or to single out 
phenomena which those beliefs would force them to approve. But he is no more 
acknowledging that institutions really are just than, say, Freud acknowledged that 
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demons really had existed when he claimed that demonic possession in the 
Middle Ages was schizophrenia based on infantile guilt and fear.
707
 
 
Like other commentators, Miller distinguishes between Marx’s sociology and Marx’s own 
views. Unlike the other commentators, however, Miller believes that Marx only mentions justice 
because some people mistakenly think it exists, not because Marx wants to contrast the 
prevailing morality with one of his own. 
 Miller also distinguishes between the realms of exchange and production: 
 
Even if Marx did believe that capitalist transactions were just, typically and on 
the average, there would be no need to transfer this judgment to the capitalist 
mode of production or typical capitalist institutions. His ordinary-language 
arguments appeal to considerations quite specific to individual acts of exchange. 
His other arguments similarly rely on a notion of equal value quite specific to the 
analysis of capitalist exchanges and their consequences for price, profit and 
related phenomena. No corresponding body of everyday assumptions or scientific 
measures of value supports a rational standard of justice for whole economic 
systems.
708
 
 
Miller distinguishes between capitalist exchange and the capitalist mode of production. He does 
not do this in order to show how the more fundamental injustice of the latter negates the formal 
justice of the former. Rather, he distinguishes them in order to insulate the mode of production 
from any criterion of justice at all. In doing so, he adopts the methodological individualism of 
Allen. He therefore focuses only on the exchange between individuals, not the societal relations 
between entire classes. 
We recall that for Tucker and Wood, capitalism is exploitative and evil, but not unjust. 
Similarly, for Miller, Marx’s politics are “humane, though, in an important sense, anti-
humanitarian,”709 and “decent without being moral.”710 This is because Marx is committed to the 
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non-moral goods of the vast majority of people. Miller asserts that, if Marx is correct, the 
motivations that initially attract us to the moral point of view will, upon reflection, cause us to 
reject it.
711
 This is an interesting paradox. One of the first things young Marxists often learn is to 
reject as ‘bourgeois’ humanism all of the values which inspired them to become Marxists in the 
first place. When we turn to Buchanan and Lukes, we will find that they are critical of Marx and 
Marxism for this very reason. Denying the cogency of justice and of rights becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Alan Ryan also argues that Marx’s critique of capitalism is essentially beyond a standard 
of justice.
712
 Ryan does disagree with Marx in certain respects, but the nature of his disagreement 
is worded ambiguously. It seems that Ryan does not critique Marx on the basis of fundamental 
issues, but rather, because Marx failed to address certain issues and to clarify certain terms. 
Furthermore, Ryan asserts that he shares some of Marx’s more substantive claims. Therefore, it 
makes more sense to discuss Ryan in this section rather than the next one, which addresses 
Buchanan and Lukes’s much more foundational criticisms of Marx. 
Initially, Ryan expresses some sympathy for Cohen’s view. 
 
Cohen’s claim that whether he knew it or not Marx attacked capitalism for its 
injustice rests on the plausible point that Marx uses terms such as ‘rob’ and 
‘usurp’ in their plain sense, and does not so to speak bracket them or place them 
in inverted commas; Marx condemned theft, not ‘theft.’ Yet, Marx’s scepticism 
about ethical appeals is well known.
713
 
 
Nevertheless, when Marx says that capitalist exchange is not unjust, he does not put it in scare 
quotes. Marx says the wage-relation is not unjust. He does not say it is not ‘unjust.’714 Despite 
these assertions, Ryan ultimately concludes that, for Marx, moral judgements are 
“epistemologically dubious.”715 Marx believes that morality basically functions to preserve the 
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social order. In this, Ryan takes Kantianism to be paradigmatic of morality: “The features which 
Kant ascribes to morality—its coercive character and its independence of self-interest above 
all—reflect in a mystified fashion the social function of the institution of ‘morality.’”716 
Therefore, morality, like law, is purely ideological. Ryan shares with Tucker and Wood the 
belief that justice has only a functional role in society. 
Ryan notes how Marx seems to both assert and deny the justice of capitalist 
exploitation.
717
 In buying labour-power the capitalist does not violate the rule of equivalent 
exchange, but in using labour-power he does. Ryan argues that the only satisfactory explanation 
is that capitalism is in contradiction with itself. Ryan is to be commended for noticing how Marx 
undermines bourgeois justice according to its own internal standards. Nevertheless, he does not 
provide any explanation of immanent critique and its broader meaning in these debates. 
Furthermore, he does not provide any explanation of the distinction between labour and labour-
power, which, as we will see, is an important aspect of the explanation of Marx’s ideas about 
justice. 
For Ryan, Marx is not demonstrating that capitalism is just according to its own standards 
and unjust according to socialist standards. Ryan believes that there are no such standards of 
justice in socialist society: 
 
After that state, we reach the end of the road. Here, on my view, there is no 
justice, because there are no rights. There is, however, a principle of distributing 
work and resources, the famous principle of ‘from each according to his capacity, 
to each according to his need.’ This is not a principle of justice in Marx’s eyes—
and mine—because it does not ground claims of right. There is no question of its 
imposition on the members of the communist society; there is no question of 
anyone being forced to work on these terms. Not only is it not a principle of 
justice, it is not a moral principle at all. It will be understood by everyone, not as 
a moral principle but as a practical or rational principle.
718
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For Ryan, since the goal of this principle is freedom, it is a practical good, not a moral ideal.
719
 
Ryan makes the common-sense assumption that justice resides in the state. Therefore, without a 
state, there is no basis for, or a need of, justice. 
According to Ryan, Marx espouses a kind of anti-moralism or amoralism because the 
basis of his theory, freedom, is not a moral entity: “It is not a moral view; freedom is not an 
ideal, and we are not morally obliged to seek it. Like freedom from ill health, it is a natural good 
and its pursuit is a practical, not a moral imperative.”720 Ryan contends that this distinguishes his 
own theory from that of Lukes, which, as we will see, regards freedom or emancipation as a 
moral imperative in Marx. Nevertheless, Ryan downplays the stakes of their differences, stating 
that not much hangs on the difference. Lukes, like Nasser, will have to determine why justice is 
of a different ontological status than freedom, whereas Ryan, like McCarney, must determine 
how we can deny ethics any ontological status at all without falling into the fact-value distinction 
that Marx rejects. Neither Lukes nor Ryan answer these questions adequately. 
In response to Marx’s ‘bracketing’ of moral ideals, Ryan asserts: “That leaves it an open 
question whether he was wholly wise to do so; I hope I have suggested that he was not.”721 
Nevertheless, since Ryan has agreed with much of what Marx says, it is not clear what he is 
referring to here. My best guess is that Ryan means the following. After explaining how Marx 
offers a sociology of morality, Ryan asserts: “I readily concede that what Marx omits is a careful 
account of where the boundaries lie between ‘moral’ and non-‘moral’ evaluation.”722 This 
indicates that, for Ryan, the problem is not Marx’s assertions themselves, but that he left his 
analysis incomplete. He did not adequately distinguish between the moral and the practical. 
 
8. 2: Marx is Wrong to Think Beyond Justice 
 
We turn now to those who argue, first, that Marx deems his critique beyond justice, and second, 
that he was wrong to do so.
723
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According to Allen E. Buchanan, for Marx, justice is a primarily negative value. It means 
the protection of the individual’s rights. Therefore, a set of social conditions that requires 
principles of justice and rights is already defective in some significant way. It entails that 
violations of individuals are systemic. They are frequent enough to require principles of 
protection. Therefore, Marx does not critique capitalism as unjust because justice itself already 
entails defects worthy of critique. For this reason, Marx deems capitalism neither just nor unjust. 
Rather, his critique is beyond justice. 
Buchanan summarizes what he regards as Marx’s “multidimensional critique of rights 
and justice”: 
 
i) One of the most serious indictments of capitalism—and of all class-divided 
societies—is not that they are unjust or that they violate persons’ rights, but 
that they are based on defective modes of production which make reliance 
upon conceptions of justice and right necessary. 
ii) The demands of justice cannot be satisfied in the circumstances which make 
conceptions of justice necessary; thus efforts to achieve justice inevitably fail. 
iii) Conceptions of rights and justice will not play a major motivational role in 
the revolutionary struggle to replace capitalism with communism. 
iv) Communism will be a society in which juridical concepts—including the 
juridical concept of respect—have no significant role in structuring social 
relations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
our society cannot hope to achieve moral consensus. For quite non-Marxist reasons Marx was in the right when he 
argued against the English trade unionists of the 1860s that appeals to justice were pointless, since there are rival 
conceptions of justice formed by and informing the life of rival groups. Marx was of course mistaken in supposing 
that such disagreements over justice are merely secondary phenomena, that they merely reflect the interests of rival 
economic classes. Conceptions of justice and allegiance to such conceptions are partly constitutive of the lives of 
social groups, and economic interests are often partially defined in terms of such conceptions and not vice versa. 
Nonetheless Marx was fundamentally right in seeing conflict and not consensus at the heart of modern social 
structure. It is not just that we live too much by a variety and multiplicity of fragmented concepts; it is that these are 
used at one and the same time to express rival and incompatible social ideals and policies and to furnish us with a 
pluralist political rhetoric whose function is to conceal the depth of our conflicts” (MacIntyre, After Virtue, op. cit., 
252-53). As we have seen, MacIntyre asserts that Marxism cannot claim to have a distinct moral standpoint, 
however, because in practice Marxists always fall back into either Kantian or utilitarian stances (ibid., 261). 
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v) The concept of a person as essentially a being with a sense of justice and who 
is a bearer of rights is a radically defective concept that could only arise in a 
radically defective form of human society.
724
 
 
We will focus here on the first two claims. The last three claims will be addressed in later 
chapters. 
Buchanan asserts that, according to Marx’s materialism, justice means juridical relations. 
Consequently, it has very little explanatory value in comparison to the much more fundamental 
production relations. In class societies, these production relations necessarily give rise to scarcity 
and conflict. For Marx, this is what makes justice necessary. Without this historically-contingent 
scarcity and conflict people would not need rights to separate and protect them from each other. 
In Buchanan’s interpretation of Marx, therefore, to say that a society is just is to condemn it as 
defective because it contains the poverty and antagonism that make principles of justice 
necessary. Furthermore, these principles cannot fundamentally address and alter the social 
conditions upon which they depend. Therefore, class-societies inevitably fail to adhere to the 
principles of justice to which they give rise. Consequently, for Marx, the reason why 
communism is superior to all class societies is not because it finally achieves justice. Rather, it is 
because it eliminates scarcity and conflict and thereby renders justice irrelevant.
725
 
Buchanan is highly critical of this, but not because he rejects Marx’s explanation of 
exploitation. Rather, his critique has more to do with Marx’s neglect of the significant civil rights 
afforded under capitalist society and the need for them in the revolutionary transition to, and 
establishing of, a socialist society. Since Buchanan’s critique is more relevant for questions of 
complete justice, we will explore it in more detail in the final chapters. Nevertheless, I will 
provide a brief summary of Buchanan’s critique of Marx here. First, Buchanan argues that 
Marx’s account of justice under capitalism focuses too exclusively on matters of exchange to the 
neglect of important civil rights such as the right to free speech. Second, Buchanan contends that 
justice plays an indispensable role in revolution. Without it, any attempt to overthrow capitalism 
will fall prey to collective action failures. Finally, Buchanan argues that, even in a communist 
society, justice and rights will be necessary in order to, among other things, preserve universal 
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democratic participation, limit paternalism, and specify what can and cannot be done to 
individuals in the name of the general social welfare.
726
 
Steven Lukes asserts that the paradox of Marxism and morality is that, on the one hand, 
morality is deemed to be an ideological expression of a particular stage in the development of the 
productive forces, and yet, on the other hand, the writings of Marx and Marxists abound with 
moral judgments.
727
 Marxism seems to have a commitment to both the rejection and the adoption 
of moral criticism.
728
 For Lukes, the solution to this paradox is to distinguish between a morality 
of Recht and a morality of emancipation.
729
 Marx rejects the former and accepts the latter.
730
 
Indeed, emancipation means, in part, emancipation from the morality of Recht and the conditions 
that call it into being: 
 
Marxism maintains that the conditions of Recht are historically determined, 
specific to class-societies, and imminently removable. Neither limits to desired 
goods, nor limited sympathies, nor antagonistic social relations, and 
corresponding moral ideologies, nor the opaqueness or reified character of social 
relations are essential to the human predicament. To assume that they are is itself 
an ideological illusion (propagated by Recht) – ideological in serving to 
perpetuate the existing class-bound social order.
731
 
 
Indeed, by regulating conflicting interests, Recht fosters class compromise rather than 
revolution.
732
 
Lukes asserts that the rejection of liberal rights is not replaced with a Marxist theory of 
rights and justice because its anti-utopianism prevents it. There are four reasons for this: (i) Marx 
and Engels had teleological faith in the coming of communism and believed that it would 
alleviate all present social disparities; (ii) they believed that the evils of capitalism were so 
obvious; (iii) they saw that the proletariat was rapidly becoming the majority of citizens and 
therefore utopian speculation would not be needed; and (iv) they asserted that utopian 
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speculation would engender pointless debates about the future when the real fight remains in the 
present.
733
 Nevertheless, Lukes argues that, since Plato, utopian thinking has provided two useful 
functions from which Marxism could benefit: first, it clarifies political and social ends through 
imaginative counter-factuals; second, it brings non-routine perspectives to bear on intractable 
issues in the present context.
734
 
Lukes asserts that Marx’s conception of justice is “internally complex and hierarchically 
organized.”735 First, Marx provides a functional account of how capitalist exploitation is 
regarded as just according to bourgeois standards. Second, he provides an ‘internal’ or 
‘immanent’ critique of those relations, which only appear equitable. Third, he offers an ‘external’ 
critique of capitalism from the perspective of the lower stage of communism, regarding it as 
unjust according to the principle, ‘to each according to their contribution.’ Fourth, Marx offers a 
critique from the perspective of the higher phase of communism in which the very form of the 
criticism of capitalism as just or unjust is indicative of a class society in a prehistorical phase that 
has not yet transcended the morality of Recht.
736
 
Although Lukes argues that Marx thinks in terms of a hierarchy of concepts, he disagrees 
with Elster that this is a hierarchy of justice: “What Marx offers is multi-perspectival analysis in 
which capitalism’s self-justifications are portrayed, undermined from within, and criticized from 
without, and then both justification and criticism are in turn criticized from a standpoint that is 
held to be beyond justice.”737 Lukes therefore disagrees with Cohen that Marx has a non-relative 
notion of justice: “for Marx, there was no such sense: all such judgements are perspective-
relative. Objectivity, in the sense of perspective-neutrality, was, for him, an illusion, indeed an 
ideological illusion.”738 This is a persuasive account. We must remain skeptical that, for Marx, 
contemporary capitalism can be deemed unjust according to a future socialist standard. In every 
other respect, however, Lukes’s schema is able to account for most of the evidence presented by 
the Tucker-Wood and Cohen-Geras theses. 
For Lukes, the content of Marx’s morality of emancipation is a specific theory of 
freedom. Marx’s theory of substantive freedom is an Aristotelian, perfectionist, teleological 
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actualization of our species-being or capacities.
739
 The key to this notion of freedom is 
emancipation from external purposes, whether natural necessity or social duty.
740
 The basis of 
Marx’s critique of non-communist societies is that they stifle this substantive freedom. 
Although Lukes deems Marx’s notion of freedom to be quite sophisticated, he is also 
highly critical of Marx’s attempt to get beyond justice, and for reasons similar to Buchanan. 
Therefore, I will explore his critique in more detail in the final chapters while offering a brief 
summary here. First, Lukes also contends that Marx’s critique of the egoistic rights, such as the 
right to private property, is too narrow. Marx neglects political rights that are worth preserving, 
such as the freedom from unlawful detention. Second, Lukes argues that, without a substantive 
concept of justice, proletarian revolution will be prone to excessive and arbitrary violence. Since 
it takes its coordinates from a distant goal, it will be tempted to excuse its atrocities in the 
present. Therefore, it will become mired in ‘dirty hands’ problems and will ultimately be self-
defeating. Finally, Lukes is skeptical that the end of private property will result in declines of 
scarcity and egoism sufficient to ensure that principles of justice are no longer necessary to 
regulate interactions between individuals.
741
 
 
8. 3: Critical Assessment of These Commentators 
 
Miller’s distinction between moral and non-moral goods and Ryan’s distinction between moral 
and practical goods warrant all of the criticisms I have already made of commentators like 
Wood, Smart, and McCarney insofar as they rely on similar saving distinctions. Furthermore, 
depictions of Marx as an amoralist are directly contradicted by the evidence. Take, for example, 
Marx’s embrace of the “moral influence” of revolution: 
 
The right of the democratic popular masses, by their presence, to exert a moral 
influence on the attitude of constituent assemblies is an old revolutionary right of 
the people which could not be dispensed with in all stormy periods ever since the 
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English and French revolutions. History owes to this right almost all the energetic 
steps taken by such assemblies.
742
 
 
Conversely, the perspective offered by Buchanan and Lukes is the most sophisticated so far 
because it can account for and integrate all of the strongest arguments of the others. Despite their 
praise-worthy efforts, however, there remains at least one major shortcoming. As is so common 
in these debates, this is due to their idealist approach. 
 Buchanan, for example, explains Marx’s “evaluative perspective” by discussing the 
influence of Hegel.
743
 Similarly, Lukes explains Marx’s notion of freedom by contrasting it with 
the tradition of Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, and Mill, and by comparing it to the tradition of 
Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel.
744
 Delineating intellectual influences is, of course, 
necessary. Indeed, that is why I emphasize the importance of Hegel, and in particular, his theory 
of immanent critique. Nevertheless, attributing Marx’s perspective to his intellectual influences 
is not sufficient. This also requires a materialist critique that roots these ideas, however critical, 
in their historical conditions. This is needed not only in the critique of his influences but of Marx 
himself. 
 Take, for example, Buchanan and Lukes’s affirmation of the missing link, of justice and 
rights. I am certainly sympathetic to this. It is the purpose of this inquiry. By failing to engage in 
a materialist critique, however, they take for granted prevailing conceptions of justice and rights. 
Both Buchanan and Lukes describe rights as a kind of protection against others, what Dworkin 
calls ‘trumps.’745 Nevertheless, this is a historically specific notion of rights. This negative notion 
of justice is quite different from positive conceptions in which justice is an essential part of our 
self-realization. In the positive connotation, justice is not merely a protection against others, but 
how our self-realization necessarily occurs in and through our common efforts with others. 
Indeed, with his distinction between the moralities of Recht and emancipation, Lukes does not 
adequately explain why justice is not deemed to be an ontological part of human nature in the 
way that freedom is. Buchanan and Lukes uncritically adopt the modern, more negative notions 
of right and justice because, without rooting them in changing historical conditions, we assume 
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that this simply is what justice and rights entail as such. This is not to say that the modern 
notions of primarily negative justice and rights are false. This must be argued on its own terms. 
Rooting justice and rights in specific historical conditions is not enough to prove that they are 
narrow, mutable, and deserve to be superseded. But it can begin to stimulate the critique that is 
otherwise precluded if we accept concepts immediately. I am not yet affirming either the positive 
or negative notions of justice and rights. I am simply noting the difference as well as how the 
transition from the predominance of the former to the latter may be rooted in historical social 
relations. 
 Marx often criticizes a specific notion of rights that is primarily negative. He offers as an 
alternative a conception of positive freedom. He does not speak of positive justice. Perhaps Marx 
thinks that justice is inescapably negative. Therefore, he thinks that justice, or the conditions that 
require principles of justice, are to be negated. Why would Marx assume this about justice and 
not freedom? Perhaps it is because freedom is the paramount value under modernity. Conversely, 
justice, particularly as complete justice, is considered to be old-fashioned. In a certain sense, 
Marx may unwittingly accept the ‘egoistic’ conception of others as limits to my freedom. If he 
rejects justice, perhaps this is because he accepts that the ‘egoistic’ conception is its only 
possible expression. As we have seen, a stark rejection can feature an underlying and more 
fundamental acceptance. Rejecting something as a whole because it is mistakenly conflated with, 
and made reducible to, what is only a particular expression of that thing, means we will continue 
to be haunted by the ghosts of the alternative conceptions that, in this blanket-rejection, have 
been ignored. 
Despite these shortcomings, however, Buchanan and Lukes’s interpretation of Marx’s 
relation to justice and rights is the most accurate so far. 
 
8. 4: Critical Assessment of the Debate on Marx and Commutative Justice as a Whole 
 
It is now time to offer an assessment of these debates up to the point we have now reached. Here 
I will offer what I think are some important conclusions, but these will only be tentative and 
partial. It is impossible to come to any definite conclusions without first studying what Marx 
asserts about socialist society. Therefore, I must prolong these definite conclusions until the next 
two chapters. Nevertheless, even if some of the conclusions offered here feature some 
 228 
 
unresolved antinomies, we have traversed enough material to begin weighing the comparative 
merits of the different interpretations as well as to point to a number of shortcomings in all of 
them. 
If we take Marx literally, he says that the wage-relation is not unjust according to 
bourgeois justice, the only standard of justice possible under capitalist conditions. If we take 
Marx literally, he says that the wage-relation is based in theft, robbery, extortion, and plunder. It 
seems that the bourgeois notion of commutative justice is internally contradictory, self-defeating, 
and therefore, ideological and false. This perspective has superficial similarities with certain 
aspects of both the Tucker-Wood and the Cohen-Geras theses. Like Tucker and Wood, I argue 
that Marx believes that bourgeois justice is the only form of justice possible under capitalism. 
Therefore, it is the only notion of justice by which one could evaluate capitalism. Consequently, 
capitalism is not unjust. Nevertheless, contrary to Tucker and Wood, I agree with Cohen and 
Geras that Marx’s invocations of ‘theft’ undermine the validity of bourgeois justice. Therefore, 
Marx does not seem to regard capitalism as just in any non-self-contradictory sense of that term. 
Contrary to Cohen and Geras, however, I do not believe that this proves that Marx has some 
alternative, implicit, positive notion of justice by which capitalism can be condemned as unjust. 
Ultimately, both sides neglect the ways in which Marx deploys immanent critique. 
The proponents of the Tucker-Wood thesis neglect or dismiss as ‘rhetorical’ the ways in 
which Marx undermines bourgeois justice when he explicitly asserts that it is predicated on 
systemic theft, robbery, or extortion. Much of the discussion about the systemic theft embodied 
in capitalist appropriation misses the philosophical tradition to which Marx contributes. In other 
words, a crucial aspect of the relation between Marx’s immanent critique and what he says about 
justice and theft are his intellectual predecessors, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, and, of course, the 
historical conditions that inform their ongoing discussion of justice. Each of these intellectual 
predecessors deem ‘to each their due’ and ‘do not steal’ as the consummate positive and negative 
expressions of private property. This is precisely the basis by which Marx undermines bourgeois 
justice as self-contradictory. Nevertheless, Marx also embraces Hegel’s immanent critique as 
well as his assertions that concepts of justice arise from specific, historically-determined forms 
of property relations. It is for this reason that Marx’s destabilizing of bourgeois justice does not 
necessarily erect in its place an alternative principle of justice capable of being implemented in 
prevailing historical conditions and by which those conditions can be criticized as unjust. As we 
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will see in a subsequent chapter, Marx says much the same thing about the first phase of 
socialism. 
The proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis also neglect immanent critique. Although 
Marx undermines bourgeois justice, this does not mean he affirms a different conception of 
justice that can serve as a positive alternative within capitalism. He does not say that capitalist 
exploitation is unjust. Rather, he says that the only standard of justice possible under capitalism, 
bourgeois justice, is a form that contains a contradictory content: the necessary antagonism 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Marx will offer a principle of justice that poses an 
alternative to bourgeois justice, but he gives every indication that it is specific to post-capitalist 
society. In other words, the dialectical resolution occurs beyond capitalist historical conditions. 
Since that resolution must exist not only in our minds but in our material conditions, it cannot be 
imposed on capitalist conditions as some external or transcendental standard. Therefore, this 
principle of justice in socialism is not a basis by which we can (i) critique capitalism as unjust, 
(ii) justify the post-capitalist society, and (iii) inform the revolutionary activity that takes us from 
one form of society to the other. 
We must also conclude that Marx is not inconsistent in the way that Cohen and Geras 
think he is. Is Marx’s theory of justice the necessary outcome of his use of immanent critique? 
Perhaps not. After all, Marx asserts that capitalist freedom and equality necessarily result in 
unfreedom and inequality. He criticizes capitalism on these grounds even though alternative 
notions of a more substantive freedom and equality cannot be achieved within capitalist society. 
Why then does Marx fail to assert that capitalist justice necessarily becomes injustice? When 
Cohen and Geras accuse Marx of inconsistency, they are looking in the wrong place. Everything 
Marx has said so far about justice is internally consistent. If Marx applies the method of 
immanent critique to principles of freedom and equality in ways that are fundamentally different 
from its application to justice, the question becomes, why does Marx separate justice from other 
ethical principles? Is it not his notion of justice, but his use of immanent critique that is 
inconsistent? As I will show, it is only a historical materialist critique of Marx that can prove this 
to be the case. 
 Even those who argue that Marx’s theory casts itself as essentially beyond justice neglect 
immanent critique, if not the use of immanent critique in Marx’s work, than in their own critique 
of Marx. To a significant extent, I agree with the interpretation and critique of Marx offered by 
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Buchanan and Lukes. Nevertheless, even they engage in an idealist method. They attribute 
Marx’s errors only to specific intellectual influences and cognitive mistakes. Thus, the question 
of justice and rights becomes something to append to Marx’s theory. In Hegel’s terms, this does 
not meet Marx on his battleground. A truly thoroughgoing critique of Marx would be what is 
attempted here: an immanent critique that shows how Marx, on his own terms, may be guilty of 
ideology in his sense of the term. 
 As I noted earlier, each of the three waves of debate about Marxism and ethics has ended 
in the same basic impasse: the mutually reinforcing antinomy between, on the one hand, 
determinism or consequentialism, and on the other hand, formalism or deontology. This is one of 
the reasons why I insist so stringently on the use of the historical materialist method in the 
debates about Marx. It is not only that this is the least we should expect from self-described 
Marxists. It also because, by failing to root the problems of Marxist ethics in capitalist social 
relations, too often these commentators turn to what they deem to be the only possible 
alternative, which is as rooted in these historical conditions as are the shortcomings in Marx. 
Every position in this debate allows liberal notions of justice to not only frame the discussion, 
but to dominate it. As we will see, this is true not only for those commentators who embrace 
certain aspects of liberal justice and rights, whether it is, on the one hand, Cohen and Geras, or 
on the other hand, Buchanan and Lukes. It is also true of those commentators who reject liberal 
justice and rights, which they deem to be justice and rights as such, whether it is, on the one 
hand, Tucker and Wood, or on the other hand, Miller and Ryan. This is why the impasse struck 
by each of these waves of debate resorts to liberal antinomies, either the consequentialism of that 
tradition descending from Kautsky to Wood or the deontology of that tradition descending from 
Bernstein to Cohen. 
 In the first two debates, there were attempts to construct a genuinely dialectical, non-
determinist ethics. These efforts failed. I point to this not because I can offer here a successful 
dialectical ethics. Rather, I do so in order to put on the agenda the question of whether or not a 
genuine dialectical method results in serious shortcomings in the domain of ethics. Indeed, these 
limitations may be severe enough to call into question the dialectical method altogether. In doing 
so, however, I will have attempted to critique it on its own grounds. 
If we take Marx literally, so far, all we can say is that Marx never speaks affirmatively 
about a principle of justice without demonstrating how it is self-contradictory. In other words, 
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Marx nowhere speaks of a principle of justice that is not destined to be transcended by another 
principle of justice. Furthermore, he explicitly states that these principles of justice are specific to 
their historical circumstances and cannot be used to comparatively judge different modes of 
production. As we will soon see, Marx, in his discussion of the first phase of socialism, describes 
the socialist standard of distribution: ‘From each according to their ability, to each according to 
their contribution.’ We have not addressed this yet because, unlike the issues of commutative 
justice we have covered so far, this principle of right, when embodied in socialist conditions, is 
genuinely a standard of distribution. Two questions arise. First, does Marx deem that principle 
an appropriate standard for the evaluation of capitalist society? In other words, is it a basis by 
which we can critique capitalism, not merely because of its self-contradictory justice, but 
because it is unjust? Second, does Marx deem this principle of right an adequate standard for 
human societies? 
We will find that, for Marx, this principle of right corresponds more to its practice. In 
other words, its content is more reconciled with its form. Nevertheless, he also criticizes what he 
regards as its serious shortcomings. Marx argues that the principle of justice under socialism is, 
as with every other form of justice, self-contradictory. Nevertheless, it is not transcended by 
another principle of justice. Indeed, justice itself is transcended. As we will soon find, it is on the 
basis of this critique that Marx does not deem that principle an appropriate standard for the 
evaluation of capitalism as unjust. Since Marx looks forward to a time beyond justice, he deems 
it futile to use it as a concept in the present. Indeed, we will find that Marx never articulates a 
principle of right or justice without calling it into question shortly thereafter. To fully appreciate 
why he does this, we must soon turn to the rare occasions where Marx actually speaks of 
distributive justice rather than the commutative justice with which it is so often conflated. First, 
however, we must again return to Hegel. 
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Part 3: Distributive Justice 
Chapter 9: Hegel on Distributive Justice  
 
Soon we will turn to Marx’s most extensive discussion of distribution under socialism, the 
‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ written in 1875. There he articulates the famous principle of 
need. As Manuel notes: “The banderole inscribed ‘From each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his needs’ may be getting a bit frayed with age, but it is still fluttering in the winds 
of doctrine, belief, and hope.”746 Nevertheless, a mystery must be solved. Although Marx gives 
to the needs principle its most famous expression, he did not invent it. The principle of need was 
well-known among socialists at that time. Marx’s discussion of it in the ‘Critique,’ like his 
discussions of socialism in all of the writings in which they occur, is brief. If we could discover 
from whom Marx acquired it—if indeed this can be attributed primarily to a single person—and 
how they conceptualized it, it could be crucial for our understanding of how Marx theorizes the 
needs principle, and more generally, socialist society. The curious case of the needs principle is 
littered with hidden clues and fraught with many dead-ends. Fortunately, the mystery has a more 
than satisfying resolution. 
H. S. Harris contends that Marx was quoting Bakunin.
747
 His source, J. M. Davidson, 
asserts: “In 1870 Bakunine organised an insurrection at Lyons. It was a fiasco, but it led to 
something like an authoritative statement of Anarchist aims. Forty-seven of the prisoners signed 
a declaration, read by one of them at the trial,” which includes the following: “We wish, in a 
word, equality—equality in fact as corollary, or, rather, as primordial condition of liberty. From 
each one according to his faculties, to each according to his needs; that is what we wish sincerely 
and energetically.”748 Nevertheless, Davidson offers no evidence of the connection to Marx 
inferred by Harris. Similarly, although Cornelius Castoriadis asserts that Marx got the needs 
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principle from Prosper Enfatin, one of the early Saint-Simonians, he also provides no evidence 
for this.
749
 
Tucker, Wood, Reiman, Gilbert, and van der Linden all speculate that Marx got the needs 
principle from Louis Blanc.
750
 It is often attributed to his The Organization of Labour, which 
was published in French in 1839, in German in 1847, and in English in 1848. It is quite possible 
that the young Marx, despite his later contempt for Blanc, read and was influenced by the first 
editions of Blanc’s text. There are uncanny resemblances. For example, Blanc asserts: 
 
It is because liberty has been defined by the word right, that men have come to be 
called free, who are in fact the slaves of hunger, the slaves of cold, the slaves of 
ignorance, and the slaves of chance. Let it be said once, and for all, Liberty 
consists, not only in the rights accorded, but in the power given to men to 
exercise and develop their faculties under the empire of justice and the safeguard 
of the law.
751
 
 
Similarly, Marx and Engels assert, “The right of proletarians to eat has never been ‘curtailed’, 
nevertheless it happens ‘of itself’ that they are very often unable to ‘exercise’ it.”752 
Characteristically, Marx and Engels’s rendering of this idea drops any mention of a positive 
conception of justice. Nevertheless, the needs principle is nowhere expressed in the original 
edition of Blanc’s The Organization of Labour. Blanc does not express it for the first time until 
his Plus de Girondins, published in 1851: “De chacun selon ses facultés, à chacun selon ses 
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besoins.”753 The dates of Bakunin and Blanc’s respective articulations of the needs principle are 
significant because, as most of the commentators on the relation between Marx and justice have 
missed, the ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ is not the first time the principle of need appears 
in Marx’s work. 
In the manuscripts for The German Ideology, written in 1845, we find the following 
statement: “the false tenet, based upon existing circumstances, ‘to each according to his 
abilities,’ must be changed, insofar as it relates to enjoyment in its narrower sense, into the tenet, 
‘to each according to his need.’”754 As we will see later, Harris attributes much importance to 
Hegel’s concept of forgiveness. It is therefore peculiar that he occasionally lambasts misreadings 
of Hegel as ‘unforgiveable.’ When one reads his assertion that Marx acquired the needs principle 
from Bakunin, even though it can be found in Marx’s work twenty-five years before Bakunin’s 
declaration, we can only say that this misreading, or rather, this non-reading, of Marx 
is…unforgiveable. The attribution to Blanc by other commentators is somewhat more plausible. 
It only came six years after. 
Although Marx and Engels were aware of the needs principle as early as 1845, neither are 
its author in this text. While writing The German Ideology, Marx and Engels recruited Moses 
Hess to write two chapters, including that in which appears the needs principle.
755
 In all 
likelihood, this chapter, similar to one of Hess’s later articles, was written by him, copied by 
Joseph Weydemeyer, and edited by Marx and Engels.
756
 Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt 
that Marx learned the needs principle from Hess, or had his specific articulation of it in mind 
while writing the ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme.’ 
In The German Ideology, the needs principle is articulated during an analysis of the ‘true 
socialist’ Georg Kuhlmann, whose socialism is, according to Hess, “based on the abject doctrine 
of predestined slavery.”757 Kuhlmann argues that distinct forms of labour with their different 
degrees of value confer a right to different amounts of pleasure or enjoyment. Therefore, 
Kuhlmann, with his self-described important and highly valuable philosophical labour, can make 
claims to deserving a better life than the common artisan. Hess responds, 
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But one of the most vital principles of communism, a principle which 
distinguishes it from all reactionary socialism, is its empirical view, based on a 
knowledge of man’s nature, that differences of brain and of intellectual ability do 
not imply any differences whatsoever in the nature of the stomach and of physical 
needs; therefore the false tenet, based upon existing circumstances, ‘to each 
according to his abilities,’ must be changed, insofar as it relates to enjoyment in 
its narrower sense, into the tenet, ‘to each according to his need’; in other words, 
a different form of activity, of labour, does not justify inequality, confers no 
privileges in respect of possession and enjoyment.
758
 
 
Hess ultimately accuses Kuhlmann of concealing his “craving for power” and “hypocritical 
pleasure-seeking” under the veil of his socialist “dogma,” and equates him with the dictatorial 
tendencies of the “reactionary socialists” who would use their own merits to justify their 
continuing rule.
759
 
Norman Geras, one of the only commentators to have noticed Hess’s earlier formulation 
of the needs principle, sees certain similarities with Marx’s later formulation. Geras notes the 
resemblance between Hess’s assertion that differences of ability should not confer “privileges,” 
and, as we will soon see, Marx’s critique of the principle of labour-contribution for its tacit 
recognition of “natural privileges.”760 We could also point to the similarity between Hess’s 
assertion that the supposed superiority of specifically intellectual labour does not justify 
inequality, and Marx’s assertion that communist society will bring an end to the antithesis 
between mental and manual labour.
761
 Nevertheless, Geras also notes that Hess’s depiction of 
needs as basic, physical needs is much narrower than Marx’s conceptualization.762 This is true 
whether we are referring to the ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ which recognizes needs for, 
say, education, or to other texts, such as the ‘Instructions for the Delegates of the Geneva 
Congress,’ where Marx discusses the need for “intellectual development.”763 We could also point 
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out that, contrary to Hess, Marx argues that distinct forms of labour can and should confer 
different amounts of value or worth, even if he does not draw from this the same conclusions as 
does Kuhlmann.
764
 Nevertheless, Geras limits his discussion to an evaluation of whether or not 
Marx can be considered an egalitarian. Since Hess affirms the needs principle against 
Kuhlmann’s inegalitarian doctrine, this is enough to satisfy Geras that it is evidence of Marx’s 
egalitarianism. For our purposes here, however, the differences between the two expressions of 
the needs principle inspire us to look elsewhere for Marx’s source. 
The modern form of the needs principle probably originates from the ‘Code of Nature,’ 
written in 1755 by the obscure philosophe Etienne-Gabriel Morelly.
765
 Until the nineteenth-
century, however, this text was falsely attributed to Diderot, who did not deny it. Morelly asserts 
that the ‘sacred laws’ that would ‘tear out the roots of societal vice’ include, on the one hand, 
that each will contribute according to their capacity, talent, and age, and on the other hand, that 
each will own nothing beyond what is of immediate need or use.
766
 These ideas were famously 
expressed by Gracchus Babeuf in his defence during the trial that led to his execution: 
 
To be more specific, it is necessary to bind together everyone’s lot; to render the 
lot of each member of the association independent of chance, and of happy or 
unfavorable circumstance; to assure to every man and to his posterity, no matter 
how numerous it may be, as much as they need, but no more than they need.
767
 
 
Babeuf was probably the major source of the needs principle for Europeans in the following 
decades. This includes the utopian Etienne Cabet, who featured the principle on the title page of 
his Voyage en Icarie, published in 1840.
768
 Marx was certainly familiar with Morelly, Babeuf, 
                                                          
764
 For example, see: Marx, Capital: Volume One, op. cit., 305. 
765
 R. N. C. Coe, ‘The Fortunes of the ‘Code de la Nature’ Between 1755 and 1848,’ French Studies, II (1957): 117-
26; 118. 
766
 Morelly, op. cit., 20. 
767
 Gracchus Babeuf, ‘Babeuf’s Defence (From the trial at Vendôme, February-May 1797), in Socialist Thought: A 
Documentary History, eds. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1964), 67. 
768
 Etienne Cabet, Voyage et aventures de Lord Villiam Carisdall en Icarie (Paris: H. Souverain, 1840). That the 
needs principle appears on the title page of the 1840 edition is a widely-made claim. Take, for example, Manuel, op. 
cit., 171. None of the electronic copies of the 1840 edition I have seen feature the needs principle. The earliest 
edition with the needs principle that I have seen is from 1845: Etienne Cabet, Voyage en Icarie (Paris: Bureau du 
Populaire, 1845). Nevertheless, my search has not been exhaustive. The following is a helpful summary of the 
history of the search for the origins of the needs principle, which, nonetheless, does not discover Marx’s source: 
Editors, ‘Notes from the Editors,’ Monthly Review, 66.3 (July-August 2014): 
 237 
 
and Cabet.
769
 It is possible that Marx’s expression of the needs principle engages entirely with 
these and subsequent socialist theorists. Nevertheless, there is another, much more interesting 
potential source. 
In my opinion, the primary influence on Marx’s discussion of the needs principle 
is…Hegel. For many commentators, this will seem absurd. And yet, in passage 430 of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel criticizes the needs principle. We have already studied parts of 
this section of the text in a previous chapter. Hegel discusses the kinds of laws that arise from 
different property-regimes in order to illustrate a broader argument about the formalism of an 
individualistic moral standpoint not grounded in ethical life, in the societal whole in its world-
historical development. Hegel asserts that there are two basic forms of proprietary justice. The 
first, which naturally arises from private property, has as its standard ‘to each according to their 
due.’ Its paradigmatic rule is ‘Tell the truth.’ The second form, arising from communal property, 
is ‘to each according to their need,’ paradigmatically expressed as ‘Love thy neighbour.’770 The 
conflict between these two notions of justice would have been a pressing issue for Hegel 
because, as we just saw, the principle of need was given radical expression in the lead up to and 
during the French Revolution, the most significant event of his life. It is likely that Hegel 
encountered Babeuf’s espousal of the principle of need in the journal Minerva.771 It is obvious 
that in his critique of private property, Hegel has Kant in mind. It is possible that Hegel’s critique 
of communal property is directed, at least in part, at Fichte. There is evidence that Babeuf 
influenced Fichte’s quasi-socialist assertions in his theory of the ‘closed commercial state.’772 
Perhaps Hegel saw the connection. 
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Hegel criticizes the principle of need for two reasons. First, he argues that it is necessarily 
shortsighted in its concern for immediate needs and cannot support the long-term independence 
and stability that private property alone guarantees: 
 
But by non-ownership of the thing is not meant absolute non-ownership, but that 
it shall come into someone’s possession according to the individual’s needs, and, 
moreover, not in order to be kept, but to be used immediately. But to provide for 
the need in such a completely arbitrary way is contradictory to the nature of the 
conscious individual who alone is under discussion. For such an individual must 
think of his need in the form of universality, must provide for the whole of his 
existence, and acquire a lasting possession.
773
 
 
Hegel’s second criticism of the principle of need is that it is self-contradictory. It espouses the 
equality of humankind in order to justify unequal distributions according to the unequal needs of 
individuals: 
 
In a society based on a common ownership of goods, in which provision would 
be made in accordance with a universal fixed rule, either each receives as much 
as he needs—in which case there is a contradiction between this inequality and 
the essential nature of that consciousness whose principle is the equality of 
individuals—or, in accordance with that principle, goods will be equally 
distributed, and in this case the share is not related to the need, although such a 
relationship alone constitutes the very notion of ‘sharing.’774 
 
Hegel is not one-sided in his analysis. He also criticizes the formalism of the kind of justice that 
arises from private property. Hegel argues that the permanence and the universal recognition 
upon which its property-rights are based is contradicted by the impermanence and the exclusivity 
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of the property consumed by each individual.
775
 For Hegel, there is nothing in either of these 
principles that, at this level of abstraction, makes one inherently superior to the other. We must 
move beyond these formal rules to the social content that gives rise to them. Indeed, the relations 
between form and content pervade this section of the text. From the perspective of the individual 
abstracted from time and place, Hegel transitions to Spirit, to the social perspective, to the shapes 
of society in their world-historical development.
776
 In other words, this is a transition from 
abstract universals to more concrete universals. 
Though Hegel is critical of private property, he ultimately deems it a ‘fate’ to which we 
must be reconciled. In his early essay, ‘The Spirit of Christianity,’ the only aspect of Christ’s 
teachings that Hegel flatly rejects is Jesus’s advice to his followers that they sell their 
possessions and give all of their money to the poor because it is easier for a camel to fit through 
the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. The young Hegel responds: 
“there is nothing to be said; it is a litany pardonable only in sermons and rhymes, for such a 
command is without truth for us. The fate of property has become too powerful for us to tolerate 
reflections on it, to find its abolition thinkable.”777 As far as I know, there is no evidence that 
Marx read these early theological works, although he would have read the mature Hegel’s 
critique of what he deems to be Christ’s revolutionary communism: “Were this precept directly 
complied with, a social revolution must take place; the poor would become the rich.”778 In one of 
Hegel’s lectures on religion, he goes so far as to accuse Christ of “sansculotism”!779 
Although Hegel deems private property a ‘fate,’ he is quite critical of bourgeois property 
relations. Hegel wants to ameliorate the negative effects of the market on modern society. He 
rejects the principle of need as the sole basis of justice because it is not and cannot be concerned 
with lasting possession. Nevertheless, the basis of the needs principle, immediate necessity, often 
exists in modern society. Hegel therefore deems the needs principle an appropriate supplement to 
the principle of due. Since life is the basis of all rights, if someone is starving, then stealing a loaf 
of bread is not common theft. This moral claim has its basis not in equal right, which it 
contravenes, but in the right of necessity. For the same reason, Hegel embraces the beneficium 
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competentiae, the debtor’s right to pay only what they can. ‘Ought,’ the root of which is ‘to 
owe,’ implies ‘can.’ Nevertheless, promoting welfare cannot justify an action that is wrong: 
“When St. Crispin stole leather to make shoes for the poor, his action was both moral and wrong, 
and hence invalid.”780 Furthermore, the only thing that is absolutely necessary is the preservation 
of life in the immediate context. The right of necessity cannot be invoked for the sake of our 
future, longer-term preservation.
781
 
Hegel’s emphasis on immediate need may be one of the reasons why he finds so 
troubling the increasing incidence of pauperization in the modern market. It is a much more 
systemic, and therefore, long-term deprivation of necessities. Hegel acknowledges that, in 
market relations, private acts and individualized choices can pass out of our control and wrong or 
harm other individuals.
782
 Furthermore, the accumulation of wealth necessarily fosters the 
specialization of work, which increases the dependence and want of the producing class. This 
inhibits the feeling of wider freedoms and spiritual advantages of civil society. This 
impoverishment leaves individuals with all the needs of civil society but none of its benefits.
783
 
The loss of the honour associated with supporting oneself through work can inspire laziness or 
even viciousness and the rise of the ‘rabble’: “The important question of how poverty can be 
remedied is one which agitates and torments modern societies especially.”784 
Hegel asserts that if the burden of maintaining the welfare of the poor fell on the wealthy, 
this would be contrary to the principle of civil society and would result in overproduction: “This 
shows that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough – i.e. its own distinct 
resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble.”785 
Hegel contends that the administration of justice in modern society should not only guarantee the 
security of persons and property, but also the livelihood and welfare of individuals.
786
 
Hegel attempts no dialectical resolution to this issue. He asserts that the administration of 
justice needs to strike a balance between absolute free trade, which results in abject poverty, and 
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total state control, which hinders wealth accumulation.
787
 Hegel also asserts that this “inner 
dialectic” drives civil society to look for consumers through colonialism.788 This ever-expanding 
civil society does not address its internal contradictions. Hegel engages here in the ‘spurious’ or 
‘bad’ infinite for which he so often faults others. 
With regard to the connection between the discussions of the needs principle in Hegel 
and Marx, there is, as far as I can tell, no definitive proof. It is possible that in writing the 
‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ Marx’s explanation of the needs principle is influenced 
entirely by the early communists. Nevertheless, while Marx’s ‘Critique’ is obviously structured 
in terms of its analysis of the Gotha Programme, it seems also to be structured in order to 
respond to Hegel’s critique of communism and the needs principle. This can only be 
demonstrated through a close reading of the text. It is to Marx’s contributions to theories of 
distributive justice that we now turn. 
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Chapter 10: Marx on Distributive Justice 
 
This chapter explores the relation between Marx and distributive justice proper.
789
 As we saw in 
a previous chapter, contemporary political philosophy, whether Marxist or non-Marxist, often 
conflates the two forms of proprietary justice, namely, commutative and distributive justice. 
Whereas commutative justice has to do with individuals exchanging privately-held goods in the 
market, distributive justice is about the public distribution of commonly-held goods, primarily 
through state institutions. The standards of commutative justice tend toward a more exacting 
equivalence between the worth of the products irrespective of the status of their possessors. 
Conversely, the standards of distributive justice are highly variable, tending toward notions of 
proportionate equality based in historically specific class relations. In order to maintain the 
distinctions between exchange and distribution and between commutative and distributive 
justice, I will describe the two forms of property-holdings as allocations and distributions. 
Under capitalism, production for exchange predominates over production for use. 
Consequently, commutative justice overtakes the traditional primacy of distributive justice in 
matters of proprietary justice. Distribution therefore becomes a matter of redistribution beyond 
the allocations resulting from market exchange. As we saw in the last chapter, the standard of 
justice typical of private property, and in particular, of relations of exchange, is ‘to each their 
due’ or ‘to each what they are owed.’ In contemporary political philosophy, distributive justice is 
often intended to ameliorate the inequalities and other negative social effects associated with 
commodity exchange. The justifications and standards for these redistributive measures has been 
the focal debate within political philosophy over the last fifty years. 
When we properly distinguish between commutative and distributive justice we arrive at 
a paradoxical result. Despite the voluminous commentaries about the relation between Marx and 
so-called ‘distributive justice,’ the vast majority of what he writes about justice is relevant to the 
content of commutative justice. In fact, Marx says very little about the content of distributive 
justice proper. In this chapter we will look at what Marx says about distributive justice in 
capitalism and socialism. In particular, we will focus on the two principles of distribution 
attributed to Marx. These are the principle of labour-contribution, ‘From each according to their 
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ability, to each according to their contribution,’ and the principle of need, ‘From each according 
to their ability, to each according to their needs.’ 
 
10. 1: Distribution Under Capitalism 
 
The most significant of Marx’s examinations of the content of distributive justice occurs in the 
‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ Marx’s scathing commentary on the draft political platform 
for what would become the founding congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. As 
we will see, however, commentators often overemphasize this text to the neglect of relevant 
discussions in his other works. 
One of the more famous passages from the ‘Critique’ is Marx’s criticism of those who 
make too much of a “fuss” about distribution: 
 
The distribution of the means of consumption at any time is only a consequence 
of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter 
distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist 
mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of 
production are in the hands of non-workers in the form of property in capital and 
land, while the masses are only owners of the personal conditions of production, 
viz., labour power. Once the elements of production are so distributed, then the 
present-day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. If the 
material conditions of production are the co-operative property of the workers 
themselves, then this likewise results in a different distribution of the means of 
consumption from the present one. Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section 
of democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration 
and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence 
the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real 
position has long been made clear, why go back again?
790
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When Marx asserts that, in our more precise terminology, the allocations of the means of 
consumption ‘result automatically’ from the allocation of the means of production, he seems to 
ignore the great deal of variability between the allocations and distributions of the means of 
consumption, and therefore, the significance of redistributive measures. Although we will soon 
critique Marx for neglecting distributive justice, this passage is not a broad indictment of 
redistribution. Rather, it is a more specific critique of, first, overemphasizing the allocation of the 
means of consumption relative to the means of production, and second, arbitrarily separating 
them and therefore effacing the extent to which the latter determines the former. 
In fact, throughout the course of his work, Marx affirms redistributive measures. Take, 
for example, a proposal from his draft programme for the IWMA: 
 
(a) No modification of the form of taxation can produce any important change in 
the relations of labour and capital. 
(b) Nevertheless, having to choose between two systems of taxation, we 
recommend the total abolition of indirect taxes, and the general substitution of 
direct taxes. 
 Because indirect taxes enhance the prices of commodities, the tradesman 
adding to those prices not only the amount of the indirect taxes, but the interest 
and profit upon the capital advanced in their payment; 
 Because indirect taxes conceal from an individual what he is paying to the 
state, whereas a direct tax is undisguised, unsophisticated, and not to be 
misunderstood by the meanest capacity. Direct taxation prompts therefore every 
individual to control the governing powers while indirect taxation destroys all 
tendency to self-government.
791
 
 
Although he warns us about its limits, Marx nonetheless recommends this redistributive measure. 
Other redistributive measures either proposed by Marx or co-signed by him in various 
committees include abolition of the right to inheritance; nationalization of banks and 
centralization in the state of credit, the means of communication, transport, factories, and the 
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instruments of production; performance of legal proceedings done free of charge; and free 
education.
792
 
Marx’s support for redistributive measures is one of the reasons why commentators like 
Husami contend that, first, even though the principles of contribution and of need can be fully 
realized only in socialism, Marx believes that these principles should be adopted by proletarian 
parties for more or less immediate, albeit partial, implementation within capitalism; and second, 
that Marx, on the basis of these principles, condemns capitalism for its injustice and affirms 
socialism as a more just society.
793
 Supporting Husami’s second claim, Nielsen asserts: “We can 
see from looking at the programme of The Critique of the Gotha Programme that, pace Wood, 
Marx set out socialist principles of justice for evaluating institutions and indeed for evaluating 
the whole capitalist system.”794 Marx, however, would surely dismiss this as utopian. As he says 
time and again, the critique of capitalism cannot be derived from the standards of socialism. 
Rather, the standards of socialism must be derived from the critique of capitalism. Furthermore, 
Marx seems to reject the second of Husami’s claims: 
 
What is ‘equitable distribution’? 
Do not the bourgeois assert that the present-day distribution is ‘equitable’? 
And is it not, in fact, the only ‘equitable’ distribution on the basis of the present-
day mode of production? Are economic relations regulated by legal conceptions 
or do not, on the contrary, legal relations arise from economic ones? Have not 
also the socialist sectarians the most varied notions about ‘equitable’ 
distribution?
795
 
 
As we saw in previous chapters, Marx asserts that, because social relations, practices, and 
institutions are determined by their historical conditions, bourgeois justice is the only notion of 
justice possible within capitalism. Nevertheless, as we have just seen, he does not abandon 
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redistributive measures. Rather, he seems to assert that, although these measures are necessary, 
we should not distort them with moral concepts like the ‘equitable.’ 
Wood goes too far, however, when he rejects the first of Husami’s claims, namely, that 
Marx deemed the principles of contribution and of need as appropriate for proletarian parties.
796
 
Wood argues that, because of the objective historical constraints imposed by capitalism, Marx 
intends these principles as descriptions only of the post-capitalist future. In fact, however, Marx 
demonstrably embeds versions of both principles in the transitional programmes of proletarian 
parties. The real question is whether or not Marx regards them as alternative principles of justice. 
We will begin with the needs principle because, as we will soon see, its presence in a proletarian 
programme is more straightforward than that of the contribution principle. 
There are numerous occasions where Marx justifies reforms with an appeal to human 
needs. For example, when he argues for the legal restriction of the working day, Marx appeals to 
the needs for physical well-being, intellectual development, and sociable intercourse.
797
 More 
significantly, point twelve of the ‘Demands of the Communist Party in Germany’ states: “In the 
salary scale of all government officials there is to be no differential except that those with a 
family, that is, those who have greater needs, are to receive a higher salary than the others.”798 
As we will see later, Marx’s discussion of the needs principle in the ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’ also invokes the needs arising from, among other things, having a family. There, 
however, the context is socialism, in which the needs principle can achieve its fullest expression. 
The version of the needs principle expressed in the ‘Demands’ is only partial because, under 
production for exchange, needs are necessarily subordinate to the standard typical of private 
property, to each their due. In capitalism ‘due’ is defined as ‘effective’ need, as need attached to 
purchasing power. These are the only needs that gain recognition in the market. Nevertheless, 
even with these constraints, it is enough to note this example to refute Wood’s claim that Marx 
defers this principle to the socialist future. 
Marx also affirms versions of the contribution principle in proletarian programmes, but 
not in the ways that are usually expected. By the principle of labour-contribution is usually 
meant that each labourer receives the full fruits of her labour. As we saw in previous chapters, 
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Marx deems the relation between the wage-labourer and the capitalist as inherently exploitative. 
The capitalist appropriates unpaid surplus labour. This precludes, in the vast majority of cases, 
the principle of labour-contribution under capitalism, at least as it is conceptualized in terms of 
the ‘full fruits’ of labour. Nevertheless, Marx is also able to embed a version of the contribution 
principle in proletarian programmes because he inverts its usual emphasis. Stated in full, the 
contribution principle is ‘From each according to their ability, to each according to their 
contribution.’ The first part, ‘From each according to their ability,’ is common to the needs 
principle as well. Consequently, both principles include what is called the equal liability of all to 
labour, although Marx recognizes exemptions on the basis of age and disability. In fact, Marx 
asserts that to work with both head and hands in order to eat is a “general law of nature.”799 
Therefore, the principle of labour-contribution is also a principle of contributing labour. In a 
society that does not affront this general law, one must contribute to the total social product from 
which they gain a share. It is in this sense that Marx can deploy the contribution principle. Rather 
than demanding that those who are already contributing wage-labour receive the full fruits of that 
labour, which is impossible under capitalism, Marx demands that those who do not contribute to, 
but nonetheless take a share from, the total social product, must be forced to contribute. 
 Take, for example, point four in the ‘Demands of the Communist Party in Germany’: 
 
General arming of the people. In the future, the armies are to be at the same time 
working armies, so that the troops are no longer, as hitherto, consumers but, 
rather, producers of more than their maintenance cost. 
 This is, moreover, a means for the organization of labor.
800
 
 
It would seem that, at least with regard to the contribution principle, Marx’s qualification, “In the 
future,” lends credence to Wood’s argument that Marx defers his distributive principles to the 
socialist future. Nevertheless, this has more to do with the specific, less developed conditions of 
Germany. Marx expresses the same principle in the ‘Manifesto’801 where he makes clear that its 
ten proposals are an international transitional programme to be gradually implemented within 
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capitalism. The first steps are “to win the battle of democracy” and “to wrest, by degrees, all 
capital from the bourgeoisie,” because “in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means 
of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production.”802 
In the ‘Demands’ these despotic inroads on the rights of property include feudal property, surely, 
a measure that is not to be deferred to a socialist future! Marx justifies this, in part, because the 
landowners, like the standing armies, offend against the equal liability of all to labour: 
 
6. All feudal burdens, dues, socages, tithes, etc., which have hitherto 
burdened the country people, are abolished without any compensation. 
7. Princely and other feudal landed estates, all mines, pits, etc., are 
transformed into state property. On those landed estates agricultural land will be 
cultivated on a large scale and with the most modern scientific methods for the 
benefit of the whole people. 
8. Mortgages on peasant farms are declared to be state property. Interest 
on them is to be paid by the peasants to the state. 
9. In the areas where tenant farming is developed, ground rent or tenure 
schilling is to be paid to the state as a tax. 
All measures under Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9 are conceived with a view toward 
diminishing the official and other burdens of the peasants and small tenant 
farmers, without decreasing the necessary means for the defrayal of state costs 
and without endangering production itself. 
The landowner who is neither a peasant nor a tenant has no share in 
production at all. His consumption is therefore merely a misuse.
803
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Consequently, partial versions of the contribution principle appear in Marx’s proletarian 
programmes. Nevertheless, like the needs principle, they are subordinate to capitalist forms of 
private property. 
In the debates about the relation between Marx and distributive justice the issue should 
not be whether or not he deems the principles of contribution and of need as appropriate for 
contemporary political programmes—he evidently does. The question is whether or not Marx 
bases these redistributive measures under capitalism in principles of distributive justice.
804
 Marx 
never explicitly describes them as such. Although he occasionally speaks of ‘transactional’ 
justice, Marx often conflates commutative and distributive justice as the ‘distribution’ of the 
undifferentiated means of consumption. As we have seen, this is frequent in modern thought. 
Since he deems ‘transactional’ or commutative justice the predominant form under capitalism, 
perhaps redistributive measures are more of a rearguard action rather than full-fledged, 
competing principles of justice. Furthermore, Marx did not bother to develop a systematic theory 
of these redistributive measures. Marx sometimes appeals to the criterion of need, as was the 
case, for example, when he argues in favour of a higher salary for government officials with 
families to reflect their greater needs. At other times, Marx appeals to the criterion of due, as was 
the case in his pamphlet, Value, Price, and Profit, in which he argues for higher wages 
irrespective of downturns or upturns in the prices of commodities. Nowhere does Marx explain 
how or even if the principles of due and need can be reconciled in a theory of radical reforms 
within capitalism. Taylor argues that, for Marx, the question ‘what is just?’ can have no purview 
within capitalism, that “no incomes policy can be the right one,” because capitalism is 
“irremediably a domain of force.”805 Taylor goes too far in this respect. Nevertheless, although 
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Marx does not describe praiseworthy redistributive measures as distributive justice, this may not 
be because he deems any redistribution under capitalism as necessarily unjust, but because he 
believes that the concept of justice has no real application or meaning at all. 
Although we may be inclined to attribute Marx’s silence on the questions of distributive 
justice under capitalism to the relatively underdeveloped condition of public services and the 
welfare state in Marx’s lifetime, perhaps his neglect of distributive justice is the result of deeper 
and persisting theoretical shortcomings. Therefore, the subsequent development of the public 
sector may not be the only reason for developing a theory of redistribution under capitalism. We 
will return to this question at the end of this chapter. First, however, we must turn to Marx’s 
discussion of distribution under socialism. 
 
10. 2: Distribution Under Socialism 
 
In the first phase of socialism, production for use replaces the production for exchange typical of 
capitalism. For Marx, socialism, as it is described in the ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme,’ has 
no exchange of commodities, no exchange proper, only the exchange of activities.
806
 With this, 
distribution overtakes exchange as the primary way of acquiring goods, and distributive justice, 
or at least its content, becomes predominant over the content of commutative justice. To put this 
in perspective, let us compare it to libertarian theory. In debates about commutative and 
distributive justice, libertarianism and socialism are the two most extreme poles. Libertarians, the 
most consistent defenders of the market, attempt to collapse distributive justice into commutative 
justice. For them, commutative justice can account for the vast majority of economic 
interactions.
807
 Therefore, the scope of distributive justice is limited. It arises only in exceptional 
cases of ‘market failures.’ Conversely, socialists, the most consistent critics of the market, 
attempt to collapse commutative justice into distributive justice. Market exchange and 
commutative justice, if they are to exist at all, should be confined to the production and exchange 
of the non-necessities that arise from the wholly unique interests of individuals and groups, not 
society as a whole. 
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Although Marx bases the first phase of socialism on the principle of labour-contribution, 
at the outset, he introduces substantive qualifications to the principle. Marx criticizes that part of 
the ‘Gotha Programme’ which calls for “the co-operative regulation of the total labour with 
equitable distribution of the proceeds of labour.”808 He criticizes it not only because, as was 
mentioned before, he is sceptical about the notion of the ‘equitable,’ but also because, under 
socialism, there will have to be different kinds of deductions from the total social product before 
workers are directly given their individual shares of the remainder: 
 
Let us take first of all the words ‘proceeds of labour’ in the sense of the product 
of labour, then the co-operative proceeds of labour are the total social product. 
 From this is then to be deducted: 
 First, cover for replacement of the means of production used up. 
 Secondly, additional portion for expansion of production. 
 Thirdly, reserve or insurance fund to provide against mis-adventures, 
disturbances through natural events, etc. 
These deductions from the ‘undiminished proceeds of labour’ are an 
economic necessity and their magnitude is to be determined by available means 
and forces, and partly by calculation of probabilities, but they are in no way 
calculable by equity.
809
 
 
In other words, one part of the total social product must be deducted for the reproduction and 
expansion of production itself irrespective of questions about equitable distribution. 
After these deductions the remainder of the total social product serves as the means of 
consumption. This remainder is divided into two parts. The first part is deducted as forms of 
communal property for collective consumption. The second part is distributed as personal 
property for the private consumption of individuals. We will look at each in turn. 
The part deducted for collective consumption includes the following: 
 
First, the general costs of administration not belonging to production. 
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 This part will, from the outset, be very considerably restricted in comparison with 
present-day society and it diminishes in proportion as the new society develops.
810
 
 
It may appear odd to describe administration as a form of consumption. Nevertheless, we cannot 
consume any product without also consuming all of the labour, including the general 
administrative labour, that goes into it. We can also compare Marx’s discussion of administration 
to an assertion made in his commentary on the Paris Commune: “The Commune made that 
catchword of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality by destroying the two greatest 
sources of expenditure—the standing army and state functionarism.”811 This immanent critique 
of liberalism shows how socialists can get the better of liberals according to one of their own 
principles. 
Marx continues:  
 
Secondly, that which is destined for the communal satisfaction of needs, such as 
schools, health services, etc. 
 From the outset this part is considerably increased in comparison with 
present-day society and it increases in proportion as the new society develops.
812
 
 
Before articulating the principle typical of the first phase of socialism, the contribution principle, 
there is already a partial form of that principle which characterizes the second phase, the needs 
principle. Included in the initial deductions are provisions for communal needs like education 
and health.
813
 Marx seems to assert that the extent to which each individual engages in collective 
consumption, say, of medicinal products and services, is determined by their individual needs, in 
this case, their health. It is not determined by how much they as individuals have contributed to 
the total social product. The criterion is communal need, the needs of individuals as guaranteed 
by the community. Marx asserts that this communal property is analogous to present-day public 
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institutions, goods, and services. Under capitalism, however, they exist in a much more meagre 
form because they are subordinate to production for exchange. Does this mean that the standard 
of communal need underlying these institutions in socialism is, from the perspective of the 
working class, the same standard for their expansion under capitalism? Marx does not say. 
Marx concludes with a final deduction for communal consumption: “Thirdly, funds for 
those unable to work, etc., in short, what is included under so-called official poor relief today.”814 
This deduction is different from the previous one because the public institutions dedicated to 
communal consumption, while much more robust than those under capitalism, cannot fulfill all 
of the needs of individuals. Each individual will also need personal property for their own private 
consumption. As we will soon see, this is distribution according to the amount of labour each 
contributes. Consequently, those who cannot contribute labour will need funds to access this 
personal property. 
Marx characterizes the nature of these deductions: “The ‘undiminished proceeds of 
labour’ have already quietly become converted into the ‘diminished’ proceeds, although what the 
producer is deprived of in his capacity as a private individual benefits him directly or indirectly 
in his capacity as a member of society.”815 Presumably, he says ‘directly or indirectly’ because 
there is no exact correspondence between the contributions of the individual as an individual and 
the manifold compensations for an individual as a member of the community. What is the criteria 
for distinguishing between communal needs and individual needs? What, with regard to the 
means of consumption, is the basis for the distinction between communal and personal property? 
What is the balance between, on the one hand, deductions for communal production and 
consumption, and on the other hand, the remainder for personal consumption? Marx does not 
say. This will need more theorization. 
These unanswered questions do not detract, however, from the significance of Marx’s 
distinctions between private, communal, and personal property. Although it has become the trend 
in contemporary capitalism to describe as ‘private property’ every form of property except public 
goods, this is a relatively new development. In the early phases of capitalism, private property 
meant specifically productive property. This is property in the means of production that could 
generate enough of a surplus to live on. Those who owned only their own labour, and thus, could 
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only purchase means of consumption, had only personal property, even if it was subject to the 
same formal laws as private property. Nevertheless, proletarianization meant that individual 
identities could no longer be formed through the ownership of productive property. 
Consequently, the proletariat redefined private property as the objects of consumption, like food, 
clothing, and so on.
816
 We could also point to how, from the perspective of ruling classes, there 
are ideological advantages to the conflation of private and personal property.
817
 Class 
inequalities are easier to deny if everyone holds simple, undifferentiated private property. 
 Marx cannot be accused of any such conflation in his depictions of property under 
capitalism and socialism. With regard to the latter, he carefully distinguishes between communal 
and personal property, though he does not establish their precise relations. For Marx, communal 
property includes productive property, the means of production jointly owned by the association 
of producers, and the products for collective consumption. Conversely, personal property 
consists in the products that pass into the hands of individuals for their own private consumption. 
 It is at this point that we can return to my earlier contention about the source of the needs 
principle in Marx. It seems to me that the discussion so far in the ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’ is intended, in part, to refute the first of Hegel’s criticisms of the needs principle, 
namely, what he deems to be its necessarily shortsighted concern with immediate needs. Marx’s 
assertions about the deductions from the total social product for the sake of reproducing and 
expanding communal production and consumption demonstrate the long-term vantage afforded 
by this form of socialist society. This is, in part, the significance of his theorization of the 
socialization of production under capitalism. Hegel does not (and, given his historical period, 
perhaps could not) distinguish between communal and personal property. Consequently, he does 
not distinguish between the long-term independence and stability allowed by common ownership 
of the means of production and certain forms of consumption, and the personal property 
associated with the more or less immediate needs of individuals. Conversely, Marx shows how 
the long-run tendencies of capitalism make possible a form of socialism which, rather than 
levelling everyone down to the same equal but minimal standard, instead raises everyone to a 
standard of relative abundance.
818
 This is also why Marx uses the word ‘antinomy’ in his 
assertion that, ‘Between equal rights, force decides.’ At that point in Capital, Marx had not yet 
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presented the general tendency of capitalist accumulation, namely, the way in which the 
immiseration of the proletariat coincides with the concentration and centralization of the 
conditions of production. In other words, Marx had not yet shown how the antinomy becomes an 
outright and explosive contradiction. 
It must be noted, however, that in Marx’s depiction of the first phase of socialism, the 
principle of need is not yet the primary standard by which personal property is distributed. After 
the deductions for communal production and consumption, the remainder of the total social 
product is distributed according to what appears to be the principle of private property par 
excellence, to each their due. Furthermore, although distribution becomes the primary form of 
giving and receiving activities and goods in the first phase of socialism, it does not occur 
according to a standard of proportionality, but rather, the standard of equivalence typical of 
commutative justice. This is not totally unprecedented. For example, in Aristotle’s depiction of 
democracy, although distributive justice remains the primary form of proprietary justice, the 
standard of equality is equivalence because every citizen is regarded as politically equal 
irrespective of education, wealth, or virtue. Why does Marx argue for something similar in the 
first phase of socialism? He asserts: 
 
What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on 
its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it emerges from capitalist society; 
which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still 
stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.
819
 
 
As if to extend Hegel’s assertions about the differences between the laws of private and 
communal property, Marx theorizes the transition from one to the other. Consequently, the first 
phase of socialism has as its standard to each their due according to their contribution. This 
demands an exact equivalence between contribution and compensation: 
 
Accordingly the individual producer receives back from society—after the 
deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it 
is his individual amount of labour. For example, the social working day consists 
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of the sum of individual labour hours; the individual labour time of the individual 
producer is the part of the social labour day contributed by him, his share in it. He 
receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an amount 
of labour (after deducting his labour for the common fund), and with this 
certificate he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as 
the same amount of labour costs. The same amount of labour which he has given 
to society in one form, he receives back in another.
820
 
 
The significance of these passages is lost on most commentators because they have conflated 
Proudhon’s mishandling of immanent critique with Marx’s genuine use of this method. What 
Marx reveals in these passages is the culmination of his immanent critique of the exchange 
relation between wage-labour and capital. 
As we saw in previous chapters, the laws of private property are, when stated positively, 
to each their due, and when stated negatively, do not steal. Recall how Marx, in a series of key 
passages in Capital, asserts that although it appears that the rights of private property are 
grounded in a person’s own labour, in fact, they arise from the separation of property from the 
labourer: 
 
The relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere 
semblance belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes a mere form, 
which is alien to the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. The 
constant sale and purchase of labour-power is the form; the content is the constant 
appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labour of 
others which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this 
labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others.
821
 
 
Compare the way in which, on the one hand, Marx in Capital: Volume One criticizes private 
property in terms of ‘content’ and ‘form,’ and on the other hand, how Marx in ‘The Critique of 
the Gotha Programme’ describes the first phase of communal property: 
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Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange 
of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values. Content and form are 
changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything 
except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass into the 
ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption. But, as far as 
the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the 
same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity-equivalents, so much 
labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form.
822
 
 
Recall how Hegel’s discussion of the different principles of justice is pervaded by distinctions 
between form and content. Remember also how he criticizes Kant’s maxim, honour your debts, 
as an uncritical acceptance of private property. Marx goes ever further. His critique of private 
property is an immanent critique. Marx not only demonstrates how the laws of private property 
offend their own highest principle. Marx also shows that the principle of to each their due, of the 
equality between contribution and compensation, can only be actualized within social relations 
based on communal property, on common production.
823
 Hegel, following the standard 
assumptions, regards ‘due’ as the principle of private property. Marx responds that the conditions 
of private property are precisely those in which the principle of due cannot be realized without 
contradicting itself. In Capital the laws of private property are transformed by means of a 
dialectical inversion into their opposite. They are negated. In the ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme,’ they are inverted again. This is the negation of the negation. 
 This marks an advance beyond capitalism not only because it ends exploitation, but also 
some of the imposed abstractions through which that form of exploitation occurs: “Hence, equal 
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right here is still in principle—bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no longer in 
conflict, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange only exists on the average 
and not in the individual case.”824 When Marx contrasts distribution under the first phase of 
socialism with that under capitalism, when he asserts that principle corresponds to practice, this 
is not only (as is often claimed) with regard to surplus-value and the cessation of exploitation, 
but also the cessation of a need to equate individual labouring activity to a social average that 
necessarily abstracts from it. Marx is saying here that these averages arise from the abstract 
character of alienated labour. Marx is therefore rejecting Proudhon’s assertion that these 
averages are the result of prices distorting values. On the contrary, Marx asserts that this arises 
from the abstract character of value itself, of abstract labour itself. This is why, for Marx, the key 
to socialism is not the end of private property, which, after all, is possible under authoritarian 
societies that claim to be socialist. Rather, the key is the end of alienated labour, of genuine 
communal control of production by workers. We should also note that, under capitalism, 
compensation according to contribution is stifled not only by systemic appropriation of 
uncompensated surplus labour. This is also because the reduction of actual labour-time to 
average socially-necessary labour-time distortedly refracts actual contributions through the 
levelling averages in the market. This occurs when, for example, ten hours of labour is equated 
with eight hours of more productive labour. This makes two hours of the less productive labour 
worthless, irrespective of the kinds or the extents of the talents or efforts of the individual 
workers.
825
 
This is the importance of the distinction between commutative and distributive justice. 
Marx shows that commodity production inevitably becomes capitalist appropriation and 
exploitation. Therefore, contrary to what Proudhon asserts, the principle of labour contribution 
cannot occur through exchange, through a system where commutative justice is the primary form 
of proprietary justice. Rather, Marx shows that it is only possible when distributive justice 
becomes primary again. Indeed, Marx also shows that capitalist society is a necessary phase 
between two fundamentally different forms of society in which distributive justice is the primary 
form of proprietary justice. Capitalism conquers those class societies in which exploitation 
occurs through distribution, and capitalism is in turn conquered by a form of society in which 
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distribution once again becomes primary, but is such that it not only brings an end to the 
capitalist exploitation that occurs through commutative justice, but all exploitation as such. 
Despite all of this, however, for Marx, this first phase of socialism still has significant 
shortcomings because certain abstractions remain: 
 
In spite of this advance, this equal right is still stigmatised by a bourgeois 
limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they supply; 
the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, 
labour. 
But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies 
more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve 
as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to 
be a standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right to unequal 
labour. It recognises no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like 
everyone else; but it tacitly recognises unequal individual endowment and thus 
productive capacity as natural privileges. It is therefore a right of inequality in its 
content, like every right. Right by its very nature can only consist in the 
application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be 
different individuals if they were not unequal) are only measurable by an equal 
standard in so far as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from 
one definite side only, e.g., in the present case are regarded only as workers, and 
nothing more seen in them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is 
married, another not; one has more children than another and so on and so forth. 
Thus with an equal output, and hence an equal share in the social consumption 
fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, 
and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to 
be unequal.
826
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There has been much discussion in recent political philosophy about the extent to which the 
natural endowments of individuals are morally relevant, and thus, a factor in redistributive 
measures. For example, Rawls argues that natural endowments are, from the perspective of 
morality, arbitrary, whereas Nozick argues that they are morally relevant and entitle people to 
unequal property-holdings.
827
 Marxists like Cohen have also weighed in on these debates. He has 
made a unique contribution to what is called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ which acknowledges that 
people get different amounts of utility from the same things because of differences in their 
natural endowments. Therefore, a sufficiently robust egalitarianism must be able to account for 
these differences. Cohen asserts that the right reading of egalitarianism is to “eliminate 
involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) mean disadvantage for which the sufferer 
cannot be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that he has made or is 
making or would make.”828 Consequently, whereas something like Dworkin’s form of 
egalitarianism does not subsidize expensive tastes, Cohen’s theory does not subsidize expensive 
tastes people did not choose to develop.
829
 It is in this context that we can understand Peffer’s 
contention that Marx’s example here, the comparison between someone with a family and 
someone without, is ill-suited to the case Marx is trying to make: “A better case to illustrate this 
concern would be one in which the two workers receive equal pay but one has a need or needs 
that are (1) vital to his well-being, (2) very expensive to meet, and (3) nonvoluntarily 
acquired.”830 This misses Marx’s point. His position is not only different from either Nozick or 
Rawls, but also from the luck egalitarianism of Cohen. Marx intentionally criticizes the 
imposition of an abstract standard of equal right on unequal individuals, not only with regard to 
their unchosen natural endowments, but also to their chosen legitimate obligations, such as the 
size of their families. Marx disagrees with the abstraction itself. 
Marx is also aware that his critique of abstraction cannot itself become an abstraction 
imposed irrespective of socio-historical context: 
 
But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is 
when it has emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can 
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never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural 
development thereby determined. 
In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination 
of individuals under the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis 
between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour, from a mere 
means of life, has itself become the prime necessity of life; after the productive 
forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and 
all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the 
narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its 
banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!
831
 
 
It seems to me that this is, in part, Marx’s response to Hegel’s second critique of the needs 
principle, namely, that it espouses a principle of equality as justification for distribution 
according to unequal needs. Although the first phase of socialism fulfils the standard of due 
better than any regime of private property ever could, it still imposes an abstract universal. It still 
demands the scrutiny of labour time, the monitoring of contributions, and the calculation of more 
or less precise compensations. This then is the exchange of equivalents irrespective of the 
concrete circumstances and needs of individuals. Therefore, equal right is a relation of 
inequality. The second phase ends the precise correspondence between contribution and 
compensation. The standards of production, distribution, and consumption are applied 
universally, but they establish unity rather than imposing uniformity. Marx’s vision is a 
commitment to the concrete universal that Hegel, given his critique of formalism, usually 
embraces. This is another occasion when Marx out-Hegels Hegel. 
 Marx’s critique of equal right and his articulation of the needs principle have inspired two 
significant disagreements among commentators. The first is about whether or not Marx can be 
considered an egalitarian. The second disagreement is about whether or not Marx regards one or 
both of the principles of distribution as principles of justice. We will look at each of the debates 
in turn. Ultimately, I will argue, first, that Marx is an egalitarian if you follow his explicit 
statements; second, that Marx deems the principles of distribution in the first phase of a 
socialism a principle of justice; and third, that Marx does not deem the principle of distribution 
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in the second phase of socialism a principle of justice. In other words, the fully socialist society 
is beyond justice as such. 
 Marx’s innumerable criticisms of imposed abstractions inspire some commentators to 
deny that Marx is an egalitarian. For example, Wood asserts that, “there are, as far as I know, no 
explicit and unequivocal endorsements of the notion of equality in Marx’s writings.”832 Wood 
continues, 
 
The relation between capitalists and workers is one of equality, in a way in which 
the relations between masters and slaves, lords and serfs, guild masters and 
journeymen, are not. The irony is that this equality, far from protecting workers 
from oppression, is precisely the means by which the oppression of wage labour 
is carried out. The conclusion to be drawn is not that some other sort of equality 
is to be preferred to bourgeois equality, but that the fight against working class 
oppression ought not to be carried on in the name of equality.
833
 
 
Wood acknowledges that his view may be difficult to reconcile with Marx’s avowed sympathy 
for uprisings of the oppressed across history, such as Spartacus’s slave rebellion, even when they 
had little or no hope of overthrowing the prevailing class relations.
834
 Nevertheless, Wood 
contends that Marx sympathizes with them because they have a certain kinship with the working 
class movement, not because they have the same “historical justification.”835 
Whereas theorists like Wood take Marx to be recognizing not only the differences, but 
also the inherent inequalities between individuals, other commentators like Geras, Elster, and 
Nielsen argue that Marx replaces a false equality with a truer one. As Geras describes it, this is 
“an equality of self-realization.”836 In this particular debate, although we cannot draw all of the 
same conclusions as Geras, Elster, and Nielsen, they are clearly more correct than Wood. 
Contrary to Wood’s assertion, Marx does explicitly endorse a form of egalitarianism. It is 
dependent on Marx’s distinction between social inequality and individual inequality. Marx does 
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not dismiss those inequalities, those ‘natural privileges,’ that exist between individuals 
irrespective of their social conditions. He does condemn, however, the social inequalities that 
exist between individuals irrespective of their individual inequalities. To put this in perspective, 
let us again compare socialism with libertarianism. 
Libertarians argue that if there are truly universal and impersonal procedures regulating 
free-market exchange, material inequalities are justifiable because they result purely from 
differences between innate talent and degree of effort.
837
 Conversely, for Marx, the laws of 
exchange, abstractly conceived, only appear to impose the same standards of behaviour on 
individuals. These laws conflate the qualitatively different forms of property held by wage-
labourers and capitalists. In other words, these formal procedures treat indifferently those who 
can acquire both the means of production and the means of consumption, and those who can 
acquire only the means of consumption. This systematically disadvantages the latter. It is in this 
sense that Wood, following Marx, can argue that equality is the condition of exploitation. Wage-
labour and capital confront each other as property-owners with the same abstract rights. This is 
one of the shortcomings of conflating productive and personal property as private property. For 
Marx, under capitalism, as with all class societies, the inequality between individuals as 
individuals is negligible in comparison to the social inequality between individuals, as 
determined by their class positions.
838
 As long as class stratification exists, individuals of great 
potential will often remain confined to and stifled by their place in the subordinate class, whereas 
those of meagre talent and dubious merit can more easily remain within the ruling classes from 
which they will have more opportunities. Marx demonstrates that the libertarian assertion about 
compensation according to talent and effort can only be actualized in the first phase of socialism. 
Whereas in a class-society the distinction between individuals is vastly overshadowed by their 
social inequality, in a classless society this social equality ensures that it is primarily the 
distinctions between individuals that determine outcomes. 
This is the significance of Marx’s assertion that, with the first phase of socialism, 
“Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give 
anything except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass into the ownership 
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of individuals except individual means of consumption.”839 This is why Marx later goes on to 
say, “Instead of the indefinite concluding phrase of the paragraph—‘the removal of all social and 
political inequality’—it ought to have been said that with the abolition of class differences all the 
social and political inequality arising from them would disappear of itself.”840 This is a critique 
of social inequality and thus an endorsement of social equality, on its own terms: “everyone is 
only a worker like everyone else.”841 Again, this is the general law of nature: the equal liability 
of all to labour. 
Marx distinguishes between social inequality and individual inequality. The first phase of 
socialism eliminates the former, even if it must acknowledge the latter in its exacting relation 
between contribution and compensation. It is not that the second phase could or should eliminate 
the inequalities between individuals resulting from their different natural endowments. Rather, it 
abolishes the blanket-application of abstract rights that punish not only these inequalities, but 
also our chosen, legitimate obligations. R. H. Tawney formulates this quite well: 
 
So to criticize inequality and to desire equality is not, as is sometimes suggested, 
to cherish the romantic illusion that men are equal in character and intelligence. It 
is to hold that, while their natural endowments differ profoundly, it is the mark of 
a civilized society to aim at eliminating such inequalities as have their source, not 
in individual differences, but in its own organization, and that individual 
differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and find 
expression if social inequalities are, as far as practicable, diminished.
842
 
 
As we have seen, the equal liability of all to labour is given a major qualification. This general 
law is not universal. It is limited to those who are able to work. In other words, it exempts on the 
basis of age or disability. Marx affirms equality of dignity or treatment irrespective of natural 
inequalities. He criticizes the principle of equality, not because it must be abandoned in its 
entirety, but because it is abstract and therefore insufficient. 
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The other major debate is about whether or not Marx regards the standards of distribution 
in the two phases of socialism as principles of justice. Some assert that Marx offers principles of 
distributive justice in one or both phases. Others argue that, for Marx, one or both phases are 
beyond justice of any kind. We will look at the arguments for each group in turn. I will then offer 
my interpretation. 
First, we will look at those who argue that, for Marx, the standards of distribution under 
socialism are principles of justice. Within this group, there is a disagreement over whether or not 
Marx intentionally or consciously intends to offer principles of distributive justice. Theorists like 
Hancock, Arneson, and Green argue that Marx obviously and consciously asserts this.
843
 
Conversely, theorists like Elster argue that Marx does espouse principles of socialist distributive 
justice, but he is not aware of it: “When referring to the ‘defects’ of the contribution principle, 
Marx is implicitly invoking a higher principle of justice.”844 Elster contends that Marx offers a 
“devastating” critique of abstract justice, but “did not notice that in doing so he invoked a theory 
of the kind he wanted to dispense with.”845 
Within this broader group there is also an internal debate about the scope of these 
principles of distributive justice. In other words, there is disagreement over whether or not 
socialist principles of justice can be applied to other modes of production, including capitalism. 
As we have seen, for Wood, these principles are specific to the socialist mode of production.
846
 
We cannot critique capitalism as unjust according to socialist standards. Conversely, for Nielsen, 
socialist justice is the standard by which Marx criticizes all class societies, including 
capitalism.
847
 
We turn now to those who argue that, for Marx, the standards of distribution in one or 
both phases of socialism are not based upon principles of distributive justice. There is some 
disagreement about why Marx deems socialism beyond justice. Theorists like Buchanan 
emphasize that, for Marx, the elimination of class divisions fosters harmony between the 
interests of the individual and the community.
848
 Other theorists, such as Kymlicka, argue that 
Marx believes that socialism renders justice irrelevant because it is supposed to bring an end to 
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scarcity.
849
 Kymlicka contends that Buchanan’s interpretation is truer of communitarianism than 
of Marxism.  
The most significant disagreement within this broader group, however, is whether or not 
they approve of what they take to be Marx’s stance. As we have seen, both Miller and Ryan 
affirm that socialist society would be a society beyond justice. Conversely, Buchanan and Lukes 
disapprove of this idea. Kymlicka and Shandro concur. Kymlicka thinks it implausible that we 
could overcome scarcity. Therefore, he deems the idea that we could transcend justice 
doubtful.
850
 Shandro argues that, given Marx’s theory of the historical development of human 
needs, we cannot assume from our vantage-point that transformed needs under socialism will 
necessarily harmonize: “Even supposing a harmony of needs were attained, it would still not be 
possible to know whether it would be maintained.”851 
Nussbaum also criticizes the idea that socialist society could get beyond justice, but does 
so on different grounds than Kymlicka and Shandro. In a commentary on Aristotle’s theory of 
the virtues, Nussbaum argues that, for Marx, communist social relations remove the need for 
certain virtues, including justice.
852
 
 
I think we might be sceptical here. Aristotle’s general attitude to such 
transformations of life is to suggest that they usually have a tragic dimension. If 
we remove one sort of problem—say, by removing private property—we 
frequently do so by introducing another—say, the absence of a certain sort of 
freedom of choice, the freedom that makes it possible to do fine and generous 
actions for others.
853
 
 
This is unpersuasive. Aristotle’s argument about society, namely, that the whole is prior to the 
part, means that the type of political regime influences the extent to which virtuous activity is 
possible. While virtuous activity in corrupted conditions may be more difficult and therefore 
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more praiseworthy than comparable behaviour in more congenial conditions, nonetheless, the 
latter situation is preferable. It is more conducive to our happiness. We should not preserve 
certain social relations merely because, in making virtuous activity more difficult, it also makes 
it more admirable. Furthermore, in Marx’s theory of socialism, people will have personal 
property with which they can be generous to others. The question remains, however, whether or 
not virtue is reducible to the societal conditions such that certain virtues become obsolete in 
specific forms of society. In other words, can social relations be constructed in such a way that 
the problems demanding the virtue of justice do not arise? Nussbaum argues that Marx answers 
this in the affirmative. 
Whereas Nussbaum contrasts Aristotle and Marx, Castoriadis compares them, arguing 
that because the discussion of right in ‘The Critique of the Gotha Programme’ occurs within the 
horizons set by Aristotle, Marx deems socialist society a higher form of justice: “According to 
Marx, communist society in its ‘first phase’ will base distribution on arithmetic equality that is 
still unjust. In its ‘superior phase’ it will be able to establish just distribution conforming to 
geometric proportionality, according to the principle: ‘from each according to his capacities, to 
each according to his needs.’”854 While Castoriadis is correct about arithmetic and geometric 
equality in the first and second phases of socialism, there two problems with his account. First, 
even if Marx finds that the principle of distributive justice in the first phase is inadequate, that 
does not necessarily mean that he deems it unjust. Second, we cannot assume that Marx deems 
the principle of distribution in the second phase to be a principle of distributive justice simply 
because it features the standard of geometric or proportionate equality. Marx might think that a 
sufficiently subtle notion of geometric equality which is able to account for the sheer complexity 
of all of these proportions takes distribution beyond the rigidity of right, beyond justice as such. 
Putting aside for a moment the comparisons and contrasts between Marx and Aristotle 
with regard to distributive justice proper, an illuminating way of explaining whether or not Marx 
deems the phases of socialism to be based in principles of justice is to compare his theory of the 
needs principle to Plato and Aristotle’s theory of ‘equity,’ with which Marx’s needs principle 
shares some similarities. This will provoke the question as to why, despite these similarities, 
Plato and Aristotle deem the principle of equity an avowedly ethical doctrine, whereas Marx’s 
articulation of the needs principle attempts to remain silent on questions of ethics and justice. 
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Marx’s critique of abstraction, of which equal right is an example, reflects the influence 
not only of Hegel, but of Plato and Aristotle. Given the common assumptions about ancient 
Greek thought, this assertion may appear absurd. For example, Adorno and Horkheimer assert: 
 
The mythologizing equation of Forms with numbers in Plato’s last writings 
expresses the longing of all demythologizing: number becomes enlightenment’s 
canon. The same equations govern bourgeois justice and commodity exchange. 
‘Is not the rule, ‘Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, Omnia erunt inaequalia,’ [If 
you add like to unlike you will always end up with unlike] an axiom of justice as 
well as of mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between 
commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical 
proportion?’ Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things 
comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, 
anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is 
illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains the watchword 
from Parmenides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed.
855
 
 
This ignores the innumerable occasions when Plato, including in the late writings, criticizes 
abstract universals. The most relevant for our purposes is a statement we explored in a previous 
chapter. It occurs in the Statesman where Plato criticizes the inherent generality of laws: 
 
Law can never issue an injunction binding on all which really embodies what is 
best for each; it cannot prescribe with perfect accuracy what is good and right for 
each member of the community at any one time. The differences of human 
personality, the variety of men’s activities, and the inevitable unsettlement 
attending all human experience make it impossible for any art whatsoever to issue 
unqualified rules holding good on all questions at all times.
856
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This passage is quoted in Hegel’s essay on natural law during a critique of bourgeois justice.857 It 
is paraphrased by Marx in The Holy Family during an immanent critique of Hegel.
858
 (We will 
study Marx’s citation of this passage in a subsequent chapter because it occurs during a 
discussion of crime and punishment, which pertains more to the subject of corrective justice. It is 
enough here to point out Marx’s familiarity with it.) 
Plato’s assertion about the generality of laws emerges through Aristotle’s discussion of 
the virtue of ‘equity.’ In the Nicomachean Ethics, after his explanation of justice, he asserts that 
as exalted as justice should be, the ‘equitable’ is both a part of, and superior to, justice.859 When 
the law speaks generally or without qualification, but a given situation constitutes an exception 
to the rule, it is appropriate to rectify the lawgiver’s omission with what the lawgiver would 
decree if he was present or had been aware of this case when founding the laws.
860
 Most 
important, the ‘equitable person’ “is not exacting to a fault about justice, but is instead disposed 
to take less for himself even though he has the law on his side.”861 The principle of ‘equity’ 
receives its highest expression in what Aristotle later describes as the greatest ‘external good,’ 
friendship. Indeed, friendship forms the basis of Aristotle’s highest form of political community. 
Here, in this necessarily small community of friends, social relations are not merely just, but 
equitable. Indeed, Aristotle asserts, “When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but 
when they are just, they do need friendship in addition.”862 Nevertheless, ‘equity’ remains a 
principle of ethical right. 
Marx criticizes the first phase of socialism in somewhat similar terms. It still requires the 
scrutiny of labour time, the monitoring of respective contributions, and the calculation of more or 
less precise compensations. In other words, it is exacting to a fault about justice. Only the 
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second, higher phase brings to an end the homogenizing, quantifying, calculative exaction of 
what precisely is owed. If distribution is to be according to needs, there are a series of social 
conditions that must be achieved, including the development of a culture of mutual trust. In a 
certain sense, exceptions are made the rule. Indeed, as we have seen, Marx aspires to a set of 
circumstances in which our sense of egalitarianism is subtle enough that, not only does it refrain 
from penalizing people’s unchosen needs, but it also refrains from penalizing people for their 
chosen but worthy obligations toward institutions that benefit society as a whole. As we have 
seen, for Marx, the family (which does not necessarily mean the monogamous family), is one 
such obligation. Thus, in contrast to other forms of egalitarianism, including luck egalitarianism, 
we can refer to Marx’s position as exceptional egalitarianism. It is only in these conditions that 
there can be the fullest expression of distribution according to unequal needs. There is no need of 
equal right between comrades. 
And yet, Marx heaps scorn on notions of the just and equitable. What, in this respect, 
distinguishes Plato and Aristotle from Marx? It is that in matters of ethics Marx is often more 
Epicurean than Aristotelian. This is the result, in part, of the intellectual influence expressed by 
both ancient and modern materialism, and, as we will see, the deeper historical developments 
that have made the Epicurean theory so prevalent in modern theories of ethics and justice. 
The subject of Marx’s dissertation is Epicurus. In Marx’s preparatory notebooks for his 
dissertation, written in 1839, he quotes in full a number of Epicurus’s statements about ethics 
and especially justice. The following is a representative sample: 
 
‘Natural right is a mutual agreement, contracted for the purpose of utility, not to 
harm or allow to be harmed.’ p. 97. 
‘For all living beings which could not enter into mutual contracts not to 
harm each other or allow each other to be harmed, there is neither justice nor 
injustice. It is the same, too, with peoples who have been either unable or 
unwilling to enter into contracts not to harm each other or allow each other to be 
harmed.’ p. 98. 
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‘Justice is not something existing in itself; it exists in mutual relations, 
wherever and whenever an agreement is concluded not to harm each other or 
allow each other to be harmed.’ p. 98.863 
 
Whereas Plato and Aristotle assert that justice has a ‘natural part,’ is an integral part of our 
human nature, Marx, like Epicurus, bases justice in changing historical circumstances. Indeed, 
Epicurus’s theory of justice as conventional is remarkably similar to Marx’s assertion that “Right 
can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development thereby 
determined.”864 In other words, whereas the ancient Greek theorists of natural right cast justice as 
an immutable aspect of the human condition, for Marx, justice is historically-specific. This 
makes it possible that there could be a set of social conditions without it. 
Beyond this, Marx’s materialism leads to notions of the individual and general interest 
that distinguish him from Plato and Aristotle. Marx is not a straight-forward materialist. Under 
the influence of the German Idealists, he develops a specifically historical materialism.
865
 He 
supplements materialism with, first, a theory of universal history that not only accounts for the 
influence of social relations on the individuals within them, but also gives a general typology and 
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theory of historical progression in his theory of the modes of production; second, he accounts for 
the relations between individual interests and general interest primarily through his theory of 
class relations, and in particular, labour as the nexus between the forces of production and the 
relations of production; and third, the theory of praxis espouses notions of freedom and self-
determination that, in their resemblance with Hegel’s ‘objective idealism,’ are critical of the 
passive materialism of Locke. Despite these qualifications, however, Marx’s historical 
materialism still commits him to certain fundamental materialist premises. 
The influence of modern Epicureanism on Marx is quite clear in his exposition of the 
materialism of Helvetius and d’Holbach in The Holy Family.866 Marx approves of the following 
premises of materialism. Humans are not naturally good or bad. Rather, we are subordinate to 
our material interests. Therefore, social relations have a profound influence on human activities. 
Society ‘educates’ us in specific ways. When social relations are arranged in such a way that 
interests are mutually antagonistic, conflict is inevitable. If morality is the correct understanding 
of our interests, society must be transformed so that the interests of the individual and the 
community coincide. This is what Marx means when he asserts that “it is essential to educate the 
educator himself.”867 In a set of social relations where interests are reconciled, each could not 
fulfill their own interests without at the same time benefitting the general interest. In these 
conditions, only fools would be vicious. 
It is worth noting that in the debates about the relation between Marx and utilitarianism, 
he is almost always compared to the British utilitarians, for whom Marx had mostly contempt, 
and not the French materialists, who, despite his criticisms, are quite influential for Marx.
868
 As 
per the Enlightenment materialists, and in particular, the French utilitarians like Helvetius and 
d’Holbach, Marx thinks that once the social conditions are such that the individual and general 
interests are reconciled, ethics will be more or less straightforward because anyone who acts 
against the general interest will necessarily act against their own interests. That Marx thinks that 
ethics can become straightforward in this way is one of the reasons why he is predisposed to the 
idea that justice is dispensable under certain social conditions. 
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A manifestation of these differences between, on the one hand, Marx, and on the other 
hand, Plato and Aristotle, is a disagreement about the nature of our needs. For Plato and 
Aristotle, unless pleasure or need are controlled by our reason, by the moral and intellectual 
virtues, they are unlimited, which brings people into inevitable conflict. In other words, the 
standard of need is woefully insufficient. The standard of merit, of virtue, is paramount.
869
 
Conversely, for Marx, needs are naturally self-limiting. In a lengthy footnote in The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels argue that communists “strive to achieve an organisation of 
production and intercourse which will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs, i.e., a 
satisfaction which is limited only by the needs themselves.”870 Admittedly, it is crossed out in the 
manuscript, but it is unlikely that it is this sentence with which they came to disagree given 
Marx’s virtually identical statement in the Grundrisse: “Use value in itself does not have the 
boundlessness of values as such. Given objects can be consumed as objects of needs only up to a 
certain point.”871 With the reconciliation of the individual and general interest, the standard of 
need suffices to regulate human activity. 
Plato and Aristotle deem justice and its highest expression, the ‘equity’ that is more just 
than justice, as a positive virtue through which individuals achieve their self-realization in and 
through each other. Conversely, Marx follows the modern trend, which deems justice a primarily 
negative principle, the primary purpose of which is to protect individuals from each other. As we 
have seen, this trend is fostered by historical developments in capitalist social relations. That 
production is primarily for exchange between individuals inclines us toward contractarian 
notions of justice for which it is something we construct or enter into rather than something of 
which we are always already a part. Furthermore, the uncoordinated character of production for 
individual exchange often results in the rejection of notions of our substantive common ends or 
an objective human good. This leads to an individualization of justice. It is something that must 
foster the conditions in which individuals can peacefully pursue their own subjective ends. Thus, 
justice is more of a negative virtue, a protection of individuals from the impositions of the social 
whole rather than a protection of the common ends from individuals. All of this is best illustrated 
by Hume’s assertions about the conditions of justice.872 As we have seen, he argues that the 
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primary reasons why we need justice is because of relative scarcity and egoism. If you were to 
transform social conditions such that these two things would be increased to their furthest 
possible extent, or reduced to their furthest possible extent, there would be no need for justice. In 
the first case, this is because justice would be totally ineffective; in the second, because it would 
be unnecessary. Hume is an exemplary Epicurean in this respect. Similarly, Marx believes that, 
in communist society, the forces of production and the relations of production are such as to 
substantially reduce both scarcity and egoism, and therefore, the need for negative justice they 
provoke. This, I think, is indicative of Marx’s perspective as a whole. In that spirit, it is now time 
to offer some provisional conclusions about the correct interpretation of Marx with regard to the 
question of justice. 
Marx believes that bourgeois justice is the only notion of justice possible in capitalist 
society. This is why he asserts that it is not unjust. Nevertheless, Marx’s immanent critique 
shows that private property is necessarily based in the appropriation of uncompensated surplus-
labour. In other words, Marx does not regard capitalism as positively just in any non-self-
contradictory sense of that term. Therefore, he demonstrates that private property necessarily 
offends its own highest principles. These principles are, first, to each their due, and second, do 
not steal. Marx completes this immanent critique of private property by showing that its 
principles can be achieved without these self-contradictions only with communal property. 
Socialism puts an end to systemic theft. Therefore, it alone provides the conditions where each 
receive according to their due. This is why I could not offer any definite conclusions about 
Marx’s theory of commutative justice under capitalism until I discussed Marx’s theory of 
distribution under socialism. 
 Marx explicitly asserts that the standard of distribution in the first phase of socialism is a 
principle of right or justice. Nevertheless, Marx also deems it to be self-contradictory in its own 
way. Formally, it is a principle of equal right, but in its content it promotes inequality. It rewards 
natural endowments and punishes chosen, legitimate obligations. In other words, the right is 
abstract and therefore becomes its opposite. This principle of equality is, like that within 
capitalism, in substance a principle of inequality. This is not to say that the first phase of 
socialism is thereby unjust. Marx argues that while neither capitalism nor the first phase of 
socialism can be condemned as unjust according to the principle of labour-contribution, 
nevertheless, in both cases, but in different ways, this principle of ‘due’ proves to be self-
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contradictory. When Marx describes the principle of contribution in the first phase of socialism 
as such, “It is therefore a right of inequality in its content, like every right,”873 there are good 
reasons to believe that he does not mean specifically bourgeois right, but right in general. 
Therefore, when it is transcended by the principle of need in the second phase of socialism, Marx 
seems to suggest that the second phase goes beyond not merely bourgeois right, but right as such. 
Marx speaks of inscribing slogans on banners, but he does not refer to this as any kind of right, 
whether it is socialist, human, or otherwise. Consequently, for Marx, whereas the first phase of 
socialism features a principle of distributive justice, the higher phase of socialism establishes a 
principle of distribution that is beyond justice. As I noted in my discussion of the transformations 
of justice throughout the transitions to capitalism, one of its dramatic changes is its increasingly 
impersonal and rigid character. It demands a uniformity that is skeptical of exceptions. Perhaps 
Marx uncritically accepts this notion of justice. Therefore, when he articulates a standard of 
proportionate equality that is subtle enough for his exceptional egalitarianism, he does not 
embrace an Aristotelian notion of equity, but rather, assumes that this principle of distribution 
must dispense with what he deems to be the inherent rigidity of justice. 
At this point, the most important claim we can make about the relation between Marx and 
justice is this: Marx never speaks affirmatively about a principle of justice that is not self-
defeating and destined to be transcended, either by another principle of justice, or ultimately, by 
the end of justice as such. This is why Marx does not deem the principle of right in the first 
phase of socialism a basis by which to evaluate other modes of production, including capitalism. 
It is not only that Marx asserts, ‘Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society 
and the cultural development thereby determined.’ His theory already deems justice radically 
historical in a way untrue of, say, freedom. Marx’s theory already looks forward to a time when 
social conditions are beyond justice and right as such. Therefore, Marx does not deem justice a 
plausible basis by which to compare modes of production. For Marx, to critique capitalism as 
unjust according to socialist principles of justice is utopian. Even when Marx affirms the 
working class pursuing its own rights against the resistance of capital, as is the case with the 
legal limitation of the length of the working day, this occurs within the domain of bourgeois 
right. In those passages where Marx asserts, ‘Between equal rights, force decides,’ Marx goes 
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out of his way to show how these laws adhere to the laws of private property. The working class 
is protecting the only piece of productive property they own: their capacity to labour. 
This brings us back to the question of contemporary society and standards of 
redistribution. The principle of commutative justice under capitalism is the same as any other 
social system, namely, ‘due’ according to arithmetical proportion. In other words, this is 
allocation according to equivalent exchange-values. Marx does not explicitly state the standard 
of distributive justice under capitalism. By all indications, this is because Marx does not think 
there can be a principle of justice underlying redistributions under capitalism. If pressed Marx 
would likely say the standard is power. In other words, the distribution of public goods is 
determined by class struggle. Consequently, the working class must achieve whatever they can 
get according to the balance of class forces. Perhaps Marx does not reconcile the different 
standards of redistribution because they all indifferently serve as means to the true standard, the 
class interests of workers. If this is true, Marx thinks that justice does not provide guidance in 
our revolutionary activity. As we have seen, Marx’s explanation of primitive accumulation is 
intended to show, in part, that revolutions are not conducted according to laws. Revolutionary 
activity establishes the social conditions and property relations which will give rise to new 
principles of justice or the transcendence of justice altogether. This only becomes applicable 
after these conditions have been established. This point can only be fully demonstrated in a later 
chapter on the relation between Marx and complete justice. 
If Marx does not critique capitalism for its injustice, what is his criterion? Contrary to the 
assertions of commentators like Cohen and Geras, the consistency of Marx’s assertions does not 
depend on an implicit theory of justice of which he remained unaware. The criterion with which 
Marx criticizes capitalism is interest, and, specifically, class-interest, which, because of Marx’s 
theory of the unique historical role of the proletariat, is tied to freedom as self-realization. When 
Marx says that the prevailing social relations are not unjust according to the only possible 
standards of justice, this is not sarcasm: he means it seriously. When he says that exploitation 
constitutes theft, this is not rhetorical: he means it seriously. Marx undermines the only possible 
standard of justice in prevailing social conditions because his critique of capitalism is based 
entirely in terms of the interests of that class capable of generalizing freedom and self-
realization. The question becomes, can ‘interest’ bear the ethical weight given to it by Marx? 
Does the struggle by workers animated by this standard, by class interests, make us ‘fit to rule,’ 
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much less to rule well? In future chapters, my answer will be ‘no.’ Interest may be a sufficient 
motivation for activity, but it is not a sufficient guide. 
Marx does not deem capitalism unjust by any standards, including its own. Rather, what 
guides his critique is the conflict between equal rights. Nevertheless, there are significant 
shortcomings to this approach. As we saw, one of Hegel’s major criticisms of Kantian morality 
is that the principle of non-contradiction is not a sufficient guide to concrete ethical activity. 
Although Hegel and Marx are much more concrete than Kant in this respect, perhaps their 
conceptions of the principle of contradiction are not sufficient guides either. Furthermore, the 
extent to which Marx’s assertions about justice are an uncritical, ideological absorption of 
capitalist social relations remains an open question. 
In later chapters I will attempt to get to the foundations of Marx’s ambiguous relation 
with justice in all of its aspects. Before I do that, however, I will apply this interpretation, as it 
has been developed so far, to another aspect of justice. This is corrective justice, the question of 
crime and punishment. Of all the aspects of justice, it has received the least attention in 
commentaries on Marx. If the conclusions I have drawn so far also prove true of corrective 
justice, it will provide further confirmation that this is the right interpretation. This will prepare 
the way for the explanation of those fundamental assumptions that explain Marx’s ultimate 
rejection of justice as a whole. 
 
 278 
 
Part 4: Corrective Justice 
Chapter 11: Hegel on Corrective Justice 
 
In this chapter we look at corrective justice, namely, questions of crime and punishment. It is 
important to note the interconnection between, on the one hand, exchange and distribution, and 
on the other hand, crime and punishment. In other words, there is an intimate relation between, 
on the one hand, commutative and distributive justice, and on the other hand, corrective justice. 
In the same way that distributive justice is often intended to ameliorate the social inequalities 
endemic to the commutative justice of capitalist exchange, so too does corrective justice attempt 
to address the social problems, the antagonisms and crime that arise from these inequalities, and 
which neither commutative nor distributive justice can resolve. 
Marx’s contributions to the theories of crime and punishment and of corrective justice are 
unsystematic and for the most part latent and implicit. In order to understand these contributions 
we must first examine those theorists to whom Marx is primarily responding: Kant and Hegel. 
 The modern theory of crime and punishment begins with Cesare Beccaria.
874
 Deeply 
influenced by Enlightenment thought, Beccaria sought to end the corporal punishment typical of 
medieval regimes. He also aspired to a more impersonal application of law. Beccaria combined 
two traditions of Enlightenment thought, and not always harmoniously.
875
 He drew from both the 
utilitarianism of Helvetius as well as the natural rights tradition of Rousseau. In Beccaria there 
exists elements of what would become the two major schools of corrective justice: the theory of 
deterrence and the theory of retribution. 
 Beccaria asserts that laws originate through a social contract so that isolated humans can 
leave their constant state of war and enter into civil society.
876
 They therefore ‘deposit’ some of 
their liberty for a greater overall happiness. These laws require coercive force to dissuade 
humans from their naturally selfish inclinations: “for everyone always seeks to withdraw not 
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only his own share of liberty from the common store, but to expropriate the portions of other 
men besides.”877 This is the basis of the sovereign’s right to punish crimes.878 
 Expressing the influence of French materialism, Beccaria argues that the purpose of 
punishment is to deter the criminal from committing more crimes as well as other people from 
becoming criminals in the first place.
879
 Nevertheless, Beccaria also condemned capital 
punishment. He rejects it not only because it lacks utility, but also because it offends against our 
natural rights to self-preservation as enshrined in the social contract: 
 
This vain profusion of punishments, which has never made men better, has 
moved me to inquire whether capital punishment is truly useful and just in a well-
organized state. By what alleged right can men slaughter their fellows? Certainly 
by the authority from which sovereignty and law derive. That authority is nothing 
but the sum of tiny portions of the individual liberty of each person; it represents 
the general will, which is the aggregate of private wills. Who on earth has ever 
willed that other men should have the liberty to kill him?
880
 
 
Indeed, given the right to self-preservation, Beccaria argues that no individual would offer their 
consent to a social contract that permitted their own execution.
881
 If Beccaria holds in a tense 
unity the two major wings of the Enlightenment, they become separated into competing schools 
after him. 
The utilitarian tendency descending from Helvetius was embraced by Bentham.
882
 He 
turned the theory of deterrence into a formal system. For Bentham, punishment is a ‘moral 
lesson.’ It is a calculation that stamps ignominy on an offense in order to create an aversion to it 
in others. Conversely, Kant and Hegel, critics of the deterrence theory, adopted the natural rights 
tradition of Rousseau. They espoused a formal theory of retributive justice. 
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Kant argues that, within civil society, the amount of punishment must be based in a 
principle of equality that inclines no more to one side than the other: 
 
Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the 
people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if 
you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; 
if you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law of retribution (ius talionis) – it 
being understood, of course, that this is applied by a court (not by your private 
judgment) – can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment; all 
other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict 
justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them.
883
 
 
How does the thief also simultaneously steal from himself? By making the property of everyone 
insecure he deprives himself of the security of property.
884
 If he lacks property and is unable to 
provide for himself, the state, rather than providing for him, justifiably imposes upon him the 
heinous character of the crime. A crime disrupts the relations of autonomy and equality between 
individuals. It therefore incurs a debt. Punishment is the payment through which the 
criminal/debtor re-enters society. Kant even attempts to account for class distinctions in his 
principle of equal retribution, of exchange of like for like. For example, if all that is expected of 
a wealthy person is a fine, he could insult indiscriminately the honour of others. Kant proposes 
that the upper-class person must not only apologize publicly to the lower-class person, but also 
suffer the indignity of kissing his hand. 
Kant takes the principle of retribution to its logical conclusion. He defends capital 
punishment. If no life, no matter how wretched, can be a substitute for death, then the murderer 
must be killed. Kant argues that people like Beccaria fail to distinguish between reason and will, 
between understanding that the punishment is deserved and actually wanting the deserved 
punishment. People suffer punishment not because they will it, but because they will the 
punishable action.
885
 This is what it means to be subject to rational laws: “For, if the 
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authorization to punish had to be based on the offender’s promise, on his willing to let himself be 
punished, it would also have to be left to him to find himself punishable and the criminal would 
be his own judge.”886 For Kant, this is “sophistry.”887 
Hegel’s theory of corrective justice adopts and extends Kant’s theory. Hegel espouses a 
theory of retributive justice in many of his writings, most famously in the Philosophy of Right. 
As we will soon see, however, other writings express the beginnings of a different theory of 
corrective justice. Hegel did not resolve the tensions between these two theories. This is 
significant because the same tension arises in Marx’s contributions to theories of corrective 
justice. 
Hegel’s theory of right distinguishes between three forms of wrong. The first, 
unintentional wrong, agrees with the prevailing laws and rules but disagrees about their 
application in a particular case. The second, deception, acts against the laws, but does ‘honour’ 
to them by maintaining the semblance of right. The third, crime, clearly contravenes the law. It is 
wrong and presents itself as such. The basis of right is the recognition that those who are affected 
by my actions are also free and should be so treated.
888
 Thus, crime is self-defeating because one 
free will cancels the existence of another. By contravening their free will, the criminal 
undermines the basis of right and therefore justifies similar actions against himself. Hegel, like 
Kant, contends that in willing the crime the criminal also wills the punishment. Corrective justice 
embodies a logic of action and reaction. 
Hegel asserts that corrective justice develops through two historical stages: revenge and 
retribution. Revenge is the primary form of corrective justice in the state of nature. In the 
interactions between families the cancellation of a transgression, of a ‘crime,’ usually takes the 
form of the blood feud. In its content this is just retribution, but in its form it is the action of the 
contingent and subjective will of the injured party. Each transgressor interprets their deserved 
retribution as a new infringement. Consequently, the conflict becomes an infinite regress 
inherited by each new generation.
889
 This requires a justice freed from these contingent and 
subjective powers. It requires an institution whose will is expressed not in a particular, but in a 
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universal form. For Hegel, it requires the state. It alone can confer a genuine retribution. This is 
the second phase of corrective justice. 
Retribution becomes the primary form of corrective justice when private property and the 
state are founded. The state has a ‘punitive’ rather than an ‘avenging’ justice because, on the 
basis of its objective judgement, it can punish the crime while also putting an end to the 
potentially infinite chain of action and reaction.
890
 Indeed, retribution protects the criminal from 
revenge.
891
 For Hegel, private property and the state are necessary for the mutual recognition of 
freedom. It is the “rational destiny” of human beings to leave the state of nature and live under 
government.
892
 Hegel, like Kant, argues that even the involuntary imposition of a state is 
therefore legitimate. The ‘heroes’ who founded states may have acted from partisan motives and 
used violent means, but this is nevertheless a “rightful coercion” because “goodness alone can 
have little effect when confronted with the force of nature.”893 The slavery established in the 
transitions from the state of nature to the full development of civil society “occurs in a world 
where a wrong is still right.”894 Williams asserts that, for Hegel, those who are overly concerned 
with the origins of states are guilty of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”895 Hegel is not 
concerned with the transition from the pre-social condition of isolated individuals to a social 
condition. What is significant is not the origins of the state but what the state essentially is. Its 
violent beginnings do not entail that its nature is essentially coercive. 
Strauss argues that for the ancient theorists of natural right, such as Plato and Aristotle, 
the origin of the state is important because it is necessary to determine whether civil society has 
its basis in nature or convention.
896
 Paradoxically, Hegel, the exemplification of ‘historicism,’ is 
unconcerned with the genealogy of the state. According to Strauss, this is because his ‘idea’ of 
the state rejects nature as the standard.  For Strauss, this lack of concern with origins means 
abandoning any notion of the natural law by which to evaluate the positive law of the state. Quite 
interestingly, although Marxism is often accused of ‘historicism,’ it bases its ‘idea’ or 
explanation of the state in its coercive origins. Like Hegel, Marx distinguishes between civil 
society and the state. Unlike Hegel, Marx rejects the idea that there was ever a pre-social 
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condition of any animal properly called ‘human.’ Therefore, the founding of states was not 
necessary for the development of a social condition. In fact, the emergence of states announces 
that society has become divided against itself. For Marx, mutual recognition is disrupted by the 
rise of private property and the state. 
Marx’s perspective has been enriched by subsequent anthropology. Indeed, as we will 
see, certain aspects of hunter-gather societies, what Marx calls ‘primitive communism,’ are 
similar to his vision for the communist society that is to triumph over capitalism. Stanley 
Diamond, a Marxist anthropologist, asserts that the lex talionis does not apply to these primitive 
societies.
897
 Injury in a joint-family village could sometimes provoke a blood feud, but more 
often it was treated as a tort, a demand for private restitution. It was not deemed a basis for social 
retribution demanding injury in kind. Consequently, “the law against homicide was not a 
‘progressive’ step, as if some abstract right were involved which the state, the moral idea coming 
of age, finally understood and sought to establish.”898 As the state forms, it appropriates more 
and more social power from the kinship units. This actually entails less respect for the individual. 
Diamond quotes Victor Uchendu, an Igbo anthropologist, who notes the absence of the homicide 
law among primitive Igbo: 
 
It is important to realize that the village has no power to impose capital 
punishment. In fact, no social group or institution has this power. Everything 
affecting the life of the villager is regulated by custom. The life of the individual 
is highly respected; it is protected by the earth-goddess. The villagers can bring 
social pressure, but the murderer must hang himself.
899
 
 
Indeed, the state and its laws emerge not as a response to, but are in fact a cause of, increasing 
interpersonal violence. Diamond rejects the sentiment behind ‘law and order.’ In comparison to 
the stability of customary society, law is the antonym of order.
900
 As we will see, this respect for 
the individual, this insistence on allowing the individual to evaluate, judge, and punish herself, is 
remarkably similar to Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of corrective justice, as well as Marx’s 
                                                          
897
 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007). 
898
 Ibid., 272. 
899
 Ibid., 274. 
900
 Ibid., 279. 
 284 
 
contributions to an alternative theory. If these criticisms of Hegel are correct, then the state uses 
violence to punish the violence that it in fact helps to create. Therefore, Hegel’s assertions about 
the punitive justice of the state may be as guilty of a bad infinite, of an infinite regress, as is the 
avenging justice of the so-called blood-feud. 
Hegel’s theory of retributive justice is similar to Kant’s. From the perspective of the 
criminal, punishment appears to be something imposed externally. 
 
When the criminal meets with retribution, this has the appearance of an alien 
destiny which does not belong to him; yet as we have seen, the punishment is 
merely a manifestation of the crime, i.e. it is one half which is necessarily 
presupposed by the other. What is at first sight objectionable about retribution is 
that it looks like something immoral, like revenge, and may thus be interpreted as 
a personal matter. Yet it is not the personal element, but the concept itself which 
carries out retribution. ‘Vengeance is mine’ is the word of God in the Bible, and 
if the word retribution should evoke the idea of a particular caprice of the 
subjective will, it must be replied that it signifies merely the shape of the crime 
turned round against itself. The Euminides sleep, but crime awakens them; thus 
the deed brings its own retribution with it.
901
 
 
Hegel’s idea of the state informs his notion of the relation between morality and politics. Hegel 
asserts in ‘The German Constitution,’ unpublished in his lifetime, that the state could not survive 
if its right was not always superior to private right, “for even the taxes which it must impose are 
a suspension of the right of property.”902 Hegel condemns caustically the moralizing with which 
people criticize the state whenever it pursues interests that are not immediately or directly 
reconciled with their own: “the carping, indifferent public – i.e. that uninterested, unpatriotic 
mass whose ideal of virtue is the peace of the alehouse – accuses politics of questionable faith 
and lack of justice and stability.”903 These ‘philanthropists’ do not realize that interests and rights 
can collide.
904
 In a passage we have studied in a previous chapter, Hegel asserts that “both 
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contradictory rights are equally true; hence a third factor – i.e. war – must make them unequal so 
that they can be reconciled, and this occurs when one gives way to the other.”905 Speaking 
favourably of Machiavelli, Hegel asserts that the end justifies the means: “gangrenous limbs 
cannot be cured by lavender-water, and a situation in which poison and assassination have 
become common weapons permits no half-measures. Life which is close to decay can be 
reorganised only by the most drastic means.”906 These are not isolated and unpublishable 
thoughts. They also appear in the Philosophy of Right
907
 and the Philosophy and History.
908
 
On most occasions, therefore, Hegel affirms the right of the state against the individual. 
This is the basis of his theory of retributive justice. The state must protect itself by cancelling the 
crimes that challenge its laws. Nevertheless, there is another more muted strain in Hegel’s 
thought. It is most clearly expressed in writings like the Phenomenology of Spirit and his lectures 
on religion. Hegel acknowledges that not all crime is based in an immoral motive. Sometimes, a 
contravention of prevailing laws has an ethical impetus. As we saw, Hegel describes this 
scenario as a ‘rational misfortune,’ as tragic conflict. Furthermore, Hegel seems to argue that 
modernity, the achievement of individual freedom in and through the state, makes possible a 
third phase of corrective justice. It transcends the logic of action and reaction that characterizes 
the phases of revenge and retribution. This is the phase of recognition, the mutual 
acknowledgement of independence amid our interdependence. It provides the basis for Hegel’s 
embryonic alternative to retributive justice. This alternative is able to distinguish between 
immoral crime and the criminal transgression of laws that are based in an ethical conviction. 
Hegel’s theory of recognition cannot be understood without his conception of 
Christianity as the universal religion, and, in particular, what he regards as its supreme value: the 
principle of conscience. We must briefly study this before we can appreciate his depiction of 
modernity as the era of recognition. Hegel asserts that Christianity could only emerge in the 
conditions of the Roman Empire. He describes these conditions as the relentless imperial drive 
for property and wealth amid relations of impersonal domination. Indeed, social relations consist 
of atomized individuals reduced to their status as property-owners. This provides the setting for 
the world-historical significance of the Jewish people. In them are merged the outward suffering 
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of a corrupted society and the deep sorrow of the inner person: “He must feel himself as the 
negation of himself; he must see that this misery is the misery of his nature—that he is in himself 
a divided and discordant being.”909 From this misery there emerged a prophet. 
In an early theological essay, ‘The Spirit of Christianity,’ Hegel asserts that Jesus Christ 
does not command our obedience to laws. Rather, he preaches the fulfilment of needs: 
 
This spirit of Jesus, a spirit raised above morality, is visible, directly attacking 
laws, in the Sermon on the Mount, which is an attempt, elaborated in numerous 
examples, to strip the laws of legality, of their legal form. The Sermon does not 
teach reverence for the laws; on the contrary, it exhibits that which fulfils the law 
but annuls it as law and so is something higher than obedience to law and makes 
law superfluous.
910
 
 
Thus, Christ and his disciples break the Sabbath and feed themselves. For Hegel, prohibiting 
some form of activity according to the Kantian categorical imperative imposes a rule on what 
will prove to be recalcitrant social conditions. The moral ought tries only to cancel the act 
without addressing the reasons for its occurrence.
911
 For Hegel, ethics is not a relation between 
an individual and a thing. It is not the fulfilment of a rule as an end in itself for which other 
individuals are only a means. Rather, ethics is a social relation between individuals mediated by 
those obligations necessary for mutual benefit and fulfilment of the individuals involved. In other 
words, ethics is the fulfilment of a social relation as an end in itself. Duty is its expression. This 
alone can fulfil the concrete universal, a brotherly love that “does not leave the judge to 
apportion its rights; it reconciles itself to its enemy with no regard to right whatever.”912 In this 
relationship, duty and desire are reconciled. As such, it is not a ‘spurious’ or ‘bad’ infinite in 
which we are bound by something other than ourselves, but rather, the relation is a ‘genuine’ or 
‘good’ infinite because we are self-bounding: “Love, not self-coercive Kantian antinomy, is thus 
the true basis for the ethical virtues.”913 
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Although justice is a significant part of ethics, Hegel asserts that it has significant 
shortcomings: “The punishment inflicted by law is merely just. The common character, the 
connection of crime and punishment, is only equality, not life.”914 For Hegel, justice is limited by 
the fact that it makes the sinner into “sin existent.”915 It is an abstract universal. As Bernstein 
notes, “In a sense, Hegel considers the punishments rendered by penal justice a tortured 
concession by law that there is nothing it can humanly do to respond to trespass; that punishment 
is not so much a human response to transgression, but what we do when no further human 
response is possible.”916 Penal justice turns the individual into a personification of a single sinful 
act. It neglects that she is a complex being capable of a diversity of acts. These include acts of 
redemption: 
 
An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, say the laws. Retribution and its 
equivalence with crime is the sacred principle of all justice, the principle on 
which any political order must rest. But Jesus makes a general demand on his 
hearers to surrender their rights, to lift themselves above the whole sphere of 
justice or injustice by love, for in love there vanish not only rights but also the 
feeling of inequality and the hatred of enemies which this feeling’s imperative 
demand for equality implies.
917
 
 
These ideas were not merely youthful flourishes. In a lecture delivered in the last year of his life, 
Hegel criticizes imputing a crime to an individual in such a way that they are reduced entirely to 
it: 
 
It is characteristic of the region of finitude that all individuals remain what they 
are. If they have done evil, then they are evil: evil is in them as their quality. But 
already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known 
to be free, to be affirmative within itself, so that its limitation, which extends to 
evil, is a nullity for the infinitude of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been done. 
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The action certainly remains in the memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, 
therefore, does not attain to this sphere.
918
 
 
Jesus Christ, this worldly manifestation of God, reveals that far from a transcendent 
beyond, heaven is possible in the earthly existence of the religious community. Through 
suffering, death, and the renunciation of his natural existence, Christ reveals that, in order to 
achieve unity with God, humankind must overcome its merely natural existence by making the 
world rational and divine. This is the driving force of history. For Hegel, the principle of 
Christianity, embodied in the example of Christ, is conscience. No appeal to authority, whether 
sacred or profane, is sufficient to command my allegiance. The world must prove itself rational 
for me, according to my convictions. Indeed, Christ espouses a principle similar to Antigone and 
Socrates and meets a similar fate. Nevertheless, Christianity does not emerge fully understood. It 
must also develop. It is not only the starting point, but also the goal of history. To understand 
why Hegel believes that the teachings of Christ could only be properly understood in the modern 
period, we must briefly look at how he describes the tortured history of Christendom. 
The early Church failed to appreciate the meaning of Christ’s message: “Christ says: ‘If I 
depart you, I will send the Comforter, the Holy Ghost…He will guide you into all truth,’ He—
and not Christ’s earthly presence nor His spoken words.”919 This is why Hegel endorses the 
Biblical saying, “The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”920 Christ is not like the Dalai-lama, 
present in sensuous form. Instead, he dwells in the hearts of humankind. This misunderstanding 
caused the ‘self-alienated culture’ of medieval Christianity. These Christians saw that, although 
the world is their own work, it has the feeling of something external, reacting back on them.
921
 
Thus, the feudal world is tortured by the existence of two worlds, the kingdom of life and the 
kingdom of death. On the one hand, heaven, the afterlife, can only be passed into through the 
gate of death. Feeling disconnected from this transcendent beyond, we fill it with images of 
angels, saints, and martyrs drawn from our lived experience. On the other hand, this life, our 
world, is also a kingdom of death. It is the grave of the crucified prophet and lacks all divinity 
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because God is outside of nature. All that lives in it is a vision of that other world where true life 
begins.
922
 
The Church sought the sensuous externalization of its dead God in wealth, power, and the 
Crusading reclamation of the holy lands.
923
 Refusing to sanctify the real world, and thereby 
rejecting the idea of rational law, the Church reinforced feudal dependencies.
924
 It became a 
theocracy, founding and maintaining a system of government wracked with crime, bribery, and 
avarice.
925
 These conditions foster ‘pure inversions’ of culture, the ‘alienation of opposites,’ 
where what seems good is bad and bad is good. This is particularly true with regard to state 
power and wealth accumulation. Hegel contends that this is what fosters the Enlightenment, the 
French Revolution, and the Terror. 
As we saw in the two previous chapters on Hegel, his discussion of the law-giving and 
law-testing reason featured the principles of private and communal property. In other words, this 
was a tension between the idea of justice as ‘to each their due’ and as ‘to each according to their 
needs.’ Hegel then transitions to the basis of these laws, the prevailing social relations in their 
historical development. Thus, whatever profound conflicts arise can be rooted in their objective 
foundations. Hegel describes this as ‘rational misfortune,’ or tragedy. His example is the conflict 
between Antigone and Creon, between the family and the state. We can now see that the defeat 
of Antigone—the personification of familial and religious obligations—by Creon—the 
personification of our duties to the state—announces the transition from the rule of kinship to 
that of the law. In other words, this is the development from the phase of revenge to that of 
retribution. Nevertheless, the higher principle that Antigone represents, the pathos of subjective 
freedom, arises again in the Enlightenment and makes possible a third phase. 
The principle of conscience expresses itself against the state, now considered the ancien 
régime. Any authority figure, custom, law, or institution must prove itself rational according to 
the individual’s conscience. This can have incredibly volatile effects. It results not only in the 
French Revolution, but also the Terror that follows. This was not an accident. It was a rational 
misfortune. This is because the French Revolution attempted to build society entirely from the 
ground up without regard for the necessarily historical character of freedom and the binding 
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force of the religious community. Despite its destructive consequences, the French Revolution 
inaugurates the modern era. For Hegel, the meaning of our time is that it need not regard every 
challenge to prevailing customs, laws, and rules, as a crime. In other words, it makes possible the 
transformation of the world for the better without needing to resort to violence. The modern era 
aspires to that which transcends revenge and retribution: the phase of recognition. For Hegel, 
recognition is the highest stage of corrective justice. In fact, it transcends justice altogether. 
 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel explains mutual recognition as a series of 
interactions between what he calls the ‘acting consciousness’ and the ‘judging consciousness.’ 
The acting consciousness, who Hegel also describes as the ‘beautiful soul,’ wants to transform 
the world according to her own conscience. She claims responsibility only for what she 
recognizes in her own deed, not its unpredictable effects. Nevertheless, our claims of 
conscientiousness cannot be confirmed or denied because no one else has access to our own 
conscience and introspection.
926
 Others can easily judge them as unconscientious, inauthentic, or 
uncharitably motivated. If each person acts according to their own personal convictions, it seems 
that everyone is an exception. This appears to exempt anyone from rational discussion.
927
 Like 
the categorical imperative, the conscience is an empty form that can coincide with any content. 
The acting consciousness acknowledges that, no matter how noble and universal her 
intention, her act is inherently particular. It is based in her own unique conscience. She confronts 
the embodiment of the community, the judging consciousness who upholds the prevailing laws, 
and confesses her transgression of the laws. She sees herself as identical with the judging 
consciousness and expects him to admit to his own partisanship. Refusing to acknowledge their 
identity, however, the judging consciousness, what Hegel describes as the ‘hard heart,’ does not 
offer forgiveness.
928
 The judging consciousness evaluates the beautiful soul’s challenge to the 
prevailing laws entirely in terms of her self-interest rather than her loftier aspirations. By 
denying forgiveness, the judging consciousness thereby refuses Spirit, their mutual relations, 
which, as the master of every deed “can cast them off” and “make them as if they have never 
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happened.”929 In doing so, the judging consciousness fails to acknowledge that every action, no 
matter how universal the intention, is inherently particular. 
 
No action can escape such judgement, for duty for duty’s sake, this pure purpose, 
is an unreality; it becomes a reality in the deed of an individuality, and the action 
is thereby charged with the aspect of particularity. No man is a hero to his valet; 
not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet, 
whose dealings are with the man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and 
wears clothes, in general, with his individual wants and fancies.
930
 
 
To be impartial, judging conscience must stand aloof to the side.
931
 From this attempted 
objective standpoint, the judging conscience contends that, by challenging the laws, the acting 
conscience is not contributing to the good. Nevertheless, he must recognize that, according to the 
law, the good must be done. By standing aside, he is doing nothing.
932
 In other words, the 
judging consciousness fails to recognize the hypocrisy of passively judging while doing nothing. 
The hard heart must include himself in his own judgements because objectivity in practical 
judgements only occurs when he recognizes that everyone has their own concerns at heart. This 
is a necessary moment of practical concern.
933
 This is one of the reasons why Hegel, in a passage 
from the Philosophy of History which we have already discussed, says that: 
 
we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished 
without passion. Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our 
investigation; the first the idea, the second the complex of human passions; the 
one the warp, the other the woof of the vast arras-web of universal history. The 
concrete mean and union of the two is liberty, under the conditions of morality in 
a state.
934
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It is only when the judging consciousness, the ‘hard heart,’ acknowledges and confesses his own 
fallibility that genuine recognition occurs: 
 
The breaking of the hard heart, and the raising of it to universality, is the same 
movement which was expressed in the consciousness that made confession of 
itself. The wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind. The deed is not 
imperishable; it is taken back by Spirit into itself, and the aspect of individuality 
present in it, whether as intention or as an existent negativity and limitation, 
straightaway vanishes.
935
 
 
The judging consciousness sees himself in the acting consciousness and abandons his 
divisive thought. By accepting the confession of the acting consciousness and offering 
forgiveness, the judging consciousness renounces his separation and partakes in the reciprocal 
recognition that is “absolute Spirit.”936 When the hard heart ‘breaks’ this is the breaking of the 
standpoint of the ‘moral valet.’ The goal is not to judge but first to comprehend.937 This is a 
logical forgiveness between agent and observer for the inevitable one-sidedness of being agent 
or observer.
938
 By offering forgiveness, the judging consciousness also forgives himself. Since 
the acting consciousness is no longer chained to her transgressive act like a debt that must be 
repaid in full, the judging consciousness can renounce the role of creditor. Indeed, through the 
dialectic of confession and forgiveness, the logic of action and reaction typical of revenge and 
retribution is transcended by recognition. Although it is reciprocal recognition, it is not a mere 
effect that is chained to its cause, a mere reaction to action. As Williams notes, this is the first 
mention of reciprocal recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
939
 
The acting consciousness admits the impurity of her compromises while the judging 
consciousness sets aside his moralizing judgements: “Forgiveness renounces revenge and 
domination.”940 This recognition is heaven made real on earth by individuals who recognize not 
only their fallibility and their necessary interdependence, but also the divine nature that resides in 
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each of them: “it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of 
pure knowledge.”941 Tragic conflict only finds its resolution, and Antigone, the acting 
conscience, only finds her reconciliation with others, in the divine-human community of 
confession and forgiveness, in the reconciliation of religion with the state in Ethical Life. For 
Hegel, the significance of the modern era is that it makes possible this community of 
forgiveness. Hegel is critical of the extent to which the separation between church and state 
consigns religion to the private sphere and thereby renders it superfluous: “It is in religion that 
the innermost being of mankind is expressed and in which, as a fixed centre, human beings can 
still recognise themselves, even if all other external things scattered around them are of no 
consequence.”942 Ultimately, he deems a “self-supporting” political constitution devoid of 
religion completely ‘one-sided.’943 Conversely, the community of forgiveness would make 
possible those conditions which allow people like Antigone, Socrates, and Christ to express their 
conscience, to challenge and transgress the prevailing laws of the community without having to 
die for their convictions.
944
 In other words, the community of forgiveness does not need 
revolution in order to transform society for the better. 
This is why Hegel deems Christianity the universal religion. By becoming incarnate, God 
reveals the immanence, the this-worldliness of the divine. It exists, at least potentially, within the 
human community. As we saw before, for Hegel, the promise of the universal religion is a 
‘brotherly love’ that transcends what is merely just. The last lines of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
are Hegel’s adaptation of Schiller’s poem ‘On Friendship’: “from the chalice of this realm of 
spirits / foams forth for Him his own infinitude.”945 When we study the Phenomenology in the 
light of Hegel’s theological writings, we can see that he aspires to a transformation of citizens 
into friends, the passage from a principle of right to a principle of need. 
Mutual recognition exists only as latent potential within prevailing circumstances, which 
have not yet advanced beyond the phase of retribution. Hegel projects the community of 
forgiveness into the future. That is why it has a much more prominent role in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, which explores the shapes of human consciousness in their historical development, than 
in the Philosophy of Right, a critique of the contemporary state. Although Hegel asserts the need 
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to reconcile subjective freedom with objective freedom and individual conscience with the state, 
he expresses this abstractly. Therefore, there are unresolved tensions between Hegel’s theories of 
retribution and of recognition. Furthermore, both are beset with bad infinites. In Hegel’s theory 
of retribution, the state can only punish the crimes it helps create: it cannot eliminate them. In 
Hegel’s theory of recognition, the community of confession and forgiveness is expressed so 
abstractly that he gives no indication of how it can actually be accomplished using the resources 
of the present. Therefore, it is deferred to the infinite regress of the indefinite future. As we will 
now see, Marx offers solutions to these dilemmas. He too will espouse a principle of forgiveness. 
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Chapter 12: Marx on Corrective Justice 
 
In this chapter I will explore Marx’s discussion of crime and punishment in both capitalist and 
socialist societies. Marx criticizes both the deterrence and the retributive theories of corrective 
justice.
946
 Nevertheless, while he rejects the former in its entirety, he appears to accept certain 
aspects of the latter. Beyond this, however, Marx seems to pose an alternative theory of crime 
and punishment. It is fragmentary and in many ways latent. Furthermore, as is typical of Marx, it 
is a contribution to theories of justice that is not couched in the language of justice. We will see 
that, as is the case for both commutative and distributive justice, Marx does not affirm any 
principle of corrective justice without immediately undermining it from a perspective that deems 
itself beyond justice as such. 
 
12. 1: Correction Under Capitalism 
 
One of Marx’s most significant contributions to theories of corrective justice is an article on 
capital punishment for The New York Tribune.
947
 Marx rejects the theory of deterrence: 
 
it would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish any principle 
upon which the justice or expediency of capital punishment could be founded, in 
a society glorying in its civilization. Punishment in general has been defended as 
a means either of ameliorating or of intimidating. Now what right have you to 
punish me for the amelioration or intimidation of others?
948
 
 
It appears that Marx is making uncharacteristically explicit claims about right and justice. By 
what right does the state attempt to dissuade others from crime by punishing an individual more 
than is merited by their crime? To ‘make an example’ of someone, to turn them into a cautionary 
tale, transforms the individual into a pure criminal, a personification of their crime, and renders 
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them an instrument for deterrence. Nevertheless, as Marx phrases it, his critique of capital 
punishment has a familiar basis: hypocrisy. Ultimately, he points less to an explicit theory of 
justice or civility and more to the internal contradictions of those who do. Marx then shifts the 
critique of capital punishment to more pragmatic grounds: “And besides, there is history—there 
is such a thing as statistics—which prove with the most complete evidence that since Cain the 
world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment. Quite the contrary.”949 Based 
on the statistics compiled by Adolphe Quetelet, a positivist criminologist, Marx argues that crime 
has the regularity of physical phenomena.
950
 Therefore, deterrence focuses on effects rather than 
the consistent causes. 
The format of Marx’s critique is quite similar to Beccaria’s. Earlier we noted that 
Beccaria combines, not always successfully, the utilitarianism of Helvetius and the natural rights 
of Rousseau.
951
 It is interesting that in Marx’s critique of the theories of capital punishment put 
forward by the utilitarians and the idealists, he replicated Beccaria’s practice, criticizing them on 
both pragmatic and moral grounds. Perhaps this indicates not only Beccaria’s influence on Marx, 
but also that Marx believes that the tensions between theories of corrective justice have not been 
adequately resolved. 
Marx clearly prefers retribution over deterrence: “From the point of view of abstract 
right, there is only one theory of punishment which recognizes human dignity in the abstract, and 
that is the theory of Kant, especially in the more rigid formula given it by Hegel.”952 
Nevertheless, precisely because their recognition of human dignity is only abstract, Marx also 
criticizes Kant and Hegel: 
 
There is no doubt something specious in this formula, inasmuch as Hegel, instead 
of looking upon the criminal as the mere object, the slave of justice, elevates him 
to the position of a free and self-determined being. Looking, however, more 
closely into the matter, we discover that German idealism here, as in most other 
instances, has but given a transcendental sanction to the rules of existing society. 
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Is it not a delusion to substitute for the individual with his real motives, with 
multifarious social circumstances pressing upon him, the abstraction of ‘free-
will’—one among the many qualities of man for man himself! This theory, 
considering punishment as the result of the criminal’s own will, is only a 
metaphysical expression for the old ‘jus talionis’: eye against eye, tooth against 
tooth, blood against blood.
953
  
 
Marx’s accusation that the German Idealists sanctify the jus talionis is not a profound discovery. 
As we saw, Kant describes retribution in these terms.
954
 More significantly, Marx criticizes this 
version of the jus talionis because the German Idealists replace the reductionism of the 
deterrence theory, in which the individual is made a pure embodiment of their crime, with a 
reductionism of a different kind. They reduce the individual to her free will, to a will that is 
abstracted from her social conditions. In this way, the crime is deemed to be a pure manifestation 
of her will. Therefore, the individual can be said to have willed not only the crime but the 
punishment as well. The jus talionis espoused by the German Idealists is certainly better than the 
theory of deterrence. It does not trade one eye for two eyes so as to threaten the rest with 
blindness. Nevertheless, German Idealism must mask its coercive character by pretending to 
impose on the criminal nothing but her own will. 
For Marx, in class divided societies, there are social determinants of conflict. Therefore, 
antagonisms cannot be attributed entirely, or even mostly, to the self-determining free will, to the 
personal responsibility of the individual: 
 
If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative 
power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true 
individuality, crime must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social 
source of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for 
the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by his surroundings, his 
surroundings must be made human. If man is social by nature, he will develop his 
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true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by 
the power of separate individuals but by the power of society.
955
 
 
Marx does not have a systematic theory of law, crime, and punishment.
956
 Nevertheless, he 
makes important contributions to these theories. 
Marx asserts that the law arises from particular social conditions at a specific phase in 
their historical development. Furthermore, it reflects the interests of the prevailing ruling classes. 
In contrast to the idea that the law is the general expression of free will, Marx and Engels affirm 
a form of the materialist theory, namely, might makes right.
957
 In this, they cite Hobbes, who 
makes power the basis of the law. Marx and Engels offer a qualification to the standard 
materialist conception. They say that might makes right at all stages of human history where 
private property and class divisions are still necessary. Nevertheless, the end of private property, 
class divisions, and the state cannot be willed out of existence. It requires a material, historical, 
social development that makes such a will possible. 
The law reflects the interests of the ruling class not only in its development but often in 
its application. For example, Marx demonstrates the intersections between class-rule and 
patriarchy. Although the law is supposed to be enforced on both husband and wife, it is often the 
case that only the wife is punished for adultery.
958
 Furthermore, even when it is applied 
impartially, the uniquely formal character of the law under capitalism has the effect of 
reproducing inequalities. We saw this earlier with Marx’s critique of the formal freedom and 
equality of capitalist exchange. Even though the law claims to treat individuals as equal citizens 
irrespective of their socio-economic inequalities, its impersonal application sustains what in its 
content is substantive inequality and exploitation. The formal character of the law is, as Anatole 
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France famously describes it, “the majestic equality of the French law, which forbids both rich 
and poor from sleeping under the bridges of the Seine.”959 
For Marx, the notion of the individual as a free will is intertwined with the idea that the 
law can be universal, impartial, and equal. Those who contend that laws and principles of right 
arise from general concepts of human nature and free will also tend to argue “that crimes are 
committed purely because of a wanton attitude towards some concept, that crimes, in general, are 
nothing but making mockery of concepts and are only punished in order to do justice to the 
insulted concepts.”960 Nevertheless, it is not only the law that is subject to historical 
development. This is true of crime as well. Indeed, for Marx and Engels, crime and law are two 
sides of the same relation. Marx asserts, “Like right, so crime,” because “the struggle of the 
isolated individual against the predominant relations” is not arbitrary.961 Therefore, those who 
deem the law an “independently existing general will,” and therefore see in crime nothing but the 
violation of this dominant will, fail to see that crime “depends on the same conditions as that 
domination.”962 
We can illustrate the implications of the dialectical relation between crime and law by 
comparing it to Rawls’s distinction between “strict compliance theory” and “partial compliance” 
theory.
963
 The former, the ‘ideal theory,’ assumes that individuals, adequately equipped with the 
sense of justice, will adhere to the rules of the background institutions in a just society. 
Conversely, partial compliance theory concerns the methods by which to deal with injustice, 
such as the theory of punishment. He largely limits his focus to strict compliance. This 
assumption is called into question, however, if it can be shown that inequality, including the 
inequality that Rawls endorses, is the primary source of crime. The distinction between strict and 
partial compliance is arbitrary if deviance is in large part the result of social stratification. Thus, 
even in a society with only that inequality sanctioned by Rawls’s difference principle, crime will 
not be merely the “mark of bad character.”964 
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Marx points not only to the historical character of crime, but the priority of social, rather 
than personal, explanations. Take, for example, his explanation of the rise of ‘crime’ amid the 
catastrophic transitions to capitalism: 
 
The proletariat created by the breaking-up of the bands of feudal retainers and by 
the forcible expropriation of the people from the soil, this free and rightless 
proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as fast as 
it was thrown upon the world. On the other hand, these men, suddenly dragged 
from their accustomed mode of life, could not immediately adapt themselves to 
the discipline of their new condition. They were turned in massive quantities into 
beggars, robbers and vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases under the 
force of circumstances.
965
 
 
Cain and Hunt, in their anthology Marx and Engels On Law, criticize Marx for assuming that 
certain acts are intrinsically criminal.
966
 In other words, they argue that Marx uncritically takes 
for granted that crime is a self-evident phenomenon. In contrast, Cain and Hunt affirm the theory 
of deviance that emerged in the 1960s. This theory makes crime itself problematic. It argues that 
the law is not merely a response to crime, but rather, that the law makes certain acts criminal. 
Instead of pathologizing criminals or attempting to root their deviance in biological terms, it 
shows how crime and criminality reflect disparate power relations. Despite their criticisms, 
however, Cain and Hunt’s anthology includes a passage where Marx argues precisely this: 
 
Violations of the law are generally the offspring of economical agencies beyond 
the control of the legislator, but, as the working of the Juvenile Offenders’ Act 
testifies, it depends to some degree on official society to stamp certain violations 
of its rules as crimes or as transgressions only. This difference of nomenclature, 
so far from being indifference, decides on the fate of thousands of men, and the 
moral tone of society. Law itself may not only punish crime, but improvise it, and 
the law of professional lawyers is very apt to work in this direction. Thus, it has 
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been justly remarked by an eminent historian, that the Catholic clergy of the 
medieval times, with its dark views of human nature, introduced by its influence 
into criminal legislation, has created more crimes than forgiven sins.
967
 
 
Taylor and Walton argue that Marx’s assertions here correspond to “the best of modern deviancy 
theory.”968 Furthermore, deeming certain acts as inherently criminal is not necessarily uncritical. 
Lynch and Groves argue that there are significant shortcomings to those theories that define as 
crime only that which is labelled as such.
969
 For example, this relativism is unable to describe as 
intrinsically criminal the socially injurious actions of members of the ruling classes because in 
the prevailing circumstances they are rarely recognized as crimes requiring punishment. 
Conversely, the radical criminology that descends from Marx argues that crime should have an 
“objective referent,” namely, its dangerous and undesirable consequences for society as a 
whole.
970
 
Marx argues that governments will refuse to see the sources of crime in the social 
conditions upon which governmental power is based.
971
 Political parties will attribute every 
social defect to the fact that their rivals are in power. At the most, radical politicians will blame 
only the prevailing form of state, not the existence of the state as such. For this reason, 
 
The English Parliament combined [Malthus’s] philanthropic theory with the view 
that pauperism is a state of misery bought on by the workers themselves, and that 
in consequence it should not be regarded as a misfortune to be prevented but as a 
crime to be suppressed and punished. 
 In this way the system of the workhouse came into being, i.e. houses for 
the poor whose internal arrangements were devised to deter the indigent from 
seeking a refuge from starvation. In the workhouses charity has been ingeniously 
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combined with the revenge of the bourgeoisie on all those wretched enough to 
appeal to their charity.
972
 
  
Consequently, Marx asserts that the administrative system no longer attempts to eliminate 
pauperism. Rather, it tries only “to discipline and perpetuate it.”973 This has interesting parallels 
with Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. For example, Foucault points to changes in the strategies 
of punishment: “The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it 
to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is 
regarded both as a right and as property.”974 Foucault argues that corporal punishment 
disappeared because it lost its deterrent effect. This occurred because it came to be 
misinterpreted by the general public, which deemed the punishment equal to, or worse than, the 
savagery of the crime itself. Nevertheless, Foucault does not really explain why this change in 
perceptions arose. Marx’s observations, while much more fragmentary than Foucault’s, are 
nonetheless superior because they not only describe, but also explain the development of 
specifically modern forms of punishment and crime. 
 It is not only the law and crime, but also the form of punishment that is historically-
specific. The workhouses or ‘houses of correction’ became the model for the Methodist system 
of prison cells that are now the normal form of punishment under capitalism.
975
 Developed in 
Holland and Britain in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the workhouses, and 
later prisons, were intended to ‘re-socialize’ prisoners into the industrious habits necessary for 
capitalist production.
976
 People say ‘I did my time,’ not only when leaving prison, but also upon 
entering into retirement. 
Marx does not entirely reject the need for punishment. In fact, he follows Hegel’s 
assertions about its purpose: 
 
Plainly speaking, and dispensing with all paraphrases, punishment is nothing but 
a means of society to defend itself against the infraction of its vital conditions, 
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whatever may be their character. Now, what a state of society is that, which 
knows of no better instrument for its own defense than the hangman, and which 
proclaims through the ‘leading journal of the world’ its own brutality as eternal 
law?
977
 
 
For Marx, if capital punishment is deemed a necessary form of punishment, it is the form of 
society itself that comes under critical scrutiny. If crimes have the regularity of physical 
phenomena, Marx observes, “is there not a necessity for deeply reflecting upon an alteration of 
the system that breeds these crimes, instead of glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of 
criminals to make room only for the supply of new ones?”978 
Contrary to Hegel’s assertions, for Marx, the state can only end the revenge exacted 
between individuals by mediating between individuals and becoming itself the basis of 
systematic vengeance. In other words, the state has only replaced one bad infinite with another. 
As soon as it is recognized that the prevailing Right sanctifies inequality and unfreedom that 
necessarily give rise to ‘Wrongs,’ to crime, then the punishment is not a negation of the negation, 
but rather a ‘bad infinite’ that preserves both the Right and its inevitable Wrongs, thereby 
ensuring the indefinite oscillation between the two. It is at this point that it is worth remembering 
Diamond’s assertion that law is the antonym of order. Indeed, the common assumptions about 
the function of positive law is illustrated by one of the reasons Walzer offers for the need to 
balance the different spheres of ‘distributive justice’: “We could provide absolute security, 
eliminate every source of violence except domestic violence, if we put a street light every ten 
yards and stationed a policeman every thirty yards throughout the city. But that would be very 
expensive, and so we settle for something less.”979 Marx might respond that, in addition to 
having a police officer every thirty yards, even if you had one in every domicile, at the most, this 
might eliminate all of the violence not perpetrated by the police themselves. For Marx, the state 
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does not emerge as the second, but rather as the first transgression. The state is the crime to 
which the people must deliver its punishment. 
In a commentary on Marx’s contributions to theories of corrective justice, Jeffrie Murphy 
detects an ambiguity.
980
 Marx seems to express admiration for the theory of retribution, but then 
rejects its applicability in capitalist society. Murphy asks, why is Marx both attracted to and 
repelled by retribution?
981
 Murphy argues that, for Marx, retributive theory is formally correct 
but materially inadequate.
982
 Murphy rejects the utilitarian deterrence theory in favour of the 
Kantian theory of retribution and individual autonomy, but also accepts Marx’s critique of the 
so-called autonomous individual in class-societies.
983
 This makes retributive justice largely 
inapplicable in contemporary social conditions and constitutes a radical attack on the institution 
of punishment. Murphy then asks, what practical help can Marx offer for the design of 
punishment in our prevailing conditions? 
 
The answer, I think, is that he cannot and obviously does not desire to do so. For 
Marx would say that we have not focused (as all piecemeal reform fails to focus) 
on what is truly the real problem. And this is changing the basic social relations. 
Marx is the last person from whom we can expect advice on how to make our 
intellectual and moral peace with bourgeois society. And this is surely his 
attraction and his value.
984
 
 
Buchanan, in his brief discussion of corrective justice, follows Murphy in this respect. Murphy’s 
interpretation compliments Buchanan’s assertions that Marx criticizes capitalism because, first, 
any set of social conditions is defective if it makes necessary a reliance on conceptions of justice, 
and second, these social circumstances make impossible the realization of the standards of justice 
that they themselves promote.
985
 Thus, Buchanan asserts, “the conditions of class conflict that 
engender the behavior to which the institution of punishment is a response are just those 
conditions in which the assumptions of mutually beneficial social relations and of the freedom of 
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all to obey (or disobey) the law are not satisfied.”986 One is reminded of Lawrence Stone’s 
assertion that prisons have become “vestigial institutions” that are less useful to society than is 
the appendix for the human body.
987
 
The major difference between Murphy and Buchanan is that, while Murphy aspires to 
social conditions where retributive justice is not only formally correct but materially adequate, 
Buchanan argues that, for Marx, socialism would be beyond all notions of justice as such. 
Nevertheless, both of these interpretations, for which all reforms necessarily entail ‘reformism,’ 
regard Marx as an insurrectionist. The insurrectionist tendency in theories of revolution assume 
that capitalism can be overthrown more or less in one-fell swoop. This rejects any programme 
that, as Luxemburg would put it, proposes a complex series of reforms that are integrally tied to, 
and prepare the way for, the revolutionary rupture.
988
 Indeed, for insurrectionists, reforms show 
the flexibility of capitalism and stifle revolutionary spirit. Putting this in Gramscian terms, 
reducing revolution to one grand war of movement neglects the long-term war of position that 
must pave its way.
989
 Conversely, a strategy based on the war of position uses the reform of 
society to illustrate, in however constrained a form, what can only be fully achieved with the 
overthrow of capitalism and the creation of socialism. 
The ‘insurrectionist’ interpretations, frequently found in depictions of Marx’s politics, 
have not served it well. It becomes too easy to defer problems to a socialist future rather than 
engage with them in the present. The inadequacies of this approach were an important impetus 
for the third wave of debate about Marx and ethics. Even if the participants in this debate were 
too easily incorporated into the hegemony of the liberal political philosophy to which they were 
reacting, their motives were genuine. Radical criminologists have noted how the insurrectionist 
approach has undermined the development of an alternative criminology. Cain and Hunt argue 
that socialist criminology has rarely gone beyond the liberal anti-authoritarian tradition: “In this 
sense it has been reactive rather than constituting a concrete base for an intervention in the 
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politics of crime and crime control.”990 Lynch and Groves argue that radicals have had difficulty 
generating short-range policies.
991
 To remedy this they suggest some immediate reforms. These 
include: “equal justice in the bail system, the abolition of mandatory sentences, prosecution of 
corporate crimes, increased employment opportunities, and promoting community alternatives to 
imprisonment. Other policy efforts include programs to reduce prison overcrowding, concerted 
efforts to inform the public of injustices in the criminal justice system, and the design of 
programs to combat racism in the administration of justice.”992 
Contrary to Murphy and Buchanan’s assertions, however, Marx is not an insurrectionist 
in these matters. He is not a would-be retributivist who deems it materially inadequate. Rather, 
Marx does not regard retribution as being even formally correct. There is evidence in Marx’s 
work, sparse as it may be, that he has a latent, unsystematic theory of rehabilitation. Furthermore, 
Marx does not defer this to the socialist future. He applies these latent theories to capitalist 
society. This poses an alternative to the theories of deterrence and retribution. Indeed, Marx’s 
assertions have significant parallels with what is now usually referred to as ‘restorative justice.’ 
Nevertheless, as is characteristic of him, Marx never uses the term ‘justice’ on the rare occasions 
where he is offering the content of a positive alternative to the other theories of corrective 
justice. 
Marx does not merely want to react to crime, but to prevent it. For example, in an article 
for The New York Tribune, he asserts: 
 
Strange to say, the only part of the United Kingdom in which crime has seriously 
decreased, say by 50, and even by 75 per cent, is Ireland. How can we harmonise 
this fact with the public-opinion slang of England, according to which Irish 
nature, instead of British misrule, is responsible for Irish shortcomings? It is, 
again, no act on the part of the British ruler, but simply the consequence of a 
famine, an exodus, and a general combination of circumstances favourable to the 
demand for Irish labour, that has worked this happy change in Irish nature.
993
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Putting aside the influence of famine and emigration, Marx cites productive labour as a cause for 
the reduction in crime. The theory of deterrence can attempt to cast itself as a form of prevention. 
By imposing harsh punishments on individual criminals it claims to prevent other individuals 
from engaging in the same behaviour. Nevertheless, Marx’s theory, as well as later theories of 
restorative justice, can claim to be still more preventative because they need not start after a 
crime has already been committed. For Marx, the opportunity to work will often prevent 
someone from resorting to crime in the first place. 
Marx also affirms the possibility of rehabilitation within capitalism. Take, for example, 
his response to a principle espoused in The Gotha Programme, “The Regulation of Prison 
Labour”: 
 
A petty demand in a general workers’ programme. In any case, it should have 
been clearly stated that there is no intention from fear of competition to allow 
ordinary criminals to be treated like beasts, and especially that there is no desire 
to deprive them of their sole means of betterment, productive labour. This was 
surely the least one might have expected from socialists.
994
 
 
As Melossi points out, there was a fear prevalent in the workers’ movement that forced, unpaid 
labour could lower wages in other branches of production.
995
 Marx asserts that opposition to 
uncompensated prison-labour should not be motivated by fears of competition. Rather, it should 
be based in the conviction that prisoners should not be treated as subhuman. Marx deems the 
opportunity to engage in productive labour a key factor in the prevention of crime. So too is it 
important for correction. As we saw, when Marx advocates for the struggles to legally limit the 
length of the working day, he frames it in terms of the right of private property. In other words, 
workers have the right to protect the only productive property they own, namely, their own 
labour. In the struggle against capitalists, Marx is using standards that they themselves must 
recognize. He is turning the ethical principles of capital against it. He is doing the same with 
regard to corrective justice. He is arguing that if indeed productive labour is the prisoners’ sole 
means of betterment, which is exactly the discipline that the early workhouses and prisons were 
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attempting to instil, then the true goal of corrective justice should not be retribution, but 
rehabilitation.
996
 Indeed, Marx can be accused of flirting with the ‘work ethic’ here. 
Marx’s theory of rehabilitation is part of a long tradition that begins at least as far back as 
Thomas More. Indeed, according to Bonger, a Marxist criminologist, More was the first to 
establish scientifically the relation between economic conditions and criminality.
997
 More 
asserts: 
 
Revive agriculture and the wool industry, so that there’s plenty of honest, useful 
work for the great army of unemployed – by which I mean not only existing 
thieves, but tramps and idle servants who are bound to become thieves 
eventually. Until you put these things right, you’re not entitled to boast of the 
justice meted out to thieves, for it’s a justice more specious than real or socially 
desirable. You allow these people to be brought up in the worst possible way, and 
systematically corrupted from their earliest years. Finally, when they grow up and 
commit the crimes that they were obviously destined to commit, ever since they 
were children, you start punishing them. In other words, you create thieves, and 
then punish them for stealing!
998
  
 
This shows that in Marx’s work there are other grounds to critique retributive justice. Marx often 
points to the absurdity of the functionalism with which certain political economists argue that the 
pickpocket is a productive labourer because they produce, albeit indirectly, books on criminal 
law.
999
 This functionalism, expressed most famously in the subsequent sociology of Durkheim, 
renders the prevailing conditions eternal.
1000
 It cannot explain historical change. Therefore, it 
deems crime a necessary part of society. This concedes that society is permanently irrational. 
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Marx’s critique of functionalism also applies to the theory of retributive justice. As we saw, in 
theories of retributive justice, crime incurs a debt to society that can only be paid by punishment. 
In this societal book of credit and debit, there is only a false balance achieved. If we consider it 
from the perspective of individuals, of the particular criminal and victims, a punished crime pays 
the debt and restores the balance. From the perspective of society as a whole, however, the harm 
is not cancelled. Rather, harm is met with counter-harm, thereby creating a net surplus of injury. 
Furthermore, this ‘transaction’ requires resources beyond those that are exchanged. Given how 
much it costs to maintain legal and penal institutions and practices, it is unlikely that these costs 
could be included in the punishment. Even if they could, however, consider the social needs that 
could have been served by these resources if one part was not constantly being used to cancel out 
the other. This situation constitutes a loss overall. The absurdity of this shows that retributive 
justice is only an exchange of equivalents from the perspective of the individuals involved. That 
society must constantly pay for punishing the crime that society itself creates is irrational. 
Marx’s contributions to theories of corrective justice are not limited to capitalist society. 
We turn now to his discussion of rehabilitation in socialist societies. 
 
12. 2: Correction Under Socialism 
 
In one passage from The Holy Family, Marx describes the nature of punishment in socialist 
society. This is an incredibly significant passage. In it, Marx offers the beginnings of a secular 
theory of…confession and forgiveness. I will quote the passage in full and then, shortly 
thereafter, study it line-by-line. 
 
Hegel holds that the criminal must as a punishment pass sentence on himself. 
Gans developed this theory at greater length. In Hegel this is the speculative 
disguise of the old jus talionis that Kant developed as the only legal penal theory. 
Hegel makes self-judgement of the criminal no more than an ‘Idea,’ a mere 
speculative interpretation of the current empiric penal code. He thus leaves the 
mode of application to the respective stages of development of the state, i.e., he 
leaves punishment as it is. Precisely in that he shows himself more critical than 
his Critical echo. A penal theory that at the same time sees in the criminal the 
 310 
 
man can do so only in abstraction, in imagination, precisely because punishment, 
coercion is contrary to human conduct. Besides, this would be impossible to carry 
out. Pure subjective arbitrariness would take the place of the abstract law because 
it would always depend on official ‘honest and decent’ men to adapt the penalty 
to the individuality of the criminal. Plato admitted that the law must be one-sided 
and must make abstraction of the individual. On the other hand, under human 
conditions punishment will really be nothing but the sentence passed by the 
culprit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade him that violence from 
without, exerted on him by others, is violence exerted on himself by himself. On 
the contrary, he will see in other men his natural saviours from the sentence 
which he has pronounced on himself; in other words the relation will be 
reversed.
1001
 
  
Murphy dismisses this passage: “Now except for some very brief passages in The Holy Family, 
Marx himself has nothing more to say on the topic of punishment beyond what is contained in 
this brief Daily Tribune article.”1002 Consequently, Murphy says he will construct a Marxist 
theory of punishment rather than engage in an exegesis because “there are not enough texts.”1003 
This is peculiar because the above-quoted passage from The Holy Family provides the 
explanation for the ambiguity he detects in Marx’s discussion of retributive justice. Murphy’s 
neglect of this passage is all the more strange because he later went on to make major 
contributions to theories of forgiveness. As one might expect from a retributivist, he is skeptical 
of forgiveness. Murphy argues that forgiveness often threatens “self-respect, self-defense, and 
respect for the moral order.”1004 In other words, a lack of resentment for injuries suffered 
indicates a “servile personality.”1005 In order to demonstrate that a theory of forgiveness does not 
entail a servile personality, but rather, can be the expression of revolutionary conviction, we will 
now engage in the exegesis that Murphy rejects. 
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Marx’s radical alternative to the prevailing theories of corrective justice is situated in a 
commentary on the left-Hegelians, the school of so-called ‘Critical criticism.’ Marx offers 
familiar criticisms of Kant and Hegel’s theory of punishment: 
 
Hegel holds that the criminal must as a punishment pass sentence on himself. 
Gans developed this theory at greater length. In Hegel this is the speculative 
disguise of the old jus talionis that Kant developed as the only legal penal theory. 
Hegel makes self-judgement of the criminal no more than an ‘Idea,’ a mere 
speculative interpretation of the current empiric penal code. He thus leaves the 
mode of application to the respective stages of development of the state, i.e., he 
leaves punishment as it is. Precisely in that he shows himself more critical than 
his Critical echo.
1006
 
 
This is similar to Marx’s assertions in his first critique of Hegel in his early notes on The 
Philosophy Right. There Marx argues that Hegel’s seeming sanctification of the Prussian state 
does not stem from a betrayal of his early radicalism. Rather, it occurs because Hegel’s uncritical 
idealism is necessarily accompanied by an uncritical positivism.
1007
 
Marx continues his critique of retribution: “A penal theory that at the same time sees in 
the criminal the man can do so only in abstraction, in imagination, precisely because 
punishment, coercion is contrary to human conduct.”1008 Given the importance of this assertion, 
it is quite truncated. It would be somewhat ambiguous if we did not have the benefit of 
comparing it to other of Marx’s criticisms of retributive justice. Ultimately, what Marx is saying 
is that even the theory espoused by Kant and Hegel, which claims to treat individuals as self-
determining, autonomous, rational free wills, necessarily reduces the human individual to an 
abstraction. The form of punishment espoused by the German Idealists is inherently 
dehumanizing. In the name of the human it is inhumane. This is because it is based in coercion. 
Marx does not condemn the use of violence as such. Rather, he refers to force insofar as it is 
expressed by the state and its laws. Elsewhere, Marx describes the state as “the social organ for 
the maintenance of the social order” that is “separated from society through the division of 
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labour.”1009 Since the state is not a genuine self-government, what Marx describes here as 
inhuman coercion is punishment imposed externally. 
 Marx continues: “Besides, this would be impossible to carry out. Pure subjective 
arbitrariness would take the place of the abstract law because it would always depend on official 
‘honest and decent’ men to adapt the penalty to the individuality of the criminal. Plato admitted 
that the law must be one-sided and must make abstraction of the individual.”1010 Marx asserts 
that, in order to be humane, the law must account for the unique circumstances of the individual. 
Benevolent and competent adjudicators and administrators are unlikely given the lack of 
accountability endemic to anything but self-government. Even if there were such officials, 
however, this difficult process would give way to the subjective whims of those vested with 
these powers. As we saw, Hegel deems the state and therefore its punitive justice an objective 
and universal institution. This is why it is superior to the avenging justice of the state of nature. 
Conversely, Marx depicts the state and its laws as a reflection of the particular interests of the 
ruling class. This is the significance of his mention of the jus talionis. The state, including the 
modern state, has only avenging justice. As we saw in Diamond’s anthropology, if anything, 
hunter-gatherer societies, what Enlightenment thought might describe as the ‘state of nature,’ had 
more of the respect for the individual that Hegel attributes to societies with private property and 
the state. Indeed, as we will soon see, Uchendu’s aforementioned description of the primitive 
Igbo has certain parallels with Marx’s vision of a future society. 
Marx continues: “On the other hand, under human conditions punishment will really be 
nothing but the sentence passed by the culprit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade 
him that violence from without, exerted on him by others, is violence exerted on himself by 
himself.”1011 The theory of corrective justice put forward by the German Idealists partially 
contains in embryo that to which Marx ultimately aspires. In truly human social conditions the 
individual is not driven toward crimes. The individual has genuine autonomy. If the individual 
nonetheless engages in crime, they are the real culprit, the actual source of the transgression. In 
the same way that social equality will provide, as Tawney contends, the best possible conditions 
for the expression and recognition of true talent,
1012
 so too will it provide the best conditions for 
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the identification of genuine criminality and individual psychopathology. Thus, the criminal is 
actually blameworthy and punishable. Nevertheless, this does not bring an end to their 
autonomy. They are actually able to impose the judgement and the sentence on themselves. 
There is no need to pretend that the punishment derives from the free will of the autonomous 
individual. 
Why would the individual exact a punishment on themselves? In the first instance, 
individuals with genuine autonomy will have a more robust sense of personal responsibility. 
Furthermore, they will have a more intense commitment to the community in which they actually 
have a stake. In the last instance, if the individual is genuinely immoral and only laments their 
transgressions when they are caught, they would impose this punishment on themselves from 
fear of excommunication by the community. Perhaps this is the other side of the liability of all 
who are able to labour. In the same way that each must contribute good things according to their 
ability, anyone who contributes bad things must be punished according to their culpability. In 
other words, they must make amends before they can again receive according to their needs. 
Invoking the criterion of needs reminds us of Marx’s critique of abstract right, of the 
calculation of precise equivalents. So far, what Marx has said seems to confirm Murphy’s 
assertions that Marx basically has a theory of retributive justice. This is in tension with his 
critique of equivalence elsewhere. Nevertheless, Marx concludes this passage in The Holy 
Family with the following: “On the contrary, he will see in other men his natural saviours from 
the sentence which he has pronounced on himself; in other words the relation will be 
reversed.”1013 Marx shows that corrective justice contains the basis for a dialectical inversion by 
which it becomes its opposite. The individual is genuinely autonomous. In willing the crime she 
actually wills the punishment. Despite this robust personal responsibility, however, others may 
excuse her transgression as a mistake, especially if it is rare for this particular individual. The 
transgressor makes her appeal to the community. The community may attribute this transgression 
to a human fallibility that they themselves share. 
Although he criticizes Hegel’s theory of retribution, Marx’s alternative is indebted to 
Hegel’s discussion of confession and forgiveness. Marx offers a secular version of this theory. In 
other words, this is an immanent rather than transcendental confession. To see what is meant by 
this, we can look at a few passages in The Holy Family where Marx criticizes the novelist 
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Eugene Sue’s Le Mystere de Paris. Marx situates a critique of religious confession within a 
broader critique of retributive justice. It is also worth noting that Sue is sometimes regarded as 
the first person to say that ‘Revenge is a dish best served cold.’ Marx notes how Marie, a 
character in the novel, becomes convinced that she must judge herself from the Christian point of 
view.
1014
 This means that she must replace her “human and therefore bearable consciousness of 
her debasement” with the “Christian and hence unbearable consciousness of eternal 
damnation.”1015 In other words, the standard by which she judges herself is not internally formed 
and self-determined. Rather, it is a standard that, because it is beyond all possible human 
experience, cannot be confirmed. Therefore, it is impossible to attain, but demands our 
adherence nonetheless. Recall that Hegel is critical of any form of punishment that makes the 
individual the ‘slave of justice.’ Marx criticizes the religious forms of retribution on precisely 
these grounds. The Christian form of confession and forgiveness, which imposes its judgement 
in a transcendental or external way, renders Marie a “serf of consciousness of sin.” In this, the 
external judgement becomes internalized and made into an end in itself: 
 
In her unhappy situation in life she was able to become a lovable, human 
individual; in her exterior debasement she was conscious that her human essence 
was her true essence. Now the filth of modern society which has come into 
exterior contact with her becomes her innermost being; continual hypochondriac 
self-torture because of that filth will be her duty, the task of her life appointed by 
God himself, the self-aim of her existence. Formerly she boasted: ‘I am not the 
one to have fits of tears’ and knew that ‘what’s done is done.’ Now self-torment 
will be her good and remorse will be her glory.
1016
 
 
Conversely, in Marx’s theory of confession and forgiveness, the process is based in the self-
determination of the individuals involved. It is not imposed externally, whether by the state or by 
religious authority. 
Hegel’s critique of Kantian and post-Kantian morality, the ethos of the ‘beautiful soul,’ is 
similar to Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of retribution. And yet, Marx dismisses Hegel’s 
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discussion of the beautiful soul. In Marx’s 1844 notes on the final chapter of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, the chapter on ‘Absolute Knowing,’ he mentions forgiveness in multiple places, 
but also asserts that “Hegel keeps developing the tedious process of the beautiful soul.”1017 
Perhaps this is because one of the things motivating Hegel’s theory of confession and 
forgiveness is the possibility of conscious societal change without need of violent revolution and 
counter-revolution. Marx clearly rejects this: revolution is necessary to achieve socialism, the 
truly human society. Nevertheless, Marx also aspires to communal relations in which societal 
transformations do not require violence. In other words, he aspires to what we could call a 
community of forgiveness: “It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes 
and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions.”1018 
 Marx criticizes the prevailing theories of corrective justice, namely, deterrence and 
retribution. This is not a purely negative critique. He offers a positive alternative. Nevertheless, 
he never describes this alternative as a theory of justice, corrective or otherwise. Marx likely 
deems his alternative theory of crime and punishment to be beyond justice. In other words, what 
is inadequate in the prevailing theories of corrective justice he deems to be the shortcomings 
inherent to corrective justice as such. This also has precursors in Hegel. As we saw, Hegel argues 
that, “The punishment inflicted by law is merely just. The common character, the connection of 
crime and punishment, is only equality, not life.”1019 In other words, Hegel’s account emphasizes 
some of the limits he deems to be inherent to justice. The law is a kind of failure or defeat. It is 
the concession that it cannot eliminate crimes. It can only punish them.
1020
 Justice proves 
insufficient against that which is the cause of crimes. Marx roots crime and punishment in the 
historically mutable conditions of class-divided societies. He aspires to a classless, and therefore, 
crime-free society. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Marx deems his theory to be ultimately 
beyond justice. 
 As we have seen, this faith in the more or less straightforward reconciliation of individual 
and general interests in the classless society is deeply rooted in materialist arguments. This has 
led to a neglect of theorization about ethics and justice in the present. This has also been inspired 
by the obvious constraints imposed on ethical activity by contemporary class-divided society. 
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This silence would only be justified if these determinants were total, permitting no freedom at 
all, which they rarely, if ever, are. This neglect is particularly disastrous when we consider that 
such a theory may be necessary for the actions required in any kind of transition from imperfect 
conditions to less imperfect conditions. Marxism has been quite dependent on the materialist 
arguments made by Marx. This helps to explain the paucity of material on ethics in general, and 
justice in particular. This silence is true not only with regard to the projected socialist future, but 
in the present capitalist society. 
 This creates significant gaps in Marx’s alternative to prevailing theories of corrective 
justice. For example, he says very little about the extent of personal responsibility and moral 
culpability within capitalist conditions. Furthermore, Marx contends that the only way that 
punishment can be adapted to each individual is if it is the individual who undertakes it. 
Nevertheless, Marx says nothing about how the individual passing self-sentence can avoid 
falling into the subjective arbitrariness for which he criticizes any attempt to implement concrete 
justice under capitalism. This also provokes the question, what constitutes a genuine confession 
and sentence worthy of the forgiveness of others? Although the community is the culprit’s 
‘natural saviours,’ this does not imply that they will forgive every transgression and pardon 
every sentence, especially if the individual is a frequent transgressor. In what Marx describes as 
the human society, deterrence is abandoned altogether because it is illegitimate regardless of 
social circumstances. Secular notions of confession and forgiveness, what later came to be 
described as restorative justice, is the primary form of correction. Nevertheless, retribution may 
be required as the secondary, exceptional form undertaken as a last resort. Marx offers no 
explanation of the relation between these two forms of correction. Resolving these tensions is all 
the more important given the experiences of ‘actually existing socialism.’ For example, De 
George makes an important observation about the theory of punishment among Marxist-Leninist 
theorists in the Soviet Union: 
 
Significantly absent from the Soviet ethical literature is also any discussion of 
punishment, either in theory or in practice. While it is said that an individual’s 
motives, circumstances, and moral makeup should be considered in determining 
the punishment and education of criminals, there is no discussion of the 
retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment, and no attempt to analyze 
 317 
 
Soviet penal practices in terms either of communist morality or the writings of 
Marx. Forfeiting human life for offenses against social property, a practice 
condemned by Marx but practiced in the Soviet Union, draws neither defense nor 
comment from Soviet philosophers. In like manner Soviet ethics lacks any 
developed doctrine of rights, and the Soviet treatments of justice are few and 
suffer from acute paucity of content. It is claimed that communism is the highest 
form of social justice because under communism all men will be equal: there will 
be one relationship to the means of production, there will be equal conditions of 
work and distribution, and each person will take an active art in the direction of 
social affairs. Two Soviet philosophers, V. P. Tugarinov and E. G. Fedorenko 
recognize in justice not only the aspect of equality but also that of recompense, 
but here their analysis abortively ends.
1021
 
 
 Some of these issues have been raised and addressed by subsequent theorizing, but rarely 
within Marxism. Indeed, Marx’s alternative to prevailing theories of corrective justice has 
significant parallels with, and is therefore an important precursor of, subsequent theories of 
‘restorative justice.’ Unlike Marx, these theories do not only pose an alternative, but cast it 
explicitly as a theory of justice. 
 Howard Zehr, in one of the founding texts of restorative justice, characterizes the 
Enlightenment theories of corrective justice: “The blindfolded goddess with balance in hand 
symbolizes well the impersonal, process-oriented, nature of the contemporary paradigm.”1022 
Indeed, when Zehr contrasts this theory with his alternative, he sounds like Hegel in his 
criticisms of Kant: whereas retributive justice deems crime a violation of the state and its laws, 
restorative justice regards it as a violation of people and their communal relations.
1023
 As with 
both Hegel and Marx, the attempt to promote forgiveness is the foundational aspect of this 
alternative: 
 
Retribution often leaves a legacy of hatred. Perhaps it is more satisfying as an 
experience of justice than no justice at all, but it does little to address hostilities. 
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Such hostilities can impede healing. That is the beauty of forgiveness. By 
addressing hostilities, it allows both the victim and the offender to take control of 
their own lives. Like reconciliation, however, forgiveness is not easy and cannot 
be forced.
1024
 
 
Zehr asserts that, whereas retributive justice focuses on the past, restorative justice focuses on the 
future.
1025
 As with Hegel, the justice of revenge or retribution chains us to past transgressions. 
Conversely, the mutual recognition necessary for confession and forgiveness absolves these 
‘debts’ for transgressor and victim, for the so-called debtor and creditor alike. 
 Contemporary theories of restorative justice also begin to resolve some of the 
aforementioned gaps in Marx’s alternative to corrective justice. Indeed, Zehr notes how 
retributive justice, often deemed the paradigm of making one accountable, of claiming personal 
responsibility, actually results in the opposite: 
 
Many offenders are reluctant to make themselves vulnerable by trying to 
understand the consequences of their action. After all, they have built up edifices 
of stereotypes and rationalizations to protect themselves against exactly this kind 
of information. Many are reluctant to take on the responsibility to make right. In 
many ways taking one’s punishment is easier. While it may hurt for a time, it 
involves no responsibility and no threat to rationalizations and stereotypes. 
Offenders often need strong encouragement or even coercion to accept their 
obligations.
1026
 
 
Zehr contends that part of what it means for offenders to take responsibility is to share in 
deciding what is to be done, what will meet the obligations created by the harm.
1027
 In this, 
theories of restorative justice begin to answer questions about personal responsibility and the 
subjective arbitrariness of declaring our culpability and determining our punishment. 
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Most important, perhaps, is that theories of restorative justice prefigure what would be 
possible in much more amenable social conditions. With this theory of rehabilitation, justice is 
not about what is deserved but what is needed.
1028
 In other words, it shifts the emphasis away 
from the exacting, abstract requirements typical of commutative justice toward the concrete 
standards more typical of distributive justice in its highest form. 
Marx’s immanent critique of crime and punishment demonstrates that the capitalist state 
offends against its own highest principle of corrective justice: it punishes the crime that it helps 
to create but cannot eliminate. Therefore, punishment under capitalism is abstract and based in a 
bad infinite. Conversely, Marx makes contributions to a theory of rehabilitation, of genuine 
correction under capitalism and of forgiveness under socialism. As is by now familiar, however, 
Marx is hesitant to describe any of this in terms of justice. Although he demonstrates how an 
alternative arises from the self-contradictions of corrective justice under capitalism, there is 
every indication that, for Marx, socialism not only fully actualizes rehabilitation, but that this 
actualization means that it goes beyond corrective justice as such. This confirms the 
interpretation offered at the end of my exploration of distributive justice. 
Marx’s contributions to corrective justice are based, in part, in his assertion that, with 
regard to state power and its laws, essentially, might makes right. This has important 
implications for every aspect of justice, but most importantly, for that aspect of justice which 
remains to be discussed: complete justice. This, the ethical orientation of the individual toward 
the common ends of the social whole, was, in the millennia before capitalism, deemed to be the 
capstone of justice. It is to it that we must now turn. 
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Part 5: Complete Justice 
Chapter 13: Hegel on Complete Justice 
 
We turn now to the question of complete justice, the ethical disposition of the individual toward 
the common goods of the social whole. Complete justice tends to have two components that it 
attempts to reconcile. The first is the individual who, when deciding how to act, considers not 
only her own good but also the good of others. The second component is the content of the 
common good. This is meant both in the sense of what defines the common good, what it is 
primarily taken to mean, as well as who, if anyone, is primarily responsible for the good of the 
social whole. Although everyone bears responsibility for the common good to a certain extent, it 
is often deemed to be the primary task, the social function, of a specific group. This has often 
been ascribed to the ruling class and the state. In this discussion of complete justice we begin 
again with Hegel. 
Hegel espouses something akin to complete justice in his theory of ‘Ethical Life,’ 
although he is more inclined to speak of the universal interest and objective freedom than of the 
common good and complete justice. For Hegel, a good state must integrate every part of society 
into a more or less coherent organic whole. In the modern era, the middle-class civil servants, 
what he calls the ‘administration of justice,’ are especially important in this regard. Hegel deems 
them a universal class tasked with the reconciliation of the plurality of interests, and indeed, the 
occasional antagonism of interests. For Hegel, the most significant theorist of complete justice, 
of justice in general, is Plato. In particular, Hegel praises Plato’s attempt to construct the division 
of labour, the distribution of social functions, in a way that ensures the happiness of the whole 
society. Nevertheless, Hegel criticizes Plato for suppressing the conscience of the individual. As 
we have seen, for Hegel, it is only the modern state that has the potential to give due 
consideration to the ‘subjective freedom’ of individuals. Ultimately, Hegel’s definition of what I 
call here complete justice is the reconciliation of the objective freedom of the state with the 
subjective freedom of the individual. This can only occur when the state organizes the various 
orders of society into estates, which politicizes and educates them, so that each citizen develops 
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the capacities, the practical reason, necessary to reconcile their own particular interests with the 
universal interest of the social whole. 
 In all of the previous chapters on Hegel I have either focused on the Phenomenology or 
made it the foundation of my examination of the Hegelian corpus as a whole. In this chapter, 
however, I will focus primarily on Hegel’s later writings, and in particular, the Philosophy of 
Right. There are at least two reasons for this. First, Hegel’s theory of the state in its historical 
development, as well as its implications for his theory of justice as a whole, only become clearly 
apparent in his later works. The early works, including the Phenomenology of Spirit, are much 
more speculative in this regard. The second reason is that Marx’s theory of the state was in large 
part forged through a critique of the Philosophy of Right. As we will see, there are a number of 
significant tensions between Hegel’s early and late works with regard to questions of justice. 
Hegel begins the Philosophy of Right with the free will of the individual. He asserts, “The 
Idea of right is freedom.”1029 Therefore, Hegel’s political science will only avoid dogmatism if 
the starting point of freedom becomes justified within the exposition itself. According to Hegel, 
we must begin with the free will because, for we moderns, there are no immediate or obvious 
goods: “the will is only what it commits itself to; it is not by nature good, but can become what it 
is only by its own efforts.”1030 The world does not impose principles of good on us.1031 For 
Hegel, it is crucial which desires I choose to identify with and pursue because, as Wood notes, 
“My self-definition is at stake, along with the content of my freedom.”1032 According to Harris, 
Hegel does not espouse the ancient ideal, ‘Know thyself,’ which presupposes an already 
constituted objective human perfection. Rather, his ideal is ‘Make thyself.’1033 Hegel contends 
that the only plausible basis for an ‘objective spirit’ is freedom, namely, acting according to self-
derived and self-imposed principles or laws. The dialectical transitions throughout the 
Philosophy of Right are successive movements through ever more concrete, more encompassing, 
more robust notions of freedom. Hegel will criticize the formalism of Rousseau’s notion of 
freedom as “obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself,”1034 as well as that offered by 
Kant: “the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity of giving universal laws, although 
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with the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation.”1035 Nevertheless, Hegel does 
not wholly reject these theories. Rather, the Philosophy of Right culminates in his own version of 
the idea of freedom as the law we give ourselves. 
For Hegel, the simplest and most abstract shape of freedom is the relation between the 
individual and things. Hegel refers to this right to own property as ‘abstract Right.’1036 The 
relation between two separate wills mediated by property is contract. Each recognizes the right 
of the other to own and use what is her own property. Like Locke, Hegel more or less assumes, 
at least within the Philosophy of Right, that this must be private property. As we have seen, this 
property-relation gives rise to the principle of justice: to each their due. Nevertheless, Hegel 
deems this a shallow conception of recognition. Those who enter the contract are ultimately 
guided by their own self-interest. If this is all that justice amounted to, one or both individuals 
will break the contract if this is to their greater advantage. Therefore, without any other standard 
to guide it, abstract Right will lead to its opposite: wrong.
1037
 Hegel rejects the idea that abstract 
Right, the contractual relation, or what we have called here commutative justice, can be the 
paradigmatic form of justice for society as a whole. The social contract fosters a common or 
general will but not a will that is universal in and for itself.
1038
 We require an objective standard 
of right elevated above the contingency of these self-interested parties. 
 The search for a more universal standard is Morality. Rather than mere self-interest, the 
will of others is a crucial determination of the moral action. Whereas the instrumental relations 
of abstract Right are more concerned with consequences, Morality is based on the intentions of 
individuals: “Human beings expect to be judged in accordance with their self-determination, and 
are in this respect free, whatever external determinants may be at work.”1039 The moral point of 
view refuses to recognize anything that is not its own. Hegel believes that modernity makes 
possible, for the first time, the realization of subjective freedom: “The right to recognize nothing 
that I do not perceive as rational is the highest right of the subject.”1040 Nevertheless, this ‘right 
of subjectivity’ is only formal. The purely universal will must often result in the renunciation of 
desires and inclinations because they are inextricably bound with an outer world to which 
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morality is indifferent. Furthermore, this morality of pure inwardness, despite its attempts to 
escape the particularity of the contractual relation, becomes even more subjective. It asserts that 
the ethical nature of an action is determined by the individual’s conviction and whatever she 
holds to be right. It is contingent on the particular individual expressing these convictions. In this 
way, the moral good leads to its opposite: evil. 
The only way to overcome the contradiction between good and evil is by surpassing the 
sheer subjectivity of the individual. This situation requires the ‘right of objectivity’ embodied by 
the state: “since action is an alteration which must exist in an actual world and thus seeks 
recognition in it, it must in general conform to what is recognized as valid in that world. 
Whoever wills an action in the actual world has, in so doing, submitted himself to its laws and 
recognized the right of objectivity.”1041 As we have seen, the transition from Morality to a more 
substantive form of ethical recognition is similar to what Hegel describes as the transition from 
revenge to retribution, from an avenging justice to a punitive justice. If I transgress the prevailing 
laws according to my convictions, other people, on the basis of their own convictions, are 
therefore quite justified in regarding my actions as crimes. Others may subject me to a justice 
which, although it is only my own justice, I experience as someone else’s subjective conviction 
acting upon me as an external force. This clash of subjective convictions can only be resolved 
through the objectivity of the state. Hegel describes this progress toward a genuinely social 
ontology as ‘Ethical Life.’1042 
According to Hegel, whereas pre-modern societies tend to regard the existing customs 
and laws as sacrosanct, the ‘Bildung’ or culture of the modern age gives free thought a leading 
role in the formation of values and demands. The objective social world must conform to the 
rational determinations of individuals. If, however, these conscientious individuals do not take 
heed of their social conditions, do not appreciate that any attempt to change the world according 
to rational determinations must occur in a particular customary, legal, and institutional context, 
then these rational determinations will be nothing more than the personal whims of individuals. 
Like the French Revolution, it will devolve into the Terror. For Hegel, this is the importance of 
the objectivity conferred by Ethical Life. ‘Bildung,’ the art of making the individual ethical, 
demonstrates how these natural beings can be reborn as a second, spiritual nature: “The 
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individual attains his right only by becoming the citizen of a good state.”1043 In a free society the 
dynamic balance between institutions prepares the individual for freedom. Thus, we must unfold 
these institutions and their relations as parts of an organic whole. 
 The three essential parts of Ethical Life are the family, civil society, and the state. They 
combine as the universal, particular, and individual moments of a rational syllogism. The family 
is the universal because its basis is love, the recognition of oneself in another. Civil society is the 
particular, the seeming loss of ethical life, because everyone is self-interested and deems society 
a mere means. The State is the individual, the reconciliation of the universal and particular in a 
concrete universal because reason has been realized in the world in the form of public law. For 
Hegel, the state is a good state if the ‘subjective freedom’ of the individual conscience is 
successfully reconciled with the ‘objective freedom’ of the state as a whole. 
 Hegel differentiates the State into three elements: (i) the legislature, or the power to 
determine and establish the universal; (ii) the executive, or the power to subsume particular 
spheres under the universal; and (iii) the sovereign, or the constitutional monarch who, as the 
apex of the state, unites the different powers under a single individual.
1044
 Hegel believes that all 
of the institutions of Ethical Life gain a political character through their integration with the 
political state proper.
1045
 The most important part of the modern state for Hegel is the executive 
branch, and its most significant part is the civil service. For Hegel, the civil service is tasked with 
the integration of all of the particular interests of the familial, civil social, and state 
organizations. Therefore, civil servants are the particular class which is the most representative 
of a universal class. They perform the “universal interest of the state.’1046 
The civil service is largely drawn from the middle class, which, for Hegel, is the most 
politically conscious and well-educated class. Furthermore, they are prevented from becoming a 
remote aristocracy by the sovereign above them and the people below.
1047
 This can only occur, 
however, under two conditions. First, the people must be transformed from a disorganized 
“collection of scattered atoms”1048 into organized, guild-like estates through which they can 
express their common interests. Second, there must be impartiality in the selection of the 
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members of this universal class and in the conduct of their activities. The sole standard of 
evaluation of a civil servant is merit. In other words, Hegel is insisting on reforms, still not 
achieved in the Prussian state of his time, that offices be open to talent: “The objective moment 
in their vocation is knowledge and proof of ability; this proof guarantees that the needs of the 
state will be met, and, as the sole condition [of appointment], at the same time guarantees every 
citizen the possibility of joining the universal estate.”1049 Hegel asserts that this also requires 
decent payment and a certain degree of comfort so that their decisions are free from “subjective 
dependence and influence.”1050 It is only in these circumstances that civil servants will adopt the 
genuine object of the administration of justice, the “proper interests of all individuals.”1051 
To take one example of how the civil service acts as a universal class, we can study its 
relation to distributive justice. As we saw in a previous chapter, Hegel contends that one of the 
crucial tasks of the civil service is the ‘administration of justice.’ He acknowledges that civil 
society, the realm of the market, can give rise to both boundless extravagance and endless 
deprivation. Indeed, deprivation is to civil society what wrong and evil are to abstract Right and 
Morality. If left unchecked, civil society cannot help but create a ‘rabble’ that threatens the 
stability of the social order. Thus, harmony requires the forcible intervention of the state.
1052
 In 
its attempts to achieve the right balance between absolute free trade and total state control, the 
civil service demonstrates its capacities as the universal class and the state expresses its ability to 
integrate every social sphere into a coherent whole. Nevertheless, we should already be skeptical 
about the extent to which the civil service can be a universal class given that, as we saw, Hegel 
thinks that deprivation must often be resolved by resorting to colonialism. 
In light of his depiction of the state and the civil service, we must ask whether or not 
Hegel’s theory of Ethical Life offers a robust notion of the common good. It is obvious that 
Hegel wants to go beyond the methodological individualism of the liberal subject with its 
subjective good and voluntary contracts. Nevertheless, does Hegel offer an explicit theory of the 
ethical disposition of the individual oriented toward the common ends, the objective goods, of 
the social whole? There are longstanding disagreements about this. 
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Pinkard notes that Hegel does not say that the state should prescribe a common set of 
virtues: “Quite strikingly, Hegel nowhere invokes anything strongly resembling a classical 
doctrine of the ‘common good’ in his theory of the state”1053 Conversely, Wood asserts that “the 
burgher’s concerns as a professional man and a corporation member prominently include 
concerns about the welfare of others and about the common good of civil society as a whole.”1054 
Similarly, Avineri asserts, 
 
Hegel’s attempt to find a sphere which transcends private interests is similar to 
the Platonic endeavour, but while Plato tried to neutralize his Guardians totally 
from ‘civil society’ by depriving them of family and private property, Hegel’s 
solution is less radical; it is also, after all, the very method commonly used by 
modern states in their attempt to ensure the relative independence of their civil 
service from the pressures of civil society.
1055
 
 
Harris also seizes on this connection to Plato, but gives it much wider scope. For Harris, not only 
does Hegel endorse a notion of the objective common good, he also offers something akin to a 
theory of complete justice in its classical sense: 
 
‘Social Justice’ is the focal concept in Hegel’s practical philosophy just as it is in 
that of Plato. The justice of fairness, which is the individual virtue that is vital in 
social relations, must derive its essential criteria of what is ‘fair’ from the ideal 
harmony of the whole. What is fair is not generally or abstractly what is equal, 
but what is proportioned to the harmony of that whole, or what is required by and 
for the ‘living bond’ that holds the whole together.1056 
 
There is some evidence for Harris’s interpretation. For example, Hegel asserts that Plato was 
correct when he contends that justice as a whole, what we are calling here ‘complete justice,’ has 
its foundation in the state: “Plato had a firm grasp of this point when he showed that what justice 
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is in and for itself—which he correctly understood in its entirety to be included under the right of 
spirit—can be exhibited only in the objective configuration of justice, namely the construction of 
the state as ethical life.”1057 Indeed, Hegel asserts that Plato presents the substance of Ethical Life 
in its “ideal beauty and truth.”1058 Furthermore, Harris’s interpretation is not weakened by 
Hegel’s evident disagreements with Plato. For example, Hegel criticizes Plato’s explanation of 
the ethical substance of the state because it is devoid of subjectivity. In other words, Plato’s 
depiction of the state does not sufficiently account for the conscience of the individual: 
 
The principle of the self-sufficient and inherently infinite personality of the 
individual, the principle of subjective freedom, which arose in an inward form in 
the Christian religion and in an external form (which was therefore linked with 
abstract universality) in the Roman world, is denied its right in the merely 
substantial form of the actual spirit [in Plato’s Republic]. This principle is 
historically later than the Greek world, and the philosophical reflection which can 
fathom these depths is likewise later than the substantial Idea of Greek 
philosophy.
1059
 
 
For Hegel, Plato commits an injustice when, in establishing his ideal state, he abolishes the 
spheres of intimacy and of private property. This is one reason why Hegel invests such 
importance in the family and especially civil society in modern Ethical Life. Furthermore, Hegel 
asserts that Plato denies individuals their rights when his ruling class, the guardians, allocate 
people to the different castes in the social division of labour.
1060
 Hegel deems this to be little 
better than the Indian caste-system, which assigns social functions according to birth alone.
1061
 
For Hegel, one of the reasons why the modern era inaugurates the age of freedom is because it 
increasingly recognizes that individuals should be able to freely choose their own vocation. This 
is true especially of the civil service which should be open to any citizen with the will and the 
appropriate merits. Indeed, this freedom to choose our own path, to ‘make thyself,’ indicates 
what is actually the most important principle in Hegel’s political philosophy. 
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Although Harris is probably the most knowledgeable English-language interpreter of 
Hegel, he dramatically overestimates the significance of justice for Hegel. Harris neglects the 
extent to which, for Hegel, justice, including complete justice, has no status independent of what 
is actually the focal concept in his practical philosophy: freedom. For example, in his lecture-
notes in the History of Philosophy, Hegel asserts that, whereas Plato, in works like The Republic, 
depicts justice as being based in the “organism of the state,” for we moderns, “‘justice’ according 
to its true concept means ‘freedom’ in the subjective sense.”1062 With this in mind, we can begin 
to understand Hegel’s theory of what we have called complete justice. 
Hegel shows the merely partial character of what we have referred to here as 
commutative justice, distributive justice, and corrective justice. They must be unified into a 
coherent whole by the state. Therefore, Hegel does have a theory of something akin to complete 
justice. In a good society, each individual has a role in, and identifies with, the Ethical Life of the 
state. When the state organizes its citizens into the system of estates, it politicizes them because 
each must contribute to the articulation of their own particular interests in ways that situate them 
in the universal interests of the social whole. This educative function of the state cultivates 
practical reason in its citizens. This is the way in which subjective freedom and objective 
freedom are reconciled. Nevertheless, Hegel also seems to collapse justice into his notion of 
freedom. This occurs primarily because, unlike the ancients, Hegel does not believe that there is 
a pre-given, ontological good, much less natural right in its classical sense. Therefore, the way to 
avoid license, or, what Hegel calls ‘arbitrary freedom,’ is not a principle of justice. Rather, it is 
the sufficient universalization of freedom. This is why Hegel is more inclined to speak of the 
universal interest rather than the common good. 
Hegel also rejects natural right in its modern sense. He criticizes the instrumental reason 
of the utilitarian reduction of duty to desire and the formalistic reason of the deontological 
adherence to duty irrespective of desire. Instead, he aspires to their reconciliation. The liberal 
notion of freedom tends to regard others as limits to my liberty. The only thing that justifies 
ceding certain liberties in the establishment of ‘civilized’ society is preserving a still greater 
liberty. This is the best possible situation for a freedom that is based in a conception of 
‘rationality’ according to which the most rational outcome is receiving much and giving little. 
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Hegel disagrees with this framework. Although certain forms of social relations certainly do 
impose constraints, nonetheless, the individual acting in isolation also suffers significant 
limitations because she is prevented from undertaking important self-defining activities that can 
only occur in concert with others. Furthermore, Hegel rejects the zero-sum notion of rationality. 
Certain aspects of our fulfilment are necessarily reciprocal. In other words, they are only possible 
to the extent that one is giving approximately as much as they are receiving. In this mutual 
expression of freedom, individuals attempt to not only avoid encroaching on each other, but to 
positively contribute to each other in their accomplishment of things that neither could do in 
isolation. This is Hegel’s notion of recognition. 
Hegel’s depiction of Ethical Life as the achievement of recognition inspires questions 
about whether or not he adequately incorporates abstract Right and Morality. In other words, 
does Hegel successfully reconcile subjective freedom with objective freedom? There are also 
long-standing debates about this. Marcuse, for example, deems Hegel’s discussion of Morality 
quite impoverished.
1063
 He contends that Hegel simply subsumes it into Ethical Life without 
adequately preserving its essential aspects, as would be necessary in any genuinely dialectical 
negation. For Marcuse, this is because Hegel’s notion of the state is quite functionalist: “His 
justification of the strong state was made on the ground that it was a necessary supplement to the 
antagonistic structure of the individualist society he analyzed.”1064 Conversely, Pippin argues 
that what has vanished in the negation of Morality by Ethical Life is self-will and individualistic 
conscience, not individual will and conscience itself.
1065
 The individual’s dignity is grounded in 
ethical substantiality and she is autonomous only by virtue of such participation.
1066
 While the 
conscience of each individual must account for the collective good from the very outset, 
nonetheless, the social whole must also dedicate itself to the self-actualization of each and every 
one of its numbers.
1067
 Similarly, Siep argues, 
 
With respect to the existence of such a community, all rules, rights, and duties, as 
far as they concern individuals’ external conduct, are relative, i.e., they can be 
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restricted for the sake of this existence. But with regard to the freedom of 
individuals, the community is also relative in its own manner; if it fundamentally 
or ‘permanently’ ceases to assure the legal, moral, and ethical freedom of 
individuals, it can no longer lay claim to such duties.
1068
 
 
Nevertheless, as Siep also notes, “Hegel himself is not very clear on this point.”1069 Hegel does 
not offer much of an explanation about what this individual conscience portends. 
These questions become murkier when we note that, for Hegel, while each nation-state is 
the ultimate expression of the universal in relation to its own population, in relation to other 
nation-states, they do not follow a universal will, but rather their own particular wills. Indeed, 
Hegel argues that the ‘ethical moment of war’ is not an ‘absolute evil’ because warfare bolsters 
patriotism: “This is apparent in various occurrences in history, as when successful wars have 
averted internal unrest and consolidated the internal power of the state.”1070 A few questions 
arise. How can the state, heralded by Hegel as the embodiment of universal freedom, be akin to 
an individual in a state of nature writ large? Why must the state resort to war to intensify 
patriotism if it reconciles the duties and interests of its citizens, thereby establishing itself as the 
basis of their concrete freedom? Is this a bad infinite that is analogous to Hegel’s appeal to 
colonialism for the resolution of problems of distributive justice? 
 These questions become murkier still when we note that, for Hegel, the Ethical Life of 
states in the international domain is not the highest, shall we say, the most complete form of 
justice. This standard of ‘right’ is not a natural law against which the positive law of the state can 
be judged. Rather, Hegel’s standard is history. Ultimately, the rights embodied by abstract Right, 
Morality, and Ethical Life are subordinate to the right of world spirit. Hegel asserts that the 
justice meted out to individuals in the realm of Ethical Life, the sphere of conscious activity, is 
only an “imperfect justice” relative to the “absolute Right” of “world history as the world’s court 
of judgement.”1071 
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When the leading nation that is responsible for the latest progression of humankind 
finally actualizes all of its potential, the age becomes decadent. Isolated thinkers can express 
their radically individual conscience, but this is only a negative criticism of the prevailing order. 
It is not a positive vision of an alternative order to come. Nevertheless, the development of 
world-Spirit is only abstract and powerless without the motive power of individuals acting 
according to their own interests. Indeed, it is in this context that Hegel asserts, as we have 
already studied elsewhere, “nothing great in the world has been accomplished without 
passion.”1072 A higher order can only emerge through the actions of those rare ‘world-historical 
individuals’ who, obsessively committed to their own passion, interests, and vision, unwittingly 
forge the higher phase of freedom in the development of humankind. 
These world-historical individuals, the Alexanders, the Caesars, the Napoleons, have the 
“right of heroes to establish states.”1073 Hegel contends that these world-historical individuals 
and the new “civilization” they are founding may treat all other nations as more or less 
“barbarian” peoples—after all, “so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent 
flower.”1074 Indeed, Hegel describes human history heretofore as “the slaughter-bench at which 
the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been 
victimized.”1075 Furthermore, in these most “comprehensive relations” of history there are 
“momentous collisions” between, on the one hand, the acknowledged rights, laws, and duties, 
and on the other hand, the ambitions of world-historical individuals who are the unwitting 
harbingers of a higher order.
1076
 
 
They who on moral grounds, and consequently with noble intention, have resisted 
that which the advance of the spiritual idea makes necessary, stand higher in 
moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into the means—under 
the direction of a superior principle—of realizing the purposes of that principle. 
But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of the same 
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circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently it is only a formal 
rectitude, deserted by the living Spirit and by God, which those who stand upon 
ancient right and order maintain.
1077
 
 
What formerly stood within ‘the limits of the same circle of transient and corruptible 
experience,’ namely, the antinomy of equal rights between which force decides, explodes into 
the genuinely tragic situations through which the Idea develops, the “truth striving and urging 
towards itself.”1078 Therefore, the history of the world occupies a higher ground than morality. 
Although these ultimate results are not the conscious aim of world-historical individuals, the 
substance of their actions creates an additional result that recoils back upon them.
1079
 However 
profound the conflagration, this general Idea remains untouched in the background. Hegel 
famously calls this the “cunning of reason.”1080 
Hegel believes that what ethics can accomplish is circumscribed by the spirit of the age. 
Therefore, our historical judgements of these past eras must account for this in terms of our 
understanding of history as a whole. This is how Hegel can assert the following, which should 
also remind us of similar statements by Marx: “Slavery occurs in the transitional phase between 
natural human existence and the truly ethical condition; it occurs in a world where a wrong is 
still right. Here, the wrong is valid, so that the position it occupies is a necessary one.”1081 
Nevertheless, for Hegel, this is also the significance of the modern era: it inaugurates the 
reconciliation of morality, ethics, and politics into a single cohesive freedom. Or does it? 
There are also long-standing debates about whether or not Hegel deems the modern era 
the end of history. Certain theorists, such as Pinkard, argue that, for Hegel, this certainly is the 
end of history: 
 
Prior to Napoleon’s creation of a new Germany, Hegel had been calling for a new 
order. Now, having seen his call answered – although not completely and 
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certainly not in all its details – he became increasingly interested in defending and 
reforming that order in the face of what he took to be its enemies.
1082
 
 
Pinkard contends that this is why a much more speculative and future-oriented work like the 
Phenomenology of Spirit gained an ambiguous relationship to the rest of Hegel’s corpus, while 
he deemed the Science of Logic increasingly important for his legacy. Indeed, he was in the 
process of redrafting it at the time of his death. Similarly, Gadamer argues that, for Hegel, this is 
the end of history because everyone now acknowledges that, irrespective of our social 
circumstances, the human essence is freedom. No future order could be based on a new 
principle: “It is no longer possible for anyone still to affirm the unfreedom of humanity. The 
principle that all are free never again can be shaken.”1083 Nevertheless, there is still ‘history’ in 
the sense that the principle of universal freedom must be translated into reality: “Obviously this 
points to the unending march of world history into the openness of its future tasks and gives no 
becalming assurance that everything is already in order.”1084 In a similar fashion, Williams 
asserts that, for Hegel, while logic can be closed, the empirical realm remains open.
1085
 Indeed, 
Alexander Kojeve, one of the most influential Hegelians of the twentieth-century, took Hegel 
quite literally in this respect. He largely abandoned theoretical work and joined the French civil 
service where he was, as he put it, “presiding over the end of history.”1086 
Conversely, Dickey and Nisbet, the editors of Hegel’s Political Writings, assert that 
Hegel aspires to a second Reformation. While Luther’s Reformation admirably reformed 
Christian doctrine, it failed to adequately reform Christian life. Hegel’s theory of the state as the 
embodiment of Ethical Life was to be the agent of this task.
1087
 Dahlstrom points to similar 
conclusions. He notes the liberal criticisms of Hegel that, since he says so little about individual 
conscience in the later stages of the Philosophy of Right, his theory of the state does not 
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sufficiently affirm the dignity of our subjective freedom.
1088
 Dahlstrom attempts to counter these 
criticisms by pointing to, among other things, Hegel’s discussions of those historical junctures 
when Ethical Life must cede to individual conscience: “As examples of such periods Hegel 
mentions Athens at the time of Socrates, the Rome of the Stoics, and just possibly his 
contemporary Germany. In this way Hegel clearly distinguishes between his systematic account 
of the relationship of morality to ethical life and the possible, historical forms of this 
relationship.”1089 Finally, Avineri notes Hegel’s assertion that because philosophy is only its own 
time comprehended in thought, political science must concern itself with what is, not with what 
ought to be. Avineri then asserts: “the consequence is inescapable: that though Hegel is not 
announcing the advent of a new world or preaching it, his very ability to comprehend his own 
world may already point to its possible demise.”1090 
The stakes of this are extremely high. If Hegel does not deem the modern era the end of 
history, his dialectic falls to pieces. It is not sufficient that Hegel, like Socrates or the Stoics, be 
an isolated individual criticizing the present because unlike them Hegel professes a theory of 
universal history. If this is not the end of history, then his dialectic does not become a self-
enclosed circle. It does not achieve the Absolute within which everything is contained. It does 
not become the good infinite within which all truth claims are immanent to possible human 
experience. Instead, it becomes an infinite regress, a spurious or bad infinite. It cannot verify that 
it knows the true grounds of thought. Skepticism and doubt thereby persist because Hegel’s 
attempt at an immanent method becomes no less transcendental than any of the other 
metaphysical frameworks. In order to answer these questions, we must first return briefly to the 
conclusion of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, a much more speculative and optimistic work, 
before comparing it to the strange relation between his most important late works, the 
Philosophy of Right and the Science of Logic. 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel declares Christianity the absolute religion because 
it shows what it is for a god to die. Therefore, the divine can be interpreted within human 
experience.
1091
 The death of God is not terrifying because it is only the death of God as 
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something wholly external to us.
1092
 Far from inaugurating a situation where all is permitted, the 
modern era makes possible the emergence of the divine into human existence. This is the true 
religious community that creates a world and knows itself as the creators of that world. 
Heretofore, human history has occurred ‘behind our backs.’ It has been beyond our control, an 
alien and inhuman thing.
1093
 Modernity reveals that our goal is the universalization of the 
knowledge of history in all of its major stages, as shapes of consciousness, and of ourselves as 
the product of that history. Since freedom is the comprehension of necessity, this provides the 
grounds for making our history in a conscious, rational, and free way. 
When the divine and the human are reconciled in the true religious community, the 
relation between good and evil no longer separates into the irreconcilable binary of the pure evil 
of the fallen condition of human life and the pure goodness of an afterlife that is separate from 
our own. Therefore, this world is simultaneously good and evil. Absolute Knowing comprehends 
that selfishness is evil, but that it is only the self that can have knowledge and act. This 
conscientious individual, as an individual, is open to all manner of contingency and can give rise 
to devastating unintended consequences. Nevertheless, the situation changes if we consider 
society as a whole. When someone transgresses the community according to the principles of a 
higher community, the initial reaction will be to condemn the conscientious individual as ‘evil.’ 
Therefore, evil is a necessary moment in the developments of the good. Nevertheless, Hegel’s 
ideal is that the individual with Absolute Knowing can step outside of the community, articulate 
the conscientious principle through which the community could advance or develop, and then be 
invited back into the community with forgiveness.
1094
 Social development will no longer require 
the violence that characterizes the past history of humankind. For Hegel, the modern state can 
bring an end to ‘rational misfortune,’ to genuinely tragic situations. This is its educative function. 
In this community of forgiveness, Hegel attempts to reconcile what we have called 
commutative, distributive, corrective, and complete justice. We saw earlier that Hegel 
distinguishes between private property and common property, as well as the laws to which they 
each give rise. The principle of justice of private property is to each their due. Its exemplary 
virtue is honesty and its paradigmatic activity is to ‘honour thy debts.’ In other words, for Hegel, 
the law of private property is ‘tell the truth.’ Conversely, the principle of justice of communal 
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property is to each their need. Its exemplary virtue is charity and its paradigmatic activity is ‘love 
thy neighbour.’ In other words, for Hegel, the law of communal property is ‘do the good.’ As we 
saw, Hegel raises these points during his criticism of formal law-giving, which is his initial 
critique of Morality. He argues that one can only tell the truth and do the good if one knows what 
the truth and the good are. Practical reason is at one and the same time an ethical and an 
intellectual capacity. These two principles of justice arise again in the final critique of Morality 
in the Phenomenology, his discussion of the ‘beautiful soul.’ As we saw, the practical imperative, 
‘do the good,’ emerges with the ‘acting consciousness.’ The theoretical imperative, ‘tell the 
truth,’ arises again with the ‘judging consciousness.’ It is only with their confession and 
forgiveness that they come to the realization that whatever the good and the true are, the ways in 
which we have come to know them is an irreducibly social process. Hegel’s social ontology is 
thereby consummated in the community of forgiveness. 
We also saw that, for Hegel, this community is the transcendence of revenge and 
retribution by recognition. This is the highest form of corrective justice. It breaks the cycle of 
reactive violence. Finally, with the reconciliation of the human and the divine, the state with the 
religious community, Hegel believes that every aspect of justice is integrated into the capstone of 
justice, what we call here complete justice, but what Hegel would likely call ‘rational freedom’ 
or ‘objective spirit.’ This community of forgiveness, the manifestation of the divine on earth, 
brings us closer to what Hegel calls Absolute Knowing. Everything formerly deemed 
transcendental is absorbed into a self-enclosed circle. This society does not demand uniformity—
it achieves unity. It embraces a social cohesion that allows differences and does not devolve into 
tragic conflict. As Williams notes, the Latin root of ‘absolute’ means ‘to loose,’ ‘absolve,’ or 
‘release.’1095 This is the promise held by the Phenomenology of Spirit.1096 
When we turn to his later works, Hegel’s perspective splits into the pessimistic realism of 
the Philosophy of Right and the abstract optimism of the Science of Logic. With regard to the 
Philosophy of Right, individual conscience and the community of forgiveness are muted, if not 
absent altogether. In contrast to the community of forgiveness, in which conscientious calls for 
transforming prevailing customs and laws would not provoke state repression, revolution, and 
counter-revolution, the state that Hegel describes in the Philosophy of Right remains dependent 
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on retribution, colonialism, war, and patriotic fervour. It is the Science of Logic that carries the 
mantle of attempting to reconcile the theoretical and practical imperatives into a self-enclosed 
system. The penultimate chapters are about what he calls ‘the Idea of the True’ and ‘the Idea of 
the Good.’ The former, using the entire course of the dialectical method, attempts to comprehend 
the world as it is in itself. The latter, using its own reasonable conviction, attempts to actualize 
the good, to transform the world into a more rational and freer domain.
1097
 And yet, when Hegel 
reconciles Theoretical Reason and Practical Reason in the Absolute Idea, he does so only in 
thought, whereas the Phenomenology of Spirit attempted it in reality. It seems that the mature 
Hegel dramatically curtails his horizons. 
Irrespective of where commentators fall in the ongoing debates about Hegel’s political 
philosophy, it is clear to almost everyone that, for Hegel, the most important ethical principle is 
freedom. Indeed, as we have seen, Hegel more or less collapses justice into what he thinks is a 
sufficiently universal freedom. When justice is most conspicuous in Hegel’s writings, it is often 
for the wrong reasons. Many of his most egregious slides into bad infinites have to do with the 
different parts of justice. We should consider in this light the fact that, in the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel’s attempt at a non-dogmatic starting point is freedom. Everyone since Hobbes concedes 
that individuals imbued with a free will are a necessary condition for a general freedom. 
Nevertheless, if Hegel cannot successfully close his political philosophy, perhaps ‘The Idea of 
Right is freedom’ is a dogmatic beginning. Why start there? Why not begin with ‘The Idea of 
Right is complete justice’? Why not ‘The Idea of freedom is Right’? This is not to reject freedom 
as a value, but it is to point to unresolved tensions. Of course, Hegel rejects the arbitrary freedom 
of the individualistic will. But even a ‘social’ freedom may not avoid arbitrariness if it is not 
accompanied by a sufficiently independent notion of justice. In terms of our interpretation of 
Marx, all of this shows how far Hegel already goes in devaluing justice. In this, he follows 
widespread trends in the modern era. This not only raises questions about philosophical 
tendencies but also about historical conditions. In other words, it raises the question not merely 
of Marx’s intellectual influences, but of Marx’s absorption, perhaps uncritically, of capitalist 
social relations. It is to Marx that we now turn. 
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Chapter 14: Marx on Complete Justice 
 
We turn now to the question of whether or not there is a notion of complete justice in Marx’s 
critique of capitalism and in his affirmation of socialism. In other words, does Marx offer a 
theory, or at least the beginnings of a theory, of an ethical disposition of the individual directed 
toward the common ends of the social whole? A brief canvas of commentators shows profound 
disagreement about these issues. This is unsurprising. Marx does not use the term ‘complete 
justice’ or any of its analogues, such as ‘general’ or ‘total’ justice, and he rarely speaks of the 
justice embodied by the state in general. Nevertheless, when he speaks of things that are relevant 
to complete justice, such as the general interest and common needs of the social whole, it 
initially appears that what Marx says about complete justice is rife with tensions. As with the 
other forms of justice, however, all of Marx’s statements about the content of complete justice, 
rare as they are, can be made consistent with each other. I will explore the role of complete 
justice in Marx’s theories of capitalism, the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, and in the 
achievement of socialism. In doing so, I will address questions about the extent to which, for 
Marx, states and ruling classes actually embody some form of a general interest, and whether or 
not Marx’s depiction of the working class as the bearer of the universal interest entails a notion 
of complete justice. 
 For some commentators these questions are moot because they deem notions of complete 
justice to be obsolete in capitalist modernity. Take, for example, William Leon McBride, who 
believes that Marx is silent about justice because it will wither away in socialism.
1098
 He likens 
this to the way in which older notions of complete justice have dissolved already: 
 
It is often forgotten, because Plato is so familiar to most Western political 
theorists, that there is a serious difficulty in trying to render Plato’s basic schema 
contemporary. For the expression ‘a just man’ or ‘a just woman’ is an archaism, 
and there is no other phrase in our language (or, to the best of my knowledge, in 
the other major modern Western languages) that fully translates Plato’s intended 
meaning, when he speaks of justice in the individual, that does not itself strike 
one as somewhat quaint or old-fashioned. In this one respect, then, we may be 
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slightly less ideological in our thought and speech than our ancestors were. Is it 
not barely possible to conceive of a future in which the same state of affairs 
would obtain on the level of social ‘justice,’ as well?1099 
 
McBride does not ask whether or not his acceptance of the prevailing opinion about complete 
justice is an uncritical absorption of capitalist social processes. Indeed, this might be more 
ideological than the theory espoused by Plato. Similarly, Donald van de Veer asserts that, in the 
discussions about the role of justice in Marx’s work, we are clearly concerned with distributive 
justice, not with what Aristotle described as justice in its general sense: “In regard to the question 
of Marx’s attitude toward justice, what is at issue is obviously a dispute about ‘justice’ in one of 
its several senses. We are not concerned with justice as regarded as a personal trait or disposition 
exhibited by the just man.”1100 In a similar fashion, William H. Shaw argues that, for Marx, 
moral objectivity cannot be rooted in human nature or species-being because, contrary to 
Aristotle and Feuerbach, human nature is too vague an idea to entail a complex moral theory.
1101
 
The interpretation of Cornelius Castoriadis is somewhat different. Like the others, he 
notes that the question of what he calls “total justice,” which is frequently discussed in Plato and 
Aristotle’s political works, “grinds to a halt with the philosopher of history, Marx.”1102 Unlike 
the others, however, for Castoriadis, the question of ‘total justice,’ the most significant issue in 
any political regime, would persist into the second phase of socialism. He believes that Marx 
simply dismisses such questions. 
There are other commentators, however, who claim that Marx does espouse a theory of 
something akin to complete justice. Alan Gilbert argues that when Marx, in his early pamphlet 
‘Wage-Labour and Capital,’ asserts that wage-labour is “unnatural,” he invokes “natural justice” 
in an Aristotelian sense.
1103
 Indeed, Gilbert contends, “Though he and Engels hesitated to 
characterize their own claim as one of justice, his revolutionary demand coincides with a broad 
Aristotelian conception of a community based on a common good.”1104 Similarly, Paul 
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Blackledge argues that Marx criticizes liberal moral philosophy, best typified by Kant, not 
because he is a nihilist, but rather, because he rejects a morality that attempts to suppress our 
natural desires: “Against Kantianism, Marx’s ethics amounts to a modern version of Aristotle’s 
account of those practices underpinning the virtues through which individuals are able to flourish 
within communities.”1105 According to Blackledge, this Aristotelianism is evident in Hegel too. 
Although Hegel historicized the concept of the human essence, he avoided relativism with his 
notion of an Ethical Life that rationally articulates the relation between the freedom of the 
individual and that of the broader community.
1106
 Blackledge does not ask whether or not a 
‘historicized’ human nature is fundamentally antithetical to the Aristotelian virtue ethics from 
which he attempts to develop a Marxist virtue ethics. 
George E. McCarthy argues that, with regard to the question of Marx and ethics, the most 
difficult issue has to do with Marx’s relation to principles of justice.1107 Nevertheless, McCarthy 
detects an unconscious ethical structure and an implicit theory of social justice in Marx that are 
“clearly there to be uncovered.”1108 For McCarthy, Anglo-American philosophers have focused 
too narrowly on questions of distributive justice. Therefore, they have neglected broader 
understandings of justice in Marx’s work. McCarthy also contends that, as soon as we appreciate 
the influence of the ancients for Marx’s thought, “much of the debate over morality and justice in 
Marx simply disappears.”1109 Indeed, McCarthy argues that, as with Aristotle, the focus of 
Marx’s work is “universal or total justice.”1110 This should not surprise us, McCarthy notes, 
because the natural law tradition includes notions of emancipation. Ultimately, for McCarthy, 
Marx defines social justice as “equality of freedom or self-determination.”1111 
 McCarthy is beset with a number of problems. As is often the case with Marxists who 
attempt to draw parallels between Aristotle and Marx, there is a dramatic underestimation of the 
difference between Aristotle’s ethics and modern moral philosophy, and indeed, between 
Aristotle’s ethics and, say, Epicurus’s ethics. For example, McCarthy misinterprets Aristotle’s 
discussion of prudence or practical reason in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, the book 
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immediately after his discussion of justice. For McCarthy, Aristotle discusses the nature of moral 
knowledge in book VI because he believes that “moral knowledge can never be universal, 
necessary, or scientific.”1112 This, for the most part, is incorrect. Aristotle raises this discussion 
and argues that ethics is about the “ultimate particulars,” not because he denies the existence of 
natural justice or ethical universals, but rather, because becoming virtuous, acquiring the ethical 
disposition, requires the cultivation of that very difficult ability to apply these universals to 
concrete circumstances.
1113
 That is why, in the transition to book VI, Aristotle ends his 
discussion of justice with the idea of ‘equity.’ As was discussed before, this accounts for those 
situations in which the laws speak too generally, in which being exacting to a fault about justice 
is actually unjust. Indeed, equity, and thus, practical reason, do not constitute a repudiation of 
justice, but express it in its highest form. 
This demonstrates how profoundly different is Aristotle’s theory of natural justice from 
the conventional justice offered by Epicurus, as well as from the conventionalism typical of 
modern moral philosophy. McCarthy stresses Marx’s republicanism as a means of relating him 
to Aristotle, but this is not sufficient. Aristotle’s theory of justice is not merely about our 
inherently social nature. All this offers is communitarianism. It is about whether or not our 
commitment to the common good—justice in its fullest sense—has a natural and permanent 
component irrespective of particular individuals recognizing it as such. If we are to draw 
parallels between, on the one hand, Aristotle’s theories of complete justice and practical reason, 
and on the other hand, potential theories in Marx, it will have to be on stronger grounds than 
McCarthy provides. It cannot simply be a matter of reading Aristotle, or any other thinker, into 
the supposedly unconscious ethical structure of Marx. 
Finally, we should note that there are some theorists who argue that Marxism does offer, 
or at least is compatible with, a theory of the ethical disposition of individuals, but it is not 
primarily concerned with justice. For example, John McMurtry contends that Marx does not 
posit an “amoral collectivism.”1114 Rather, Marx offers a theory of personal morality, a standard 
for acting in everyday life, for which individuals can be praised or blamed. Nevertheless, 
McMurtry does not base this personal morality in a notion of justice, much less complete justice. 
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Instead, the ultimate good is freedom in the sense of the full and free development of every 
individual.
1115
 
Given such disparate interpretations, we must now turn to Marx himself. 
 
14. 1: Complete Justice Under Capitalism 
 
Initially, it seems that there is substantial evidence that Marx rejects any notion of complete 
justice, of a genuine universal interest, under capitalism. This begins with his first commentary 
on Hegel in 1843. Marx clearly rejects Hegel’s depiction of Ethical Life. In an often neglected 
passage, Marx agrees with Hegel’s criticisms of the formal character of Morality: “Hegel has 
often been attacked for his theory of morality. But he has done no more than describe the 
morality of the modern state and modern civil law.”1116 Nevertheless, though Hegel shows the 
“illusory” character of the civil and moral law, “he does not proceed to infer from this that the 
state whose ethical life is based on these presuppositions can only be the society (the social life) 
of these illusions.”1117 In other words, Marx turns Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism back on 
Hegel himself. 
Marx argues that far from forming an integrated whole, civil society and the sovereign 
are in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Therefore, he rejects Hegel’s assertion that civil 
servants represent a universal class.
1118
 The civil service is not the representative of civil society 
in the state, but rather, of the state against civil society.
1119
 In a ‘true state,’ it would not be the 
case that every particular class had a chance to devote itself to the universal interest, but rather, 
that there was truly a universal class.
1120
 The examination by which potential civil servants are to 
demonstrate their talents and merits in Hegel’s state is not an expression of citizen equality, but 
of the privilege of the ruling class. The majority of citizens are not initiated into the ‘knowledge 
of the state,’ and therefore, are excluded from it. The constitutional monarchy does not have the 
educative function that Hegel attributes to it. Even where there is universal suffrage, the modern 
state is uniquely differentiated from civil society. Indeed, when the abstract citizen of the state is 
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separated from the self-interested person of civil society, the formal equality of citizens in the 
political realm preserves material inequality in society.
1121
 
At this stage of his theoretical development, Marx argues that the development of a 
genuinely universal class requires republican democracy. Whereas Hegel’s constitutional 
monarchy can only ever be rule by a part that takes itself to be the integrated whole, a democracy 
would be rule by the whole for the whole. Only in this case would the political constitution be in 
appearance what it is in reality: the creation of human beings.
1122
 Hegel misses this point because 
of what Marx, following Feuerbach, describes as the ‘subject-predicate inversion.’ Hegel 
neglects human activity, the ‘subject,’ in favour of the products of that activity, the ‘predicates.’ 
In Hegel’s depiction of Ethical Life, it is only the state that produces people as citizens and never 
the people producing the state as their collective form of organization. By emphasizing the 
products of human activity, Hegel renders them more or less permanent, whereas a focus on 
human activity enables due consideration for our capacity to change our social conditions 
according to, as Hegel might put it, our rational determinations. 
As Marx’s theories developed and matured, his critique of the abstract thought 
represented by Hegel’s theory of Ethical Life only intensified. As Marx transitioned from a 
republican democrat to a full-fledged communist, he became much more explicit that the state is 
dominated by, and reflects the interests of, the ruling class. Marx not only asserts that “The 
executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie.”1123 He also argues that irreconcilable antagonisms between class interests foster 
conflicts that require practical intervention by the state, which acts according to the “illusory 
‘general’ interest.”1124 There are numerous passages where Marx appears to be wholly 
contemptuous of any notion of a general interest under capitalism. For example, he rejects the 
theory of the invisible hand of the market whereby the aggregate of private interests 
unintentionally leads to a general interest: “One could just as well deduce from this abstract 
phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others’ interests, so that, 
instead of a general affirmation, this war of all against all produces a general negation.”1125 In 
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this respect, Marx asserts, “The general interest is precisely the generality of self-seeking 
interests.”1126 In other words, it is merely an abstract universal. 
Marx also seems to reject any notion of the general interest because he deems class 
societies to be riven by incommensurable moral standpoints. Although Marx is not as 
deterministic as Engels in this respect, he does contend that there are class-determined 
moralities. For example, in 1844, he describes the conflict between the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie as, in part, a conflict between moralities. Whereas the landowner sees the capitalist 
as the presumptuous slave of yesterday, the capitalist sees the landowner as the idle lord of 
yesterday. In this bitter opposition, each side tells the truth about the other. The landowner 
emphasizes his noble lineage, his poetry, and that agriculture is alone productive, and depicts his 
opponent as huckstering, deceitful, heartless, devoid of honour, and estranged from a community 
he trades away. The capitalist emphasizes political freedom, freedom of civil society, linking the 
brotherhood of man in commerce and creating a pure morality, and depicts his opponent as 
unenlightened and hell-bent on replacing moral capital with brute force.
1127
 Although the victory 
of capital over the landowner is inevitable, it is only the victory of enlightened self-interest over 
superstitious self-interest, self-conscious baseness over unconscious baseness.
1128
 
Another reason why Marx appears to reject the idea of a general interest is because of the 
way in which capitalism is differentiated into incommensurable social spheres. Marx asks, what 
does the political economist have to say about prostitution? “His answer will be: your acts do not 
contravene my laws, but you should find out what Cousin Morality and Cousin Religion have to 
say about it; the morality and religion of my political economy have no objection to make, 
but…But who should I believe, then? Political economy or morality?”1129 Marx goes on to 
assert: “It is inherent in the very nature of estrangement that each sphere imposes upon me a 
different and contrary standard.”1130 
For Marx, the impersonal character of the market under capitalism illuminates the true 
character of class interests. What he initially discovers about modern society, the split between 
particular and general interests, he soon deems to be true of every class society. Indeed, he 
believes that capitalism reveals the illusions underlying the ways in which complete justice has 
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traditionally been cast, namely, as an objective good common to all humans and continuous with 
the divine order of nature. This, for Marx, is one of the progressive features of capitalism: 
 
It produced world history for the first time, insofar as it made all civilised nations 
and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their 
wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of 
separate nations. It made natural science subservient to capital and took from the 
division of labour the last semblance of its natural character. It altogether 
destroyed the natural character, as far as this is possible with regard to labour, and 
resolved all natural relations into money relations.
1131
 
 
This in turn has bearing on our notion of justice under capitalism. Marx argues that if “privilege” 
is the political expression of the medieval mode of production, then for the capitalist mode of 
production, “right as such, equal right, is the expression.”1132 In other words, the way in which 
political power secures societal inequality is through the formal character of equal rights. 
It therefore seems that the case is overwhelming that Marx wholly rejects the notion of a 
general interest under class societies, and thus, a bourgeois form of complete justice under 
capitalism. Nevertheless, there is some counter-evidence that is worth considering. 
While Marx rarely speaks about the justice of the state in terms broader than specifically 
corrective justice, there are some occasions when he does. For example, in the following 
passage, Marx and Engels make an assertion that directly pertains to the idea of complete justice, 
although it has potentially ambiguous implications that will require some clarification. They 
assert: 
 
Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their 
common interest, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised, 
it follows that all common institutions are set up with the help of the state and are 
given a political form. Hence the illusions that law is based on the will, and 
                                                          
1131
 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., 81-2. 
1132
 Ibid., 346. 
 346 
 
indeed on the will divorced from its real basis—on free will. Similarly, justice is 
in its turn reduced to statute law.
1133
 
 
What is meant when they assert that the state, as the embodiment of the common interests of the 
ruling class, reduces justice to statute law? This could mean two things. First, it could mean that 
there exists a natural law independent of any particular positive law, but that this natural law is 
neglected by particular ruling classes in order to reduce the law to whatever reproduces their own 
forms of rule. If this is the case, then the natural law could provide a standard by which 
opponents of this particular regime could critique its narrow conceptions of justice. Those who 
impute a notion of natural right to Marx will certainly favour this interpretation. 
 A second interpretation is nonetheless possible. Marx and Engels could also mean by this 
statement that there is no natural law independent of each regime. Rather, the only aspect of 
‘justice’ that is common to every regime is that each describes as ‘justice’ only that which is 
functional to its own form of rule. Therefore, when justice is reduced to statute law, it is not 
reduced from a justice existing independently of it and every other regime. Rather, it is reduced 
from the form that justice took in the old regime which the new regime has replaced. This second 
interpretation is more consistent with the broader interpretation offered here. As we will now see, 
it is also confirmed by what Marx says elsewhere. 
Although Marx’s social theory is based in material interests, and for Marx, the interests 
of producers and ruling non-producers are necessarily antithetical, this does not mean that he 
entirely dismisses the idea of a general interest under class societies. Take, for example, the 
defence speech that Marx delivered in 1849 while he and other Rhenish revolutionaries were 
being tried for fomenting insurrection. We must be tentative with this piece of evidence. Given 
the pressure of the circumstances in which he delivered the speech, Marx may be casting his 
views in a certain light. Nevertheless, although it is less rigorous than a theoretical work, it was 
subsequently published as a political pamphlet. Furthermore, as we will see, it accords with 
everything he says elsewhere. It also has the virtue of portraying his views with a certain 
popularizing bluntness. 
In his speech, Marx first articulates his opposition to the United Provincial Diet, the 
representatives of the absolutist monarchy and feudal estates. He then expresses his justification 
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for the revolution, indeed, the largely bourgeois revolution, of 1848-49. Marx begins by asking, 
then answering, what motivates the counter-revolutionary legality of the crown? 
 
To maintain laws belonging to a bygone social era and framed by representatives 
of vanished or vanishing social interests, who consequently give the force of law 
only to these interests, which run counter to the public needs. Society is not 
founded upon the law; this is a legal fiction. On the contrary, the law must be 
founded upon society, it must express the common interests and needs of society 
— as distinct from the caprice of the individuals — which arise from the material 
mode of production prevailing at the given time. This Code Napoleon, which I 
am holding in my hand, has not created modern bourgeois society. On the 
contrary, bourgeois society, which emerged in the eighteenth century and 
developed further in the nineteenth, merely finds its legal expression in this Code. 
As soon as it ceases to fit the social conditions, it becomes simply a bundle of 
paper.
1134
 
 
Marx continues: 
 
To maintain the old laws in face of the new needs and demands of social 
development is essentially the same as hypocritically upholding the out-of-date 
particular interests of a minority in face of the up-to-date interests of the 
community. This maintenance of the legal basis aims at asserting minority 
interests as if they were the predominant interests, when they are no longer 
dominant; it aims at imposing on society laws which have been condemned by 
the conditions of life in this society, by the way the members of this society earn 
their living, by their commerce and their material production; it aims at retaining 
legislators who are concerned only with their particular interests; it seeks to 
misuse political power in order forcibly to place the interests of a minority above 
the interests of the majority. The maintenance of the legal basis is therefore in 
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constant conflict with the existing needs, it hampers commerce and industry, it 
prepares the way for social crises, which erupt in political revolutions.
1135
 
 
As Marx and Engel’s describe it in The German Ideology, the political power of ruling classes 
must be given “a universal expression,” as is evident in the class-determined forms of civil and 
criminal law: “Their personal rule must at the same time assume the form of average rule.”1136 
Nevertheless, this only lasts for a certain amount of time: 
 
The more the normal form of intercourse of society, and with it the conditions of 
the ruling class, develop their contradiction to the advanced productive forces, 
and the greater the consequent discord within the ruling class itself as well as 
between it and the class ruled by it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the 
consciousness which originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it 
ceases to be the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the 
more do the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in which actual 
private interests, etc., etc., are expressed as universal interests, descend to the 
level of mere idealising phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy.
1137
 
 
It seems that, for Marx, the notion of a general interest in class societies is not wholly illusory. 
If we consider the evidence so far, we can come to some conclusions about Marx’s 
relation to complete justice, at least as it exists in class societies. Marx asserts that a kind of 
general interest does arise from a newly established mode of production. There is, at least for a 
certain time, a general interest, a public need, that forms a standard by which to assess the use 
and misuse of political power. Therefore, it seems that Marx contends that something akin to 
complete justice exists in every mode of production, or at least, every class-based mode of 
production. These class societies require a state and a body of laws that functionally reproduce 
the social order by providing a legitimate standard by which to distinguish between public 
interest and private whim. This is its standard: the general interest. 
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 Marx also shows, however, that each state, and thus, its laws, are self-contradictory. A 
ruling particular interest casts itself as the universal interest without remainder. Although, for a 
time, the ruling class is the only social force capable of leading the entire society, nonetheless, 
this entails inevitable antagonisms between classes as well as between the personal interests of 
individuals and the general interest. At the most, these antagonisms can be held in abeyance, in 
tense unity. At a certain point in their development, however, they explode into full 
contradictions. Indeed, the ruling class offends its own highest principle of complete justice, the 
general interest, as it increasingly becomes a particular interest standing in opposition to the 
general interest embodied in societal development and transformation. Eventually, the 
contradiction of the forces and relations of production are such that this common interest breaks 
upon the open contestation of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary classes. Thus, whatever 
complete justice exists in a given mode of production is only temporary and even at its peak is 
inherently self-contradictory. Therefore, Marx’s thought about complete justice accords with 
what we have said about every other aspect of justice. 
 As we have seen, since Marx deems bourgeois justice, including complete justice, the 
only possible standard under capitalism, there is no basis by which you can condemn the state, or 
indeed, the mode of production as a whole, as unjust according to some other standard, whether a 
trans-historical standard or the ‘higher’ standard of socialism. Rather, Marx seeks to expose the 
irreconcilable antagonisms that occur within bourgeois justice, the equal rights between which 
force decides. That is why Marx also does not deem capitalism positively just according to 
bourgeois right. Consequently, since bourgeois justice does not exist in any positive, non-self-
contradictory way, revolutionary action against capitalist states cannot be described as unjust in 
any meaningful sense. Does Marx think that the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism is based 
in a ‘higher’ principle of justice? Does Marx think that revolutionary classes in general, and the 
revolutionary proletariat in particular, are motivated and guided by principles of complete 
justice, a common good against which the prevailing state offends? It is to these questions that 
we must now turn. 
 
14. 2: Is There Complete Justice in the Revolution Against Capitalism? 
 
 350 
 
Certain theorists argue that, for Marx, revolution is motivated by justice. This includes not only 
distributive justice, but justice in some of its broader aspects. For example, Elster argues that the 
somewhat uneven, but nonetheless continuous process of democratization over the last few 
centuries makes more sense when understood in the context of the motivation that justice 
provides.
1138
 Conversely, Paul Smart asserts: “Revolution would never succeed if all it attempted 
to do was to impose on society a set of radical rules and norms, however laudable they might 
be.”1139 This, however, is a straw-man argument. None of the Marxist commentators who argue 
that justice is a necessary motivation for revolution believe that it is a sufficient one. Peter Mew 
gives a more balanced account.
1140
 He argues that, although Marx does in fact deem capitalism 
unjust, he does not believe that this provides the basis of revolution: “Communism is to be the 
precipitate not of moral ardour but of activated self-interest.”1141 Furthermore, Mew contends 
that while philosophers are prone to having too much faith in rational argument, Marxists above 
all should be aware that ruling classes are not likely to change their activities even if the moral 
ideologies supporting them are exposed as false: “disguised power is more likely to turn into 
naked power than to disappear in a wake of shame and repentance.”1142 This is true, but it is also 
significant that naked power is much weaker than that clothed in the shroud of justice. 
Furthermore, the question cannot only be about Marx’s theory of revolution in general, but also 
about what is unique to proletarian revolution in particular. 
As might have been expected, Allen Wood offers the most sophisticated defence of the 
argument that, for Marx, revolution is not motivated by a sense of justice.
1143
 According to what 
Wood calls the ‘class-interests thesis,’ for Marx, our actions can only be historically effective, 
can only dramatically transform social conditions in ways congenial to historical progress, if 
these actions are pursued on the basis of class interests.
1144
 Conversely, acting on the basis of 
ideals such as justice condemns us to historical ineffectiveness. Wood argues that Marx never 
advocates for the overthrow of capitalism from a disinterested standpoint. Rather, he is a clear 
partisan of the working class and its allies. Although Marx deems revolution to be in the interests 
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of the vast majority of people, the interests of the ruling class and its allies must be sacrificed. 
Therefore, Marx does not confuse the interests of the majority with the common interests of the 
whole society. Indeed, Marx regards the idea of a universal interest or a common good as purely 
ideological.
1145
 Thus, the appeal to justice is incompatible with the class-interests thesis. 
Although there is some evidence to support this interpretation of Marx, there are a 
number of problems with Wood’s argument so far. First, it is not clear whether or not we should 
equate justice with a disinterested standpoint, or, if we should, what it is that justice should take 
no interest in. As we saw in earlier chapters, because Wood defines justice as the laws and rules 
most functional for a given mode of production, his notion of what justice entails in capitalist 
social conditions is the distinctly liberal notion of justice. In other words, justice is meant to be a 
neutral arbiter between separate but equal interests amid a sheer plurality of goods or values. In 
other words, one interest is not, in and of itself, more or less valuable than any other. If indeed 
this is what justice entails then it would be difficult, if not impossible, to overthrow capitalism on 
that basis. Conversely, if justice had some other notion of merit to provide the basis of its 
disinterestedness, this might not be the case. Wood wrongly assumes that Marx rejects some 
form of a disinterested standpoint. As we saw in an earlier chapter, Marx actually criticizes other 
political economists for abandoning what he thought Capital had achieved, namely, a 
disinterested scientific method.
1146
 Furthermore, although Marx is clearly an advocate for the 
interests of, and revolution by, the working class, this does not necessarily mean that this 
partisanship is not objective or disinterested. It may appear that way if we consider it only from 
the point of view of the antagonisms between the proletarian and capitalist classes in capitalist 
society. Nevertheless, from the perspective of Marx’s universal history, his conception of human 
history as a whole, and, in particular, the significance of labour in that history, Marx’s support 
for the working class might have a more objective, disinterested basis. 
 There are also some problems with Wood’s assertions that Marx rejects notions of the 
universal interest or the common good as ideological. First, Marx explicitly describes the 
revolutionary working class as the basis of achieving a genuinely universal emancipation.
1147
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This is fairly early on in his theoretical development, but it is not obvious that it is a position he 
later rejected. The mature Marx speaks of how, even within capitalism, certain measures 
undertaken by the proletariat are not only in their own interests, but indeed, that of capital. Take, 
for example, Marx’s description of the workers’ struggles for a legally limited working day. 
 
With suppressed irony, and using very cautious expressions, the factory 
inspectors hint that the present Ten Hours’ Act also frees the capitalist from some 
of the brutality natural to a man who is merely an embodiment of capital, and that 
it has given him time for a little ‘culture.’ ‘Formerly the master had no time for 
anything but money; the servant had no time for anything but labour.’1148 
 
Marx is attempting to show, in an embryonic way, the leadership capacity of the working class. 
Indeed, this is an early expression of what Gramsci would later theorize as the battle for 
hegemony. 
 To return to the rest of Wood’s argument, he contends that, according to the class-
interests thesis, our primary concern must be with historical results: “We will see our task as 
historical agents not as one of setting our goals according to abstract values or standards and then 
trying to find some means of achieving them, but rather of choosing between the goals of already 
existing historical movements.”1149 This raises certain questions. How are the historical results 
themselves to be evaluated? What is the definition of ‘effective’? If we begin by examining the 
already existing historical movements, how do we define and evaluate what they are moving 
toward? In other words, why identify with one class rather than another? 
 Although Wood rejects the disinterested standpoint, he concedes that Marx often 
describes the expected results of a communist revolution in terms of what could be interpreted as 
impartially good. For example, Marx argues that communism will bring an end to alienation and 
will promote the universal satisfaction of our needs, the free and creative development of our 
human capacities, as well as solidarity and community. Wood continues: 
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The passages in which Marx makes such claims are well-known, since they 
constitute the liturgy which self-styled ‘Marxist humanism’ never tires of 
chanting. What is striking, however, is that Marx at the same time rejects the 
preoccupation with disinterested human goods. He displays only contempt for the 
humanitarianism of the ‘true socialists’ who, he says, ‘have lost all revolutionary 
passion and proclaim instead the universal love of humanity.’1150 
 
When conflicts arise between the class-interests of the proletariat and principles of justice, Marx 
insists that we, as Wood puts it, “get our priorities straight and thus dampen our enthusiasm for 
justice, so that we may get on with what really matters.”1151 Indeed, for Wood, people who make 
justice the basis of their activities are hypocrites because, ultimately, they must be indifferent to 
whether or not justice will be victorious in historical struggles.
1152
 Wood does not shy away from 
the full implications of his interpretation. If justice can and should be sacrificed for the sake of 
historically effective revolutionary activity, then ideas of justice are only the “vehicles” or 
“masks” of class-interests.1153 Ultimately, for Wood, it is only by abandoning the pursuit of 
justice as our highest priority that we can “harmonize our conscious intentions with our historical 
self-understanding and thus attain to self-conscious historical agency.”1154 
In his book on Hegel’s ethics, Wood compares Hegel’s account of historical development 
with Marx’s theory of revolution. For Hegel, the ‘absolute justification’ of world historical 
individuals is possible only for the reflective historian who, by rejecting moralistic judgements, 
is capable of discerning the rational meaning of history.
1155
 Consequently, no one could 
legitimate their own transgression and crimes by availing themselves of the absolute right of 
world spirit. Wood nonetheless concedes the profound dangers of Hegel’s theory of historical 
development: 
 
We should not attempt to deny that Hegel’s amoralism is a dangerous doctrine. 
Our defense should rather be that the danger is not Hegel’s creation; he is only 
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the bearer of bad news. Moral restraints should not bind us when they stand in the 
way of human liberation. If there really are times when the human spirit can be 
emancipated only through doing wrong, then it would be dreadful if we let our 
fear of wrongdoing keep us forever in chains.
1156
 
 
In this, Wood sounds remarkably similar to Bertolt Brecht’s ‘learning play,’ The Measures 
Taken: 
 
With whom would the just man not sit 
To help justice? 
What medicine is too bitter 
For the man who’s dying? 
What vileness should you not suffer to 
Annihilate vileness? 
If at last you could change the world, what 
Could make you too good to do so?
1157
 
 
Indeed, Wood’s assertions also resemble Brecht’s moral ‘realism’: 
 
It was not you who sentenced him, but 
Reality.
1158
 
 
The implications of Hegel’s doctrine are all the more dangerous because, according to Wood, 
whatever Hegel thought about his own theory of history, it does not preclude radical social 
change based on a conception of the historical meaning of these transformations. Furthermore, 
this historical meaning is not dependent on ethics or a determinate conception of the social order 
being created.
1159
 It is sufficient to identify the prevailing social problems that the new order will 
have to resolve, the general characteristics of the new ethical order, and the social movement 
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necessary to create it: “If there is, then it might be possible for you to know of your own action 
that it possesses a supramoral justification. You might be able knowingly to exercise the world 
historical right to do wrong.”1160 For Wood, this is precisely what Marx does. Although, for 
Marx, historical development does not occur through the personal ambitions of world-historical 
individuals, but rather, the interests of classes with a world-historical task, nonetheless, they also 
“fall outside morality and ethics.”1161 
Wood’s contributions have provoked a number of responses. As is so often the case, 
Geras sets the tone. He argues that Marx deems the working class to have universal significance 
from a disinterested standpoint, namely, the actualization of the free development of 
everyone.
1162
 For Geras, this is the principle of justice upon which Marx’s theory of 
revolutionary motivation is based, even if Marx is not always aware of this fact. Geras criticizes 
Wood’s reductionist class-interest thesis: 
 
to limit the ‘historical meaning’ of action along this path to its functional role 
within a struggle so characterized, just one sectional interest against another, is 
radically to diminish, to impoverish, the sense which Marx himself—
everywhere—gives it. For, as partial and as ‘interested’ as he unashamedly 
proclaims it to be, such action also has a universal aspect, in virtue of the 
character of its historical objective, of what the proletariat’s struggle is a struggle 
for.
1163
 
 
Nielsen also criticizes Wood’s class-interests thesis, but in doing so, adopts many of Wood’s 
presuppositions. Nielsen contends that moral beliefs, and justice in particular, do have an 
emancipatory use in class struggles.
1164
 Although, he seems to agree with Wood that justice is an 
instrument in class struggle and revolution, Nielsen gives it much wider application than does 
Wood. He asserts that in the debates about the validity of socialism, arguments about the 
injustice of capitalism and the justice of socialism have a “modest” role to play.1165 Nevertheless, 
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this does not imply that the standard of justice is the only or most significant critique, or that 
such criticisms can be effective without practical considerations and an understanding of the 
mechanisms for change in capitalist conditions.
1166
 
This raises the question: is morality to be of use for the class struggle, or is it the point of 
class struggle? Nielsen seems to affirm the former. Despite his disagreements with Wood, he is 
almost as ready as Wood to abandon justice in the midst of class struggle and revolution: 
 
the socialist who wishes to condemn capitalism as an unjust system because it 
systematically treats some human beings, in their conditions of servitude, as 
means only, could still recognize that sometimes such evils and such injustices 
are necessary. Not infrequently in morality, we have to choose the lesser evil. 
Such socialists could grant, as John Rawls would not, that sometimes, in grim 
circumstances, utility outweighs justice and that we then must accept injustice as 
morally necessary. This seems to me both a realistic and, if one thinks about it 
carefully, a morally sensitive reaction. But this does not mean that we have to 
throw up our hands in the face of arguments about the justice or the lack thereof 
of whole social systems or regard all such talk as the ideological twaddle of 
confused ideologues.
1167
 
 
Indeed, Nielsen assures us that if Marx’s assertions about capitalism, the working class, and 
socialism are correct, then proletarian revolution cannot conflict with principles of justice: 
“therefore, a historical agent could not be faced with a situation where he or she must choose 
between struggling to realize proletarian class interests and supporting what is disinterestedly 
good.”1168 Furthermore, Nielsen argues that for most proletarians these arcane debates are 
somewhat moot: “Proletarian militants, particularly when they are not also theoreticians, need 
not engage in such complicated reasoning. In the midst of class struggle, furthering proletarian 
class interests should be their aim.”1169 Nielsen’s endorsing of a division of mental and manual 
labour within the revolution is quite troubling. If we assume for a moment that Marx does give 
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justice a significant role in revolutionary activity, surely his theory of working class revolution as 
the emancipation of workers by workers would require that justice extend to, and be embraced 
by, the majority of participants. Ultimately, Nielsen’s position is the mirror opposite of Wood’s. 
Instead of deriving his standards of justice from the capitalist mode of production, Nielsen 
derives them from the socialist mode of production. Nevertheless, justice provides little guidance 
in the revolutionary transition between these modes. 
 Cohen is also susceptible to some of these shortcomings because, according to him, 
Marxists deem capitalism unjust primarily because it involves the theft of surplus labour: 
 
The criticism that a society based on the capitalist relationship represses the 
development of human potential is at least as important, but that criticism does 
not entail that the capitalist relationship is unjust. My claim is that, for Marxists, 
the central justice objection to capitalism is the labour theft objection, and that, to 
the extent that Marxists have other justice-inspired objections to capitalism, they 
do not clearly distinguish them from this one.
1170
 
 
Since Cohen discounts the repression of human potential as an aspect of justice, this entails that, 
for him, principles of justice provide the motivation for revolution, but not a concrete guide for 
revolutionary activity beyond the elimination of exploitation itself. This risks neglecting the role 
of practical reason in revolution. 
Peffer criticizes Wood on grounds similar to Nielsen, but is more sophisticated in his 
approach. As is typical of Wood’s critics, however, Peffer applies an idealist method. He treats 
what he regards as the inconsistencies and falsities in Wood’s assertions, and indeed, those of 
Marx, as the result of personal idiosyncrasies. For example, Peffer asserts: 
 
The question, of course, is how Wood gets from the relatively innocuous—if 
somewhat amorphous—class interest thesis to the conclusion that accepting it is 
absolutely incompatible with taking justice as one’s fundamental concern. Justice 
and the class interest thesis are certainly not a priori incompatible. After all, one 
seemingly can take justice as one’s fundamental concern and still admit that if the 
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class interest thesis is true and one is serious about advancing the cause of justice 
in the world, then one should support those class interests that, if realized, will 
best meet the demands of justice.
1171
 
 
This neglects the fact that Wood does not derive his assertions a priori. Wood might be wrong to 
reduce justice to whatever reproduces the prevailing social conditions, but, as we have seen, 
there are significant social determinants for Wood’s functionalism. It is on these grounds that 
Peffer should be assessing and criticizing Wood. 
 Despite these shortcomings, Peffer offers important criticisms. He argues that the role of 
justice in revolution is not primarily for winning public debates about the legitimacy of 
revolution and socialism. Rather, it is about a set of principles that serve as a guide to our activity 
in the midst of revolution. Peffer asserts: 
 
Does Wood really mean to suggest that the vigorous prosecution of the class 
struggle ought not be bound by any constraints imposed by justice, even the 
requirements of a just war, e.g., bans on indiscriminate killing of civilians, the use 
of chemical or biological weapons, or the torture of prisoners? Perhaps this will 
be regarded as a red herring. It might be argued that Wood has in mind only the 
distribution of such goods as income and wealth when he speaks of justice. But it 
seems to me extremely important for Marxists to make clear that while they are in 
favor of utilizing virtually any means to effect the socialist transformation—up to 
and including popular revolution and civil war if absolutely necessary—they are 
not in favor of violating the Geneva Accords in such situations or in any way 
violating the constraints of just-war theory, even if doing so would increase the 
chances for success.
1172
 
 
Peffer’s assertions are cogent, but not completely decisive. Wood could respond with arguments 
similar to those made by Trotsky, namely, that not all means are permissible, only those that 
really lead to the liberation of humanity.
1173
 Similarly, Wood could argue that refraining from 
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violations of the Geneva Accords do not depend on principles of justice. Rather, the appeal to 
class-interests will suffice because the use of such abysmal methods could never actually 
increase the chances of success for a socialist revolution. Nevertheless, though Peffer’s critique 
is not totally devastating to Wood’s arguments, it still raises the question of what is permitted in 
class struggle and revolution. 
 Since Peffer at least begins to think through these incredibly difficult issues, he not only 
criticizes Wood, but also substantively disagrees with Nielsen. Peffer rejects the idea that 
because the working class is the universal class, the pursuit of its interests can never conflict with 
the demands of social justice.
1174
 For Peffer, such conflicts are at least logically possible: 
 
This would be the case, for example, if the pursuit of those interests were to result 
in a situation in which the proletariat is materially better off, but grave injustices 
are perpetrated against other segments of the population from that point in time 
on. I am not claiming there is any reason to believe they will diverge, but we at 
least have to be able to talk about such possibilities.
1175
 
 
This is an important point. Nevertheless, Peffer undermines it when he asserts: “Nor am I 
suggesting that the discussion of such abstract possibilities is important to the actual class 
struggle.”1176 He then quotes approvingly Nielsen’s assertion about the division of mental and 
manual labour with regard to questions of justice in the revolutionary proletarian movement.
1177
 
Ultimately, Peffer does not take seriously enough the role of justice as an ethical disposition, as 
the basis of practical reason, as a guide for the activity of each and every individual amid the 
difficult circumstances of revolution. Therefore, he unwittingly makes justice a basis by which 
some revolutionaries can be guided by others. 
 Buchanan and Lukes find a middle ground between Wood and Geras. As we saw, 
Buchanan argues that, for Marx, justice does not play a major motivational role in the 
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. Furthermore, Marx believes that the notion that people, 
irrespective of their social conditions, have a sense of justice and are bearers of rights, can only 
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arise in a radically defective society.
1178
 Since they disagree with the proponents of the Tucker-
Wood thesis that Marx deems capitalism positively just, they do not think that Marx would 
regard the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism as unjust according to the only available 
standards. Nevertheless, because they deem Marx’s theory to be ultimately beyond justice, they 
also disagree with the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis that, for Marx, justice plays a 
significant role in revolutionary motivation or activity. Therefore, with regard to the actual 
revolutionary activity itself, their interpretation of Marx is similar to Wood’s, although unlike 
him, Buchanan and Lukes substantially disagree with what they take to be Marx’s neglect of 
justice in the practice of revolution. I will discuss Buchanan and Lukes’s criticisms of Marx 
more substantively in the next chapter where I will be better positioned to draw out the major 
implications of Marx’s theory of complete justice. In the meantime, having canvassed the major 
interpretations, we must now turn to an exegesis of Marx. Ultimately, his assertions reveal 
definitive answers to the questions of whether or not he believes that the proletariat is the bearer 
of complete justice and whether or not justice has a significant role to play in revolution. 
There is some evidence for the interpretation offered by Geras, Nielsen, and Peffer. In his 
early article, ‘On the Jewish Question,’ Marx continues the attempts by Rousseau, Kant, and 
Hegel to discover a form of freedom that is sufficiently universal to become what Hegel 
describes as ‘justice in and for itself.’ As we have seen, in the same way that Hegel criticizes the 
abstract notions of freedom offered by Rousseau and Kant, Marx criticizes Hegel for his abstract 
attempt to reconcile in thought the practical contradiction between the self-interested person of 
civil society with the ‘moral’ citizen of the political state. On this basis, Marx distinguishes 
between mere political emancipation and a genuine human emancipation in which the abstract 
citizen of political society is absorbed back into the real person of civil society. Indeed, Marx 
quotes Rousseau: 
 
Whoever dares to undertake the founding of a people’s institutions must feel 
himself capable of changing, so to speak, human nature, of transforming each 
individual, who in himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of a 
greater whole from which he somehow receives his life and his being, of 
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substituting a partial and moral existence for physical and independent 
existence.
1179
 
 
It was this initial critique of Hegel’s abstract notion of freedom that inspired Marx to search for 
that class or estate most excluded from the supposedly integrated organism of the state. In his 
subsequent article, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,’ 
he tells us that it is the proletariat. It is “a class of civil society which is not a class of civil 
society,” which has “a universal character because of its universal suffering.”1180 Indeed, Marx 
explicitly speaks of its exclusion and its historical potential in terms of ‘recht’ and unrecht.’ The 
proletariat “lays claim to no particular right [justice] because the wrong [injustice] it suffers is 
not a particular wrong [injustice] but wrong [injustice] in general.”1181 In the proletariat is 
embodied “the total loss of humanity,” but that is also why it alone can carry through “the total 
redemption of humanity.”1182 This evidence, while compelling, comes before Marx develops the 
theory of historical materialism and becomes a full-fledged communist. Marx certainly seems to 
retain notions of the working class as the total redemption of humanity, as the basis for universal 
human emancipation. Nevertheless, does he retain the notions of justice and injustice he 
expresses in 1843? In this respect, the evidence is decidedly against the proponents of the Cohen-
Geras thesis. It is much more in favour of the interpretations offered by, on the one hand, Wood, 
and on the other hand, Buchanan and Lukes. 
There is much to suggest that Marx believes that moral principles obscure class 
antagonisms and thereby stifle the class consciousness of the working class. For example, during 
the 1848 revolutions, Marx, in his articles for the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, notes how one of the 
watchwords of 1789, ‘fraternité,’ has emerged again.1183 He argues that there is only a 
‘brotherhood’ between the emerging bourgeoisie and proletariat as long as they are united in 
their struggles to displace the feudal aristocracy and the Absolutist state. As soon as they are 
successful, however, these ‘fraternal’ feelings will be cast aside in the class struggle between 
capital and labour. It is not that Marx thinks that the working class should initiate a civil war 
against the capitalist class. Given the exploitation of the former by the latter, Marx contends that 
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there already is a “veiled civil war.”1184 Rather, Marx calls for the unveiling of this irreconcilable 
antagonism: “The best form of polity is that in which the social contradictions are not blurred, 
not arbitrarily—that is, merely artificially, and therefore only seemingly—kept down. The best 
form of polity is that in which these contradictions reach a stage of open struggle in the course of 
which they are resolved.”1185 In 1879, when Marx and Engels criticize trends in German radical 
politics, they assert: “When the class struggle is pushed on one side as a disagreeable ‘crude’ 
phenomenon, nothing remains as a basis for socialism but ‘true love of humanity’ and empty 
phraseology about ‘justice.’”1186 This, however, is potentially ambiguous. Perhaps Marx and 
Engels do not mean that justice is inherently empty. They may be arguing for a more substantive 
justice based in the need for class struggle. 
It is obvious that Marx adopts substantial aspects of Hegel’s assertion that the ‘right’ of 
history is higher than the right embodied by the prevailing social order. We can see the 
implications of this in Marx’s work on three different levels: his micro-level assertions about 
historically effective action within a mode of production, his meso-level assertions about the 
revolutionary transition from one mode of production to another, and his macro-level assertions 
about the course of human history (or, at least, ‘pre-history’) as a whole. We will look at 
examples from each level in turn. 
 On the micro-level, Marx, in an 1846 letter, advises fellow communist G. A. Köttgen that 
if he cannot collect at least five-hundred signatures for a “working men’s petition” demanding 
freedom of the press and a new constitution, he and the other communists should join the 
“bourgeois” petitions: “proceed Jesuitically, put aside teutonic probity, true-heartedness and 
decency.”1187 Marx then asserts, “When this has been achieved a new era will dawn for 
communist propaganda. Our means will be increased, the antithesis between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat will be sharpened. In a party one must support everything which helps towards 
progress, and have no truck with any tedious moral scruples.”1188 This certainly supports the 
interpretation of what some commentators have described as Marx’s ‘moral futurism.’ 
                                                          
1184
 Marx and Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto,’ op. cit., 483. 
1185
 Marx and Engels, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, op. cit., 49. 
1186
 This comes from a letter drafted by Engels and approved by Marx: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, letter to 
August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Wilhelm Bracke, September, 1879: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1879/letters/79_09_15.htm. 
1187
 Karl Marx, Letter to G. A. Köttgen, June 15, 1846, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels: Collected Works: Volume Six (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), 54. 
1188
 Ibid. 
 363 
 
On a more meso-level, Marx seems to argue that, quite simply, might makes right. Take, 
for example, his depiction of the battle between the monarchists and the insurrectionists during 
the 1848 revolutions: 
 
When these two sovereign powers are no longer able to agree or do not want to 
agree, they become two inimical sovereign powers. The King has the right to 
throw down the gauntlet to the Assembly, the Assembly has the right to throw 
down the gauntlet to the King. The greater right is on the side of the greater 
might. Power is tested in struggle. The test of the struggle is victory. Each of the 
two powers can prove that it is right only by its victory, that it is wrong only by 
its defeat.
1189
 
 
Nevertheless, even if the King prevails, Marx would prefer rule by the Assembly. The standard 
by which Marx makes this assessment need not be an immutable notion of right according to 
which republican regimes are always better than monarchical regimes. After all, republican 
regimes are not possible in every set of social conditions. Rather, the standard can be established 
by what is possible within the prevailing historical conditions, and, in particular, with regard to 
the expansion and development of freedom. Therefore, although Marx’s articulation of might 
makes right is certainly not moral absolutism, it is not purely relativistic either. In another 
example, Marx, in his marginal notes on Bakunin’s Statism and Anarchy, asserts that the 
proletariat, in order to overthrow capitalism, must nonetheless act on the basis of capitalist 
society and its corresponding political forms because “it has at that stage not yet arrived at its 
final organisation, and hence to achieve its liberation has recourse to methods which will be 
discarded once that liberation has been attained.”1190 This raises the question about whether the 
ends justify the means and, if they do, how they are to be weighed. It also provokes questions 
about the point at which the discarding of these methods may no longer be deferred to future 
conditions. Marx does not address these questions in his marginal notes. 
 On the macro-level, with regard to human ‘pre-history’ as a whole, some of Marx’s most 
revealing assertions occur amid his first critique of Proudhon. Marx asserts that, according to 
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Proudhon’s version of the dialectical method, we must distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
sides, the advantages and drawbacks of a particular social system, so that we can preserve the 
good side: “For him, M. Proudhon, every economic category has two sides—one good, the other 
bad. He looks upon these categories as the petty bourgeois looks upon the great men of history: 
Napoleon was a great man; he did a lot of good; he also did a lot of harm.”1191 As we have seen, 
Marx later criticizes Proudhon’s attempts to transform capitalism according to standards 
unwittingly derived from capitalism. Conversely, Marx embraces Hegel’s assertion that good 
and evil are inseparable because it is the transgression of current notions of the ‘good’ by means 
of the ‘evil’ that historical development occurs. As Marx puts it, “What constitutes dialectical 
movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new 
category. The very setting of the problem of eliminating the bad side cuts short the dialectical 
movement.”1192 Marx explains the proper method of studying a mode of production: “It must be 
shown how wealth was produced within this antagonism, how the productive forces were 
developed at the same time as class antagonisms, how one of the classes, the bad side, the 
drawback of society, went on growing until the material conditions for its emancipation had 
attained full maturity.”1193 For Marx, a mode of production is anything but the embodiment of 
eternal laws. Indeed, it is quite significant that Marx begins this critique of Proudhon by 
paraphrasing the Epicurean poet Lucretius: “There is a continual movement of growth in 
productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable 
thing is the abstraction of movement—mors immortalis.”1194  
 The implications of this account of historical development are perhaps most evident in 
Marx’s controversial articles on British colonialism in India. In these articles, Marx expresses 
certain ideas about ‘Oriental despotism’ that he would later call into question.1195 Nevertheless, 
what is relevant for us is the notion of historical development that he retained throughout his life. 
 Marx asserts that whatever political changes India might have undergone in the past, its 
social conditions remained unaltered until British colonialism initiated a social revolution.
1196
 
We should not lament this too much because these apparently “idyllic” Indian communities were 
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based in “despotism.”1197 This does not mean, however, that the British were acting from 
benevolent intentions. Nevertheless, for Marx, neither Indian nor British despotism is the 
significant question: 
 
The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution 
in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England 
she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. 
 Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient 
world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, 
to exclaim with Goethe: 
 
 Sollte diese Qual uns qualen 
 Da sie unsre Lust Vermehrt, 
 Hat nicht myriaden Seelen 
 Timur’s Herrschaft aufgezehrt?1198 
 
Translated, Goethe’s poem reads: “Should this torture torment us/Since it brings greater 
pleasure?/Were not through the rule of Timur/Souls devoured without measure?”1199 Timur, 
conqueror and modernizer of Persia and Central Asia, was both praised and feared by Europeans, 
demonstrating that civilization and barbarism always go hand-in-hand. Perhaps Proudhon would 
say that Timur did a lot of good, but he also did a lot of harm. 
 In a subsequent article on India, Marx asserts that British colonialism will not mend the 
social contradictions of the mass of people in India.
1200
 It will only create the material conditions 
for their ultimate emancipation: “The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of 
society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the now ruling 
classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves 
shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether.”1201 Only when the 
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“most advanced peoples” expropriate and bring under common control the modern powers of 
production “will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not 
drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.”1202 In other words, no longer will the economic 
and cultural development of the species necessarily be monopolized by a minority at the expense 
of the majority of individuals. Again, what Marx says about a mode of production he also deems 
to be true of history in general. With the achievement of socialism, not only production, but 
indeed, human history, will be planned in a conscious way. 
 If Marx follows in significant respects Hegel’s theory that the right of history is higher 
than that of any particular social form, does that mean that Marx believes that revolutionaries 
confront prevailing notions of justice with a higher principle of justice? We must distinguish 
between, on the one hand, the revolutionary overthrow of feudal relations as well as radical 
attempts to create greater self-government—a ‘social republic’—that nonetheless remain within 
capitalism, and on the other hand, the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. With regard to the 
former, as is to be expected, Marx engages in an immanent critique by turning prevailing notions 
of justice against themselves. For example, during the bourgeois revolutions of 1848, Marx uses 
bourgeois notions of right to go beyond the measures of the bourgeoisie. In a passage I have 
already cited, Marx not only affirms the ‘moral influence’ exerted by revolutions, but also 
advocates for the right to revolution: 
 
The right of the democratic popular masses, by their presence, to exert a moral 
influence on the attitude of constituent assemblies is an old revolutionary right of 
the people which could not be dispensed with in all stormy periods ever since the 
English and French revolutions. History owes to this right almost all the energetic 
steps taken by such assemblies. The only reason why people dwell on the ‘legal 
basis’ and why the timorous and philistine friends of the ‘freedom of debate’ 
lament about it is that they do not want any energetic decisions at all.
1203
 
 
This evidence repudiates all of those commentators who deem Marx an amoralist or as someone 
who is solely concerned with so-called ‘non-moral’ goods. Indeed, he also describes as a 
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revolutionary duty and right the refusal to pay taxes, the parliamentary form of protest par 
excellence: “The resolution of the National Assembly regarding the refusal to pay taxes had the 
force of law both formally and materially. We went further than the National Assembly in our 
appeal. This was our right and our duty.”1204 This may seem inconsistent with Marx’s assertion 
that revolutions do not occur according to laws. We must note that Marx believed that the 
bourgeois revolution in 1848 had established itself through the National Assembly, had created 
the political form adequate to the emerging capitalist economic conditions, and therefore, had 
developed the capacities necessary to found a constitution and declare law. 
With regard to the establishing of a social republic within capitalism, the best example is 
his commentary on the Paris Commune. The Commune is a somewhat ambiguous example 
because it exists somewhere between the establishing of a social republic and the attempt to 
create what Marx would describe as the first phase of socialism. The evidence suggests that 
Marx never thought that the Commune could actually achieve socialism.
1205
 If we assume for the 
sake of argument, however, that Marx deemed the Commune socialistic, even in these 
circumstances he is hesitant to speak of justice in any sense, including complete justice. Marx 
does argue that the “revolution had become the legal status of France.”1206 He also notes how one 
of the measures of the Commune was to make judicial functionaries subject to immediate recall 
and directly accountable to the people. Consequently, they were “divested of that sham 
independence which had but served to mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding 
governments to which, in turn, they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance.”1207 Indeed, 
Marx invokes something like the right to revolution, without actually using the terminology, 
when he asserts that “the war of the enslaved against their enslavers” is “the only justifiable war 
in history.”1208 Nevertheless, the only time that Marx, in his own words, explicitly addresses 
justice, he points to the hypocrisy of bourgeois justice: “The civilisation and justice of bourgeois 
order comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against their 
masters. Then this civilisation and justice stand forth as undisguised savagery and lawless 
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revenge.”1209 We must now turn to what Marx says about genuinely socialist conditions, about a 
society that has successfully left behind counter-revolution and its lawless revenge. 
 
14. 3: Is There Complete Justice Under Socialism? 
 
In Marx’s discussions of the genuinely socialist society, although he speaks of distributive justice 
in the first phase of socialism, he does not characterize either the first or the second phase in 
terms of complete justice or anything akin to it. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx explicitly 
asserts that, with regard to ‘eternal truths’ such as ‘Freedom’ and ‘Justice,’ “Communism 
abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on 
a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.”1210 These ‘eternal’ 
truths are common forms to all preceding societies as much as is exploitation and class 
antagonism: “No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the 
multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which 
cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.”1211 Of 
course, Marx cannot deem freedom to be a mere ‘eternal truth.’ After all, two pages after his 
critique of these “common forms,” Marx endorses a notion of freedom, a set of social conditions 
in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”1212 It is 
clear that, for Marx, whereas the freedom of the disembodied free will is an abstract universal, 
his materialist notion of freedom becomes an ever more concrete universal as it develops 
historically through its particular social forms. It is not clear that Marx regards justice in the 
same way. 
As we have seen, Marx affirms a notion of distributive justice in the first phase of 
socialism even though there is no private property or state. He argues that this is because 
socialism, at least in this respect, cannot immediately escape bourgeois right. It is important to 
note that Marx says, “What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has 
developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it emerges from capitalist society; 
which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the 
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birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.”1213 He does not say politically. This 
is not pedantry. It is highly relevant that Marx deems politics inextricable from the state. 
In his ethnological notebooks, Marx notes how Theodor Mommsen describes the 
primitive communism of hunter-gatherer societies in terms of ‘political sovereignty,’ which 
causes Marx to respond with “asinus!”1214 In his article praising the Silesian weavers’ strike, 
Marx asserts that socialism will require a political revolution, but can then cast off its ‘political 
mask.’1215 For Marx, politics does not exist in periods before or after state societies. He contends 
that, in socialism, public power will lose its political character because political power is “merely 
the organised power of one class for oppressing another.”1216 If Marx has an alternative theory of 
a politics that will persist in socialist society, he never explicitly defines it. This makes all the 
more significant Marx’s belief that the reconciliation of the individual and general interests will 
be more or less straightforward. 
Since Marx describes a principle of distributive justice in the first phase of socialism, but 
does not describe something akin to complete justice in either the first or the second phases, 
perhaps this is because, like politics, he deems this specific form of justice inextricable from the 
state. Perhaps the eclipse of the state brings an end to the need for this kind of justice. Indeed, 
when Marx speaks of the withering away of the state, he does not cast it in terms of justice. 
Rather, he depicts it using the familiar standard: “Freedom consists in converting the state from 
an organ standing above society into one completely subordinated to it.”1217 
If all of this does not seem to be strong enough evidence, Marx and Engels, in their 
discussion of communist society in The German Ideology, state their point unequivocally: “As 
far as Recht is concerned, we with many others have stressed the opposition of communism to 
Recht, both political and private, as also in its most general form as the rights of man.”1218 This 
seems to affirm Wood’s interpretation. And yet, in this paragraph from The German Ideology, 
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Marx and Engels support their rejection of justice by citing three of their previous articles in 
which they criticize certain aspects of justice without rejecting justice altogether. These articles 
are Engels’s ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy’ and Marx’s articles, ‘On the Jewish 
Question’ and ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction.’ This is 
peculiar because Marx’s essays, and especially the latter one, provide some of the strongest 
evidence for the interpretation offered by the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis. After all, it 
is there that Marx describes the exclusion of the proletariat as unjust and their redemption of 
humanity as total justice. By citing these articles, Marx and Engels are pointing to the 
continuities between their 1843 articles and the 1845 draft of The German Ideology. If this is 
true, the question arises, what inspired the change with respect to the theory of rights 
specifically? The secret is in Marx’s first engagement with political economy in the manuscripts 
of 1844. There he discovers the foundation for his theory of historical materialism, namely, the 
actualization of our ‘species-being,’ or, what has traditionally been described as the good life for 
human beings. In the process, Marx comes to regard justice not as something that gives rise to 
alienated expressions, but as itself the alienated expression of what, according to this newly 
discovered theory of history, are transitory social relations: private property and the state. In 
other words, justice becomes as mutable as they are. 
Up until 1844, Marx had in large part followed Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, including 
Feuerbach’s rejection of the negation of the negation. In 1844, however, Marx’s first exploration 
of political economy yields what is the most important among a number of significant 
discoveries. He realizes that, heretofore, he had been guilty of a subject-predicate inversion the 
likes of which he earlier criticized Hegel’s theory of the state. Marx discovers that he was 
viewing the development of human history as if private property was a separate and autonomous 
predicate. He thereby neglected the human activity, the subject, that gives rise to it, namely, 
labour in its alienated forms: 
 
How, now ask, does man come to alienate his labour, to estrange it? How is this 
estrangement founded in the nature of human development? We have already 
gone a long way towards solving this problem by transforming the question of the 
origin of private property into the question of the relationship of alienated labour 
to the course of human development. For in speaking of private property one 
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imagines that one is dealing with something external to man, in speaking of 
labour one is dealing immediately with man himself. This new way of 
formulating the problem already contains its solution.
1219
 
 
Although private property appears to be the cause of alienated labour, rather, it is an effect of this 
alienation.
1220
 The profundity of his realization that private property is not an external thing, but 
an internal relation, is that the developing dialectic between alienated labour and private property 
becomes the basis of his own theory of universal history. 
The alienation of labour, of humans from themselves, creates the master of labour, 
whether this latter takes the form of the slave-owner, the feudal lord, the capitalist, and so on.
1221
 
This is crucial because it is only if labour ultimately produces the ruling non-producers that the 
latter can be incorporated back into the labourers as self-ruling producers. This is why Marx 
asserts that in the emancipation of the working class is contained universal human emancipation: 
“The reason for this universality is that the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation 
of the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are nothing but modifications and 
consequences of this relation.”1222 Marx’s first exploration of political economy, the science of 
capitalist society, reveals that it makes possible the end of this alienation. Capital becomes the 
master of the division of labour and the perfection of private property through its total 
dispossession of the proletariat. Consequently, the proletariat becomes the perfection of labour 
because, in order to assert their freedom, they must overthrow this perfected form of private 
property. In other words, they must take control of a division of labour shorn of private property 
altogether. In light of this discovery, no longer is the proletariat merely excluded from an overly 
abstract notion of freedom. Its newfound significance is that it becomes the basis for the negation 
of the negation in history. Marx does not become a communist until he discovers the grounds for 
this universal history. 
Marx describes communism as the positive supersession of private property as self-
alienation and the conscious restoration of humankind as a social being: “It is the solution of the 
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riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution.”1223 This is full of obscure, but profound 
meaning. Marx is echoing similar sentiments expressed by Hess in his own theorization of 
universal history in ‘The Philosophy of the Act (1843)’: 
 
History has already broken through the closed circle of slavery. The revolution is 
the break from captivity, from the condition of bigotry and oppression in which 
the spirit found itself before it became self-conscious. But, as we have seen, this 
anarchy only broke through the limits imposed from the outside, without 
progressing further to self-determination or self-limitation, to morality. The 
revolution is still incomplete, and it knows that it is still incomplete. Even so, the 
anarchy could not stay as it was at the beginning, and has in fact not stayed that 
way. And as we, the children of the revolution, move on from it forward into 
morality, the riddle is thus being solved.
1224
 
 
Characteristically, Marx does not speak of morality as freely as does Hess. Nevertheless, with 
their invocations of the riddle of history, both Marx and Hess are drawing from Hegel. In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, during his critique of the merely ‘observing reason’ that treats the 
world with detachment and considers it a dead thing—as if a human head were just a skull—
Hegel quotes Goethe’s Faust: 
 
It despises intellect and science 
The supreme gifts of man 
It has given itself to the devil 
And must perish.
1225
 
 
Hegel then offers the ‘active reason’ that aspires to the kind of knowledge that only occurs 
through deeds.
1226
 Although this Faustian figure attempts to know himself through his deeds, he 
gives rise to consequences he does not intend: “Consciousness, therefore, through its experience 
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in which it should have found its truth, has really become a riddle to itself, the consequences of 
its deeds are for it not the deeds themselves […] The abstract necessity therefore has the 
character of the merely negative, uncomprehended power of universality, on which individuality 
is smashed to pieces.”1227 As Speight notes, Hegel deems this figure to be tragic.1228 For Marx, 
although the proletariat is mired in a tragic conflict with capital, they are at the center of his 
universal history because he believes that, unlike any such conflict heretofore, the proletariat can 
make history consciously. It can know its tasks and intend its deeds. It knows itself to be riddle 
of history solved. 
Most of the significant aspects of Marx’s theory of revolution are well known by 
commentators. Nevertheless, few, if any, have asked whether or not Marx, in his adaptation of 
the dialectical method, offers a notion of the Absolute. As we saw before, the dialectic, the circle 
of circles, needs an Absolute in order to be a self-enclosed system. Otherwise, it will fall into 
infinite regress, the bad infinite. For Hegel, the Absolute, the good infinite, is providential 
history, the developing self-knowledge of the universe itself culminating in an immanent God, 
the reconciliation of the divine and the human. It is significant that at the end of the manuscripts 
of 1844, Marx criticizes Hegel’s notion of the Absolute for being too abstract to sufficiently 
account for nature.
1229
 We have also documented numerous instances where Marx ridicules the 
idea of the eternal, especially with regard to moral principles such as justice. Does he ever speak 
favourably of the eternal, the infinite, the Absolute, in a way that does not immediately 
undermine these notions? Indeed he does. 
For Marx, the Absolute is, in successive levels of concreteness, nature, or the metabolism 
between human nature and non-human nature, or the nexus between natural history and human 
history in the entire course of its development. Put succinctly, the basis of Marx’s dialectic and 
the principle of his universal history is free creative labour pursued as an end in itself in the 
conscious transformation of nature and our own nature. That Marx had developed this theory by 
1844 is evident when he praises the “final result” of Hegel’s Phenomenology, which “conceives 
the self-creation of man as a process,” as “alienation and as supersession of this alienation.”1230 
That Marx deems the culmination of this process the basis of his notion of the Absolute is most 
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obvious in a famous assertion in The Grundrisse where Marx uses the term ‘absolute’ more than 
once. First, Marx notes how the ancients are not concerned with wealth in itself, but only insofar 
as it creates the best citizens.
1231
 This seems quite “lofty” in comparison to the modern world. 
Marx then asserts: 
 
In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is 
wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, 
productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development 
of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of 
humanity’s own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, 
with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which 
makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as 
such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he 
does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives 
not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of 
becoming?
1232
 
 
Marx retains this notion of actualized species-being, of the good life, of the objective good of 
human beings, throughout his life.
1233
 
That free labour is Marx’s Absolute is evident in his depiction of the modes of production 
as the different shapes of increasingly more concrete freedom. Marx’s theory of history is not a 
simple unilinear chronology. The Asiatic, Greco-Roman, and Germanic modes of production are 
different ways of transitioning from hunter-gatherer societies, or, as Marx calls, them, ‘primitive 
communism.’ Nor does he schematize the modes of production according to geography. For 
example, the ‘Asiatic’ mode of production includes Mexico and Peru as well as the Celtic and 
Slavic peoples. Rather, Marx’s theory of history is based on the development of individual 
freedom, particularly in our productive activities. This development corresponds to the shifting 
relations between communal and private property. In the Asiatic mode no one owns private 
property in land because there is a unity of agriculture and manufacture in the common property 
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of the village. (Marx, heavily reliant on English accounts, downplays the variety of state forms 
and the extent of market exchange in these societies.) In the Greco-Roman mode the emergence 
of private property in the family plot is nevertheless subordinate to the communal property of the 
public area. In the Germanic mode the separate households are independent centers of production 
united by common pastures that serve only as their complement. In the feudal mode crafts 
manufacture and independent guilds feature the greatest possible individualization of labour 
outside of capitalism.
1234
 This is why Marx describes communism as the ‘freedom of each is the 
condition of the freedom of all,’ rather than the other way around.1235 
Even if free creative activity is Marx’s notion of the Absolute, why is this relevant for his 
theory of justice? This is the major discontinuity between 1843 and 1845. Marx comes to deem 
justice as functional to, and inextricable from, certain aspects of the alienation of labour, namely, 
private property and the state. Marx criticizes Hegel on grounds similar to Hegel’s critique of 
Kant: he reconciles social contradictions merely in thought and therefore does not address 
practical transformations of the social conditions that give rise to those contradictions: “Thus, for 
example, having superseded religion and recognized it as a product of self-alienation, he still 
finds himself confirmed in religion as religion.”1236 This critique of the abstract character of 
Hegel’s Absolute Idea extends beyond religion: “Man, who has realized that in law [Recht], 
politics, etc., he leads an alienated life, leads his true human life in this alienated life as such. 
Self-affirmation, self-confirmation in contradiction with itself and with the knowledge and the 
nature of the object is therefore true knowledge and true life.”1237 This reveals the significance of 
the manuscripts of 1844 for our question. Marx believes that justice is not something that gives 
rise to alienated expressions, but rather, that justice is itself an alienated expression of something 
else. In this, justice is less like freedom and more like religion and politics. As with the latter, 
certain aspects of justice may persist in socialism, in a genuinely human society, but they will not 
have the form of justice, just our search for spiritual meaning or our public responsibilities will 
not have the form of religion or politics. With Marx’s discovery of the negation of the negation, 
he now has the basis by which to envision the end, the withering away, of not only private 
property and the state, of not only religion and politics, but also the need for justice. 
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Up until 1843, Marx continues the project of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. Marx’s search 
for a sufficiently universal notion of freedom leads to his initial discovery of the excluded 
proletariat. But Marx also continues Hegel’s search for the Absolute. This is what Marx 
discovers in 1844. The proletariat is not merely excluded, but the unique form of their exclusion 
makes their struggle for a more inclusive freedom the negation of the basis of all exclusion. Once 
he discovers that private property and the state are not isolated predicates, but rather, alienated 
features of the subject, they become historically transitory. Unlike Hegel, Marx’s notion of 
freedom as the Absolute is not ‘justice in and for itself.’ Quite the opposite. Marx associates the 
need for justice with private property and the state. Therefore, any freedom that still requires 
principles of justice demonstrates precisely that it is not yet sufficiently universal and concrete. It 
is not yet Absolute. 
Support for this interpretation is provided by a series of passages in Capital, the 
significance of which has not, to my knowledge, been understood heretofore. During a 
discussion of the difference between what he calls the ‘social’ and ‘technical’ divisions of 
labour, Marx makes a number of allusions to Plato’s theory of justice. What Marx says about the 
division of labour here demonstrates that he thinks the essence of justice is the functional 
reproduction of private property and the state, and therefore, that justice is as historically 
transitory as they are. 
To understand what Marx is doing in these passages, we must briefly review a key 
section in Plato’s Republic. At the beginning of book IV, Socrates has stripped his guardians, his 
ideal ruling class, of family and private property. His interlocutors ask, how can the guardians be 
happy in such a state? If the best are not happy, who could be? Socrates responds that the most 
just city is founded with an eye for the happiness of the whole, not any specific part. Indeed, the 
justice embodied by the guardians is their concern for the common ends of the social whole. 
Socrates likens this to a painting in which the colors of one part may appear wrong when they are 
considered in isolation, but are correct when we consider the balance of the whole: 
 
Just as if we were painting statues and someone came up and began to blame us, 
saying that we weren’t putting the fairest colors on the fairest parts of the 
animal—for eyes, which are fairest, had not been painted purple but black—we 
would seem to make a sensible apology to him by saying: ‘You surprising man, 
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don’t suppose we ought to paint eyes so fair that they don’t even look like eyes, 
and the same for the other parts; but observe whether, assigning what’s suitable to 
each of them, we make the whole fair. So now too, don’t compel us to attach to 
the guardians a happiness that will turn them into everything except guardians.
1238
 
 
It is also on this basis that Plato legitimates that other feature of his theory of justice, namely, 
that everyone remains with the tasks for which they are naturally suited. Indeed, those in the 
bronze and silver classes are not adequate judges of the gold classes, the guardians, who are 
primarily concerned with the good of the whole. This is why the guardians are much more 
important than, say, the cobbler: 
 
That men should become poor menders of shoes, corrupted and pretending to be 
what they’re not, isn’t so terrible for a city, but you surely see that men who are 
not guardians of the laws and the city, but seem to be, utterly destroy an entire 
city, just as they alone are masters of the occasion to govern it well and to make it 
happy.
1239
 
 
Before we can interpret Marx’s allusions to these passages, we must first understand three 
aspects of Marx’s theory of the division of labour. First, Marx argues that the division of labour 
has a merely ‘natural’ character if the distribution of tasks does not occur voluntarily according 
to a common plan: “man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves 
him instead of being controlled by him.”1240 Second, as long as the division of labour retains this 
“naturally evolved” character, there will necessarily be a conflict between particular interests and 
the common interest.
1241
 Finally, Marx describes the state as an organ that stands separate from 
and above society “through division of labour.”1242 
 Keeping these things in mind, we can now turn to Marx’s discussion of the social and 
technical divisions of labour in Capital. The social division of labour into different branches of 
production exists in a wide variety of societies. Conversely, the technical division of labour 
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within the factory is unique to capitalism. With it, all of the tasks of production are broken down 
into their constituent parts. During this discussion, Marx notes, in a statement that should remind 
us of his assertions about the ‘absolute state of becoming’ in The Grundrisse, that Plato’s theory 
is the “standpoint of use-value.”1243 In other words, Plato is not concerned with the accumulation 
of wealth in itself, which is the standpoint of exchange-value, but rather, in wealth that creates 
good citizens. Furthermore, Plato’s division of society into estates is based on the social division 
of labour: “Plato’s Republic, in so far as the division of labour is treated in it as the formative 
principle of the state, is merely an Athenian idealization of the Egyptian caste system, Egypt 
having served as the model of an industrial country to others of his contemporaries, e.g. 
Isocrates.”1244 That Marx deems this a paradigmatic example of the natural division of labour is 
evident in the footnote to this statement, which approvingly quotes James Harris: “The whole 
argument to prove society natural i.e. (by division of employments)…is taken from the second 
book of Plato’s Republic.”1245 Marx asserts that, for Plato, the division of labour results from the 
fact that individuals are many-sided in their needs but only one-sided in their capacities. 
Furthermore, the worker must adapt herself to the work rather than the work to the worker or else 
critical points in the production process can be missed and the article spoiled. Marx notes that 
this ‘Platonic idea’ had arisen recently when the English bleachers opposed the clause in the 
Factory Act guaranteeing fixed meal times for workers. The bleachers argued that interrupting 
these operations might damage valuable goods. Marx responds, “Le platonisme où va-t-il se 
nicher! [‘Where will Platonism be found next!’]”1246 
Marx then asserts that, in the development of capitalism through the early manufacturing 
period, the establishing of a technical division of labour in the workshops came up against 
significant obstacles, namely, handicraft production and guild protections. Marx cites Andrew 
Ure, a forerunner to theories of scientific management of production. Ure criticizes guild 
protections as “the scholastic dogma of the division of labour” and praises Richard Arkwright, 
whose invention of the throstle revolutionized cotton-spinning and broke through this 
‘dogma.’1247 This is how the technical division of labour emerges within the social division of 
labour. Marx notes that, by abolishing the regulation of production by handicraftsmen, “the 
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technical reason for the lifelong attachment of the worker to a partial function is swept away.”1248 
Nevertheless, this also paves the way for the domination of production processes by capital. 
As we saw, Hegel criticizes Plato’s theory of complete justice because, among other 
things, his ruling class assigns people to their positions in the social division of labour rather than 
permitting them the freedom to choose their own vocation. Marx now demonstrates that, despite 
what Hegel says about modern freedom, this choice is only formal. Although people have more 
choices over their vocation, for the majority, these choices nonetheless remain within their being 
assigned to the producing classes. The social, and now technical, divisions of labour are still 
under the control of a ruling class, though this is mediated by competition. Sandel notes that, for 
most modern thinkers, justice is not about ‘fit’ but rather ‘choice.’1249 They are wary of 
teleological theories of the human purpose because they tend to lead to the belief that tasks can 
be externally imposed. This is contrary to human freedom: “To allocate rights is not to fit people 
to roles that suit their nature; it is to let people choose their roles for themselves.”1250 As Marx 
demonstrates, Sandel misunderstands the nature of capitalism. A ruling minority still divides the 
majority into the different social functions, but this now occurs economically through the market 
rather than politically through the state. Furthermore, it is done from the standpoint of exchange-
value and therefore disregards which forms of wealth create the best citizens. 
Marx details, over the course of hundreds of pages, the effects of this domination on 
workers before concluding the chapter with a synoptic statement about the long-term tendencies 
of the technical division of labour. Under capitalism, large-scale industry necessitates the 
variation of labour but does so in a way that reproduces the old “ossified” division of labour.1251 
In other words, it is imposed involuntarily. Furthermore, with the technical division of labour, 
the workers’ specialized function upon which they depend for subsistence is under constant 
threat of being rendered superfluous by automation. In this way, workers are forcibly adapted to 
the needs of the work, of capitalist exploitation. Nevertheless, Marx contends that the 
“possibility of varying labour must become a general law of social production, and the existing 
relations must be adapted to permit its realization in practice.”1252 In other words, capitalism 
creates conditions in which “the partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one 
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specialized social function,” can eventually become “the totally developed individual, for whom 
the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn.”1253 This 
requires, however, a revolutionary transformation of social conditions. 
 
Though the Factory Act, that first and meagre concession wrung from capital, is 
limited to combining elementary education with work in the factory, there can be 
no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working 
class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper 
place in the schools of the workers. There is also no doubt that those 
revolutionary ferments whose goal is the abolition of the old division of labour 
stand in diametrical contradiction with the capitalist form of production, and the 
economic situation of the workers which corresponds to that form. However, the 
development of the contradictions of a given historical form of production is the 
only historical way in which it can be dissolved and then reconstructed on a new 
basis. ‘Ne sutor ultra crepidam,’ a phrase which was the absolute summit of 
handicraft wisdom, became sheer non-sense from the moment the watchmaker 
Watt invented the steam-engine, the barber Arkwright the throstle and the 
jeweller Fulton the steamship.
1254
 
 
In a footnote to this passage, Ben Fowkes, the translator of Capital, asserts this about ‘Ne sutor 
ultra crepidam’: “‘Let the cobbler stick to his last,’ the reply supposed to have been made by the 
Greek painter Apelles to a shoemaker who criticized one of his works. It is reported by Pliny the 
Elder, Historia Naturalis, Bk xxxv, para. 84.”1255 Another way to translate it is, ‘The cobbler 
should not judge above the sandal.’ Fowkes does not realize that this is a reference to the 
Republic. Where will the critique of Platonism be found next! 
Indeed, this is not the only time Marx references the cobbler as the paradigmatic example 
of the merely ‘natural’ division of labour, of the idea of justice as ‘minding your own business.’ 
Take, for example, Marx’s first critique of Hegel. His refutation of Hegel’s depiction of the civil 
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servants as the universal class includes a criticism of the division of labour embodied by the 
state: 
 
In a rational state it would be more appropriate to ensure that a cobbler passed an 
examination than an executive civil servant; because shoe-making is a craft in the 
absence of which it is still possible to be a good citizen and a man in society. But 
the necessary ‘knowledge of the state’ is a precondition in the absence of which 
one lives outside the state, cut off from the air one breathes and from oneself. 
Thus the ‘examination’ is nothing but a Masonic initiation, the legal recognition 
of the knowledge of citizenship, the acknowledgement of a privilege.
1256
 
 
In the young Marx’s vision for radical republican democracy, he deems the role of guardianship 
as more important than cobbling, but unlike Plato, and, for that matter, Hegel, he does not think 
that these tasks should be divided according to class. Not only manual labour but also the mental 
labour required for rule are different roles in which every citizen in the self-governing 
democratic republic should share. Everyone should have ‘knowledge of the state.’ Heretofore, 
the majority of people have been excluded from rule and self-rule. Therefore, we are 
unaccustomed to seeing how society as a whole functions and taking responsibility for it. This 
disrupts our capacity to think of how our own particular interest relates to the universal interest. 
He retains this theory in his adoption of communism. When every individual takes up different 
social functions in turn, we have a better understanding of how society as a whole works, and 
therefore, the knowledge necessary to reconcile our interests. Alienated forms of human activity, 
whether in the state or in private property, are absorbed back into the community of well-
rounded individuals. A precondition of this are forms of class struggle and political activities 
through which the working class can educate themselves about society, about social laws and 
processes, so that they are better able to determine for themselves the best ways in which to unite 
their individual interests with the general interest. In other words, a genuine socialism requires 
the cultivation of the democratic capacities, of what I have been referring to as practical reason, 
by which workers make themselves ‘fit to rule.’ 
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Let us return to the allusions to Plato in Capital. Given how significant education of the 
virtuous citizens is in the Republic, it is interesting that Marx, in his discussion of the 
transformations of the division of labour in and through capitalism, speaks of future education in 
the schools of the workers. When he speaks of technological education that reconciles both 
practical and theoretical aspects, he is envisioning the end to the separation of manual and mental 
labour, the latter of which he deems to be a hallmark of the entrenched power of private property 
and the state. This is why, when Marx describes the second phase of socialism, he speaks not 
only of free labour becoming our primary need and of the eclipse of distributive justice by the 
principle of need, but also the end of “the enslaving subordination of individuals under the 
division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour.”1257 
Indeed, Marx’s vision of the end of the ‘natural’ division of labour inaugurates the age of 
‘the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of 
activity he takes up in turn.’ It is not that Marx thinks we can, or should, overcome the 
differences in natural endowments between individuals. His exceptional egalitarianism embraces 
these differences. Rather, Marx seeks the abolition of a division of labour that is ‘natural’ insofar 
as it is spontaneously arisen and under the control of a ruling minority. This is in large part a 
refutation of Plato’s notion of justice as keeping to the specialized function to which each is 
declared to be ‘naturally’ suited, and therefore, the notion that responsibility for the social whole 
is monopolized by a part of society, rather than each and every individual throughout the whole 
of society. Indeed, one of the reasons Marx rejects classical notions of natural right is because he 
associates them with ideological attempts to turn historically-specific class inequalities into 
theories of the natural and immutable hierarchies between human beings. All of this contributes 
to the interpretation that Marx regards justice in the form of complete justice to be inextricable 
from the natural division of labour, the most significant aspects of which are the various forms of 
private property and the state. Conversely, Marx aspires to a rational division of labour that is 
controlled and planned by the association of self-ruling producers, of free labour, which has shed 
its class character. The question arises, is this not complete justice in another form? 
We must now come to an overall interpretation of Marx on the question of justice in all 
of its most significant aspects. In doing so, I will also provide a summary of the results found 
with regard to Marx’s theory of what I have referred to as complete justice in capitalism and 
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socialism. Marx contends that the only possible standard of justice in a given set of conditions is 
that which corresponds to the prevailing mode of production. What is unjust in those conditions 
are actions by individuals and groups that transgress the laws and rules that functionally 
reproduce those historically-specific social relations. Therefore, both a mode of production and 
the people within it cannot be praised as just or condemned as unjust according to standards 
external to that mode of production, whether these standards are trans-historical or those of a 
‘higher’ mode of production. This is no less true with regard to the capstone of justice. Marx 
thinks that each class-based mode of production has something akin to complete justice. 
Consequently, there is a bourgeois form of complete justice that corresponds to the needs of 
commodity production under capitalism. Its standard is the general interest defined as the neutral 
arbitration between a plurality of competing interests. 
This does not mean, however, that Marx deems each mode of production as 
unproblematically just. His immanent critique reveals that no form of justice exists in any 
positive, non-self-contradictory sense of that term. Marx shows how the capitalist social structure 
as a whole systemically offends against its own highest principles. Under capitalism, surplus 
appropriation occurs through production for exchange. Therefore, the principles of commutative 
justice, ‘to each their due’ and ‘do not steal,’ are both offended by the inherently exploitative 
wage-relation between labour and capital. The highest principle of distributive justice under 
capitalism, providing for those needs excluded by commutative justice, is fraught with tensions 
because the state, incapable of truly confronting the systemic inequality that forms it basis, 
cannot ameliorate needs—it can only discipline them. The highest principle of corrective justice, 
the punishment of crime, is transgressed because the state is a not a response to crime, but rather, 
its cause. It punishes the crimes it creates. All of this also applies to complete justice. With 
regard to its bourgeois form, its apparent neutrality obscures its many-layered support for the 
particular rule of the capitalist class. In fact, the split between the particular and the general 
interest under capitalism, made so obvious by the differentiation of competitive economic 
activity from citizenship in the ‘purely political’ state, reveals the underlying essence of the 
forms of complete justice that are typical of pre-capitalist modes of production. The idea that 
complete justice is based in the common ends of the social whole and the objective goods of a 
human nature that is continuous with the divine structure of the universe masks what are the 
particular interests of a ruling class. 
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Therefore, although forms of complete justice exist in every class-based mode of 
production, they are self-contradictory. For the duration of its historical development, the rulers 
in a particular mode of production are typically able to maintain a tense, sometimes combative, 
unity of the particular and general interests. They are able to do so, in part, because they cast 
their own particular interest as the general interest, indeed, the most general possible interest. 
They deem themselves the primary representatives of justice, and especially, of complete justice. 
Nevertheless, this ‘complete’ justice is never actually complete because it is dependent on the 
subordination and exclusion of producing classes. Therefore, the highest principle of complete 
justice, the protection of the general interest against the personal whims of individuals, is 
increasingly undermined by a ruling class that, in the unfolding of societal tendencies and 
historical laws, becomes an ever more particular interest standing in opposition to the general 
interests of social development. For this reason, when the contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production provoke revolutionary fervour, the representatives of this dying order 
cannot plausibly claim that this revolutionary activity is unjust. 
Does Marx think that, even if the revolutionary working class should not condemn 
capitalism as unjust, it should be motivated and guided by a ‘higher’ socialist principle of 
justice? If Marx rejects the bourgeois notion of complete justice as neutral arbitration, does he 
base revolutionary activity in a notion of justice as the objective good of humankind? He does 
not. As we have seen, although he rejects the ‘conscious baseness’ of the bourgeoisie, he thinks 
it reveals that all notions of a common good were reflections of the ‘unconscious baseness’ of 
pre-capitalist ruling classes. The revolutions of the past might have clothed the limited character 
of their goals in notions of justice, but the revolutionary proletariat, a historically-conscious 
class, needs no such thing. Justice, and specifically, complete justice, has meant stable 
compromises between necessarily antagonistic classes. Therefore, justice can only obscure the 
class interests of potential working class revolutionaries, the objective bearers of a genuinely 
universal interest. For Marx, a necessary condition of achieving this universal interest is 
abandoning notions of complete justice. 
Although the proponents of the Cohen-Geras thesis are correct that Marx deems the 
working class the objective bearer of the universal human interest, the proponents of the Tucker-
Wood thesis are right that Marx rejects any role for justice as a motivation or guide for 
revolutionary activity. As is the case with the other forms of justice, Buchanan and Lukes 
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provide the best interpretation so far, although Lukes is wrong in his assertion that, for Marx, 
there is no objectivity in the sense of perspective-neutrality. Rather, Marx regards the working 
class as the bearer of the achievement of the Absolute in history: free creative labour as an end in 
itself. 
The inherently contradictory character of justice is also true of the first phase of 
socialism. Marx’s immanent critique shows that the principle of due espoused by proponents of 
private property can only actually be achieved in relations of communal property. And yet, by 
imposing the same abstract standard on every individual irrespective of differences in natural 
abilities, chosen obligations, and contingent circumstances, this right of equality becomes a right 
of inequality…like every right. Distributive justice, like commutative, corrective, and complete 
justice, is inherently deficient. This is why Marx never speaks affirmatively about a principle of 
justice without also demonstrating that it is self-defeating and destined to be replaced by a new 
standard of justice or the end of justice altogether. The basis of what I have called Marx’s 
exceptional egalitarianism is the eclipse of justice. 
While the first phase of socialism features a principle of distributive justice, Marx never 
describes either phase of socialism in terms of complete justice. The reasons for this are similar 
to why he never describes socialism in terms of corrective justice. Marx deems both forms of 
justice as inextricable from the state, the dissolution of which is the precondition for a socialist 
society. With the state, so too goes corrective and complete justice. This is another reason why 
the revolutionary working class is not motivated or guided by standards of complete justice. For 
Marx, they are consciously preparing the way for a society that eliminates the class-determined 
split between the particular interests of individuals and the general interest of the social whole. 
This abolishes the conditions in which principles of justice are needed at all. As we have seen, 
Marx’s most important intellectual influences argue that the best way to avoid license or 
arbitrary freedom is not by constraining freedom with an independent standard of justice, but to 
make freedom sufficiently universal so that the freedom of each can account for the freedom of 
all. Marx takes this to its furthest logical extent. The precondition of universal freedom, of its 
becoming sufficiently concrete, is that it transcends the need for justice altogether. 
Although Marx deems the working class the bearer of the universal interest of humanity, 
he casts this universal interest in terms of freedom as distinct from justice. In other words, what 
the revolutionary working class accomplishes by establishing socialism is an end to the ‘pre-
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history’ of humankind whereby the freedom of some necessarily comes at the expense of the 
freedom of others. For Marx, socialism inaugurates the actualization of freedom in a positive, 
non-self-contradictory way. It is a freedom that is sufficiently universal and concrete. It is not, 
however, what Hegel would describe as a universal freedom that is ‘justice in and for itself.’ In 
certain significant respects, for Marx, justice is actually the opposite of the universal interest. In 
other words, principles or standards of justice only arise when a ruling particular interest needs to 
cast itself as the general interest and establish the laws necessary for the reproduction of that rule 
amid the necessary antagonism of class-interests. Therefore, justice becomes obsolete when the 
particular interests of individuals are also genuinely the universal interest. Ultimately, though 
Marx takes much from Hegel’s theory of historical development, he would not speak of the 
‘absolute right of history.’ Rather, Marx’s Absolute, free activity as an end in itself, is only 
sufficiently realized in history when all need for right has withered away. This, I believe, is the 
correct interpretation of Marx on justice in all of its most significant aspects. Therefore, all that 
remains is the critique of Marx’s theory of justice. 
I have spoken of the significance of the allusions to Plato’s theory of complete justice in 
Marx’s Capital. It is quite interesting how Marx ends the chapter in which they are contained. In 
one of the final footnotes, Marx quotes David Urquhart’s criticisms of the “unnatural” division 
of labour represented by the separation between town and country: “You divide the people into 
two hostile camps of clownish boors and emasculated dwarfs.”1258 Marx then responds, “This 
passage demonstrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of the kind of criticism which 
knows how to judge and condemn the present, but not how to comprehend it.”1259 In this, Marx 
sounds remarkably like Hegel in the preface to The Philosophy of Right where, amid his critique 
of Plato, he asserts that “since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason 
the comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond.”1260 And 
yet, while Hegel argues that a world-historical individual cannot foresee the future order 
sufficiently to justify the historical right to do wrong, Marx deems the revolutionary working 
class to be conscious of its historical task and of the future order it is to bring about. We turn 
now to the dangers of this theory, and, in particular, Marx’s attempt to go beyond justice as such. 
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So far, I have focused on assessing the accuracy of the interpretations of Marx. I have 
attempted to understand Marx, as well as the different schools of Marxist commentators, on their 
own terms. Now, in the conclusion, it is time to shift our focus to assessing the broader moral 
and political implications of Marx’s theory of justice, as well as the variety of interpretations 
offered by commentators. As I hope to show, this required our voyage through the major aspects 
of the comprehensive theory of justice. 
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Chapter 15: Conclusion: Before Them, The Flood 
 
In every stock-jobbing swindle everyone knows that some time or other 
the crash must come, but everyone hopes that it may fall on the head of 
his neighbour, after he himself has caught the shower of gold and placed 
it in secure hands. Apres moi le déluge! is the watchword of every 
capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Capital therefore takes no 
account of the health and the length of life of the worker, unless society 
forces it to do so. Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental 
degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, is this: Should 
that pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure (profit)? But looking 
at these things as a whole, it is evident that this does not depend on the 
will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free 
competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the 
individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him. 
 
Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One
1261
 
 
This is a significant passage, and not only because it quotes Louis XV’s purported statement, 
‘After me, the flood,’ a prescient, perhaps apocryphal, intuition of the French Revolution fifteen 
years after his death. It is rarely noticed that Marx also paraphrases Goethe, who asks, as we 
recall from Marx’s article on British colonialism in India, ‘Should this torture torment us/Since it 
brings greater pleasure?’ For Marx, the generation of profit within capitalism is analogous to the 
appropriation of surplus throughout the pre-history of humankind. Indeed, what Marx says in the 
preface to Capital about the ruling class under capitalism is characteristic of his view about all 
ruling classes: while he does not paint capitalists in “rosy colours,” nonetheless, because they are 
mere “personifications” of economic processes that are tantamount to “natural history,” his 
standpoint cannot “make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, 
socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.”1262 
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Nevertheless, we should be wary of the extent to which Marx’s assertions about the wills of 
individuals, whether good or bad, closely correspond to broader transformations of ethics in the 
modern era. 
As we have seen, Marx, in one of his most sustained discussions of his historical method, 
asserts: “Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher 
development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the 
higher development is already known.”1263 In Hegel’s essay on ‘Natural Law,’1264 he says much 
the same thing with regard to the lion and the polyp, respectively, the king of the jungle and its 
lumpen-proletariat. For Marx, as with Hegel, science is its own time comprehended in thought. 
As I noted before, one of the most well-known examples of this is Marx’s assertion that Aristotle 
is not to be faulted for failing to discover the source of commensurability between different 
commodities.
1265
 It was only when capitalism had levelled most forms of labour into abstract 
commodified labour that this secret could be discovered. We have recently seen an example of 
this with regard to the question of justice. The young Marx notes how in the modern era there is 
a split between the private, egoistic individual and the public, political citizen. This not only 
leads to his mature assertion that, under capitalism, the particular interests of individuals are 
irreconcilable with the general interest of the state. It also leads to his assertion that the antinomy 
between particular and general interests is true of every human society heretofore. Nevertheless, 
this provokes questions about how to distinguish between, on the one hand, the way in which 
current conditions may reveal hidden truths about human history as a whole, and on the other 
hand, the way in which we often ideologically generalize across all historical periods what is true 
only of our own specific circumstances. 
Although I will soon point to some flaws in their approach, Buchanan and Lukes offer the 
best interpretation of Marx so far. As we saw, they criticize Marx because he deems both 
proletarian revolution and the establishing of communism to be beyond justice. Let us briefly 
examine their criticisms. We turn first to their criticisms of Marx’s theory of proletarian 
revolution. 
As we saw, Buchanan attributes to Marx a multidimensional critique of justice: 
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i) One of the most serious indictments of capitalism—and of all class-divided 
societies—is not that they are unjust or that they violate persons’ rights, but that they 
are based on defective modes of production which make reliance upon conceptions 
of justice and right necessary. 
ii) The demands of justice cannot be satisfied in the circumstances which make 
conceptions of justice necessary; thus efforts to achieve justice inevitably fail. 
iii) Conceptions of rights and justice will not play a major motivational role in the 
revolutionary struggle to replace capitalism with communism. 
iv) Communism will be a society in which juridical concepts—including the juridical 
concept of respect—have no significant role in structuring social relations. 
v) The concept of a person as essentially a being with a sense of justice and who is a 
bearer of rights is a radically defective concept that could only arise in a radically 
defective form of human society.
1266
 
 
Following from this, Buchanan interrogates Marx’s theory of revolutionary motivation because 
its ‘realism’ is often regarded as its greatest strength.1267 Buchanan seeks to undermine the 
plausibility of this realism in order to call into question Marx’s dispensing of moral principles as 
merely juridical concepts. He does this by arguing that Marx’s theory of revolution is saddled 
with significant ‘public goods’ problems. Buchanan provides a useful summary: 
 
There are five features of public goods which together result in a basic problem 
of social coordination. (i) Action by some but not all members of the group is 
sufficient to provide each member with the good. (ii) If the good is produced, it 
will be available to all, even to those who did not contribute to its production. (iii) 
There is no practical way, or no way not involving excessive costs, to prevent 
those who did not contribute from enjoying the good. (iv) The individual's 
contribution is a cost to that individual. (v) The value of what each individual 
would gain from the good outweighs his share of the costs of producing it.
1268
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On this basis, Buchanan claims that while Marx exposes the ways in which capitalists fall prey to 
collective action problems, he did not ask whether or not these could prove to be a significant 
hindrance for proletarians as well, especially with regard to something as dangerous, as ‘costly,’ 
as revolution: “Unfortunately, the psychological transformation produced by a process of 
revolutionary cooperation cannot explain how untransformed individuals came to participate in 
the process in the first place.”1269 Buchanan’s strategy to undermine the ‘realism’ of Marx’s 
theory of revolution has certain merits, but it can only be partial. A complete analysis would still 
require a discussion of the intrinsic merits of moral principles like justice. Whereas Buchanan 
notes the collective action failures that stifle revolution, Lukes more substantively addresses the 
dangers of unintended consequences for those already in the midst of revolution. 
 In some of Lukes’s early articles, he argues that Marxism, at least as it was formulated by 
its originators, rejects entirely the idea of human rights.
1270
 Lukes asserts that Marxism is not 
only a form of consequentialism, but a form of long-range consequentialism, because the 
consequences by which it judges current actions exist in an indeterminate future. For this reason, 
Marxism is even less interested in the rights of individuals in the immediate future than is 
utilitarianism.
1271
 These articles inspired Lukes to explore these issues more deeply in his book, 
Marx and Morality. There he explicitly asks about the extent to which Marxism’s morality is an 
“action-guiding theory.”1272 Lukes contends that, when Marxism attempts to judge actions 
according to their long-term contribution to our perfection or self-realization, it is typically beset 
with three illusions: (i) that envisaging these long-term goals in any kind of detail is utopian; (ii) 
that Marxists can predict the future with any kind of accuracy, which is exacerbated by the belief 
that the proletarian standpoint gives us privileged access to this knowledge; and (iii) that the 
ultimate objectives of emancipation are immanent in world-history and therefore we simply need 
to bring them about.
1273
 In sum, Marxism presumes to know the long-term trajectory of history 
while foreswearing a specification of its ultimate aim. This precludes a non-dogmatic evaluation 
of the different possible courses of action.
1274
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Ultimately, Lukes contends that Marxism has unresolved problems with regard to the 
questions of justice and rights, ends and means, and ‘dirty hands.’1275 After a survey of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, Lukes asserts that what he calls 
the “mainline Marxist tradition” cannot account for three things: (i) that bad means, though they 
contribute to an overall good, are nonetheless an “uncancelled moral wrong”; (ii) that, as per 
Kant, the interests of every person are owed equal consideration simply because they are 
persons; and (iii) that it is only a socialist movement that is sensitive to these thoughts that is 
capable of bringing about a socialism worth fighting for.
1276
 Lukes provides a much better 
diagnosis of the major problems of the Marxist theory of revolution than does Buchanan. 
Nevertheless, this is all Lukes provides. He does not offer much by way of solutions. 
Buchanan and Lukes also criticize Marx’s theory of socialist society. Buchanan argues 
that Marx and Marxists have been narrowly focused on ‘distributive’ justice to the neglect of 
non-distributive rights such as civil rights and the rights of political participation.
1277
 Buchanan 
focuses his critique on Marx’s early essay On the Jewish Question. There he criticizes elements 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Take, for example, article 16 from the 
constitution of 1793: “The right of property is that right which belongs to each citizen to enjoy 
and dispose at will of his goods, his revenues and the fruit of his work and industry.”1278 Marx 
criticizes this: 
 
The right to private property is therefore the right to enjoy and dispose of one’s 
resources as one wills, without regard for other men and independently of society: 
the right of self-interest. The individual freedom mentioned above, together with 
this application of it, forms the foundation of civil society. It leads each man to 
see in other men not the realization but the limitation of his own freedom.
1279
 
 
In other words, Marx deems these to be the rights of “egoistic persons.”1280 As Buchanan notes, 
however, there are other rights enshrined in the Declaration that are not as susceptible to Marx’s 
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critique of egoism. For example, the Declaration also affirms, “The right to freedom of 
expression, thought, and belief (especially religious belief)” as well as “the right to equality 
before the law (the rights of due process).”1281 Buchanan argues that, although Marx’s critique of 
certain of these rights is warranted, his critique is nonetheless one-sided: 
 
The charge that the other rights of man are valuable only or even chiefly for the 
isolated, egoistic individual of civil society is much less plausible. The right to 
equality before the law and the right to free speech, for example, do not seem to 
be criticizable as boundary line rights for isolated persons who view each other 
only as means or as dangerous competitors. It is true that the right to free speech 
established boundaries to prohibit certain sorts of interferences, but in what sense 
is this a criticism of the right?
1282
 
 
According to Buchanan, Marx believes that in communism, although there will be extensive 
freedoms, there will be no need for rights, for legal guarantees of these freedoms.
1283
 Buchanan’s 
formal concept of right contains three elements: (i) right is a claim to that which is due to us, not 
because we desire it, but because we are entitled to it; (ii) justified claims to right take 
precedence over considerations of welfare, whether social or individual; and (iii) rights can be 
backed by appropriate sanctions, including peer pressure, public censure, or coercion.
1284
 He 
believes that Marx would basically agree with his characterization of rights.
1285
 Buchanan gives 
three reasons to support his assertion that Marx condemns rights as an artifact of defective modes 
of production.
1286
 First, Marx nowhere asserts that defective bourgeois rights will be replaced 
with communist rights. Second, Marx describes talk about equal rights, not merely bourgeois 
rights, as rubbish. Third, Marx asserts that rights entail the application of an equal standard that, 
given their abstract character, are inherently unsatisfactory. 
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Buchanan disapproves of this wholesale attack on rights because he believes that there 
will be a vital need for rights even when egoism and class division are overcome.
1287
 These 
rights will still serve at least five functions, none of which requires that these rights to be 
universal or eternal: 
 
i) as constraints on democratic procedures (e.g., for the protection of 
minorities) or as guarantees of access to participation in democratic 
procedures; 
ii) as constraints on paternalism, i.e., as limits on when and how we may 
interfere with a person’s liberty for the sake of benefitting that person 
(where benefit is understood as welfare or freedom or some combination 
of these); 
iii) as constraints on what may be done (and how it may be done) to maximize 
social welfare, or some other specification of the common good, such as 
freedom; 
iv) as safeguards constraining the ways in which coercion or other penalties 
may be used in the provision of public goods (in the technical sense) and 
v) as a way of specifying the scope and limits of our obligations to provide 
for future generations.
1288
 
 
Furthermore, Buchanan deems implausible Marx’s assumption that these rights can be achieved 
without coercive sanction.
1289
 Therefore, this will have to be regulated in some way. Otherwise, 
as the attempts to establish socialism demonstrate, the theoretical rejection of rights becomes in 
practice a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: “The Marxian charge that rights are merely formal and 
empty then becomes all too true. The withering away of rights is accompanied by the rank 
growth of unrestrained coercive power.”1290 
 It is an open question whether or not there will be ‘coercion’ in a genuinely socialist 
society. At the very least, this requires a distinction between the kind of coercion enacted by the 
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state and that which is deployed by a public institution, what Marx would call a ‘social organ,’ 
that has been absorbed back into the direct democratic control of society. Nevertheless, 
Buchanan raises important points. As we saw in an earlier chapter, there are some ambiguous 
implications and unresolved tensions in Marx’s critique of corrective justice. These arise because 
Marx associates crime with the mutable conditions of class divided societies. Therefore, with the 
end of class society, so too will there be an end to most crime and punishment. For whatever 
transgressions do occur in socialist society, Marx follows Hegel’s theory of forgiveness. 
Nevertheless, Marx does not explain what would constitute a genuine confession or forgiveness 
in these circumstances. He also does not articulate how this process will escape the subjective 
arbitrariness for which he criticizes attempts to establish more concrete, more circumstantial 
forms of corrective justice under capitalism. Finally, he provides no hints as to the appropriate 
procedures when the democratic community is unwilling to forgive a repeat offender. It seems 
that Marx neglects consideration of negative rights in these cases because he believes that, under 
socialism, the reconciliation of particular interests with the general interest will be more or less 
straightforward. 
 Like Buchanan, Lukes deems Marx’s notion of freedom sophisticated, but rejects Marx’s 
attempt to transcend justice. Affirming Buchanan’s interpretation, Lukes argues that Marx’s 
account of liberal rights in On the Jewish Question has an “impoverished” view of the 
significance of the rights of man.
1291
 Aspects of the ‘Declaration,’ such as the seventh article 
against lawful detention, have a world-historical significance that is ignored by Marx’s narrow 
critique of egoism.
1292
 “It is probably true,” Lukes asserts, “that an exclusively rights-based 
morality would be an impoverished one, unable to accommodate collective goods and the role of 
virtue in moral life: these are hard to capture in the form of individuated interests generating 
obligations.”1293 Nevertheless, he asks, “Is emancipation conceivable, let alone feasible, without 
the recognition of principles of justice and of rights?”1294 According to Lukes, Marx thinks that 
self-interest is the product of private property. Therefore, eliminating private property will 
harmonize self-interests and the common-interest. Nevertheless, Lukes argues that we are not 
likely to ever overcome scarcity, limited altruism, conflicting moralities, and constraints on 
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knowledge. Therefore, the circumstances of justice, the condition of Recht, cannot wither away 
in the fashion envisioned by Marx.
1295
 
 Lukes argues that when Marxism rejects principles of justice and right, it deprives itself 
of “moral resistance” to the measures taken in its own name.1296 “Most important of all,” Lukes 
concludes, “can a theory of justice and of rights be developed which incorporates the insight and 
vision of marxism’s conception of freedom? Though marxism sees no need to answer any of 
these questions, it inescapably raises them, both by its critique of morality in theory and by its 
moral record in practice.”1297 
 Both Buchanan and Lukes find much that is worthy in the needs principle, but think it 
must also be balanced with consideration of negative rights, of the criterion of due. Lukes argues 
that even this would be insufficient if it was not also balanced by considerations of virtue. There 
is at least one respect where this would certainly be true: the election of people to public 
functions. Regardless of whether we describe them in terms of freedom or justice, even the 
public functions and administrative responsibilities that would still be necessary in a stateless 
society could not be ‘distributed’ according to need. Rather, the appropriate standard would be 
merit, the ability to deliberate about the common good. This is true even if one of the 
consequences of this meritorious virtue is the correct consideration of what is due to, and needed 
by, others. Marx does not provide much indication about the characteristics of this standard. For 
example, he asserts that, “The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by 
universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The 
majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the 
working class.”1298 This is a thin account of the virtues necessary for leadership. Here too it 
appears that Marx thinks that the reconciliation of particular and general interests will be 
straightforward. 
Perhaps we are being unfair to Marx here. These silences might pervade his work 
because he refuses to engage in utopian speculation. Even if that is the case, Marx thereby defers 
to the future those present considerations and activities necessary to bring this future order about. 
This is inadequate in our circumstances. These democratic deliberations cannot be cast as the 
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concern of future peoples. They are us. If justice is taken in its comprehensive sense, especially 
with regard to complete justice, it is not something that can be deferred to the future. If justice is 
not merely a principle of judgement, but a guide to activity, it is about developing the ethical 
disposition, the democratic capacities, and practical reason, in the here and now. In his biography 
of Marx, Francis Wheen offers a revealing anecdote: “A friend once suggested that she couldn’t 
imagine Marx living contentedly in an egalitarian society. ‘Neither can I,’ he agreed. ‘These 
times will come, but we must be away by then.’”1299 Marx, like his paradigmatic capitalist, 
asserts ‘After me, the flood,’ though for Marx this deluge will not bring crisis, but rather, the 
replenishment of humanity. The dangers endemic to this theory saturate the history of Marxism. 
As we have seen, each of the three waves of debate about Marxism and ethics have 
tended to result in consequentialism or deontology. The determinism of the former is expressed 
by Brecht in his poem, ‘To Those Born Later’: 
 
You who will emerge from the flood 
In which we have gone under 
Remember 
When you speak of our failings 
The dark time too 
Which you have escaped […] 
 
Oh, we 
Who wanted to prepare the ground for friendliness 
Could not ourselves be friendly.
1300
 
 
Conversely, the abstract formalism of deontology is illustrated by Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, 
when, like the revisionists before him and the neo-revisionists after, he provides eloquent 
criticisms of the ethics of the Commissar, but can only replace it with the ethics of the Yogi: 
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That was the generation which had started to think after the flood. It had no 
traditions, and no memories to bind it to the old, vanished world. It was a 
generation born without umbilical cord…. And yet it had right on its side. One 
must tear that umbilical cord, deny the last tie which bound one to the vain 
conceptions of honour and the hypocritical decency of the old world. Honour was 
to serve without vanity, without sparing oneself, and until the last 
consequence.
1301
 
 
The three waves of debate have ended in the same impasse between, on the one hand, an 
uncritical affirmation of historical materialism that reduces it to a dogmatic determinism, and on 
the other hand, a resort to utopian socialism that abandons a non-deterministic historical 
materialism as well as its critical insights about abstract formalism. One of the reasons this has 
occurred is because each wave failed to apply historical materialism to Marx and Marxism. 
 This is no less true of Buchanan and Lukes even though, with regard to the question of 
justice, they offer the most sophisticated interpretation of Marx so far. They raise perceptive 
points, and in particular, they show that any plausible socialism will require, among other things, 
standards of due and of merit to accompany that of need. Nevertheless, like the other 
commentators their interpretation is essentially idealist. They point to the importance of 
immanent critique in Marx’s work but neglect the importance of an immanent critique of Marx’s 
work. They do not engage in a Marxist critique of Marx. In Marx’s own terminology, they 
describe the problems in Marx’s theory of justice but they do not explain them. 
In light of all of this, we must ask whether or not Marx, in his theory of justice, 
uncritically absorbs certain aspects of capitalism. Marx clearly rejects significant features of 
bourgeois notions of justice. For example, he denies the idea that we are inherently selfish 
individuals. Marx believes that liberals have ideologically transformed a premise arising from 
historically-specific conditions into a characteristic of human nature in general. This is one of the 
reasons why Marx thinks that, in socialist society, when there are no laws of competition 
imposing egoistic behaviour on the mass of people, there will be no need to enshrine this egoism 
with rights that protect it from society and the state. Nevertheless, Marx may be accepting certain 
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aspects of bourgeois justice even in the act of rejecting them. Although he dismisses bourgeois 
notions of our inherent egoism, he accepts the functionalist concept of justice to which they give 
rise. Therefore, when a society abolishes what Marx deems to be historically-determined egoism, 
we will no longer need the notions of justice either. He agrees with the reduction of justice to 
bourgeois justice when, in dispensing with bourgeois justice, he believes that he is dispensing 
with justice in all of its possible forms. But one need not claim that humans are inherent egoists 
in order to see a certain value in notions of negative rights—one need only note human 
fallibility. This is all the more true in the highly contingent circumstances of revolutionary 
fervour. 
Marx’s assertions that the only available standards of justice are those that functionally 
reproduce the given social order closely mirror the transformations of justice, in practice and in 
theory, that arise from the development of capitalist social relations. With the displacement of 
production for use by production for exchange the individualization of the dominant material 
relations inspires similar changes in justice. The material goals of society are no longer contested 
and coordinated before the production process. Rather, these are uncoordinated decisions made 
by individuals or groups whose societal worth, the realized values, are determined after 
production through individual exchanges that are more or less indifferent to the aggregate of 
exchanges. As commutative justice overtakes distributive justice as the primary form of 
proprietary justice, proportionate distribution according to the merits of participating individuals 
and groups is supplanted by exchange according to the sheer equivalence of commodities 
irrespective of the merits or purposes of the parties involved. This differentiation of the 
economic from the political transforms justice from the totality of common ends to which 
individuals are subordinate into a kind of private protection against society and the state. 
Traditionally, justice was deemed a positive virtue, a necessary aspect of our self-
realization, which can only be achieved with others in common activities toward mutual goals. 
Now it is more of a negative virtue that is satisfied simply by abstaining from interfering with the 
pursuits of others. The role of the state and the practice of politics are less about educating 
people into a social hierarchy at the apex of which stands a common good that confers notions of 
objective merit. In the modern era, this is often regarded as an intolerant intrusion of private 
morality into political affairs. Rather, the state, as the embodiment of a general interest, is 
supposed to approximate a neutral arbiter between a sheer plurality of interests and values. 
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Government should limit itself to providing and safeguarding the conditions within which 
individuals can pursue their own particular interests without interference and conflict. This 
undermines the notion that justice resides in the actualization of our irreducibly social essence 
and fosters instead the idea that justice is a set of abstract principles that create the conditions 
which functionally reproduce the aggregate of individuals peacefully pursuing their own self-
determined goods. 
Another crucial dimension of this is the centralization of significant aspects of justice in 
the state. The ever-expanding accumulation of private property by capital annihilates the 
ownership of productive property by the majority of families and communal associations. 
Widespread dependence on a generalized market that is indifferent to individual needs makes the 
principle of need an imperative standard. Consequently, distributive justice increasingly becomes 
the exclusive purview of government, the one entity capable of providing for immiserated needs 
on a social scale. Furthermore, the impersonal standards required by increasingly interdependent 
national and international exchange fosters the decline of customary law relative to common law. 
This also causes the concentration of corrective justice in the state. Therefore, distributive and 
corrective justice are no longer activities within the grasp of the majority of individuals in 
familial and communal associations. Rather, they become the responsibility conferred to a 
minority by various offices of the state. All of these changes inspire the widespread sentiment 
that a considerable part of justice involves chosen obligations arising from specific institutions. 
Furthermore, given the impersonal character of capitalist social relations, as well as widespread 
assumptions about our inherent egoism, these centralized practices of justice adopt a rigid 
character that is skeptical of exceptions and largely blind to the complexity and nuances of 
concrete circumstances. 
 Indeed, the most dramatic transformation undergone by justice throughout capitalist 
modernity is its eclipse by freedom as the highest principle of the modern table of values. It is 
not only that certain features traditionally ascribed to justice are now considered the terrain of 
freedom. For example, as we saw, the question of political offices is no longer considered a 
question of distributive justice, but of liberty. More importantly, it is that freedom is deemed to 
be an ontological part of our human nature that exists even before we enter into any properly 
social relations, whereas justice is regarded as those conventions which, in the creation of 
societies, attempt to preserve this original freedom with as little conflict as possible. In other 
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words, justice is less an independent standard and more a support for a freedom with a greatly 
expanded meaning and mandate. 
 These transformations of justice under capitalist modernity are reflected in Marx’s 
ambiguous relationship with ethics. If justice is a human convention, not human nature, then, like 
most conventions, we can imagine humans existing without it. This is exactly what Marx does. 
For him, justice is radically historical in a way untrue of freedom. We cannot evaluate different 
modes of production as just or unjust according to an independent standard. Justice is whatever is 
functional for that mode of production and no other. Of course, the justice of each mode of 
production is self-defeating and this speaks to the broader array of internal contradictions 
through which these modes of production inevitably develop into something qualitatively new. 
Nevertheless, for Marx, the standard by which to compare these modes of production is freedom 
in its historical development. The basis of Marx’s historical materialism, of his universal history, 
is the development of the particular interest that can become the more general interest, and 
ultimately, the universal interest. 
In light of this, Allen Wood exaggerates the differences between Hegel and Marx’s 
accounts of historical change: “For Marx, world historical agency assumes the shape not of the 
‘great man’ but of the revolutionary class, and so the lever of historical change is not the 
passionate ambition of the world historical individual, but class interest, conceived not as the 
private interest of the class’s individual members, but as the interest that the class as a whole has 
in fulfilling its historic mission.”1302 While Marx obviously replaces Hegel’s notion of world-
historical individuals with the idea of world-historical classes, Wood neglects the similarities 
between Marx’s idea of historical change and Hegel’s notion of the ‘passionate ambition’ of 
historical ‘heroes.’ It is not only that Hegel and Marx both assert that, for example, at a certain 
phase of history, slavery is just according to the only available standards. It is also that Marx 
adopts significant aspects of Hegel’s theory of tragedy, of ‘pathos,’ and explicitly describes 
revolutionary transformations in terms of passion: “From that moment, new forces and new 
passions spring up in the bosom of society, forces and passions which feel themselves to be 
fettered by that society. It has to be annihilated; it is annihilated.”1303 
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This notion of passion has an extensive pedigree in the modern era. Indeed, Marx is not 
the only person to draw parallels between the unintended consequences of the capitalist market 
and human history as a whole.
1304
 Vico asserts that Providence is the only explanation as to how 
personal passions, such as ferocity, avarice, and ambition, can lead to the military, merchant, and 
governing classes that create the strength, riches, and wisdom of the commonwealth.
1305
 
Mandeville, with his typical candour, argues that private vice leads to public virtue.
1306
 Ferguson 
notes how there seems to be some artificer behind social circumstances that are the product of 
human activity but not of human design.
1307
 Smith praises the ‘invisible hand,’ whereby the 
pursuit of self-interest unconsciously leads to the general interest more surely than would occur 
if everyone was somehow motivated from the outset by the general interest.
1308
 Hume speaks of 
how the intellect is the slave of the passions and Kant of how history progresses toward a 
cosmopolitan future by means of our unsocial sociability.
1309
 Hegel contends that because history 
occurs ‘behind our backs,’ by means of the ‘cunning of reason,’ nothing great has ever been 
accomplished without passion. Gramsci speaks about how a truly historical act requires that a 
multitude of dispersed individual wills become assimilated through an overriding passion that 
empowers this ‘collective man’ to act ‘at any price.’1310 This tradition culminates in Hayek and 
Nozick who argue that human history is a ‘spontaneous’ and ‘self-generating’ invisible-hand 
process that is largely the result of unintended consequences.
1311
 
Marx’s account of history, at least as that history has proceeded so far, is quite similar to 
those offered from Vico to Hayek: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past.”1312 And yet, unlike most of these other 
explanations, Marx asserts that the working class will be uniquely capable of making history 
consciously. The revolutionary proletariat is supposed to know its historical tasks: 
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The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the 
past but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped 
away all superstition about the past. The former revolutions required recollections 
of past world history in order to smother their own content. The revolution of the 
nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at its own 
content. There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond 
the phrase.
1313
 
 
Although the proletarian revolution is, like all significant historical developments, rooted in its 
particular interests, in ‘passion,’ socialism is supposed to be an intended consequence. For Marx, 
it will be not only the product of human activity, but of human design. Nevertheless, Marx’s 
assertions that the particular interests of the working class are sufficient to spontaneously realize 
the universal interest, and that the coercive apparatus of the state will wither away, smack of an 
‘invisible hand explanation.’ If Marx deems revolution by the working class to be uniquely 
conscious, he must go all of the way with this. He must question the idea that ‘passion,’ the right 
form of the particular interest, will straightforwardly result in the universal interest. Otherwise, 
for all of his statements that ‘the root for man is man,’ Marx can be justly criticized for offering 
another theodicy, a secular providence. As long as this characterizes the historical practice of 
Marxism, it will remain an unintended consequentialism. 
In this respect, Marx can be criticized on his own terms. As we have seen, he rejects 
Proudhon’s attempt to fundamentally change capitalism according to standards he unwittingly 
adopts from capitalism—a self-defeating strategy. And yet, Marx can be accused of the same 
thing when he more or less adopts the notion that might makes right. For example, Marx and 
Engels criticize Max Stirner’s attempt to discover the empirical basis of right: “In this 
connection, he could have spared himself all his clumsy machinations, since, starting with 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bodius and others of modern times, not to mention earlier ones, 
might has been represented as the basis of right.”1314 They go on to assert that, 
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If power is taken as the basis of right, as Hobbes, etc., do, then right, law, etc., are 
merely the symptom, the expression of other relations upon which state power 
rests. The material life of individuals, which by no means depends merely on 
their ‘will,’ their mode of production and form of intercourse, which mutually 
determined each other—this is the real basis of the state and remains so at all the 
stages at which division of labour and private property are still necessary, quite 
independently of the will of individuals.
1315
 
 
Marx and Engels seem to assume that the only alternative to the idea that might makes right is 
the formal notion of free will offered by the idealists. They uncritically adopt the dichotomy, so 
typical in the modern era (including the three waves of debates about Marxism and ethics), 
between determinism and formalism. Indeed, Marx and Engels appear to neglect the possibility 
of a practical reason that can argue why what it deems right is justifiable in and of itself, 
irrespective of the immediate circumstances, without thereby becoming too abstract to be 
applicable in practice. Although their alternative to capitalism is certainly deeper than 
Proudhon’s, in this respect, Marx and Engels also do not go far enough. Socialists who deny any 
ethics common to the class-divided and classless societies, who, like Engels, put off a ‘truly 
human morality’ until after the revolution, separate the present from the future with “the pledge 
of a tomorrow in whose name today could in good conscience be allowed to perish.”1316 We 
think that a flood separates this day and the next. This is one of the most significant reasons why 
socialism has remained a tomorrow that never comes. 
Although Marx attempts to resolve a number of Hegel’s bad infinites, Marx himself 
becomes mired in one. The principle of contradiction, of clashes between equal rights, is too 
formal. In revolutionary circumstances, it cannot determine the extent to which the ‘higher’ 
freedom of socialism permits the cancellation of freedom for anyone who espouses the ‘lower’ 
freedom of capitalism. Furthermore, the assertion that class-interests are a sufficient guide to 
revolutionary activity is also too abstract. Attacking one positive law from the perspective of the 
more universal freedom of a ‘higher’ positive law does not give us the necessary resources to 
remain self-critical of our societal alternative in the midst of our attempts to create it. This 
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predisposes proletarian revolutionaries to regard as freedom whatever is deemed functional to the 
prevailing conditions of the developing socialist society. This notion of freedom runs the great 
risk of being swallowed by these social conditions even as they become too degraded to change. 
Even if the interests of a particular class can be rooted in the universal interest, reducing action to 
class-interest is not a sufficient guide to action. It can give the aspiration to rule, but not make us 
fit to rule. Any practical activity that reduces its motivations entirely to that of interest, whether 
individual, group, or class interest, transforms the pursuit of power from a means into an end in 
itself. 
In one of his most famous depictions of the dynamism of capitalist society, Marx asserts: 
“All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face 
with sober sense, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.”1317 This may be true, 
but it also inclines Marx to the belief that certain things will melt, will wither away, more easily 
than has proven to be the case. In this respect, Marshal Berman raises significant questions: 
 
Even if the workers do build a successful communist movement, and even if that 
movement generates a successful revolution, how, amid the flood tides of modern 
life, will they ever manage to build a solid communist society? What is to prevent 
the social forces that melt capitalism from melting communism as well? If all 
new relationships become obsolete before they can ossify, how can solidarity, 
fraternity and mutual aid be kept alive? A communist government might try to 
dam the flood by imposing radical restrictions, not merely on economic activity 
and enterprise (every socialist government has done this, along with every 
capitalist welfare state), but on personal, cultural and political expression. But 
insofar as such a policy succeeded, wouldn’t it betray the Marxist aim of free 
development for each and all? Marx looked forward to communism as the 
fulfillment of modernity; but how can communism entrench itself in the modern 
world without suppressing those very modern energies that it promises to set 
free? On the other hand, if it gave these energies free rein, mightn’t the 
                                                          
1317
 Marx and Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto,’ op. cit., 476. 
 406 
 
spontaneous flow of popular energy sweep away the new social formation 
itself?
1318
 
 
Berman goes on to ask: 
 
If bourgeois society is really the maelstrom Marx thinks it is, how can he expect 
all its currents to flow only one way, toward peaceful harmony and integration? 
Even if a triumphant communism should someday flow through the floodgates 
that free trade opens up, who knows what dreadful impulses might flow in along 
with it, or in its wake, or impacted inside? It is easy to imagine how a society 
committed to the free development of each and all might develop its own 
distinctive varieties of nihilism.
1319
 
 
In a response to Berman, Perry Anderson argues that, for Marx, each person is from the outset a 
social individual whose self is not prior to, but constituted by, relations with others: “If the 
development of the self is inherently imbricated in relations with others, its development could 
never be an unlimited dynamic in the monadological sense conjured up by Berman, for the 
coexistence of others would always be such a limit, without which development itself could not 
occur.”1320 Anderson’s response is cogent, but not sufficient. As we have seen, a broad trend in 
capitalist modernity is the erosion of what has traditionally been called ‘complete justice,’ the 
commitment to the common ends of the social whole rooted in the objective goods of human 
nature. Marx offers profound criticisms of merely formal freedom, equality, and rationality, as 
well as alternative notions of substantive freedom, equality, and rationality. And yet, his critique 
of formal, merely procedural justice never puts forward a positive assertion of substantive 
justice. Without some notion of complete justice, however, any freedom, no matter how ‘social,’ 
becomes license, an arbitrary freedom that knows no bounds. “The vocation of a socialist 
revolution,” Anderson concludes, “would be neither to prolong nor fulfill modernity but to 
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abolish it.”1321 But this is precisely why Marx’s notion of freedom, and therefore, Anderson’s 
response to Berman, are inadequate. Insofar as Marx affirms a freedom he deems ontological and 
neglects a justice he condemns as merely deontological, he uncritically absorbs significant trends 
of capitalist modernity that, in other respects, he does so much to critique. 
One of the reasons I have stressed the ways in which Marx has embraced the modern 
devaluation of justice is because a purely functional notion of justice, a justice that does not have 
the same ontological status as freedom, is quickly abandoned as a guide for revolutionary 
activity in the interregnum between modes of production. Marxists will often deny that there can 
be a complete justice, a common good, as long as there are antagonistic class interests. 
Nevertheless, by complete justice we do not necessarily mean a neutral balancing of antagonistic 
interests, although this may be the correct practical endeavour in specific circumstances. This 
takes as given that there are no objective criteria of the common good by which to evaluate the 
respective merits of competing interests. Conversely, certain notions of complete justice could 
affirm and pursue objective human goods even if they override the specific interests of particular 
individuals or even classes. This does not preclude the possibility that the working class is the 
main social force capable of achieving this. 
If we are critical of Marx’s functionalism and want to pursue the immanent critique of 
justice in a more critical fashion, an excellent illustration of how this project could proceed is 
found in one of the unlikeliest of places: Geras’s essay ‘Our Morals.’1322 At first, it may seem 
absurd that Geras could provide a model for an immanent critique of capitalist ethics given that 
he rejects immanent critique and the dialectical method in favour of trans-historical moral 
principles. Nevertheless, although Geras does not cast it in these terms, his essay engages in a 
kind of immanent critique of capitalism by applying ‘bourgeois’ principles of ‘just war’ doctrine 
to what Marx describes as the ‘only justifiable war in history,’ that of the oppressed against their 
oppressors. Indeed, one could say that Geras mistakenly thought that Geras did not believe in the 
immanent critique of capitalist ethics. Although his interpretation of Marx is quite similar to that 
of Nielsen and Peffer, unlike Nielsen, Geras does not deem justice an instrument to be 
abandoned when necessary, and unlike Nielsen and Peffer, Geras does not regard debates about 
the theory and practice of justice as the privileged terrain of a revolutionary intelligentsia. In fact, 
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of all the commentators who affirm utopian socialism, Geras offers the most sophisticated 
account of what is worth preserving in Marx’s historical materialism. 
Geras agrees in large part with Lukes’s assertions that Marxism needs to take individual 
rights more seriously.
1323
 For example, Geras finds wanting Trotsky’s assertions about the kind 
and extent of ethical conduct during class struggle and revolution. The formula, “To the degree 
that contingencies allow,” is a recipe for “moral cynicism.”1324 Nevertheless, Geras also faults 
Lukes because he fails to articulate the extent to which the oppressed must respect the rights of 
their oppressors. For this reason, Geras explores the principles of just war doctrine as a potential 
guide for revolutionary activity. Geras argues that, as is the case with a just war, a revolution is 
justified in terms of self-defence of rights and freedoms against an oppressor.
1325
 Furthermore, 
just war doctrine can provide theories of revolution some insight about how to fight—even to the 
death—within “certain moral limits.”1326 There are two fundamental questions in just war 
doctrine. First, who are the legitimate targets, or how do we distinguish between combatants and 
non-combatants? Second, in what circumstances and in what ways may combatants be attacked 
and killed?
1327
 Geras looks at each in turn. 
Geras asserts that in a revolutionary struggle against a tyrannical regime, the definition of 
a combatant must be “narrowly drawn” around those directly involved in the imposition and 
enforcement of oppressive laws.
1328
 This will include a regime’s “leaders, soldiers, police, 
security agents, jailers, torturers,” as well as “police informers and collaborators.”1329 It will not 
include state employees like teachers or health care workers. Most importantly, just as one 
cannot kill civilian supporters of an enemy regime during a time of war, neither can 
revolutionaries target those civilians who are “political supporters and economic beneficiaries” 
of the regime.
1330
 Furthermore, Geras argues that Trotsky elides the distinction between the 
intentional and unintentional injuring or killing of non-combatants. Instead, Geras affirms the 
“principle of double effect,” which permits actions that are likely to have some evil 
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consequences as long as the evil is not an intended part of one’s ends or means and as long as, at 
some costs to oneself, precautions are taken to minimize likely evils.
1331
 
With regard to the second fundamental question, the permitted forms of attack, Geras 
affirms the principle of “minimum force” whereby one is permitted to stop enemy combatants, 
even if this means killing them, but cannot gratuitously accentuate their suffering.
1332
 The only 
way in which purposeful cruelty could be justified in terms of an activity that deems itself to be 
defensive in character is if socialist society can be envisioned as embracing retributive 
punishment, which Geras rejects.
1333
 
For Geras, the ultimate “normative basis” of extending just war doctrine to revolutionary 
struggle is that individuals have rights “unless they forfeit them by making war themselves in 
defence of tyranny or grave injustice.”1334 Nevertheless, the way in which the relevant rights may 
be forfeited must be defined within narrow limits and applied to each individual in an 
“individualized” way.1335 Otherwise, individual rights are meaningless. Geras concludes: 
 
The question will be raised at this juncture whether individual rights against 
being killed or violated are then, in every other circumstance, absolute. They are 
all but absolute. If this answer is deemed to be insufficiently precise, its 
superiority over the meaningful alternative to it appears to me compelling. One 
such alternative is to say that the rights are indeed absolute, inviolable 
everywhere save when forfeited by their holders in the manner described. The 
trouble with this is that it is always possible to envisage cases (one has to kill an 
innocent person to avert a massacre of hundreds; or to save the population of city; 
etc.) for which it would be conceded by all but a few doctrinaire fanatics that the 
moral horror of the consequences has – tragically – to be allowed to override the 
rights of the innocent.
1336
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Like Buchanan and Lukes, Geras also raises questions about the extent of continuity between 
capitalism and socialism with regard to questions of justice. Geras contends that the idea of 
‘smashing the state’ implies a “total discontinuity,” which obscures certain rights and institutions 
that a socialist democracy must preserve, including 
 
a national representative assembly elected by direct universal suffrage, some 
separation of powers, the independence of judicial from political processes, the 
protection of basic individual rights, a constitutionally guaranteed political 
pluralism. Even if a socialist democracy can only emerge by replacing the 
institutions of the old state, there is reason to dwell on a line of continuity here all 
the same.
1337
 
 
Although the interpretations of Marx offered by Buchanan and Lukes are more accurate than that 
of Geras, nonetheless, Geras is to be commended for a discussion of the role of justice in 
revolutionary activity that is more sophisticated than any of the other commentaries with which I 
am familiar. He persuasively shows the importance of justice for even the most robust notions of 
emancipation. 
In contrast to commentators like Cohen and Geras, I argue that everything Marx says 
about justice is internally consistent. Where Marx is indeed inconsistent is the way in which he 
separates justice from other aspects of ethics. As we have seen, Marx’s immanent critique of 
bourgeois freedom and equality demonstrates that they result in unfreedom and inequality. He 
proposes alternative, more substantive notions of freedom and equality that, though they can 
only be fully actualized in socialism, nonetheless provide a basis by which to critique capitalism 
as unfree and unequal. Marx’s immanent critique of justice does not yield the same result. He 
does not offer a more substantive notion of justice by which capitalism, and, indeed, all class-
based modes of production, can be criticized as unjust. Is there something about immanent 
critique that automatically precludes a substantive justice by which capitalism can be criticized? 
No, it only rejects trans-historical principles of justice. And yet, Marx denies a substantive 
justice all the same. It is not what Marx says about justice that is internally inconsistent, but 
rather, the unique way in which he applies immanent critique to justice. As I hope to have 
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shown, the reasons why Marx is inconsistent on this score can only be revealed by applying 
immanent critique to Marx himself. This demonstrates why Marx needs a more robust theory of 
justice on his own terms, according to his own principles. 
 This is also one of the reasons why the method I offer here is different from, on the one 
hand, Cohen and Geras, and on the other hand, Lukes. Although I critique Marx’s silence on 
justice, this does not entail embracing utopian socialism. Rather, I argue that Marx, for 
ideological reasons, casts his rejection of utopianism too wide. He assumes that any theory of 
justice by which the capitalist mode of production can be criticized as unjust is necessarily 
utopian. This neglects what a more consistent immanent critique of bourgeois justice could 
produce, especially if it adopts the comprehensive schema of justice pursued here. 
What would Marx’s universal history look like if justice was deemed to be as 
fundamental as freedom? As we saw in the discussion of Marx’s Capital, he distinguishes 
between three phases of human history. The first phase includes all non-capitalist class societies, 
the second phase is capitalism, and the third phase is socialism. He compares these three phases 
according to the foundational principle of his universal history: freedom.
1338
 
Although the first phase features slave-labour and serfdom, it also includes circumstances 
in which producers own their conditions of production, as is the case with land-owning peasants 
and artisans who possess their own tools. Marx deems the latter forms of production the 
‘classical’ expression of this first phase because, if only to a limited extent, producers can 
express their free individuality through the conditions of production they possess. These small 
pockets of freedom are constrained by two things. First, they are hemmed in by the limited forces 
of production. Private property is small-scale and dispersed. There is no concentration or 
socialization of private property on a mass scale. Although there is certainly a social division of 
labour, these conditions preclude the technical division of labour within the separate branches of 
production, and thus, the free development of the productive forces. Second, whatever 
expression of free individuality is permitted by the possession of productive property, this is 
constrained by the prevailing relations of production, by direct unfreedom, by the political 
coercion through which the ruling classes appropriate surplus. 
The second phase is the capitalist mode of production. It is initiated by primitive 
accumulation, the expropriation of the productive property of the mass of producers. This creates 
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immense dependence on commodity exchange, bringing productive property itself into the 
competitive imperatives of the market. This causes the relentless drive for increasing 
productivity, which dissolves small-scale private property and increasingly socializes the 
conditions of production. The dissolution of non-capitalist production relations through the 
spread of market exchange is deemed the ‘great leveller.’ It is now a common assumption that 
human beings are inherently equal and are deserving of the same freedom and rights. 
Nevertheless, as Marx goes to great lengths to show, this is a merely formal freedom that faces 
two major constraints. First, with regard to the forces of production, because they have been 
alienated from the possession of workers, the socially-determined worth, the value, of their 
abstract labour is determined by an independent pricing mechanism. Consequently, since 
production is dictated by the imperative to constantly increase average productivity, the 
determination of production goals is largely beyond the control of workers. Second, as far as the 
relations of production are concerned, the widespread ownership of private property creates 
illusions of equality, but this abstracts from the class differences between those who can own 
both the means of production and the means of consumption, and those who can only own the 
latter. Therefore, the standards of ethics and politics under capitalism are ‘universal,’ but they are 
also abstract. Capitalist freedom and equality are actually unfreedom and inequality. 
Finally, the third phase, the socialist mode of production, combines the best elements of 
the preceding two phases. If the second phase negated the first, then the third phase is the 
negation of the negation. By abolishing alienated labour, it not only brings the conditions of 
production back under the possession and control of workers, but also establishes cooperative 
production on a genuinely universal scale. Since each person is a worker like everyone else, the 
development of the general wealth of the species need no longer come at the expense of the 
individual. This is a substantive freedom and equality. 
Whatever faults we might find in Marx’s historical materialism, and as sympathetic as we 
are with the utopian critique of the consequentialist tendency within Marxism, one of the aspects 
of Marx’s work that I think is worth preserving is his discussion of labour, especially as it occurs 
in his criticisms of utopian socialists. The labour theory of value not only explains the character 
of exploitation under capitalism, but also how to bring exploitation to an end. The inequalities 
inherent to capitalism cannot be overcome simply by abolishing money, commodity markets, and 
private property. This is why mutualism, mixed economies, market socialism, and state-
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controlled command economies only reproduced these inequalities in different forms. Capitalist 
unfreedom and inequality can only be brought to an end by abolishing alienated labour and the 
production of value. Workers must have collective and genuinely democratic control over their 
conditions of production. Before the production process begins, they must deliberate about 
production goals, about the manifold social needs they plan to meet, as well as what distributions 
of labour duration and intensity across the various branches of production are necessary to meet 
those needs. In other words, production must be planned and coordinated from the outset 
according to democratically determined patterns of distribution. Only then are production goals 
liberated from the law of value, the imperative of ever-increasing average productivity. Only 
then are workers producing for specific needs, not exchange-values. Only then can workers be 
compensated according to their actual labour, not an abstract labour that is beyond their 
control.
1339
 
These insights about freedom throughout the three phases, as well as the foundations of 
freely associated labour in the final phase, contribute to our understanding about justice in 
human history. As we have seen, in the first phase of human history, production is under the 
overt normative control of the political authorities and the common associations of producers. 
This production is primarily for the direct needs of the immediate communities. These different 
needs, as well as the contributions and compensations of the hierarchy of estates, are 
coordinated—though not without class conflict—before the production process begins. 
Therefore, production and consumption are directly connected. From the outset, producers take 
into consideration that their accumulation is subordinate to the common ends of the social whole. 
These relations of production are more congenial to the idea that individuals are always already 
embedded within social relations toward which they have mandatory obligations. In other words, 
this fosters the more positive conception of justice for which individuals can only become what 
they essentially are through their cooperative relations with others. It therefore leads to the 
notion of complete justice as the substantive common good to which every individual is 
subordinate. Nevertheless, since the division of labour is based in a hierarchy of castes or estates, 
these notions of justice are based in unequal privilege. Indeed, tangible political inequalities are 
often deemed continuous with the order of the cosmos. Consequently, it is the common belief 
                                                          
1339
 This paragraph draws heavily from Gray, ‘Planning for the Feast,’ op. cit. 
 414 
 
that there is a natural hierarchy of humankind, and thus, natural rulers over humankind. We can 
refer to these conditions as ‘concrete particularity.’ 
In the second phase, under capitalism, production is primarily for exchange. For this 
reason, production and consumption are separated from each other by the market. What is 
produced and how is not socially coordinated. Rather, production is by owners of private 
property making largely individualized economic decisions. The value of productive activities 
and their products, and thus, the rationality of these decisions, can only be determined after the 
production process through market exchange. The resultant allocations are the unintended result 
of all of these private pursuits. Although each individual is more or less indifferent to the ends 
pursued by all of the others, as the possessors of exchange-values or abstract wealth, they are 
also formally equal and free. This is more congenial to the negative notion of justice. It is the 
protection of every individual from society and the state. Therefore, the laws of justice and the 
principles of right become increasingly universal and impersonal. They are supposed to apply to 
everyone equally by remaining neutral to their substantive ends, to the ways in which their 
pursuits give rise to conflicting ideas of the good life. Indeed, it is a common assumption that 
human beings are inherently equal, but that the subsequent developments in their talents and 
efforts lead to different amounts in the holdings of property. Therefore, this material inequality is 
housed within untrammelled political equality. As Marx has so ably shown, however, these 
principles of right are formal. Commutative justice fosters exploitation. Distributive justice under 
capitalism can only ameliorate, but not address widespread necessity. Corrective justice, or, 
equality before the law, obscures the unequal determinants of both crime and punishment. 
Finally, complete justice casts as the neutral and universal interest what is actually the particular 
interests of the capitalist class. We can refer to this situation as ‘abstract universality.’ 
Marx criticizes both systems of justice, the one based in equal rights as much as that 
based in unequal privileges. Furthermore, when he describes the third phase of human history, 
the socialist mode of production, he casts it beyond justice. Unlike freedom, which has its full 
realization in socialist conditions, there is no substantive justice to be actualized in Marx’s 
socialism. This separates justice from other ethical values. Indeed, Marx treats justice like an 
abstract negation, not a determinate negation. It is not preserved in a higher form. It is 
annihilated. Therefore, when it comes to justice, he does not pursue the dialectical method 
consistently. What if we were to preserve the best aspects of the two preceding phases through 
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their reconciliation in the third phase? Perhaps capitalist social conditions make latently possible, 
and socialist conditions actually possible, the reconciliation of robust notions of the common 
good of the social whole with the criterion of universality. These conditions might make possible 
more positive notions of justice, of our irreducibly social processes of self-actualization, of 
creative activity as an end in itself, without thereby requiring notions of the natural hierarchy of 
humankind. Can we refer to this as ‘concrete universality’? Perhaps it is on the basis of this more 
substantive justice that we can criticize capitalist justice as being, in actuality, capitalist injustice. 
 At the outset, it may not appear all that significant if we argue that capitalism is unjust. If 
all we focus on is the critique of exploitation, for example, then it might seem a trivial matter 
whether or not we do so according to a principle of justice. It might appear only slightly less 
trivial if we do so according to a more comprehensive notion of justice. After all, the only 
change is that we deem capitalism not only commutatively unjust, but also unjust according to its 
own notions of distributive, corrective, and complete justice. The critique of capitalist injustice 
can only become profound when our theory of justice, and in particular, of complete justice, 
deems justice to be not only a principle of judgement, but also a guide to activity. This more 
comprehensive theory of justice would not only provide the standards by which to judge 
capitalism as unjust and socialism as just, but would also show that the revolutionary transition 
from one to the other can only occur in very specific ways according to highly rigorous 
principles and practices. It requires a socialist politics in which the mass of workers and their 
allies engage in agonistic and educative class struggle and political organizing based in the long-
term and widespread cultivation of practical reason, which connects an ever deepening 
understanding of social conditions with a developing ethical disposition toward the common 
good. 
Marx follows the modern tradition in the search for a sufficiently universal freedom. 
Nevertheless, like Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel before him, his notion of freedom is formal. For 
Marx, the Absolute is free labour or creative activity as an end in itself. But if creativity can be 
used for bad as well as good, can this be the Absolute? If one person’s self-realization 
encroaches on that of another and both have plausible claims to the legitimacy of their own self-
realization, is the notion of freedom as self-realization sufficient to resolve the dispute? By what 
standards do we judge between them? Can we say that the standard is ‘need’? But Marx never 
really indicates how needs are to be evaluated. He does not assert whether or not some are 
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objectively better than others. Rather, he assumes that the reconciliation of these needs, the 
integrating of self-interests with the general interest, will be more or less straightforward. Even 
in ideal circumstances, however, those democratic deliberations will have to appeal to standards 
independent of needs themselves. Otherwise, how do you decide which needs to prioritize? The 
criterion of urgency is not enough. Someone may profess a great deal of urgency for a need that 
others deem unworthy or unimportant. 
 The universalization of freedom which, if conflicts arise, legitimates, in the name of a 
higher freedom, either the constraint of freedom or the imposition of a genuine unfreedom, is too 
formal. It becomes too easy to abuse, as did the Soviets when they distinguished between liberty 
and stability, between the formal freedom of the capitalist West and the ‘genuine’ freedom of 
‘actually existing socialism.’ Even if one is unwilling to say that, under socialism, the freedom of 
some will necessarily come at the expense of the freedom of others, nonetheless, there will 
surely be a great deal of ethical negotiation about our mutual interactions given that there is 
likely to be disagreement about priorities, obligations, and so on. The appeal to freedom alone is 
not sufficient for this negotiation given that there could still be substantive disagreements over 
that in which our positive freedoms consist. 
If the self-realization of each as the condition for the self-realization of all is not 
straightforward enough to avoid conflict, if we can imagine disputes arising from two equally 
plausible but antithetical claims to positive freedom, does the idea of freedom as a universal law 
we give ourselves provide a sufficiently independent standard of adjudication between them? Or, 
will there arise the temptation to…let force decide? If so, then the robust conception of freedom 
offered by Marx is an important part of the Absolute, but is incomplete. Indeed, Marx’s theory of 
justice could be criticized as an example of a subject-predicate inversion. He transforms justice, 
an integral part of the subject, into a reified thing, a predicate, something so alienated from 
humans that we could conceivably exist without it. 
As we saw, Marcuse’s immanent critique of Soviet moral philosophy and practice shows 
how it suffers a dialectical inversion and embraces the elitism of the Western morality to which it 
is opposed.
1340
 I hope to have shown that the immanent critique of Marx offers similar results. 
Marx uncritically absorbs fundamental aspects of the bourgeois justice he rejects. His theory of a 
socialist society devoid of justice does not transcend the conditions of tragic confrontation. 
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Rather, it establishes them in another form. Ultimately, the story of Marx and justice is a theory 
of tragedy which itself becomes tragic. 
Even if the natural division of labour is replaced by the voluntary division of labour, even 
if the division of social tasks occurs according to a collective and conscious plan, even if 
everyone participates through democratic deliberation in choosing the distributions of social 
tasks, there will still be need to compromise. This includes assigning onerous tasks for which the 
appeal to the common good is necessary. This voluntary division of labour can acknowledge 
inequality of intrinsic talents, as well as the ways in which these talents are cultivated over the 
lifetime of each individual according to the various standards of merit, without thereby denying 
the equal intrinsic dignity of everyone. Nevertheless, the need for a robust theory and practice of 
justice is all the more profound given Marx’s aspiration for what I have called ‘exceptional 
egalitarianism.’ Distributing the means of consumption according to its standards will demand a 
vigorous communal spirit. This is especially true with regard to those chosen obligations arising 
from institutions and practices which, because they benefit the social whole, are not penalized in 
the distributions according to individual needs. Indeed, an exceptional egalitarianism capable of 
accounting for complex, concrete circumstances will require a robust practical reason. 
It is not that justice should be valued more highly than freedom. Nor is the inverse true. 
Rather, justice, as much as freedom, is an inextricable part of that which is the genuinely highest 
value, and that for which there may be an even more deafening silence than justice. The most 
conspicuous absence in Marx and Marxism is ‘the good.’ We have seen several reasons why the 
good cannot be reduced to freedom as an end in itself. It also requires a notion of justice, the 
transcendence of which cannot mean the simple annihilation of justice, but rather, its 
replacement by something deemed to be more just than justice, as is the case, for example, with 
‘equity,’ or perhaps, with exceptional egalitarianism. This is why the critique of justice is a 
taproot into the broader questions of ethics. Indeed, Marxism, unlike most worldviews, envisions 
an end to politics proper. Therefore, more than any other worldview, Marxism needs a theory of 
ethics sufficient to regulate the interactions between individuals in a stateless society. 
Those who have attempted to construct a Marxist ethics have tended to pursue an idealist 
method. They either try to generate a systematic ethics directly out of Marx’s sparse statements 
about ethics, or they attempt to synthesize Marx with some other theorist more explicitly 
concerned with ethics, such as Aristotle, Spinoza, or Kant. Conversely, this immanent critique of 
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Marx puts on the agenda the need for a full scale historical materialist critique of capitalist 
ethics. One of the reasons I needed to use Aristotle as a general—perhaps too general—paradigm 
of pre-capitalist ethics is because, in the absence of a historical materialist critique of ethics, we 
cannot account for the development of ethics through human history as a means of 
comprehending the transformations of ethics under capitalism. It is not enough to simply 
condemn as abstract Hegel’s theory of the state as the embodiment of Ethical Life. We require 
the critique of capitalism not only as an economic and political system, but as a form of Ethical 
Life. The dramatic transformations of justice under capitalism are only a part—albeit, a 
significant part—of the broader changes to ethics as a whole. R. H. Tawney eloquently describes 
these changes: 
 
Between the conception of society as a community of unequal classes with 
varying functions, organized for a common end, and that which regards it as a 
mechanism adjusting itself through the play of economic motives to the supply of 
economic needs; between the idea that a man must not take advantage of his 
neighbour’s necessity, and the doctrine that ‘man’s self-love is God’s 
providence’; between the attitude which appeals to a religious standard to repress 
economic appetites, and that which regards expediency as the final criterion – 
there is a chasm which no theory of the permanence and ubiquity of economic 
interests can bridge, and which deserves at least to be explored. To examine how 
the latter grew out of the former; to trace the change, from a view of economic 
activity which regarded it as one among other kinds of moral conduct, to the view 
of it as dependent upon impersonal and almost automatic forces; to observe the 
struggle of individualism, in the face of restrictions imposed in the name of 
religion by the Church and of public policy by the State, first denounced, then 
palliated, then triumphantly justified in the name of economic liberty; to watch 
how ecclesiastical authority strives to maintain its hold upon the spheres it had 
claimed and finally abdicates them – to do this is not to indulge a vain curiosity, 
but to stand at the sources of rivulets which are now a flood.
1341
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These transformations of ethics in early modern Europe can be generalized across the capitalist 
world. Again, we must ask, has Marx, in the development of his theories of capitalism and 
history as a whole, critically adopted these modern trends or has he uncritically absorbed them? 
The virtue of turning the method on the master is that it liberates the method from the master. 
Indeed, this leads to questions of whether that method can actually incorporate ethics into its 
circle of circles. 
The dialectic, as a universal history, is opposed to the Parmenidean notion that, because 
the true and the good are eternal, whatever they are, they have always been such. Rather, the 
dialectic contends that the true and the good are timely. At the beginning they are only latent 
potential. They can only become actual at the end of a history which comprehends itself as a 
rational process. The idea that the true and the good develop can only avoid the relativism of the 
infinite regression if the dialectic can become a self-enclosed Absolute. The only way to assert, 
on the one hand, that thought is a child of its time, and on the other hand, that the dialectical 
system as a whole is true, is if our own time is the end, or reveals the end, of unconsciously 
historical time. Otherwise, there is no way to tell whether or not our initial immersion in the 
prevailing conditions does not dogmatically absorb elements of these conditions. More 
profoundly, we cannot tell whether or not this immersion, without recourse to foundations or 
potential truths beyond possible human experience, is in itself dogmatic through and through. 
We must consider the implications of Marx’s depiction of free creative activity as the 
‘absolute state of becoming.’ This is reflected in Marx’s criticism of questions of ‘infinite 
progression’ as abstract and his assertion that communism will not be the last historical form.1342 
These assertions sound too much like the endless regression of the bad infinite. Again, it is a 
tomorrow that never comes. This is not to reject the importance of free activity for human nature. 
Rather, it is to point to unresolved tensions in our conception of the Absolute, which, as long as 
they persist, preclude a completely critical, non-dogmatic comprehension of our present 
circumstances and what is possible in the future. 
Marx famously advocates for ‘the ruthless criticism of everything that exists.’ What 
happens when this ruthless criticism is turned against itself? What would an immanent critique of 
immanent critique look like? The dialectical method should be able to account for this self-
imposed immanent critique because the Absolute is supposed to exist within possible human 
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experience. In other words, an immanent critique of the dialectical method should result in the 
Absolute without remainder. What a ruthless criticism of immanent critique could reveal, 
however, is that if the dialectic has not been successfully self-enclosed by its most able 
proponents, Hegel and Marx, perhaps this is because it cannot be closed. Perhaps the dialectic is 
inherently flawed. Perhaps it results in a remainder that is precisely what the anti-
foundationalism of immanent critique rejects: the need for a trans-historical standard, a 
foundational notion of the good against which all socio-historical forms must be measured. 
Perhaps this is why ethics is the rock upon which the dialectic so often breaks. The collapse of 
the dialectical method would not necessarily entail the rejection of socialism, but it would 
fundamentally change our notion of socialist thought and activity. Perhaps our means have been 
inadequate because our conception of the end has been inadequate. To achieve in substance what 
our historical method deemed to be the next phase of human society may require abandoning the 
primarily historicist character in which we have cast the activity that could bring about that 
society. 
This is the central paradox: if the immanent critique of immanent critique reveals a 
remainder, this calls into question immanent critique and its rejection of foundations, of 
‘external’ or ‘transcendental’ standards. Why then engage in immanent critique in the first place? 
Why not do what Cohen and Geras do, namely, make an immediate appeal to natural right? If 
immanent critique is the best strategy for refuting immanent critique, does this, quite 
paradoxically, affirm the strength, or at least certain strengths, of immanent critique? Not 
necessarily. If the dialectic breaks down, then immanent critique need not be rejected entirely. It 
is only demoted from the primary method to one of many potential philosophical strategies, 
albeit one with a unique rhetorical persuasiveness. It demonstrates to proponents of the 
dialectical method why the dialectic breaks down according to their own highest principles, the 
dialectical method itself. 
The reason I have emphasized and criticized the many occasions when Marxists, mired in 
moral quandaries, have had recourse to liberalism is not because the notion of negative rights 
should be rejected altogether. I am not prepared to say to what extent negative rights must play a 
role in any coherent ethics. It remains an open question. Rather, it is because Marxism has rarely 
engaged in any substantive way with what is often regarded as the exclusive terrain of 
conservatism, namely, theorists of classical natural right who reject the liberal notion of 
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complete justice as a neutral arbitration between subjective interests, affirming instead complete 
justice as the common ends of the social whole based in objective human goods. 
Marxists have not taken these considerations very seriously. For example, Nielsen argues 
that it would be difficult to determine the content of natural rights with any “objectivity” because 
human societies have proffered such diverse and often incompatible ideas of what is naturally 
right.
1343
 A modern theorist of classical natural right like Leo Strauss easily rebuts claims like 
these: “In the first place, ‘consent of all mankind’ is by no means a necessary condition of the 
existence of natural right. Some of the greatest natural right teachers have argued that, precisely 
if natural right is rational, its discovery presupposes the cultivation of reason, and therefore 
natural right will not be known universally.”1344 Even if every principle of justice has been 
denied somewhere this tells us nothing about whether or not those denials are reasonable.
1345
 To 
take another example, Wood argues that every formal principle of justice that is abstracted from 
concrete historical circumstances is “empty and useless.”1346 Furthermore, these principles of 
justice become “distorting” when they are applied to specific historical circumstances because 
“they encourage us to treat the concrete context of an act or institution as accidental, inessential, 
a mere occasion for the pure rational form to manifest itself. But the justice of the act or 
institutions is its concrete fittingness to this situation, in this mode of production.”1347 
Nevertheless, when another modern theorist of classical natural right, Jacques Maritain, criticizes 
Machiavelli’s ethics, he could just as easily be refuting Wood’s historicism: 
 
The first complication comes from the fact that Machiavelli, like many great 
pessimists, had a somewhat rough and elementary idea of moral science, plainly 
disregarding its realist, experiential, and existential character, and lifting up to 
heaven, or rather up to the clouds, an altogether naïve morality which obviously 
cannot be practiced by the sad yet really living and labouring inhabitants of this 
earth. The man of ethics appears to him as a feeble-minded and disarmed victim, 
occasionally noxious, of the beautiful rules of some Platonic and separate world 
of perfection. On the other hand, and because such a morality is essentially a self-
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satisfying show of pure and lofty shapes—that is, a dreamed-up compensation for 
our muddy state—Machiavelli constantly slips from the idea of well-doing to the 
idea of what men admire as well-doing, from moral virtue to appearing and 
apparent moral virtue; his virtue is a virtue of opinion, self-satisfaction and glory. 
Accordingly, what he calls vice and evil, and considers to be contrary to virtue 
and morality, may sometimes be only the authentically moral behavior of a just 
man engaged in the complexities of human life and of true ethics: for instance, 
justice itself may call for relentless energy—which is neither vengeance nor 
cruelty—against wicked and false-hearted enemies.1348 
 
Perhaps even Geras, an avowed supporter of a doctrine of natural rights, does not take it 
seriously enough. As we saw, he applied ‘just war’ doctrine to the right of revolution and 
revolutionary conduct. Nevertheless, he applies modern just war doctrine. Although he cites 
contemporary thinkers like Michael Walzer and Thomas Nagel, there is no evidence that he 
thought to explore pre-modern theorists of just war like Aquinas.
1349
 And yet, if these principles 
are based in natural right, if they arise from permanent features of the human condition, 
presumably, the accessibility of these truths is not exclusive to we moderns. After all, Aquinas is 
the discoverer of the principle of ‘double effect’ that Geras embraces.1350 Despite his advocacy 
of natural right, his historicism bleeds through. 
This is not to say that modern natural right theorists have adequately considered the most 
significant arguments of historicist approaches either. When Strauss speaks of the natural 
inequality of humans and the existence of natural rulers, he often becomes his most 
metaphorical. For example, when he argues that there is only a small number of people capable 
of the competence necessary to correctly judge a ruler, much less a philosopher, he contends, 
“For try as one may to expel nature with a hayfork, it will always come back.”1351 If Marxists 
have not taken seriously enough the most sophisticated proponents of natural right, then the latter 
have not taken seriously the Marxist contention that the hierarchy of human beings is more 
historically-determined than naturally-determined. This is not to deny a hierarchy of objective 
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human goods, of ethical values. But these modern theorists of classical natural right have not 
sufficiently appreciated that capitalism may make latently possible, and socialism actually 
possible, the universal ‘cultivation of reason’ necessary to comprehend and pursue those goods. 
Ultimately, testing the dialectical method against justice in particular and ethics in general puts 
on the agenda, to paraphrase the greatest modern critic of historicism, the question of natural 
right and historical materialism. 
This brings us back to the question of standards. It appears that whatever the good is, it 
cannot be reduced simply to one or another standard, whether it is merit, due, or need. The 
correct balance of negative rights, positive needs, and objective virtues is still very much an open 
question. We do not know what the balance of our multiple standards should be: 
 
 To each according to her merit. 
 To each according to her due. 
 To each according to her need. 
 
The question remains, who should receive the nicest flutes? It is the same old song because we 
still do not know who plays it, let alone who ought to call the tune. 
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